

THE PORTUGUESE IN CEYLON, 1617-1638

BY

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ABSTRACT

This thesis furnishes a survey of Portuguese rule over the northern , western and south-western plains of Ceylon from 1617 to 1638. The first chapter surveys the sources utilized and makes an assessment of previous historical writing on the subject. It also contains a brief (historical introduction outlining Portuguese activity in Ceylon from 1505 to 1616, The three events that demarcate the period under consideration from the previous era, namely the rebellion of Nikapitiya Bandara, the first treaty of peace between the Portuguese and the Highland kingdom of Kandy and the Portuguese conquest of the kingdom of Jaffna are examined in detail in the second chapter which traces political history up to 1623. The third chapter is exclusively concerned with events in Portuguese Ceylon during the captain-generalship of Constantino de Sa de Noronha (second term 1623-1630). The survey of political history, and of the economic and social reasons which underlay political decisions is continued up to the Portuguese defeat at Gannoruwa in 1638 in the fourth chapter. The administrative superstructure established by the Portuguese in Ceylon and the armed forces, the ultimate basis of Portuguese power formed the subject of the fifth chapter, while in the next are considered the principal sources of revenue

and the probable revenue and expenditure of the Portuguese state in Ceylon. The seventh chapter deals with missionary activity and relates it to Portuguese political fortunes while the main themes of the study are summed up in the conclusion.

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PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS

- AHU : Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon
- AHU Caixa : Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon. India caixa
- Ajuda : Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon
- APO : Archivo Portuguez-Oriental, ed.by.J.H.Cunha Rivara.
- Assentos : Assentos do Conselho da India ed.by P.S.S.Pissurlencar
- BM.Add.Mss. : British Museum, London. Additional Manuscripts
- BM Or. : British Museum, London. Oriental Manuscripts
- BNL.FG : Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. Fundo Geral
- CALR : Ceylon Antiquary and Literary Register
- CLR 3 ser. : Ceylon Literary Register, Third series
- Coimbra : Biblioteca da Universidade de Coimbra
- DR : Documentos Remittidos da India
- Evora : Biblioteca Publica Eborensense, Evora
- F.de Souza : Faria de Souza,M
- Goa C Pe As : Archives of Goa - Cartas Patentes e Alvaras
- Goa A e CR : Archives of Goa - Assentos e Cartas Regias
- JCBRAS : Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society - Ceylon Branch
- JCBRAS (NS) : Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society -Ceylon
Branch, New Series
- Reimers : Constantino'de Saa's Maps and Plans of Ceylon,
1624-1628, ed. by E.Reimers
- Rego : Documentação para a Historia das Missões do Padroado
Portugues do Oriente, ed. by A.de Silva Rego

Simancas SP : Arquivo Geral de Simancas, Secretarias Provinciales

TT : Arquivo Nacional de Torre do Tombo, Lisbon

TT.LM : Arquivo Nacional de Torre do Tombo, Lisbon.

Libros das Moncoes

TT.Mss da Liv. : Arquivo Nacional de Torre do Tombo, Lisbon.

Manuscritos da Livraria

CHAPTER I

Part I - The subject and the sources

The period 1617-1638 forms a natural unit in the history of Ceylon. During the two preceding decades the Portuguese had established a seemingly secure hold over the lowlands of Kotte. During all this time they had also been continuously at war with the Sinhalese ruler of Kandy in an attempt to conquer that highland kingdom. The years 1616-1619 heralded the beginning of a new era. A formidable rebellion in Portuguese territory compelled them to revise their policy of relentless hostility to Kandy and conclude a treaty of peace with its king. The arrival of an enterprising captain-general enabled them to make use of this respite and conquer Jaffna, which had so far remained virtually independent. With the lowlands of the west, south-west and north in their hands, with revenue for the first time exceeding expenditure and with missionary activity more flourishing than ever, the Portuguese had ^{now} only one major problem - the conquest ^{of} or the establishment of a lasting accord with Kandy. The relations between the Portuguese and Kandy therefore provide the dominating theme in this thesis. The year 1638 marks an even more decisive break than 1617. It saw not merely the unsuccessful end of

the last Portuguese attempt to conquer Kandy but also the arrival of a new European power - the Dutch in Ceylon. The coming of the Dutch meant a revolution in the balance of power in Ceylon. The days of Portuguese dominance were ended and from then on for the most part the Portuguese were on the defensive.

The main task of this thesis will be to explain why in this period of their greatest power in Ceylon, the Portuguese failed either to maintain friendly relations with Kandy or alternatively, to conquer it. The explanations will be sought both in the military and political events of the time and in the economic, administrative and religious activities of the Portuguese, some of which ran counter to the political aims they pursued. An attempt will also be made to show the impact of Portuguese policies on their Sinhalese and Tamil subjects and to trace the changes in native society which ensued.

The history of the island during these two decades have been touched on by several historians writing in the twentieth century. Chief among them are Alfredo Botelho de Souza, P.E.Pieris and Fr. S.G.Perera. All of them have consulted many of the chronicles and near contemporary accounts as well as some of the contemporary documents relating to the

period. Botelho de Souza's interest in the island is unfortunately limited to Portuguese military activities in Ceylon. The island is viewed simply as a distant outpost of the estado da India and as such given little (though perhaps proportionate) space. Moreover, Botelho de Souza adds little comment to the material he has gathered from the sources and indeed on occasion some of the material seems ill-digested. (1)

P.E.Pieris devotes some two hundred and sixty pages of his work - Ceylon, the Portuguese era, Vol.II to consider the political history of this particular period, its economic background and the administrative structure of the Portuguese regime. Pieris, undoubtedly an inspired writer with considerable historical imagination, was the first Ceylonese to seek to write the history of Ceylon from the Sinhalese -Tamil point of view from Portuguese records and deserves recognition as a pioneer in this field. His work however suffers from the same defect as that of his major source, Queyroz's Temporal and spiritual conquest of Ceylon, for it is both lengthy and badly organized. Pieris's unorthodox use of sources has (2) subjected him to considerable criticism. Also much of the documentary sources on which this thesis is based was not

(1) A.Botelho de Souza= Subsidios para a hãstoria militar maritima da India, Vol.III.248,268-269

(2) Fr. S.G.Perera (The conquista of Ceylao by Fernao de Queyroz' in CALR II. Colombo 1916.

available to him when he made his study fifty years ago.

Fr. S.G.Perera's shorter review of the whole Portuguese period may be considered a sound work of historical scholarship. Fr. Perera's qualities as a critical historian fail him only (3) where his religion is involved. Future historians however will be indebted for his work in publishing much of the material in the Vatican Archives relating to Ceylon.

In addition to the above mentioned work T.Abeyasinghe's excellent study of 'Portuguese rule in Ceylon, 1594-1612' has much material relating to land tenure, missionary activity and economic conditions which could well applied to this period. To avoid repetition it has been decided to ignore aspects of history adequately considered in T.Abeyasinghe's study as well as in other works even if they do come within (4) the scope of this thesis. If this has forced the present study to be more lop-sided than it otherwise might have been, it has at the same time provided a greater opportunity to concentrate on problems still left unresolved by these earlier writers.

(3) Fr. S.G.Perera - Portuguese missionary methods or the myth of forced conversion and the Jesuit letters translated by Fr. Perera himself in CALR I-V give different pictures of Portuguese missionary activity.

(4) Perhaps the most important among the other works on Ceylon history relating to this period is Fr. W.L.A.Dom Peter's Studies in Ceylon church history.

This study is based primarily on Portuguese sources. However use has also been made of English and Sinhalese books and manuscripts. My lack of knowledge of Tamil prevented me from using sources in that language but this did not prove too great a handicap as the only Tamil document of historical value for this period - The Jaffna chronicle or the Yalpana Vaipaya Malai gives little information that (5) cannot be obtained from Portuguese sources.

The English sources too were only of marginal use. These consisted chiefly of the records of the English East India Company and ^{letters} ~~little~~ of its employees. They were useful however in placing Portuguese Ceylon in the perspective of the politico-economic struggle that went on in the Indian (6) ocean in the first half of the seventeenth century.

The Sinhalese material too is disappointing, for the archives of Kotte and Kandy like those of Jaffna have not (7) survived. The major Sinhalese chronicle, the Cūlavamsa gives

(5) I am indebted to Mr. S. Pathmanathan of the Department of History of the University of Ceylon for providing me with his translation of the relevant sections of the chronicle. An English translation of this chronicle has been published, (Yalpana Vaipaya Malai trans. C. Brito, Colombo 1879) but I was unable to locate a copy.

(6) Calander of state papers Vols. II, III, VI, VIII. ed. by W. N. Sainsbury. Vaduz, 1964. Letters received by the East India Company from its servants in the East. Vols. III-VI. ed. W. Foster, London, 1899-1902. The English factories in India, 1618-1641. ed. by W. Foster, Oxford, 1906-1912.

(7) Cūlavamsa translated by W. Geiger, II.

scant attention to the Portuguese and is of little practical value for this period.

The Rajavaliya though of greater value, or at least (8) for political history, is unfortunately all too brief. The three war poems the Kustantinu Hatana, the ^P Parangi Hatana (9) and the Maha Hatana fill in some of the details of military history while two other documents the Mandarampura puvata and the Matale Disave Kadayim Pota give an inkling of the politico-economic conditions within Kandy in the reign of (10) Senerat (1605-1635) but on the whole, the Sinhalese documents though useful as a means of checking and corroborating evidence from Portuguese sources, are insufficient to provide a clear picture of the period on their own.

The Portuguese sources can be divided into ~~three~~ four distinct categories (a) official letters , reports and petitions
(b) semi-official letters, reports and records
(c) biographies and diaries
(d) chronicles and histories

Official letters, reports and petitions -

Official letters, reports and correspondence on Ceylon during this period emanated from four different places - the

(8) Hardly two pages are devoted to the events under consideration.

(9) These two poems have been translated into English and published in Ribeiro's History of Ceilão (trans. P.E. Pieris) 209-220, 246-270

(10) Two panegyrics of Senerat (BM Or.6606 (126) and Or.6611 (55)) which are in the British Museum are of no historical value.

king's court in Spain, Lisbon, Goa and Colombo. The itinerant conselho da Portugal which moved with the royal court ^{in Spain} considered any problems on Ceylon when these were referred to it from Lisbon and sent instructions on this matter to Lisbon or more rarely, direct to the viceroy. In Lisbon the politico-economic problems of the Portuguese estado da India were discussed in the council of revenue or conselho da fazenda and religious problems in the mesa de consciencia after which orders were sent to the viceroy at Goa with or without consulting the conselho de Portugal in Spain. The viceroy in Goa in his turn conveyed royal instructions to the captain-general and the vedor da fazenda or the controller of revenue in Ceylon and occasionally direct to the captain-major of Jaffna. While orders, inquiries and directives flowed from Spain to Ceylon via Lisbon and Goa, there was at the same time a stream of reports, replies and suggestions from Colombo to Europe through the same channels. Apart from these letters there were innumerable reports produced by the councils concerned at Goa and Lisbon and in Spain. These records - or rather, what remains of them - form the main source of this study.

Of the proceedings of the conselho de Portugal, the ultimate policy making body and its correspondence with the authorities at Lisbon little has survived. What remains

(11)
 in the bound volumes at the Arquivo Geral de Simancas and
 (12)
 the Arquivo Nacional de Torre de Tombo however illustrate
 that many of the less weighty problems too were referred
 to Spain at times. The Arquivo Historico Ultramarino codices
 31 and 32 have provided a sample of reports sent up to the
 king or the governors of Portugal by the conselho da fazenda
 in Lisbon while codices 459, 460 and 645 at the Biblioteca da
Universidade de Coimbra provide a similar insight into the
 reports of the mesa da consciencia.

Most important of all however are the records of
 the correspondence between the authorities in Europe and
 the viceroy in India. These are preserved in a collection
 known as the Books of the Monsoon (Livros das monções). The
 bulk of these records are available in the collection of
 sixty two volumes found in the Arquivo Nacional de Torre de Tombo
 in Lisbon of which the volumes 9 to 45 cover the period
 under consideration. The Torre de Tombo collection however
 is incomplete for the years 1629-1638 and has to be supplemented
 by volumes 12-20 of the Goa collection of the Livros das
monções which are available in microfilm at the Filмотeca
Ultramarina Portuguesa in Lisbon. Copies of the Torre de Tombo

(11) Simancas SB 1508, 1509, 1515, 1516, 1519, 1520, 1522, 1523
 These documents have been catalogued in the Boletim de Filмотeca
 vols. 14-16.

(12) TT. Collecao de S. Vicente XIX

collection are also available both in the British Museum,
(13)
London and in the India Office Library, London.

A small proportion of the Goan records have been published in J.H.Cunha Rivara's Arquivo Portuguez Oriental volumes ^{I-VI} ~~V~~ and in the appendices to the Assentos do conselho do estado da India, volumes I and II edited by Panduronga S.S.Pissurlencar. The documents in Lisbon covering the period up to 7 March 1619 have been published in the Documentos Remettidos da India, volumes I-VI. The issues discussed in the Lisbon-Goa correspondence vary greatly in importance from the fate of a baby elephant born in a convent in Colombo to the question of the monopoly of cinnamon or the resumption of war with Kandy, but they are useful in illustrating aspects of Portuguese policy in Ceylon. All the records of the Portuguese council of state available in the Goan archives
(14)
have been edited by Panduronga S.S.Pissurlencar. In this study, two volumes of hitherto unpublished records of the proceedings of this council covering the year 1624-1626 now located in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon have also been

(13) BM.Add Ms.20,861-20,900; India Office Library, Portuguese Records 71-74

The copies at the British Museum made out in the 1750's, are generally accurate. Less reliable are the more recent transcripts at the India Office Library. Some idea of the contents of the Goa collection could be obtained from the comprehensive summaries of documents published in the Boletim de Filmoteca.

(14) Panduronga S.S.Pissurlencar - Assentos do conselho do estado da India, vols.1-2

(15)
used. The records of the council of revenue at Goa have
provided some information on the economic basis of Portuguese
(16)
rule in Ceylon.

^{Owing}
Due to the complete loss of Portuguese archives in
Colombo, little of the correspondence between the viceroy
and his subordinate officials in Ceylon has survived. What
records that remained are copies of some of the regimentos
or standing orders issued to the captains-general and the
(17)
vedores or controllers of revenue. Six such regimentos
issued between 1614 and 1639 have been utilized in this work.

This regular exchange of letters, orders and reports
between one level of authority and another can be supplemented
by the correspondence of the camara or municipal council of
Colombo. Although these letters relate chiefly to the efforts
of the Portuguese married settlers or casados to gain or
preserve special privileges for themselves, they also revealed
much information on the economic and political conditions of
the time. Many of the manuscripts relating to the camara
are to be found in the unbound collection (documentos soltos)

(15) BNL.FG.1982 and 1983

(16) Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda I-V.

(17) Goa Regimentos e instruccoes, Goa cartas patentes e
alvaras, Goa livros dos segredos, AHU Caixas.

Acknowledgements are due to Mr. J.B. Harrison of the School of Oriental
and African Studies for making available to me the notes he
had made of the Goan Archives.

of the Arquivo Historico Ultramarino in Lisbon. They are stored in metal cabinets (caixas) and roughly classified by country and then by date. All documents relating to Ceylon
(18)
are found in the India caixas. These caixas contain a varied collection of material. Significant among the documents are some of the applications for rewards (requerimentos) of soldiers who were serving or had served in the East. These include descriptions of the campaigns they had engaged in and the services they had rendered, certified by their commanding officials and thus provide an invaluable check on the picture of military history as depicted by chroniclers of later times. Copies of petitions for rewards are also found in the archives at Simancas while summaries of a large number of such petitions are recorded in codices 435 and 501 of the Arquivo Historico
(19)
Ultramarino.

One more type of official document remains to be considered - the reports sent by special emissaries on the varied aspects of Portuguese rule in Ceylon. An excellent example of this

(18) Twenty eight caixas containing documents on Ceylon dating from 1610-1635 were examined. The caixas are not indexed and are arranged by the date of the documents - not the period they cover. Thus documents in India caixas 26 (1664-1665) contain references to events in Ceylon as early as 1622.
(19) Codice 436 is a copy of 435.

type of material is available for our period. In late 1619 the bishop of Cochin visited the island on the request of the king of Portugal. He remained in Ceylon for almost two years, and during that period submitted critical reports on the conduct of Portuguese affairs in the island. Many of his suggestions were turned down by his superiors, but his views, if treated with caution provide considerable light on Portuguese (20) policy and administration.

Semi-official letters and reports

Dr. T. Abeyasinghe aptly described this category as 'writings neither wholly private nor yet official.' (21) To this category belong the annual reports of the religious organizations and the letters of individual missionaries to their superiors. Many of the Jesuit letters and reports, a valuable source for the religious history of the period, have been translated and sympathetically interpreted by a fellow Jesuit, Fr. S. G. Perera. Others are available in the British Museum, (22) London. Similar records are not known to exist either for the Franciscans or for the Dominicans and for an account of the activities of these orders it is necessary to rely greatly on Paulo da Trindade's Conquista espiritual do Oriente

(20) AHU 33. ff. 11-23

(21) T. Abeyasinghe 5

(22) BM. Add Mss. 9853

and Luis Cacegas's Historia de S.Domingos Part IV. Contemporary documents relating to the Augustinians have been found in the manuscritos da livraria collection of the torre de tombo. These have been used in conjunction with a work composed by
(23)
Fr. Manoel da Ave Maria in 1817.

Biographies and diaries

Of the viceroys of India in the 1620's and the 1630's it was undoubtedly the conde de Linhares who had the most important influence on Portuguese policy in Ceylon and he maintained a detailed personal diary during his period of office. However, only parts of the diary are still extant. A section covering the period 6 February 1634 to ^{18 October} ~~16 February~~
(24)
1635 has¹ been published by the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. Another two sections together extending from early March 1630 to the end of October 1631 are available in manuscript at
(25)
the Biblioteca Nacional and the Biblioteca da Ajuda in Lisbon. The diary has to be treated with caution when taken as a

(23) Manual Eremitico da Congregacao da India Oriental dos eremitas de N.P.S. Agostinho¹ forms codice 1650 of the Biblioteca da Universidade de Coimbra and has¹ been published in Rego XI.95-833

(24) Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei da India I-II
Professor C.R. Boxer has pointed out that the title should read 4º and not 3º.

(25) BNL.FB 939.ff.1a-86a; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.ff.1-434

source, for there are clear signs that it was intended to be read if not by posterity at least by his superiors in Europe. However, it contains a great deal of useful information regarding fleet movements, policy making and the like.

In this category may also be placed an account of the trials and tribulations of the captain-general Dom Jorge de Almeida from his appointment in Goa in early 1631 to his reconquest of most of ~~his~~ Kotte in 1632. The author of this sketch, de Almeida's own brother Francisco de Almeida, seeks to show the captain-general in the best possible light and describes in lurid detail the methods used to cow the Sinhalese into submission. This sketch together with a shorter account obtained from the Biblioteca Nacional have formed the chief sources for the account of the campaign of 1632 in this study.

The biography of Constantino de Sa de Noronha written by his son and heir João Rodriguez de Sa de Menezes comes close to the border line between a biography and a chronicle. It purports to give the life story of de Sa and an account of

(26) Ajuda 51-V-36. ff. 75-108

(27) BNL FG. 7640 ff. 17-18

his rule in Ceylon but includes much background material. As the author had no first hand knowledge of Ceylon and composed (28) this work before he visited the East it seems likely that he depended a great deal on the chronicles of João de Barros and Diogo do Couto for general information and his father's private papers and the reports of acquaintances for the events in 1620's. Though filial affection and the desire for a reward for his father's services may have influenced De Sa de Menezes to turn a blind eye to his father's shortcomings, his picture of Constantino de Sa as a kindly, tactful man respected by his subordinates, is supported by independent evidence.

These three categories of material when taken together provide a fairly clear picture of the political events and military campaigns in Ceylon. Considerable information can also be collected on sources of revenue, the system of administration and the missionary efforts. There are however several gaps to be noted. Firstly, though the documents give a fair picture of the Portuguese administrative superstructure

(28) D.W.Ferguson in JCBRAS XI.427 claimed that de Sa de Menezes wrote his book almost fifty years after his father's death but evidence within the book itself indicates that it is likely that it was completed before 1640. (See pages 214-215 of the Spanish edition where de Sa de Menezes refers to his friendship with the conde de Linhares). Acknowledgements are due to Professor C.R.Boxer for drawing my attention to this point.

little information is available as to the changes in status and functions of the Sinhalese and Tamil officials at the lower levels. Secondly, information on the economic organization of Portuguese Ceylon is inadequate. The additions to Vaz Freire's tombo or land register have not survived with the single exception of Pinheiro Ravasco's tombo of the Two Korales, 1622. (29) None of the tombos of Jaffna are extant and thus the economic life of both regions had to be pieced together by collecting stray references from documents. Finally, though material on Catholic missionary policy is not difficult to find, practically no positive evidence exists as to the fate of Buddhism and Hinduism in Kotte and Jaffna.

Histories and chronicles

Fr. Queyroz's Temporal and Spiritual conquest of Ceylon has provided the framework on which the chapters on political history in this study have been built. Fr. Queyroz wrote this work with a purpose- that of inspiring the Portuguese to reconquer Ceylon - and to drive home his arguments he did not at times scruple to twist historical facts. But it is a tribute to his skill in assimilating evidence that an examination of contemporary records leaves his narrative (though bereft of the miracles he describes) more or less ~~intact~~ intact. Queyroz's study however is uneven in depth and treatment. The whole

(29) Translated into English by Fr. S.G.Perera.

(30)

period 1612-1618 is dismissed in two pages. The political developments of the next twelve years are described in a hundred pages while the period 1630-1638 receives a comparatively scanty thirty pages.

deficiency

This last/~~deficiency~~ however, can be partially compensated

for by using Fr. Manoel de Assumpção's account of the

final ^{campaign} ~~campaign~~ of Constantino de Sa and the siege of Colombo

(31)

that followed. Fr. Assumpção or Manoel Borges da Costa as he

was christened, entered the Augustinian order at the age of

nineteen or twenty in 1613. He arrived in Ceylon in 1620

and soon after became the first vicar at the Augustinian

mission at Rambukkana. He worked at Bentota in 1628 and was

eventually appointed prior of the convent of Colombo on 1 December

1628. Soon after completing his work he left the island never

(32)

to return again. His accounts of the events of the period

August - December 1630 can be checked with two other contemporary

documents - an account of the expedition to Uva as narrated

(30) Pages are given of the printed English translation. All available information on Fr. Queyroz has been published in the introduction to this translation.

(31) Racopilacão breve das guerras da ilha de Ceilão e da Rebelião dos Levantados, morte do geral Constantino de Sa de Noronha e perda de todo arrayal co outras cousas q succederão.

(32) Dom Peter - Studies in Ceylon church history 122-123; Rego XI.405; TT.Ms da Livraria ff.246

by a soldier who took part and an account of the siege of
 (33) Colombo. The two other seventeenth century Portuguese writers
 Faria de Souza and João Ribeiro have both been extensively
 used. Faria ^{de} Souza stands out as the only seventeenth century
 (34) to criticise de Sa for imprudence in his last campaign.
 Ribeiro is useful because his eighteen years of experience
 in the island enables him to rival Robert Knox as a first
 (35) hand source of information on Ceylon. Ribeiro's figures
 of armies and prices however should be treated with caution.

The study which has emerged from these sources is in
 a sense a study in Portuguese colonial history. It is also
 a chapter in the history of Ceylon and with this in mind
 despite the deficiencies of the sources an efforts had been
 made to look at the point of view of the Sinhalese and Tamil
 subject as well as that of the Portuguese conqueror.

(33) These two accounts have been published and translated
 by Fr. S.G.Perera in The expedition to Uva made in 1630.
 They will henceforth be referred to as Jornada and Jornada- Lomba
 respectively.

(34) The references to Faria de Souza in this work are to the
 Portuguese translation by M.V.Garcia Santos Pareira. There is
 an abridged English translation by Captain John Stevens entitled
The Portuguese Asia, London, 1695, but it leaves out some of the
 material used in this study.

(35) Robert Knox An historical relation of Ceylon. The page
 references to Ribeiro are from the 1909 edition of P.E.Pieris's
 translation.

(1)

Part II- The Portuguese in Ceylon (1505-1616)

In 1505, when the Portuguese first visited Ceylon the island was divided into three major political units and a number of lesser principalities. The first Portuguese contacts were with the kingdom of Kotte⁽²⁾ which at this time covered the whole of the populous and fertile south-western lowlands. Kotte had ⁱⁿ on the previous century exercised effective suzerainty over the rest of the island but since the days of Parakramabahu VI (1415-1467) its ruler had been gradually losing control over various parts of the island. Nevertheless even in the early sixteenth century it remained the strongest kingdom in Ceylon and the king of Kotte still claimed to be the overlord of the whole island.

The Kotte economy was basically one of subsistence

(1) Except where otherwise stated the sources for this section of the introductory chapter are Fr. S.G.Perera - A history of Ceylon for schools (1505-1796), Fr. Fernao de Queyroz - The temporal and spiritual conquest of Ceylon, and T.Abeyasinghe - Portuguese rule in Ceylon, 1594-1612.

(2) In the history of Ceylon kingdoms are usually known after their capitals. Kotte therefore will be generally used to indicate the kingdom of which the city of Kotte was the capital. The sole exception in the period under survey is the kingdom of Jaffna whose capital remained at Nallur until 1621.

agriculture. However there was a limited external trade in few valuable commodities - cinnamon, precious stones, arecanut and elephants - handled at the ports of Puttalam, Kalpitiya, Colombo, Negombo, Beruwala, Galle and Weligama. This trade was largely in the hands of a small Muslim community concentrated in the port towns of Kotte, and of the other kingdoms of Ceylon.

The central highlands of Ceylon were under the rule of a separate monarch. Sometime after the arrival of the Portuguese the capital of this kingdom on the hills was transferred from Gampola to the more centrally situated Senkadagala or Kandy. Throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the primary political objective of the king of Kandy was to secure his independence from the ruler of Kotte. Kandy, protected by geographical factors such as its mountainous terrain, forest tracts and rivers, was a country difficult to keep under subjugation. On the other hand, as it was less populous and poorer than Kotte, the king of Kandy had often to seek a foreign alliance or the aid of rebels within Kotte to maintain his position. Kandyan foreign trade was even more limited than that of Kotte, though elephants and arecanut were exported through the east coast ports of Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Kottiyar, and also by way of Kotte and Jaffna.

The kingdom of Jaffna was in many ways distinct from the two other major kingdoms of the island. It was peopled by Tamils, a race distinct in language and culture from the Sinhalese who inhabited Kotte and Kandy. Moreover the people of Jaffna were Hindus while the Sinhalese of the south were adherents of Buddhism. The position of Jaffna in the northern extremity of the island made it a link (and sometimes a buffer) between the two Sinhalese states in the south and the powers of south India. Jaffna itself had special ties of culture and commerce with the south Indian empire of Vijayanagara and its successor states of Tanjore and Madura, but since it was also exposed to attacks from them directed at the acquisition of the lucrative pearl fishery off Mannar, independence for Jaffna meant warding off threats from across the Palk straits as well as from the south. Jaffna too was based on a subsistence economy but the relative infertility of the soil in this area had stimulated crafts such as the production of cloth.

Lesser principalities extended from the western coastal region between Mannar and Puttlam across north-central Ceylon and then southwards along the eastern seaboard up to the boundaries of Kotte at the Walawe ganga. These principalities often of no more than a few dozen square miles in extent, were ruled by petty chieftains called the Vanniyars. During

the sixteenth century most of the Vanniyars of the eastern coast came under the overlordship of Kandy while those in north-central Ceylon yielded allegiance to either Jaffna or Kandy, as circumstances dictated.

The Portuguese, as their envoy explained to the king of Kotte on their first visit, came to the East mainly to trade. Having established their headquarters at Goa in 1510, they seized strategic positions like Malacca, Ormuz and Sokotra in the Indian ocean and attempted to exclude their traditional rivals - the Muslims - from the trade in spices and cloth. However in Kotte for a dozen years after 1505 the Portuguese traded on equal terms with the Muslims who had hitherto monopolized the external trade of the kingdom. It was after they had built a fort in Colombo in 1518 that they secured a more favourable position by means of a treaty of alliance with the king of Kotte.

Kotte itself was weakened by a partition of the kingdom in 1521. This was the result of a revolt of the three sons of Vijayabahu, against their own father, the king of Kotte. The three princes who feared that their father was planning to disinherit them, had him killed and divided the kingdom amongst themselves. The eldest, Bhuvanekabahu, ruled most of the kingdom of Kotte from the

capital while the other two, Madduma Bandara and Mayadunne were allocated small portions of territory around Rayigama and Sitawaka.

Mayadunne who had played a leading part in the events of 1521 was by no means content with his position. Bhuvanekabahu for his part, while he lacked the ability to oppose his brother, ^Wshowed no inclination to give him greater recognition. To counter the ambitions of Mayadunne he began increasingly to identify himself with the Portuguese interest ⁽³⁾ and began to rely on their assistance. The Portuguese were quite willing to supply this for they knew that military protection was the first step to political dominance over the valuable domains of Kotte. Mayadunne thereupon turned for assistance to the well-known enemy of the Portuguese on the Malabar coast, the zamorin of Calicut.

The first attempt of Mayadunne to gain supreme power in Kotte occurred in 1526. In this and other attempts during the next twenty five years Bhuvanekabahu was saved only by the arrival of a Portuguese expeditionary force from Goa. His dependence on the Portuguese became even more

(3) As by expelling their commercial rivals, the Muslims.

complete when he sought to exclude Mayadunne from the succession,⁽⁴⁾ in favour of his own grandson Dharmapala.

Bhuvanekabahu himself seem to have realised the weakness of his position as a client of the Portuguese and this was probably why he never agreed to the complete destruction of his brother's power, or to give up Buddhism, the faith of his people, to accept ~~to~~ Christianity. On the other hand the limitations of his power are apparent from the fact that he had to appeal to the king of Portugal to order the Portuguese and the converted Christians in his own kingdom to obey the laws of the land.⁽⁵⁾

Even this limited power in time became irksome to the Portuguese who had Bhuvanekabahu assassinated,⁽⁶⁾ and then drove out his powerful son-in-law Vidiya Bandara who had shown open hostility towards both Christianity and the

(4) The normal rule of succession in Kotte was from brother to brother and then to the eldest son of the eldest brother. Exceptional cases of son succeeding instead of brother are sometimes found, but grandsons clearly had a weaker claim than brothers.

(5) Fr. G.Schurhammer and E.A.Voretzch - Ceylon zur zeit des konigs Bhuvanekabahu und Franz Xaviers - 1539-1552, I. 107-121; Ribeiro\$ 27-28.

(6) P.E.Pieris and M.A.H.Fitzler - Ceylon and Portugal, I, 12-13. 257-260. 282-285; Rajavaliya (ed. by B.Gunesequera) 79.81

Portuguese. The young prince Dharmapala who was proclaimed king by the Portuguese on his grandfather's death in 1551 was induced to accept Christianity six years later and the Portuguese took upon themselves the task of reducing his kingdom to obedience.

This proved to be no easy task. Mayadunne claimed to be the true heir of Bhuvanekabahu and posed as the champion of the Sinhalese and of Buddhism against foreign and Christian influences. This factor as well as the lawless behaviour of the Portuguese induced many of the leading men of Kotte to take his side. Friendly relations between Bhuvanekabahu and Jaffna facilitated the flow of south Indian mercenaries to Ceylon. Furthermore the military prowess of Mayadunne's son, Rajasinha enabled him to confine the Portuguese to a small coastal area around Colombo. Attempts to capture Colombo itself however were foiled by the timely arrival of aid to the besieged from India.

Nevertheless for forty years from 1550, the rulers of Sitawaka confined Portuguese power, exercised in the name of Dharmapala, to the environs of Colombo. The missionary activity of the Franciscans was likewise confined to the same area. However, though the coastal villages of Kotte which had given their allegiance to Mayadunne suffered

heavily from Portuguese raids, the Sinhalese inhabitants of the lowlands seem to have continued trade relations with the Portuguese except during the two great seiges of Colombo in 1579 and 1587-88.⁽⁷⁾

The power of Sitawaka now at its zenith, was also signalized by the conquest of Kandy. Since 1521 the rulers of Kandy had been left undisturbed while Mayadunne and Bhuvanekabahu were engaged in a struggle for supremacy. One of them, Jayaweera Bandara by name, being anxious to gain sovereign status had asked for Portuguese aid in the 1540's. The Portuguese were quite willing to grant such assistance, despite their promises to defend the realms and rights of Bhuvanekabahu, but unfortunately for the Kandyan king, this assistance was forthcoming only at a time when Bhuvanekabahu and Mayadunne had temporarily united and the first bid for independence ended in failure.

When Rajasinha succeeded to the throne of Sitawaka in 1581 he found that Karaliyadde Bandara, Jayaweera Bandara's successor, not only had a force of Portuguese soldiers to aid him but had allied himself with the Portuguese and had given his daughter in marriage to Dharmapala. This

(7) DR.IV, 239-243

convinced Rajasinha that the conquest of Kandy was necessary to safeguard his own flank while attacking Colombo. Some of the Kandyan chiefs, alienated by Karaliyadde Bandara's pro-Portuguese policy also gave valuable aid to Rajasinha in his campaign. Finding his supporters too few and his Portuguese contingent too small to offer much resistance, Karaliyadde Bandara fled to Trincomalee, where he died. His children baptised as Dom Filipe, Dom João and Dona Catherina respectively were later taken with a Portuguese escort to Mannar.⁽⁸⁾

In the period up to 1590, while the Portuguese were foiled in their ambitions in Kotte and Kandy due to the power of Sitawaka, in Jaffna they were ^{held} at bay by a succession of rulers who clearly saw that it was in their interest to resist Portuguese encroachment. The best known amongst them Sankili (1519-1561) pursued a consistent anti-Portuguese and anti-Catholic policy. He knew that the heir of the former king whom he had deposed had gained friends among the Portuguese. He also quickly realised that the Christian converts of the Fishery Coast would acknowledge no temporal sovereign other than the king of Portugal. Thus to him the Portuguese represented the enemy from without and Christianity

(8) P.da Trindade - Conquista espiritual do Oriente, III. 65-68.

subversion from within. This was why he aided Mayadunne against the Portuguese and later offered refuge and assistance to Vidiya Bandara. The Portuguese military efforts against Sankili had little effect.⁽⁹⁾ Even the elaborately prepared expedition of 1560 which was led by the Viceroy Don Constantino de Bragança himself was eventually forced to sail away without dethroning him. Bragança's expedition however achieved one important gain. The island of Mannar was seized and a fort was built on it. A number of Christians from the Fishery Coast were settled in the island which henceforth became a base for intrigues against hostile monarchs in Jaffna and a source of support to those who favoured the Portuguese. However, even when in the 1560's the captain of Mannar eventually found himself able to play the king-maker in Jaffna it was not long before the new ruler found himself obliged to oppose the Portuguese to protect his own interests and to maintain the loyalty of his Hindu subjects. For instance Periyapulle Chegarajasekaram installed in 1570 attacked Mannar with aid of forces from Tanjore.⁽¹¹⁾

(9) Fr. S.G.Perera holds that in 1543 Martim Affonso de Souza forced Sankili to promise tribute but the very next year Sankili killed all Christians in Mannar who refused to give up their faith. The Portuguese were unable to make him reverse this policy despite another expedition in 1545.

(10) The Tirunaveli coast of south India between Cape Camorin and the island of Rameswaram.

(11) Vriddhagirison & The Nayak of Tanjore, 78.

Eighty five years after their first visit to Ceylon, the Portuguese still had little real power in Ceylon. They and their Christian converts were confined to the areas surrounding the forts of Colombo and Mannar. Even these forts were frequently beseiged by the kings of Sitawaka and Jaffna⁽¹²⁾ who acted in concert against the foreign danger. Portuguese efforts to set up puppet rulers who would be amenable to their wishes had so far failed. Correspondingly the missionary activity and the social impact of Christianity was reduced to a minimum.

During the next few years, however, a series of striking victories enabled the Portuguese to become the rulers of Kotte and the dominant power in Ceylon. This sudden reversal of fortune was to a large extent a result of the decline of the power of Sitawaka. Rajasinha's exactions, especially those during his preparations for his last seige of Colombo, alienated many. His conversion to Hinduism and the favours he granted to Hindus could not have endeared him to those who had turned to his father as a defender of Buddhism. Moreover his ruthless elimination of all potential rebels ensured that there would be no

(12) Mannar for instance was attacked five times in thirty one years (Queyroz 418-419; Vriddagirison 78)

strong successor at his death.

After his failure to capture Colombo in 1588, Rajasinha faced revolts in his own dominions. The Portuguese profited by these disturbances to capture some of the lands of Kotte. Furthermore they sent a force to the hill country under Konnappu Bandara⁽¹³⁾ to enthrone Don Filipe, son of Karaliyadde Bandara, as the new king of Kandy. Konnappu Bandara joining hands with the rebellious Kandyan nobility defeated Rajasinha's forces at Ganetenna and then successfully defended Balane Pass against Rajasinha himself. Having failed in his final attempt to recover Kandy Rajasinha retired towards Sitawaka in 1593 and died on the way. After his death dissensions within Sitawaka enabled the Portuguese to gain the support of a large section of the Sinhalese army led by Manamperuma Mohottala⁽¹⁴⁾ and with his aid Sitawaka itself was captured and the whole of south-western Ceylon reduced to obedience.

In Jaffna too the Portuguese gained ground. The King Puviraja Pandaram Pararajasingham⁽¹⁵⁾ had already launched

(13) Son of Virasundera Bandara who had helped Rajasinha to seize Kandy. Virasundera Bandara was later killed by Rajasinha on suspicion of treachery and his son fled to the Portuguese.

(14) Manamperuma Mohottala was a south Indian recruit to Rajasinha's army. His original name was Aritthakeevendu Perumal. After Rajasinha's death he won a skirmish against the Portuguese and taking the name of Jayaweera Bandara, made an attempt to gain kingship for himself, before destroying the Portuguese.

(15) The successor of Periyapulle Chegarajasekaram.

an unsuccessful attack against Mannar. Realising the need for a naval power to cut off Portuguese sea-borne aid he appealed to the Kunjalis, the admirals of the zamorin of Calicut to aid him. This proved to be his undoing, for in wake of the Calicut fleet came the Portuguese fleet of Andre Furtado de Mendonça which had been especially organised to put an end to Kunjali ~~raids~~ raids on Portuguese ships. De Mendonça not only destroyed the fleet but having relieved Mannar invaded Jaffna. The king of Jaffna was defeated and killed together with his son and ^{the} commander-in-chief of the Jaffna forces. Ethirmanne Singham, son of Periyapulle whom the Portuguese had set up in 1570 and son-in-law of Puviraja Pandaram was then placed on the throne. The new king agreed to accept the king of Portugal as sovereign and to pay tribute. (16)

In Kandy however the initial Portuguese success was soon followed by a humiliating reverse. The Sinhalese forces of Don Filipe having proved themselves well able to

(16) C.R. Boxer - Andre Furtado de Mandonça, 1538-1610, (13-17)

A. Botelho de Souza - Subsidios para a historia militar maritima da India, I.32

BM. Add. Mss. 28432.f.124v ; BNL.FG.482.f.54; BNL. Illuminados 139.f.82

defend Kandy, the Portuguese contingent returned to Mannar leaving a small garrison at Gannoruwa. Konnappu Bandara however was not satisfied with his position as commander-in-chief, and made use of the growing unpopularity of the Franciscan missionaries and the Portuguese to form a group loyal to himself. Thus when the king Don Filipe died suddenly⁽¹⁷⁾ Konnappu Bandara seized the opportunity to rise against Don Filipe's infant son and to expel^{him} and the Portuguese from the highland kingdom. Konnappu Bandara himself renounced Christianity and taking the name of Vimaladharmasuriya proclaimed himself ruler of Kandy.

In an effort to avenge this defeat and restore Portuguese power in Kotte the viceroy at Goa nominated Pero Lopez de Souza to lead an expedition to Kandy. De Souza arrived with a large force of Portuguese from Goa and prepared to invade Kandy, and to enthrone Dona Catherina ~~or~~ (Kusumasana Devi) the sole surviving child of Karaliyadde Bandara. De Souza was aided by the former Sitawaka commander-in-chief, Jayaweera Bandara and many of the leaders of Kandy who were glad to see their royal family back on the throne. After only slight~~ly~~ resistance Dona Catherina

¶17) The Portuguese suspected that Konnappu Bandara was responsible for the death of Dom Filipe, There is however no definite evidence to prove this.

was installed as queen in Kandy and Vimaladharmasuriya was driven off.

From his rather despezate position Vimaladharmasuriya extricated himself by exploiting the polátical weaknesses of the Portuguese. Since the time of Karaliyadde Bandara, if not earlier, a large section of the nobility had been mistrustful of Portuguese interference. Vimaladharmasuriya obligingly circulated rumours that the heavily-guarded princess was to marry a Portuguese who would then be the actual ruler.

Further the Portuguese wished to avoid a repetition of what had happened in the previous expedition to Kandy. They entertained suspicions of the ambitions of Jayaweera Bandara. Vimaladharmasuriya, knowing this, contrived to let a ^{compromising} message from him to the Sinhalese commander fall into the hands of the Portuguese. The resultant execution of Jayaweera Bandara led to the desertion of the Sinhalese troops and the defeat of de Souza. The capture of Kusumasana Devi by Vimaladharmasuriya which followed was perhaps an even more important result of de Souza's expedition, for the Kandyan monarch/^{who} promptly married her was thereby provided with the best of claims to be the legitimate sovereign of the highlands. When Kotte passed into Portuguese hands

at the death of King Dharmapala without issue, Vimaladharmasuriya as the sole surviving Sinhalese monarch was considered even by many of the people of Kotte as their protector.

Hitherto the ^{Portuguese had} ~~Portuguese~~ sought to establish their influence in Ceylon by the support or installation of client rulers, first in Kotte and then in Jaffna and Kandy. There is little evidence of a change of policy from that pursued in Kotte from the early years of Bhuvanekabahu's reign until the defeat of Pero Lopes de Souza. Andre Furtado de Mendonça having defeated the opposing forces in Jaffna did not annex the kingdom. He merely set up a tributary ruler who, it was expected would remain loyal to the Portuguese. Similarly the two expeditions to Kandy in the early 1590's both aimed at establishing Sinhalese rulers under Portuguese protection. The document by which King Dharmapala of Kotte in 1580 bequeathed his kingdom to the king of Portugal in case he died without issue seems on the face of it to tell against this proposition. However in 1580 when Dharmapala's near relatives were all in the opposite camp this was the only possible solution. The Portuguese had nothing to lose by maintaining a figurehead ruler. It was merely that at this time they could not find a successor to Dharmapala.

Under Don Jeronimo de Azevedo (1594-1612), Portuguese policy changed from one of favouring ~~of~~ the establishment of

protectorates to a ~~par~~ policy of direct conquest. Some of the factors which influenced this change were developments within Ceylon. The political events of the early 1590's seemed to indicate to the Portuguese that the conquest of the whole island was well within their reach. The rapid collapse of the kingdom of Sitawaka not only removed a major obstacle to Portuguese expansion but enabled them to seize most of the lands of Kotte and supplement their own forces by large numbers of Sinhalese militiamen. In this changed context those who favoured conquest gained a valuable advocate in Azevedo who by determined and vigouring measures soon brought all Kotte to heel. Moreover in the case of Kandy the Portuguese ran out of claimants to set up on the throne, while the experience of Jaffna showed that vassal rulers did not always remain amenable to Portuguese wishes.

While Azevedo in Ceylon urged direct conquest, developments elsewhere in the East convinced the king of Portugal that this was indeed the best policy. The Deccan campaign of Akbar between 1593 and 1600 awoke the fear of a Mughul threat to Portuguese India. In the event of a Mughul conquest of the Deccan sultantes it was considered that Ceylon would provide a valuable base from which possible losses in India might be recovered. More important was the arrival of the Dutch in the East in 1595. The early Dutch

expeditions followed the Portuguese route along the eastern coast of Africa and then sailed across the Indian Ocean to the East Indies. Their fleets in the first twenty years therefore sailed just south of Ceylon. Ceylon thus acquired a strategic value it had not had in the earlier period and the Portuguese realised that the existence of an unsubjugated kingdom occupying a long stretch of coast was an open invitation to the Dutch.

While political events dictated a warlike policy, economic inducements too pulled their weight in the same direction. The control of Ceylon would have secured a plentiful supply of cinnamon, arecanut, pearls and precious stones as well as a monopoly of the supply of cinnamon. Moreover the climate of the island was thought extremely suitable for fostering a Portuguese colony. Advocates of the conquest of Kandy could point to economic rewards as well as political necessity especially as the elimination of inland frontiers was expected to result in reduced defence costs.⁽¹⁸⁾ There thus

(18) T. Abeyasinghe (189) estimates that costs would have been reduced by over ten thousand xerafins a year. This was of course in time of war. But in time of peace the saving could not have been much less as Portuguese troops remained on a war footing even from 1621 to 1628. However against this must be set the expenses of garrisoning Kandy, though this might conceivably have been financed by Kandyan revenues.

seemed a variety of good reasons why Don Jeronimo de Azevedo should have pursued a policy of direct conquest of Kandy.

To meet this new and more determined Portuguese threat Vimaladharmasuriya had only the resources of the kingdom of Kandy, though this also included some control over the Vanniyars of the eastern coast. His lands however were poorer and more sparsely populated than the fertile south-western plains which were now under Portuguese control. It is thus no surprise that he was forced on the defensive for most of his reign.

Vimaladharmasuriya however had two sources of strength. Firstly the people of Kandy remained loyal to him,⁽¹⁹⁾ and those of the low country, especially after the death of King Dharmapala in 1597, regarded him as their lawful sovereign. This factor aided by the harsh measures of Azevedo⁽²⁰⁾ enabled him to divert the Portuguese attack by encouragement of revolts in the lowlands. The Portuguese were thus occupied with the successive revolts of Akaragama Appuhamy, Edirille Rala, Simão Correa, Manoel Gomez, Kangara Aratchi

(19) Vimaladharmasuriya's patronage of Buddhism was a factor which ensured this loyalty. P.M.P. Abeyasinghe - Udarata Vitti, 140.

(20) A letter of the camara of Colombo to the viceroy dated 21 November 1617 describes how Azevedo ordered the massacre of every living person from the youngest child to the oldest inhabitant in Attanagalla, for the killing of a Portuguese soldier in the village.

AHU. Caixa V. 21.11.1617

and Kuruwita Rala.⁽²¹⁾

Secondly Vimaladharmasuriya had access to supplies of men, munitions and provisions from abroad. Fortunately for the Portuguese his negotiations after 1602 for Dutch assistance bore no fruit, but the lack of Portuguese power in the east coast enabled the Muslim traders to supply Kandy with much of what she needed, chiefly through the ports of Trincomalee, Kottiyar and Batticaloa.⁽²²⁾ Soon after 1594 moreover, Jaffna had become an important route of supply.

Ethirimanne Sinham, the king set up ~~by~~ in Jaffna by Andre Furtado de Mendonça in 1591 was for a time loyal to the Portuguese. By 1595 however the Portuguese had found reasons to suspect his loyalty.⁽²³⁾ His change in attitude was perhaps due to a desire to gain greater real power and perhaps also due to irritation with the overbearing attitude of the Portuguese officials and the demands of the Catholic priests.⁽²⁴⁾ Whatever the cause, there seems to be little doubt that he aided Kandy in ^{the} procuring of essential supplies.⁽²⁶⁾

(21) Kuruwita Rala was also known as Antonio Baretto. He later fled to Kandy and gained high office under Vimaladharmasuriya and became the ruler of Uva and commander of the army under Senerat.

(22) Puttlam was also a source of supply but not between 1601 and 1603 and after 1612.

(23) APO.III.504; P.E.Pieris- Ceylon-The Portuguese era, II. 118.

(24) P.E.Pieris- Ceylon- The Portuguese era, II. 119.

(25) P.E.Pieris- Ceylon- The Portuguese era, II. 150-152.

(26) P.E.Pieris- Ceylon- The Portuguese, Efa, II. 119-120.

By 1614 the Portuguese king had sent definite instructions to depose him and only the lack of means prevented the captain-general in Ceylon from carrying out this order.⁽²⁷⁾

However Ethirimanne Sinham, naver dared to come out openly either against the Portuguese or against Christianity.⁽²⁸⁾

The tribute was paid regularly. In fact he was even forced to allow the construction of a number of churches in the islands near Jaffna. These churches also served as defensible positions round which were gathered a number of Tamil converts. The grant of permission to build a church

(27) P.E.Pieris- Ceylon-The Portuguese era, II. 119-120. DR.II.308,402; A.Bocarro Decada XIII da historia da India, 277

(28) P.da Trindade (III,204-206) mentions an expedition led by Manoel Barreto da Silva, captain of Mannar, who with three hundred Portuguese and seven hundred Christians of Mannar sailed to Jaffna to force the king to prohibit trade with Kandy. The expedition failed in its purpose for the king stood firm and Barreto had to rest content with a promise of continued religious freedom for Christians in Jaffna. The Christians of Jaffna apparently set little store by this undertaking for a majority of them, about eight hundred in number migrated to the island of Tanadiva or Kayts which became a Christian stronghold.

at Urkavalturai for instance led to the loss of political control over the island. The grant of the revenues of the island of Tanadiva to the church also led to the same result.⁽²⁹⁾ These developments while they provided a basis of support for any Portuguese intervention, inevitably roused hostility among the Jaffna Hindu nobility.

During the twenty three years after 1594 the main interest of the Portuguese lay in the maintainance of their hold on Kotte and in the subjugation of Kandy. In the first eighteen years of this period they were led by Don Jeronimo de Azevedo. Azevedo left his mark on Ceylon in more ways than one. In the religious field the monopoly of the Franciscans was broken first by the Jesuits and then by the Augustinians and Dominicans with his active encouragement, so that the total missionary effort could be enlarged. It was he who established the Portuguese headquarters at Malwana, an inland capital.

In matters of civil administration Azevedo did not seek to innovate. In his times Kotte was governed largely through the traditional Sinhalese administrative organization. Thus Kotte was, as of old, divided into disavas or provinces

(29) P.da Trinida^{de}/III.205

and korales or districts. Further subdivisions were represented by pattus and villages. Each of the four disavas of Kotte⁽³⁰⁾ was ruled by an official also termed disava who had administrative, military and judicial powers. The korales were in charge of korale vidanes who ~~were~~ in turn aided by⁽³¹⁾ atukorales, mohottalas and kanakapulles and headmen. Apart from this territorial organization there also existed baddas which were organizations (often of caste groups) for purposes of revenue and service to the state.⁽³²⁾ The Sinhalese armed forces too remained organized under their own mudaliyars or commanders and aratchis or captains. As in the days of Kotte they remained an untrained militia. Nevertheless, though the Sinhalese administrative framework was retained, the increasing substitution of Portuguese for Sinhalese officials and Portuguese ignorance of Sinhalese custom upon which the administration was based did lead to change which bore heavily upon the subject Sinhalese.

It was however in the military sphere that Azevedo

(30) Matara, Sabaragamuwa, Four and Seven Korales. These divisions had existed before the time of Azevedo. P.da Trindade III. 8-9.

(31) These chiefly assisted the korale vidane in keeping records of land and revenue.

(32) For example the cinnamon department or the mahabadda which included most of ^{the} chaleas or cinnamon peelers.

excelled and it was to this that he devoted most of his time and energy. He was an uncompromising opponent of Kandy, particularly of Vimaladharmasuriya. He had however to first pacify the lands of Kotte that had risen in revolt on the news of the defeat of de Souza. By 1603 this task was completed and a number of forts and stockades had been constructed both to prevent rebellion within Portuguese territory and to ward off Kandyan attacks. In January 1603 Azevedo led his troops against the forts guarding the mountain approaches to Kandy, took them and found his way to ~~Kandy~~, the capital.

Azevedo's attempt to invade and conquer Kandy in one decisive campaign failed however due to the revolt of the lascarins, who formed the bulk of his forces. The tough campaign that followed, the revolts in ~~Kandy~~ Kotte itself and the increasing difficulties of the Portuguese in the East created by the coming of the Dutch and English, apparently convinced Azevedo of the need to weaken his enemy before further attempts at conquest. Thus he began a policy of destructive raids on Kandy. Twice a year, normally at harvest time, a lightly armed and highly mobile group of Portuguese and lascarins entered Kandyan territory and laid the lands waste. This policy was reinforced by a blockade of Kandyan trade enforced by a fleet of light vessels

which cruised off the eastern coast of Ceylon. This policy was pursued with considerable success for the next decade. It was nevertheless only a makeshift attempt to keep Kandy weak till the Portuguese had gained sufficient strength for a final decisive campaign.

The change to a defensive policy by the Portuguese coincided with a change of ruler in Kandy. The death of Vimaladharmasuriya in 1604 led to a crisis in Kandy. His (33) only son Rajjuru Maha Adhasin was still a child and the queen Kusumasana devi prove to be too weak to rule over the Kandyan nobility. Vimaladharmasuriya himself had tried to secure an undisturbed succession by appointing his cousin Senerat to the key position of commander-in-chief. (34) Senerat

(33) The Cūlavamsa and some versions of the Rajavaliya hold that Kusumasana devi had at least three sons by Vimaladharmasuriya. (BM.Add.Mss.22012, BM.or. 2702, BM.or.5307, BM.or.8219, Rajavaliya, 98, Cūlavamsa, II,233) Nevertheless Portuguese sources supported by other versions of Rajavaliya appear to prove that Kumarasinha and Vijayapala as well as Maha Astana were sons of Senerat. (Biker I. 205-207, II. 40, Assentos I. 573, CALR.III.49-50; 3CLR.ser.III.155-293, Diario de conde de Linhares, 66; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.ff.216, 220v) This leaves us with the conclusion that Rajjuru Maha Adhasin was Vimaladharmasuriya's sole son.

(34) There is little doubt that Senerat was entrusted with the protection of Kusumasana devi and the prince by Vimaladharmasuriya (Rajavaliya 100, Jornada 34, Queyroz 606, Mandarampurapuvata stanza 177,) ~~on the 16th of November,~~ but it is doubtful whether Vimaladharmasuriya wished him to be his successor as asserted by Queyroz and some Sinhalese authorities. (eg. P.M.P.Abeyasinghe, 132-138)

soon found that other princes, chiefly Mayadunne of Uva and Vidiya Bandara of the Seven and Four Korales wished to marry Kusumasana devi and become king. He promptly forestalled them and marrying Kusumasana devi himself was acclaimed king after a period of turmoil lasting several months. (35)

The dispute^{ute} regarding the succession in ~~Kotte~~^{Kandy} enabled Azevedo to regain control over much of Kotte. The significance of the death of Vimaladharmasuriya and accession of Senerat has however been exaggerated. It is true that Senerat had at one time been a bhikkhu (36) and was very much less warlike than his cousin. He had had for years experience in leading troops (37) and had proved astute enough to overcome his rivals in 1604. Moreover he had the assistance of two of the rebels who had risen against Azevedo in 1603 - Kuruwita Rala and Kangara Aratchi. He did face more opposition within Kandy than Vimaladharmasuriya, but the real decline in Senerat's

(35) The allegation is made by Queyroz (606-609) that Senerat put to death three hundred Portuguese prisoners including sixty blind men after they had aided him to become king. A contemporary Portuguese document (Ajuda 51-V-34.f.101 a report on India 1605) gives the same story but puts the number of Portuguese killed at two hundred. Senerat's character and his treatment of captured Portuguese on other occasions makes this report improbable unless the Portuguese opposed his succession.

(36) A Buddhist monk.

(37) Jornada 34; Baldeaeus 37; In fact an old Sinhalese poem published in P.M.P. Abeyasinghe's Udaratavitti 132-133 even suggest that he was chosen as Vimaladharmasuriya's successor due to his military skill.

position, popularity and authority occurred only after 1612 with the death of Rajjuru Maha Adhasin and Kusumasana devi. (38)

During the period 1604-1612 the Kandyan were in no position to attempt to expel the Portuguese. The latter were likewise too weak to make another attempt on the scale of 1603. On the whole however the Portuguese retained the military initiative. They were relatively free from revolts in Kotte, for constant risings and harsh reprisals had exhausted and cowed the lowland Sinhalese. The Portuguese army was thus free to launch periodic punitive raids on Kandyan territory. These raids aimed at undermining the economic basis of Kandyan power - the village settlement. The systematic devastation of villages and crops did make the Kandyan retire further and further into the forested areas rather than risk captivity or death in Portuguese hands. (39) Nevertheless Kandy survived, for the paucity of troops limited the effectiveness of the Portuguese raids.

(38) Senerat was suspected of being responsible for the death of Vimaladharasuriya's son. (Jornada 34, Baldaeus 58, Queyroz 610, Biker I.78) The mode of killing is given only by Baldaeus and the Rajavaliya. The former asserts that the prince was poisoned and the latter that he was drowned. Kusumasana devi, herself married Senerat against her wishes. (Baldaeus 42, Jornada 34)

(39) Filmoteca LM. 12 19/1-2. Dr. T. Abeyasinghe blames the ills that befell Kandy on the personal incompetence of Senerat. That at this time the Kandyan forces were led by Kuruwita Rala, an opponent justly feared by the Portuguese.

Moreover despite the official embargo ^{on the} ~~of~~ trade of Kandy and efforts to deprive her of essential goods, the lure of high profits from trade in Kandyan pepper and ginger, elephants, ivory and arecanut proved to be too strong for some Portuguese as well as Muslim traders. Thus in Ceylon as in contemporary Europe, political and military struggles did not involve the cessation of economic relations.

Azevedo left Ceylon in December 1612 to take up the post of viceroy of India. As viceroy he sent detailed instructions to his successors to guide them into the administration of Kotte as well as in the conduct of the war against Kandy.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Consequently for four years after his departure Portuguese policy in Ceylon remained essentially that of Azevedo.

The most important development in Kotte during these years was the making of a tombo or a register of lands and revenues by Antao Vaz Freire, an official sent from Lisbon for this task. Freire who occupied the post of vedor da fazenda or controller of revenue was not the first Portuguese to record the sources of royal revenue, for this had been done in 1599 by Jorge Frolim de Almeida. However

(40) AHU Caixa 23.4.1614; Bocarro 275-276; AHU Caixa 5. 9.10.1615

Freire's work, in addition to being in much greater detail than that of de Almeida also included a register of all the lands. The foral or register of revenue prepared by Freire certainly achieved one of its objectives, the increase of revenue for while the actual revenue in the days of Azevedo did not exceed 30,000 xerafins,⁽⁴²⁾ Antao Vaz Freire's estimate was as high as 73,740 xerafins. Freire's achievement must have come as welcome news to the king of Portugal who was no doubt aware that in Azevedo's day the Ceylon budget had an annual deficit of 25,000 xerafins. In the years that followed the revenue assessed according to the new registers proved to be the financial basis of Portuguese power in Ceylon. For the time being however the conversion of all customary dues and gifts into compulsory payments did not endear Portuguese rule to the Sinhalese peasantry.

But if the years after 1612 were years of hope for the Portuguese, for Senerat they were years of trouble.

(41) TT.Manuscritos do convento da Graça , tomo 6D.pg. 325-411.

(42) AHU Codice 222 f.172v; Balthazar Marinho, the escrivao da fazenda or secreatary of the treasury estimated the revenue to be 15,000 xerafins a year, apart from some customary dues and the revenue from elephants. A xerafin was a coin worth about 300 reis in value. In the seventeenth century it was equal to a pardao.

After the death of Kusumasana devi who had legitimised his rule, as it were, his position in Kandy became so insecure that he forced her eldest daughter to marry him to preserve his legal claims to the throne.⁽⁴³⁾ For a time he hoped for foreign assistance. The honours and high position he bestowed on Marcellus de Boschouwer, the Dutch envoy in Kandy (1612-1615) ^{was an index} (as much of his need for Dutch aid as of his personal regard for Boschouwer. Despite Boschouwer's representatives^{my}, however, his superiors in Masulipatam and Batavia were not keen on fighting Senerat's battles and ⁽⁴⁴⁾ no aid materialized. Meanwhile after a brief respite in

(43) Baldaeus 80-81 ; Biker I.224; S.G.Perera- Historical sketches, 152 ; DR II.402.

Vimaladharmasuriya and Kusumasana devi had two daughters - Soriya Adhasin and Hantana Adhasin. The elder, Soriya ~~xx~~ ~~Wimaladhasin~~ married Senerat in 1613 and became his chief queen. They had one daughter Lancadhasin or Hamiadhasin before the queen died in 1617. From then on her sister Hantana Adhasin became his chief queen. Hamiadhasin was later married to Maha Astana, Kusumasana devi's third son by Senerat.

(44) CLR 3 ser.I.26-27; 216-219; 330332; 425-418 ; Pieris - The Portuguese era I. 418-429; Baldaeus 82; Rayachaudhuri- Jan company in Coromandel 1605-1690, 86.

Boschouwer left Ceylon on 9 May 1615 to try to convince his superiors of the advantage of giving military aid to Senerat in return for a trade monopoly and other rights. He was eventually sent to Holland to present his proposals before the XVII.

the time of Azevedo's successor Don Francisco de Menezes Roxo
 (1612-1614),⁽⁴⁵⁾ Portuguese attacks became even more frequent
 in the time of Manoel Mascarenhas Homem (1614-1616),⁽⁴⁶⁾ As
 viceroy Azevedo kept Ceylon adequately supplied with men
 and munitions to continue the pressure against Kandy,⁽⁴⁷⁾ The

(45) Don Francisco de Menezes Roxo was the son of Diogo de Menezes, count of Ericeyra. He came to Ceylon in 1596 and served as a captain of a company of Portuguese soldiers. Later he became the captain of a galleon and was the captain-major of the annual fleet sent to Ceylon. In the last days of Azevedo's captain-generalship he was the captain-major of the fleet. Like Azevedo, de Menezes had no qualms about diverting royal revenues to his own use, but he had neither the ability nor the military skill that Azevedo possessed. In his term of eighteen months (December 1612- May 1614) he made only one raid on Kandyan territory.

F.de Souza VI. 14-15; Baldaeus 65;77-81; Bocarro 45-47; DR IV.26,206; TT.LM.16.f.754; Simancas SP.1473.f.278; AHU Caixa 6, 2.11.1618

(46) Homem had served in Malacca before his appointment as captain-general of Ceylon. Bocarro gives two dates of his arrival in Ceylon - May 1614 (Bocarro 278) and November 1614 (Bocarro 405,410). Contemporary documents in the AHU indicate that the former is the correct date. Homem seems to have been equally effective in war and internal administration and was removed from office only because Don Nuno Alvares Pereira, the king's nominee for the post arrived in Goa in 1615. Homem served till the arrival of Pereira in February 1616.

~~(47)~~ Bocarro 272-279, 405-411; AHU Caixa 3, 30.6.1613; AHU Caixa 3. 22.10.1615; F.de Souza VI.77-78; CLR 3 ser.I.507-8; Baldaeus 81

(47) The Portuguese forces in Ceylon in the four years 1613-1616 ranged between 500 and 700 soldiers. Bocarro 405-410, 496-497; Filmoteca LM.12.76/3; LM.12.99/1/3; CLR 3 ser. I.507-508, 513; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.172

arrival of a new captain-general Don Nuno Alvares Pereira⁽⁴⁸⁾ (1616-1618) on 28 February 1616 led to a further intensification of Portuguese hostilities. Pereira himself led two expeditions to Kandy in April and August of the same year.

Senerat and his general Kuruwita Rala, however were by no means powerless. Although they seldom risked open battle they constantly followed the Portuguese raiding parties, cutting off stragglers and setting ambushes.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Moreover the Portuguese did not succeed in conquering any sizeable tract of Kandyan territory and Senerat remained strong enough to punish feudatory chiefs who contemplated joining the Portuguese.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Nevertheless when Pereira arrived in 1616 the general situation in Ceylon was one of hope for the Portuguese. The Kandyan king seemed ^{to be} becoming weaker year by year while Kotte

(48) Pereira, brother of the count of Feyra was the person chosen by the king in February 1613 to succeed Azevedo in Ceylon. He left Lisbon in 1614 in the ship 'Remedios' which arrived in Goa only in May the following year. He set out for Ceylon in October 1615 but ~~failed~~ was forced to put in to Cochim due to bad weather and remained there till February 1616. Though a man of mediocre talents he was ambitious. In the 1620's on his return to Goa after serving in Moçambique he came to be regarded as the 'Ceylon expert' in the viceroy's council

Bocarro 480-481; DR V.37-38, 42, 45; AHU codice 501.f.6v; Filmoteca LM.12.76/3; Ribeiro - Registo da casa da India, 440-441.

(49) F.de Souza VI.78; Bocarro 407, 409

(50) Baldaeus 60-64; Mandarampuravata, stanzas 182-187.

seemed more firmly in the grasp of the Portuguese than ever before. The missionary work of the Franciscans progressed steadily in Jaffna and they and other order were active in Kotte.

CHAPTER II

Although, when Don Nuno Alvares Pereira took up the captain-generalship of Ceylon in early 1616, the position of the Portuguese seemed most satisfactory, with the lands of Kotte quiet and increasingly productive and the enemy in Kandy forced back on the defensive by the punitive raids and an economic blockade, within a year all was to be in turmoil, peace in Kotte shattered by major rebellions and even more unexpected, Senerat from Kandy seeking a positive alliance with the Portuguese against the rebels.

The origins of this radical change in the political situation are to be found in two revolts, unco-ordinated movements of the type so often seen in the early years of Azevedo's regime, which drew upon widespread if latent discontent. The first rising occurred in Sabaragamuwa in September 1616 and Fálípe de Oliveira, disava of the Seven Korales had to be sent there to restore order with a force of a hundred and twenty Portuguese aided by a lascarin contingent.⁽¹⁾ While ^{de} Oliveira was occupied in the South a second and far more formidable

(1) A. Bocarro 497-8

rebellion broke out in December 1616⁽²⁾ in the Seven Korales
under a man who called himself Nikapitiya Bandara.⁽³⁾

The success of Nikapitiya who in the absence of
de Oliveira, became master of the eastern half of the Seven
Korales within a few weeks, was the signal for Kandyan intervention.
For the first time since his accession Senerat saw a chance of
carrying the war into Portuguese territory. Kangara Aratchi, a
former rebel leader who had considerable support in the Seven Korales⁽⁴⁾
led two thousand well-armed Kandyan militiamen to reinforce

(2) The exact date of the commencement of the second rebellion is not certain. A letter of the camara of Colombo to the king of Portugal in 1618 states that it began on 7 December but the Annual Report of the Jesuits in 1617 records that two of their number were killed on the 6 December. According to Bocarro the rebellion had begun at least by 5 December.

(3) The real Nikapitiya Bandara was a prince of Sitawaka who was proclaimed king on the death of Rajasinha in 1592 and captured by the Portuguese soon after. He was later educated at Colombo and Coimbra and died in 1611 at Coimbra. The rebel was a pretender, son of a measurer of grain and a priestess of the Raigam Korale. He was educated by Fr. Manoel de Trinitade and married the daughter of Pulasinha Aratchi of Waskaduwa, Potupitiya. He served the Portuguese in various capacities after 1616 and gained the valued posts of vidant of Chaleas and Palanguin Bearer of the captain-general in the time of Menezes and Homem. While at Malwana he learnt much about the Sitawaka royal family from ladies of the Sitawaka court who resided at Walgama. His career however was sharply interrupted and he seems to have been dismissed from his posts. Bocarro suggests that the reason for his disgrace was the abandonment of his wife and consequent disputes with the clergy. In 1615 he accompanied Antonio Batalha who was taking some elephants to Jaffna and disappeared into the jungles of Nuwarakalawiya whence he emerged an year later.

A. Bocarro 497; DR I.10.106; CLR 3 ser.II 530; F.de Souza VI 92; DR II. 230.239; W.L.A. Don Peter- Studies in Ceylon church history 113.

(4) T. Abeyasinghe 50; Bocarro 498 identifies him as Gancara Rache.

Nikapitiya's peasant army in the north while Kuruwita Rala, governor of Uva descended with his forces on his homeland the Two Korales where he could always rely on finding support. (5)

The Portuguese were thus confronted with attacks on two fronts by Sinhalese forces which in both cases amounted to several thousand men. To meet these the Portuguese had some seven hundred regular Portuguese troops who could be reinforced by detachments of casados and topazes. (6) The timely arrival of a fleet from Malacca in December 1616 placed an extra force of a hundred Portuguese and their followers at the disposal of the captain-general. (7) A proportion of these forces was of course occupied in garrison duty but at the outbreak of the revolt the captain-general Pereira certainly possessed a Portuguese force twice as strong as that at the disposal of Azevedo in the latter half of his regime in Ceylon. (8)

The key to the position however was held by the lascarin forces. If they deserted the Portuguese forces would have little option but to withdraw from most of the Seven Korales and Sabaragamuwa. As it was, many of them did desert to join the

(5) A.Bocarro 498.508; F.de Souza VI.92

(6) Casados are married Portuguese settlers. Topazes 'Dark skinned or half-caste claimants of Portuguese descent and Christian profession' according to H.Yule and A.L.Burnell -Hobson-Jobson

(7) This fleet of eight vessels continued on its way to Goa in January 1617 leaving many of the soldiers behind. A.Bocarro 496-7. 685; F.de Souza VI.91; CALR II.131; Filmoteca LM.12/99/1/3 Filmoteca LM.12 76/3

(8) T.Abeysinghe 64

leader they believed to be the grandson of Rajasinha of Sitawaka,⁽⁹⁾
 but Dom Constantino, a converted prince of the Kotte dynasty
 who commanded the lascarin forces⁽¹⁰⁾ was able to keep the majority
 loyal.

The first use made of these forces by the captain-general was against Nikapitiya whose success in the Seven Korales continued threateningly. Portuguese reinforcements were pushed up the Kelani Ganga to the forward base at Menikkadawara with orders^{to} Manoel Cezar who commanded the Portuguese ~~there~~ forces there to put a speedy end to the rising. Cezar marched northwards with a force of two hundred and twenty Portuguese and a thousand Sinhalese lascarins and was met by Nikapitiya's forces about four thousand strong who had crossed the Maha Oya into the Four Korales. The two armies met on a stretch of level ground⁽¹¹⁾ at Gandolaha on 18 December 1616. Despite the desertion of half of Cezar's lascarins Nikapitiya was forced back into the Seven Korales after a hard fought battle. This dearly earned victory proved to be of little use to the Portuguese however, for when Manoel Cezar advanced into the Seven Korales he found himself in a hostile land. No intelligence of the rebels could be had and the Portuguese forces were harassed by the guerilla tactics

(9) CALR II. 130; A.Bocarro 499.504

(10) A.Bocarro 498

(11) A.Bocarro 498 says that Gandolaha was located on the river Loao. The site was probably located somewhere in the present Gandolaha Pattuwa. It was evidently a piece of strategic value as P.da Trindade(III 118) mentions that the Portuguese had a garrison at Gandolaha (Gandole) in 1632.

of Nikapitiya's men. His force was soon reduced to eighty Portuguese and a handful of lascarins. Indeed it was only the arrival of de Oliveira from the Two Korales with a hundred and twenty Portuguese and eight hundred lascarins that saved Cezar from annihilation. Even these joint forces were placed in danger when de Oliveira's lascarins absconded one night with all their arms and at this stage the two commanders decided to abandon the struggle for the Seven Korales, retreat twenty miles southeast to Attanagalla and there fortify themselves.

Relieved of the pressure on the centre of his power, Nikapitiya once more took the offensive, moving into the western reaches of the Seven Korales and raiding on occasion to within a few miles of Colombo fort.⁽¹²⁾ These successes emboldened Kuruwita Raka operating in the south in the Two Korales. He attacked and captured the fort of Sabaragamuwa,⁽¹³⁾ the main stronghold of the disava of Sabaragamuwa, by a stratagem and turned to the Matara disava, particularly the rich Raigam Korale.⁽¹⁴⁾

It was at this time when things were going so well for both Nikapitiya and Kandy that a 'Diplomatic Revolution' occurred in Ceylon. Senerat who had so far led the Kandyans in

(12) A.Bocarro 499-506; F.de Souza VI.92-96; AHU India caixa 5, 21.11.1617; CALR II.130-131; Ajuda 51-VIII-40 f.230v

(13) Located at or near the modern town of Ratnapura. In 1616 the fort was garrisoned by sixty Portuguese under its captain Manoel Matoso and the lascarins of Sabaragamuwa under disava Estavao da Faria.

(14) A.Bocarro 508, 685; F.de Souza VI.98

war against the Portuguese suddenly turned to his erstwhile enemies for friendship and alliance. Kuruwita Rala, the general who had served the Kandyan kings so loyally since 1603 not only turned against his master and raised a revolt in the hill country itself but also invited a rival prince of the Sitawaka dynasty to assume the throne of Kandy. T. Abeyasinghe in his Portuguese rule in Ceylon seeks to explain this phenomena by stating that the revolt in Kotte '... became a struggle against the foreigner in the low country and a revolt against incompetent monarchy in the country on the hills. The two powers threatened by the revolt therefore drew together and the first Kandyan-Portuguese treaty of 1617 was the result.'⁽¹⁵⁾ The Luso-Kandyan entente was no doubt a product of common interest but the above explanation is a reversal of the order of events, for the revolt against Senerat was a result and not the cause of the Kandyan alliance with the Portuguese.⁽¹⁶⁾

The true explanation of this unusual sequence of events must be sought for in the character and aims of three of the main protagonists - Nikapitiya Bandara, Senerat and Kuruwita Rala. The tragedy of Nikapitiya was that in claiming to be the grandson of Rajasinha, he also inherited all of the Rajasinha legend. Elated by the success of his first campaign

(15) T. Abeyasinghe, 68

(16) Queyroz 710; P. da Trindade III.78

he began to think of the ruler of Kandy as a vassal and demanded from him one of the daughters of Kusumasana Devi as wife. (17) Senerat had so far thought of himself as Nikapitiya's patron and protector. On receipt of this message he swiftly realised that his protégé could become a dangerous rival. He therefore immediately withdrew the contingent he had sent to aid Nikapitiya and instructed Kuruwita Rala to withdraw from his campaign. Furthermore, he began to make efforts to reach an understanding with the Portuguese.

The cause of the rift between Senerat and Kuruwita Rala lay in this decision. Senerat's primary interest was to safeguard his own dynasty and protect his own position. For this he was willing to sacrifice all hopes of expelling the Portuguese from the island. Born and bred in Kandy he was content to rule in his kingdom if left unmolested by the Portuguese. In this respect he was a true successor of Vimaladharmasuriya. The Sitawaka dynasty had no tradition of friendship with that of Kandy, and Nikapitiya's pretensions alarmed him all the more as he had achieved in a few weeks what Senerat had failed to do in years of fighting - he had forced the Portuguese to give up most of the Seven and Four Korales and had placed them on the defensive in Kotte. Thus, to the king the prudent course seemed to be to ally himself with the hard-pressed Portuguese

(17) A. Bocarro 506; F. de Souza VI.96

against the more dangerous Nikapitiya.

Kuruwita Rala viewed the conflict from an entirely different point of view. As a native of Kotte he could not regard the fate of the people of the lowlands with the same indifference as Senerat. To him the Portuguese were always the main enemy and he no doubt considered that the differences between Senerat and Nikapitiya could be sorted out after the Portuguese had been expelled from the island. Already his own homeland, the Two Korales was in his hands. Kuruwita Rala therefore refused to turn his back on the most favourable opportunity to liberate Kotte that he had ever known. Thus when Senerat persisted in his policy of seeking peace with the Portuguese Kuruwita Rala revolted against him and soon became master of much of southern Ceylon including Batticaloa, Wellassa, Panama, Uva and part of Sabaragamuwa and Matara.⁽¹⁸⁾ In a sense Kuruwita Rala rather than Senerat was the true Sinhalese patriot for it was he who placed national above dynastic interests.

There is little doubt that Senerat, like the Portuguese, had formed an exaggerated opinion of the strength of Nikapitiya,⁽¹⁹⁾ but for some time he failed to convince the Portuguese of his desire for peace. The messenger he sent to Balana to ask for

(18) Kustantinu Hatana stanzas 14-19; CLR 3 ser.I. 151

(19) Nikapitiya's base and source of strength was the Seven Korales which had suffered much devastation in the time of Azevedo. Apart from the two thousand men he could raise in this area many lascarins who deserted the Portuguese forces of the Four Korales and Matara joined him.

an escort for his ambassador was put to death by the garrison. Senerat however did not lose hope. He next sent Domingos Rodrigues and Balthazar Ribeiro, two of the Portuguese captured at Sabaragamuwa to convey his wishes. Finally as even this would not convince Manoel Falcão, the captain of the fort, he brought all the forces he could spare and laid siege to the fort. After some resistance the Portuguese who had no hope of relief surrendered. It was only then that Senerat succeeded in convincing Falcão that his desire for peace and an alliance was genuine. However due to these delays it was only on 15 March 1617 that two of his envoys reached Malwana to offer a treaty of peace to the captain-general.⁽²⁰⁾ Even then, though Pereira was pleased to gain an ally at such a difficult time, Senerat was asked to release some Portuguese prisoners and to send envoys of greater standing as an earnest of good faith. It was only when these further envoys with an escort of a hundred lascarins together with thirty of the Portuguese held captive in Kandy arrived at Malwana on 6 May 1617 that all doubts about Senerat's intentions were set at rest. The question was how the Portuguese should react to the Kandyan offer.

Azevedo's policy had been one of uncompromising^o hostility to Kandy and though direct assault had to be abandoned

(20) F.de Souza VI. 99-100; CALR II.135,131; A.Bocarro 509-510; CRL. 3 ser.II. 530-533

in favour of containment and a wearing down process, the absorption of Kandy remained the ultimate goal. One argument in favour of this policy had always been the need to deny to Portugal's European rivals in the East any trade, or military alliance in Ceylon. In early years while the Dutch and the English were seeking to avoid a full scale clash with established Portuguese centres of power and instead were pushing their trade in the Indonesian archipelago, the Coromandel coast and Bengal, it seemed a justifiable policy to devote Portuguese energy to consolidation in Ceylon by the elimination of Kandy. But as Dutch and English pressure intensified and their need to break into the 'country' or port to port trade of Asia drove them westwards, the right course for the Portuguese in Ceylon became less clear. Complete mastery of the island was more desirable than ever, but whether resources could properly be spared for a war on Kandy when so many other points in the Estado da India were threatened seemed increasingly doubtful. In the second decade of the seventeenth century doubt grew as the English by their naval victories in Gujerat broke into the trade with Mughul India, the Dutch consolidated their hold on the Coromandel cloth trade and as both European and Achinese attack put Malacca in peril. With the failure in 1616 of Portuguese plans for a counter-blow in Indonesia by a joint Portuguese-Spanish Philippine naval expedition doubt turned to certainty; the pursuit of victory in Ceylon must be set aside. In Europe

the king instructed the new viceroy Dom Joao Coutinho, Conde de Redondo to 'dissimulate' with the kings of Ceylon and to concentrate on opposing the European enemies. The news of the revolt in Ceylon made even Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo serving as viceroy in India admit that the peace proposals from Kandy must be accepted.⁽²¹⁾

Meanwhile in Ceylon events both in Kotte and Kandy were drawing Senerat and the captain-general even closer together, for after consulting those who supported him⁽²²⁾ Kuruwita Rala decided to invite Mayadunne of Denawaka, descendant of his namesake who founded the kingdom of Sitawaka,⁽²³⁾ to return from Tanjore and accept the title of king of Ceylon. The exact reason for this invitation is unknown, for there is no reason to believe that Kuruwita Rala suspected Nikapitiya to be an imposter. It is more likely that this was an act to safeguard his own position. Having renounced his ~~his~~ allegiance to Senerat, he had to provide his followers with another king. He himself was inhibited from assuming the title due to

(21) H.W.Livermore, ~~editor~~ Portugal and Brazil 227; Botelho de Souza III.7

(22) The chief among these were Kangara Aratchi and Vellappu Aratchi..The latter had rebelled in the Hewagam Korale in the days of Azevedo and had since been in Kandyan service. T.Abeyasinghe 64; Jornada 10,35; BM.Add.Mss.19866; BM.Or.2012; BM.Or.2702; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.220v; Rajavaliya 99

(23) Biker I.224; CLR 3 ser.I.151

his caste.⁽²⁴⁾ Thus he needed a figure-head prince who would be amenable to his control. Nikapitiya's recent conduct hardly recommended him for this post. Mayadunne on the other hand was an ideal candidate, for even Nikapitiya could hardly dispute the claims of this well-known prince. On Mayadunne's arrival the two claimants agreed to a compromise. Nikapitiya was to be king of Kotte and Mayadunne, king to Kandy.⁽²⁵⁾

During the first six months of 1617 Mayadunne, Kuruwita Rala and Nikapitiya more than held their own. Nikapitiya on 12 January 1617 tried and failed at Kaleliya to defeat the Portuguese in open battle.⁽²⁶⁾ But Kaleliya like Gandolaha proved to be a Pyrrhic victory for the Portuguese. Nikapitiya realised that without the trained troops of Kandy, his ill-armed levies had little chance of winning pitched battles. He therefore began following Kuruwita Rala's policy of avoiding battle, harassing the Portuguese forces on the move and attacking isolated Portuguese outposts. The captain-general Pereira was unable to formulate an effective plan of military action against the rebels. This may have been partly due to the lack of troops. In the first half 1617 Portuguese forces were at no time strong enough to launch an offensive against both Nikapitiya and the forces of Mayadunne and Kuruwita Rala at the same time.

(24) Kuruwita Rala was of the Karawa caste which was not held in high esteem in Ceylon in the seventeenth century. (Queyroa 591, F.de Souza VI.78; T.Abeyasinghe 64; Jornada 35; A.Bocarro 508; Ajuda 51-IV-32.f.16v) This was not enough to bar him from high office, for Senerat made him ruler of Uva. To assume the title of king was another matter and Kuruwita Rala was shrewd enough to realise that this was no time to risk dispute over loyalties.

(25) LM.12.f.454 (26) Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.230v; A.Bocarro 507-508 F.de Souza VI.97

This enabled the rebels to launch diversionary attacks on the depleted Portuguese forces in one sector while the main Portuguese force^s was fighting in the other. Thus the apparently successful campaign of Manoel Cezar against Nikapitiya in January 1617 had to be halted due to Kuruwita's offensive against the Raigam Korale following his capture of Sabaragamuwa fort.⁽²⁷⁾ Similarly an attack on Kuruwita Rala in February of the same year could not be pursued partly due to renewed activity by Nikapitiya. Nevertheless it is difficult to disagree with Faria de Souza's criticism that the Portuguese forces could have achieved more had they been better utilized.⁽²⁸⁾ Pereira let the rebels dictate the campaign, switching his main forces against the one or the other according to the success they temporarily achieved. Throughout this period therefore the Portuguese forces achieved little save devastation of land which only tended to attract more support for their enemies. Their control of Kotte remained limited to the Kelani Valley and the coastline from Negombo to Matara.⁽²⁹⁾

By June however the situation began to favour the Portuguese once more. The rebels received no new accessions of strength. The Portuguese on the other hand received a flow

(27) A.Bocarro 507-508; 684-685

(28) F.de Souza VI.130

(29) A.Bocarro 686-690, 703-711; CALR II.132; F.de Souza VI.130

of men and supplies which began to alter the balance of power. In early February the China fleet on its way to Goa called at Colombo and besides providing a much needed supply of money left a number of the four hundred Portuguese sailors, soldiers and merchants who were on board to serve in the defence of the island. ⁽³⁰⁾ When favourable winds set in in March, a stream of reinforcements poured in from Goa. First to arrive was Lourenco Pires de Carvalho with a force of sixty or seventy men and a consignment of rice. ⁽³¹⁾ He was soon followed by Pedro Alvares Cabral who led a force of a hundred and fifty Portuguese. ⁽³²⁾ Another force of eighty men was sent from Goa to Galle in April to ensure that the cinnamon producing villages in the southern regions of Kotte remained under Portuguese control. ⁽³³⁾

While the forces of the Portuguese were thus being built up, the aid in men and supplies which the rebels had expected from Jaffna was largely denied because of a political upheaval in that kingdom. The death of Ethirmanne Sinham at the end of 1615 had been followed by the installation of his

(30) Pereira obtained about seven thousand xerafins in money from state and private funds on board the fleet. TT.Corpo Chronologico Part I, Maco 116. Doc. 101; TT.LM.13.f.123; TT.Corpo Chronologico Part I, Maco 116. Doc. 87

(31) CALR II.f.132; F.de Souza VI.130; A.Bocarro 702-703

(32) Simancas SP.1468.f.182v

(33) A.Bocarro 693

three year old son ⁽³⁴⁾ under the regency of Arasakesari, Ethirmanne's brother. This arrangement was confirmed by the viceroy in May 1616 but before his letter could reach Jaffna a rival faction headed by Sankili, ⁽³⁵⁾ a nephew of Ethirmanne Sinham had seized power and put to death all the princes of the blood save the heir and Sankili's own brother-in-law, Luku Kumaran. Periyapulle Aratchi, one of the chief support^yes of Arasakesari was also put to death. His son Sinna Migapillai Aratchi thereupon fled to the Portuguese with two princesses and requested support to oust Sankili. ⁽³⁶⁾ Sankili himself also applied for confirmation of his position as Regent. The Portuguese were thus placed in a strong position ^{and} ~~for~~ in return for recognition as regent they forced Sankili not only to refuse aid and assistance to Nikapitiya but also to close the frontiers against him and deny him a refuge. ⁽³⁷⁾ Since the rebels had also lost any hope of aid

(34) The age of the prince stated above is that given in Queyroz 463. P.da Trinidade says the prince was seven or eight years old. (III.207)

(35) Queyroz 463 calls Sankili 'a perfect heathen and a traitor' but evidence from the work of P.da Trinidade (III 189) indicates that he was by no means anti-Christian throughout. While still a nobleman he granted the villages of Visivil and Ilavr to Fr. Pedro Betaneor.

(36) Sinna Migapillai Aratchi was baptised under the name of D.Luis. He returned to Jaffna when the Portuguese recognised Sankili and later led a rising against him.

(37) Vriddagirison 80; A.Bocarro 698-99; F.de Souza 132-133, 216; Queyroz 463-467; P.da Trinidade III.207-8

The persistant Portuguese charges that Sankili aided both Kuruwita Rala and Nikapitiya may throw some doubt as to how far Sankili kept to his promises but there is little doubt that Sankili did not join Nikapitiya and Kuruwita Rala in an attempt to get rid of Portuguese overlordship as asserted by Alfredo Botelho de Souza. His position in Jaffna itself at this time was too dependent on Portuguese support for this. Nevertheless it is possible that he followed Ethirmanne Sinham's policy of allowing contacts between the Sinhalese and south India through the traditional routes across Jaffna.

from Senerat who was busy negotiating an alliance with the Portuguese, their position became increasingly desperate. The majority of soldiers in their armies were peasant recruits, armed only with swords, bows and spears who could not be expected to be absent from their village fields for long.⁽³⁸⁾ Promises of lavish grants of land might bring them up for a while but the immediate need to sow or harvest the family fields soon overshadowed all hopes of future gain. Moreover though Kuruwita Rala could draw on his base in Uva for supplies and new recruits, for his long tenure of power in that province had won him loyalty there, Nikapitiya had not the same facilities in the Seven Korales and his supplies and recruits were forthcoming only while he was attended by success in the field.

These factors explain why the campaign of Luis Gomes Pinto and Dom Constantino against Nikapitiya in May-July 1617 was such a success. Nikapitiya, who was forced to withdraw northwards, escaped the Portuguese only because of the imperfect control that Senerat had over the Vanniyars of Nuwarakalawiya. From July 1617 Nikapitiya ceased to be a force to be reckoned with. Though he made a final incursion into Portuguese territory in

(38) Evidence in A. Bocarro (499,707) and in contemporary Jesuit letters (CALR II.130) indicate that Nikapitiya's army fluctuated in number from about four thousand to under one thousand men.

September 1617, he found the people of the Seven Korales reluctant to support him. He therefore speedily withdrew to the forests of north-central Ceylon and was never heard of again.⁽³⁹⁾

The revolt left its mark on the Seven Korales. This province had been a valuable source of revenue and had provided the seat for one of the sub-kings of Kotte at the end of the fifteenth century. Its prosperity however had suffered a check after the systematic devastation of the area by Azevedo in his attempt to regain control of it in 1596-1601⁽⁴⁰⁾ and again in 1603-1612. After five years of relative peace the Seven Korales once more became a battleground in 1616-1617. It is unlikely that the Portuguese estimate of seven thousand Sinhalese killed and over a thousand crippled by injury in war in the eight months of revolt was an exaggeration.⁽⁴¹⁾ In the long run the Portuguese themselves lost by their own scorched earth policy for by 1618 the Seven Korales which had mustered four thousand lascarins in the time of Rajasinha yielded less than half that number.⁽⁴²⁾

(39) A.Bocarro 714

(40) T.Abeyasinghe 32

(41) AHU 501.ff.68v,287. Eight years later Francisco Barbosa de Andrade estimated that at least two thousand lascarins died in the revolt of Nikapitiya. (Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.220v) The Portuguese loss probable exceeded two hundred dead. On many occasions the Portuguese killed all their captives to instill terror and to subjugate the land. (A.Bocarro ff.686-687)

(42) Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.266

The peace treaty of 1617 between the king of Kandy and the Portuguese was in many ways the most significant result of the activities of Nikapitiya. As might have been expected so complete a reversal of past policies as the treaty represented was not easily achieved. Over three months elapsed between the arrival of the king's accredited ambassadors in Malwana and the eventual signing of the peace.⁽⁴³⁾ Part of the delay arose from matters of procedure, though this did not include delay in contacting and getting the approval of the viceroy as Faria de Souza would have us believe.⁽⁴⁴⁾ In fact the whole process of negotiation from the Portuguese side was done by the captain-general Don Nuno Alvares Pereira himself, though he was always careful to obtain approval of the steps he took from a council he had formed for the purpose. This council normally consisted of the captain-general himself, the vedor or the controller of revenue, the captain of Colombo, the

(43) Fr. S.G.Pereira has written a number of articles (based mainly on Jesuit records) on the negotiations for the peace treaty and gives a translation of the peace treaty itself. CALR II.132-35; CALR III.49-52; CLR 3 ser.II.536-538; CLR 3 ser.III.157-166) The treaty and some of the negotiations which proceeded it are published in Portuguese in Biker I.203-217. A manuscript at Evora CVI / 2-2 ff.246-253 provides much the same information as Fr. Pereira gives. It is a version of the proceedings in Ceylon in 1617 authenticated by A.Bocarro in 1643. Another manuscript copy of the peace treaty is found in TT.LM.51.ff.364-369v.

(44) ~~Faria~~ de Souza VI.132

heads of the four religious orders, the four disavas (if available), the officials of the camara or municipal council of Colombo and a few senior Portuguese soldiers. The council held its meetings in Colombo.⁽⁴⁵⁾ The delay arose chiefly from the fact that the Kandyan envoys were allowed little power to negotiate. Often they could merely indicate the king's wishes to the captain-general and convey the Portuguese proposals to the king and his advisers in Kandy. Thus after the first meeting of the captain-general's council when it approved of the decision to negotiate peace on 13 May 1617 , it met again on 27 July 1617 to consider the draft proposals of the general and twice more in the same month to discuss amendments proposed by the king of Kandy.⁽⁴⁶⁾

The delay was also due to the differences between the two parties as to the terms of the treaty. Senerat was willing to pay tribute and release all prisoners seized in war in return for recognition as king of Kandy and for an alliance with the Portuguese. On the other hand he did not agree completely to the Portuguese proposals regarding the amount of tribute, the delimitation of the frontier, missionary activity in Kandy, treatment of refugees from Portuguese lands

(45) CLR 3 ser. III.158,160,162; CLR 3 ser.II.533,536
Biker Vol.1.208,211,213; Evora CVI/2-2.ff.246v-247,249-249v,
250v,251v,253

(46) On 18 and 30 of July.

and the question of the fort of Balane.

Senerat's conception of tribute proved to be a token gift offered 'to do honour to the king of Portugal for the king of Portugal has no need of money but only honour.' (47) The Portuguese on the other hand demanded a substantial tribute; namely four elephants (each five cubits in height) together with one thousand amunas of arecanut and two hundred (48) bahars of cinnamon. Eventually Senerat's offer of one elephant a year led to^a compromise settlement of a tribute of two elephants a year being accepted by the Portuguese on 18 July.

The differences over Balane fort were as wide. The Portuguese originally wanted the fort to be rebuilt by Senerat, stocked with provisions for a whole year and handed over to the Portuguese with all the men, arms and ammunition captured there in February. Senerat was not prepared to concede this. The fort at Balane had been constructed by Azevedo for the express purpose of attacking Kandy and one of Senerat's chief objectives since his accession had been the dismantling of

(47) CLR 3 ser. III.155; CALR III 50

(48) The Portuguese proposals mentioned above are those of the draft treaty prepared by Don Nuno Alvares Pereira on 30 June 1617 and approved by his council on 2 July 1617. The compromise settlement mentioned, unless otherwise indicated were reached by 18 July. For the proposals of the Portuguese and the counter-proposals of the king see, CLR 3 ser. II. 536-537; CLR 3 ser. II. 156-157; Biker I. 205-208; CALR III. 49-52; Evora CVI/ 2-2.ff.246-250v
bahar=a measure of weight 400-500 lbs. amuna= a measure of capacity. An amuna of arecanut contained 24000-26000 nuts.

the fort. Thus he offered merely to restore all men and weapons captured from the fort and the Portuguese had to rest content with this. On the question of the return of the men captured at Sabaragamuwa, Senerat offered to return the Portuguese who were in his power but made it clear that their weapons were with the men of the area who were now followers of Kuruwita Rala.

Then there was the question of the repatriation of the rebels. Pereira like all the generals since Azevedo, was concerned with the depopulation of Kotte and wanted Senerat to send back all those rebels who had fled to the hill country. Senerat agreed on condition that the captain-general would pardon them and restore their lands to them.

At the outset the Portuguese also insisted that all Moors and Europeans should be excluded from any contact with Kandy. This was a clause which Kandy would have found difficult to honour in practice, for much of the Kandyan trade was in the hands of the Muslims. Senerat found an ingenious way out here. Omitting all specific mention of nationalities he proposed that Kandy 'would be a friend of our friends and an enemy of our enemies.' (49) This preserved Kandyan trade against interference, for Indian Muslims supplied many goods

(49) CALR III.50; CLR 3 ser.III.155; Evora CVI/2-2f.248; Biker I.207

to Kotte too and therefore could not be regarded as enemies of the Portuguese. The Portuguese fears of a Kandyan alliance with other European nations were also assuaged by this clause.

The Portuguese proposals regarding the propagation of Christianity also raised problems. The captain-general had stipulated not only that Senerat should provide a site for a church in Kandy but the he should 'favour and help' ⁽⁵⁰⁾ the spread of Christianity. ⁽⁵¹⁾ Senerat was a tolerant king for he had allowed Franciscan friars free access to Kusumasana devi and had even entrusted the education of his sons to them. Yet he could not have failed to realise that the support of his people was to a great extent dependent on his patronage of Buddhism. This was perhaps why the eventual treaty merely contained a clause establishing the right of Kandyans to become Christians if they chose to do so. ⁽⁵²⁾

The captain-general in his draft treaty of 30 January

(50) CLR 3 ser. III. 538; Biker I.206; CALR III.50

(51) This demand should also be viewed in the context of the Portuguese intolerance of Buddhism and Hinduism in their territory.

(52) There is no reason to believe that freedom of conscience did not exist in Kandy before this. The only difficulty Senerat raised was in the case of slaves who on conversion became free, since this led to dispute between their masters and the priests. The Portuguese who doubtless had experience of the difficulty in Kotte agreed to exclude slaves from the freedom to accept Christianity. The final treaty also specifically granted Senerat the right to name the Franciscan friar in Kandy. The extent to which Senerat exercised this right is unknown. He certainly did nominate the first Fr. Jose de Madre de Deus. Other Franciscans who served in Kandy in the 1620's and 30's include Fr. Francisco Negrão, Fr. Bernado de Cruz and Fr. Pedro dos Anjos. (P. da Trindade III. 79.85)

1617 requested that one of Senerat's three sons be handed over as a hostage, and as the princes were young that four of the Kandyan nobles should also be handed over to the Portuguese. This demand reflects the distrust that the Portuguese had of Kandyan intentions even at this late stage. Senerat predictably refused to part with one of his sons and pointed that his royal word was more valuable than two hundred hostages. However, to calm Portuguese apprehensions he agreed to the sending of some nobles as hostages on condition that they could take turns so that none need be separated from his family for long.⁽⁵³⁾

All these issues having been settled by 18 July only the question of the delimitation of boundaries remained. Once negotiations began Don Nuno Alvares Pereira had sent a delegation of five trusted persons to Kandy to determine the limits of each kingdom. This did not prove difficult as the traditional boundaries of Kotte and Kandy were well known. The difficulties arose from the Portuguese efforts to obtain some kind of control over the eastern seaboard of Ceylon.⁽⁵⁴⁾ The captain-general in his original proposals

(53) Senerat himself asked for no hostage save the Franciscan friar in Kandy. This clause of the treaty on hostages does not appear to have been enforced at any time.

(54) The fortification of Trincomalee and Batticaloa, two ports on the eastern seaboard of Ceylon had been urged on the captain-general of Ceylon from the time of Azevedo. (See, DR.IV.137; AHU.282.f.62; DR.II.478; DR.III.202.397)

asked the king of Kandy to promise to aid the Portuguese in building forts on the sea-coast. Senerat refused to agree to this as such a measure would isolate Kandy and place Kandyan trade at the mercy of the Portuguese. The Portuguese thereupon laid claim to Batticaloa. Senerat once more refused to give in, despite a Portuguese compromise offer in early August by which Batticaloa was to be included in Kandyan territory on condition that Senerat would aid the Portuguese to build a fort there. Eventually it was agreed that all rights over Batticaloa belonged to Senerat and his heirs.⁽⁵⁵⁾

Thus the delay in signing the formal treaty was due partly to the process of negotiation itself and partly to the differences between the two parties. Senerat appears to have had an edge over the Portuguese in negotiations for he yielded far less often than the Portuguese on points at dispute. It should however be recalled that Senerat had conceded much to make the Portuguese commence negotiations.⁽⁵⁶⁾ Moreover Senerat unlike the Portuguese was compelled to stand firm on several issues. The very policy of making peace with the Portuguese had raised revolts in his domains. Senerat knew only too well that too many concessions might

(55) Evora CVI / 2-2 ff.249v-250v; Biker I.210-211; CLR 3 ser. III. 159-160

(56) He agreed to be a vassal and to release some of the prisoners-of-war.

lose him his throne. On the other the Portuguese captain-general feared a further deterioration of the military situation due to fresh revolts and also feared Dutch intervention, especially after rumours of the sighting of three Dutch ships off Batticaloa.⁽⁵⁷⁾ Nevertheless, Faria de Souza's charge that Senerat at first offered favourable terms and then changed them after the defeat of Nikapitiya is refuted by contemporary documents. Senerat's objections to the original Portuguese proposals and the acceptance of the eventual compromise solutions by the Portuguese (except in the case of Batticaloa)⁽⁵⁸⁾ all came before the final defeat of Nikapitiya.

The treaty was ultimately signed by the captain-general on 17 August 1617 and by the king seven days later. The treaty was then sent to Goa for the viceroy's approval and finally to Lisbon for confirmation by the king. The Luso-Kandyan alliance however brought no immediate peace to Ceylon for the swift Portuguese success against Nikapitiya was not repeated against Kuruwita Rala and Mayadunne.

The ability of Kuruwita Rala to resist the combined power of Senerat and the Portuguese was partly due to his skill and experience in war and partly due to the extent

(57) The new disava of the Seven Korales Luis Teixeira de Macedo also warned of another rising being planned with the aid of the king of Jaffna in the Seven Korales. Evora CVI/2-2. ff. 250v-251v; Biker I. 212-213; CLR 3 ser. III. 161-162

(58) F. de Souza VI. 132 appears to confuse the terms proposed by the captain-general with those offered by Senerat. Bocarro 709-710 gives the original proposals of the Portuguese as the actual contents of the treaty.

of his resources. Throughout 1617 and most of 1618 Kuruwita Rala commanded much of the disavas of Sabaragamuwa and Matara as well as the southern half of the Kandyan kingdom. The forces he could raise in these areas were superior to any that Senerat could muster in number and as well as in armament.⁽⁵⁹⁾ That was why Kuruwita Rala could raid Kandy and drive Senerat out of his own capital.⁽⁶⁰⁾ In Kotte, when confronted by the better armed Portuguese forces Kuruwita Rala always withdrew and used his superior mobility and better information service to surprise isolated bodies of lascarin auxiliaries serving the Portuguese or to attack relatively undefended settlements. Thus by the end of 1617 Kuruwita Rala ^{had} not merely avoided defeat and kept control over the areas he subjugated but he had forced the Portuguese to abandon the newly rebuilt fort at Sabaragamuwa,⁽⁶¹⁾ had raided Beruwala, had attacked two detachments of lascarins and had even persuaded some more of the lascarins of Matara to desert to him.⁽⁶²⁾

The success of Kuruwita Rala however owed much to a

(59) Most of the foundry workers who had served the Portuguese had joined Kuruwita Rala, partly as a protest against their increased burdens under Portuguese rule. (T. Abeyasinghe 83; TT. collecção de S. Vicente. livro 19. doc. 276) The king of Kandy at this time could hardly raise three thousand men. (JCBRAS XXXVII.75)

(60) Kustantin Hatana stanzas 20-26

(61) Sabaragamuwa had been re-captured and re-fortified by the Portuguese in March-April 1617 in an attempt to regain control over the district.

(62) Bocarro does not mention a single military victory against Kuruwita Rala during the last six months of 1617. Thus the mention of a victory in which twelve aratchis and eight mudaliars of Kuruwita Rala were killed, in a petition of a Portuguese soldier should be treated with some caution. (Bocarro 711-713; AHU 501.f.287.

factor outside his control; misgovernment in Kotte itself. Pereira's mediocrity as a soldier had been partially disguised by the fortuitous treaty of peace with Kandy. His work as an administrator had no such saving grace. Here his principal faults lay in his inability to discipline his subordinates and an urge ^{to reward} /loyal supporters at the expense of others. The former limited the effectiveness of his forces in war, while the latter earned him the enmity of the camara of Colombo, the stronghold of Portuguese settler interests. The problem of discipline arose partly from the fact the Portuguese fidalgo or nobleman could be punished only by the viceroy and the High Court (Relação) of Goa for any crime he committed. The captain-general had only the power to order his arrest. The arrest itself would have to be done by the ouvidor or judge who would then send the accused to Goa for trial. Pereira however took no steps against the chief offenders who happened to be two of his nephews. ⁽⁶³⁾ The ouvidor

(63) Queyroz 622; JCBRAS XI.495; TT. Corpo chronologico part. I maco 116 doc. 87; AHU Caixa V.21.11.1617; AHU Caixa VI.2.11.1618. The two nephews of the general Manoel Cezar and Don Francisco Pereira became well-known for their lawless and high-handed acts. Pereira kidnapped a young Portuguese girl and kept her in his house for one and a half months. Cezar did not scruple to use force against officials of the camara and even against priests. The camara in a letter dated 21 November 1617 complained to the king as follows ' queixasse mais este povo e cidade dos criados do geral acutilarem e matarem m^{to} homens e cometerẽ adulterios porque se matarão mulheres cazados e entrarem em cazas de viuas honradas e fazerem m^{tas} forcas.'

Francisco Gomes dos Santos displayed no wish to alienate the captain-general, his superior in rank, by proceeding against his favourites. After a time therefore even the outward forms of justice ceased to be observed and general and subordinates alike displayed no scruples about making money at the expense of the royal treasury. The consequent oppression^s of the Sinhalese only tended to increase support for Kuruwita Rala.

Moreover Pereira's actions in this period were also governed by a suspicion of all Sinhalese leaders. At one stage he even suspected that Dom Constantino Barreto might lead a new rebellion in Matara.⁽⁶⁴⁾ Distrustful of the Sinhalese and disliked by the Portuguese Pereira grew increasingly ineffective as a general. This is why the arrival of a competent captain-general in the person of Constantino de Sa de Noronha in September 1618 became such a significant event.⁽⁶⁵⁾

The revolt of Nikapitiya, the peace with Kandy and the appointment of de Sa as captain-general were three key events

(64) DR V.239; Botelho de Souza III.57

(65) The need for a successor to Pereira did not arise out of any doubts in Lisbon as to his ability. On the contrary the king had decided in March 1617 that he was best fitted by experience and standing to take up the captain-generalship of Moçambique. (DR V.37-38,45)

in a period which saw the end of the Azevedo era in Portuguese Ceylon. The first clearly showed the Portuguese that they had by no means won the loyalty of the Sinhalese inhabitants of Kotte even after two decades of rule. The second gave them - for the first time since they claimed Kotte in their own right - a chance to reorganize the administration of the kingdom, provide for its defence and to try to win over the people, without the distraction of a war against Kandy. The third gave the Portuguese in Ceylon, a gifted leader for the tasks that lay ahead.

Constantino de Sa de Noronha was undoubtedly a natural leader of men. As Fr. Fernao de Queyroz put it 'his gallant disposition and manly frame and stature, tall and robust along with great strength, firmness and perfect health won him respect.' (66) De Sa came from a family with a tradition of service overseas. His own father, Martim Lourenco de Sa de Menezes had served as the warden of Ceuta. Brought up in Belem, the settlement along the river Tagus from which almost all the famous Portuguese explorers set sail, he was from early days exposed to the lure of the Portuguese overseas empire. However de Sa's departure to the East was not a product of his yearning for adventure. It was an event prompted by economic necessity. He had inherited little. His marriage in 1607 to Dona Luiza da Silva

de Medonça was merely a union between two impoverished noble households. De Sa therefore had to recourse to the only occupation thought honourable to the Portuguese fidalgo of the seventeenth century - a career in the armed services. He served in the navy for a year and then for two and a half years more in the north African fort of Mazagão. These years of service however brought him little fortune while the birth of five children to his wife certainly increased the economic pressure on him. (67)

De Sa left Lisbon for the East in 1614. Four years later he had established a reputation for himself as a leader of men and occupied the important position of the captain-major of the Fleet of Cape Camorin (1617-1618). In his rise he was undoubtedly assisted by his kinsmen but his exploits had already won him so much recognition that when on 8 October 1618 the new viceroy, Don Joao Coutinho, Conde de Redondo summoned a meeting of his council to choose a new captain-general for Ceylon (until the king made a fresh appointment) de Sa

(67) De Sa's five children included two daughters - Dona Joana and Dona Francisca. His eldest son was João Rodriguez de Sa de Menezes. For further details of de Sa's family and personal life see - JCBRAS XI.480-494; Bocarro 325, 446, 469, 645-648; AHU.501 ff.167;350; Simancas SP.1505 ff.10.44; C.R.Boxer- Commentaries of Ruy Freire da Andrade 315; TT.Livros do ordem do Christo XXI ff.35.58v

was the unanimous choice.⁽⁶⁸⁾

De Sa left Goa on 15 October of the same year with a small force of twenty seven men. A month later he arrived at Colombo.⁽⁶⁹⁾ His first task was the re-organization of the armed forces, for Portuguese power in the island in the last analysis depended on the army. He moved cautiously at first consulting the disavas and the Portuguese captains of

(68) Queyroz 759-760 holds that Constantino de Sa did not seek to enrich himself when he was captain-general of Ceylon. De Sa de Menezes (JCBRAS XI 566-567) also makes this contention pointing out that he spent eighteen thousand xerafins of his own money in works of fortification while refusing huge bribes offered by the king of Kandy. Contemporary documents however indicate that de Sa did not neglect opportunities to make money. Although his salary was fixed at four thousand xerafins a year the Bishop of Cochim in 1619 calculated his annual income to be twenty thousand xerafins. (AHU 33.f.21). ~~Such~~ His mansion at Rossapana near Malwana was kept in such style that the king ordered an investigation be made as to whether such luxury was in accordance with royal instructions. (TT.LM.15.f.16; TT.Ms. da Convento da Graca tomo.3F.ff.41, 46.303; BNL.caixa 199.doc.78; TT.LM.13.f.243) Instead of prohibiting private trade among Portuguese officials in Ceylon as his son claimed he did (JCBRAS XI.539-40) de Sa himself carried on a barter trade with the Kandyans supplying cloth and salt in exchange for arexanut and elephants. (Evora CXVI/2-3. ff.67-67v; Ajuda 51-VIII-40 f.221; BNL. Pombalina 490.f.196) Such practice however was common among Portuguese officials in India.

(69) DR.V. 242; TT.Ms.da Liv. 1699.f.247

the estancias.⁽⁷⁰⁾ He appointed Filipe de Oliveira as captain-major of the Portuguese forces and entrusted him with the regrouping of the six hundred Portuguese soldiers available for duty. The disavas were requested to muster the lascarin forces. To counter Kuruwita Rala's excellent system of obtaining news of the movements of Portuguese troops, de Sa established an espionage corps of his own. Finally, he exchanged envoys with Kandy recognising that peace with Kandy was essential to secure the defeat of the rebel forces.⁽⁷¹⁾

Having completed his preparations de Sa resolved, on the advice of more experienced Portuguese ~~soldiers~~ captains to construct a stockade at Sabaragamuwa, on the site of the sixteenth century city of Sitawaka. The stockade was to act as a base for the campaign planned against Mayadunne and Kuruwita Rala. De Sa determined to avoid any risk of a revolt in the subjugated areas while he was away in the Two Korales. Thus sizeable garrisons were left in all Portuguese forts.⁽⁷²⁾ The new stockade at Sabaragamuwa was left in charge of two companies of Portuguese soldiers aided by a force of lascarins. A thousand Sinhalese under Luis Cabral de Faria guarded the Four Korales. The defensive deployment of these

(70) About thirty soldiers formed one estancia or company.

(71) Queyroz 623; Kustantinu Hatana stanzas 65-70; JCBRAS XI. 495-496, 498, 500; Botelho de Souza III. 59 relying on a single document states that Senerat made a new peace with de Sa giving up Batticaloa to the Portuguese.

(72) Colombo, Malwana, Menikkadawara and Galle. (Kustantinu Hatana stanzas 83-87)

forces left de Sa with little more than three hundred soldiers to spare. With this force and a detachment of lascarins he set out in late 1618 to eliminate the power of Mayadunne and Kuruwita Rala.⁽⁷³⁾

The two rebel leaders having no wish to meet the general and his well-armed troops in open battle retired to their mountain stronghold of Meddegama, just inside the borders of Kandy. The distance from Sabaragamuwa fort to Meddegama as the crow flies was hardly twenty miles. To make it on foot however was no easy proposition. The shortest route lay along the valley of Bambarabotuwa Oya.⁽⁷⁴⁾ Kuruwita Rala had however made considerable defensive preparations along the valley which being thickly forested and replete with rivulets was the ideal scene for guerrilla warfare. De Sa had no wish to risk his forces in a frontal attack, but being determined to attack Meddegama he made a wide detour to the south, thus avoiding the difficult country that protected the rebel stronghold and advanced on Meddegama from the rear along the Walawe Ganga. Kuruwita Rala and Mayadunne promptly

(73) Queyroz 624; JCBRAS XI.500-503; F.de Souza VI. 185-186

(74) Across the present Meda Pattuwa Korale of the province of Sabaragamuwa.

retired further inland hoping to entice de Sa further but de Sa decided to return to Sabaragamuwa partly owing to an outbreak of small-pox among the lascarins. Hampered by many sick soldiers de Sa decided to take a shorter route on the return journey, though he once more avoided the route along the Bambarabotuwa Oya but Kuruwita Rala and Mayadunne realizing the difficulties of the Portuguese were soon on their heels. For over twenty-five miles from Imbulpe to Lellopitiya they pursued the Portuguese, cutting off stragglers and doing all they could to impede their march. At length at Lellopitiya, within four miles of the Portuguese fort of Sabaragamuwa, the captain-general decided to counter-attack. He feigned to retire in disorder and laid an ambush. The Sinhalese, elated by their success rushed into the trap and were routed by the Portuguese forces. (75)

The encounter at Lellopitiya had been hailed as a great victory for de Sa by both Sinhalese and Portuguese writers of the seventeenth century. The greatest Sinhalese poet of the age, Alagiyawanna, wrote a poem Kustantinu Hatana (76) (or the battle of Constantino) depicting it as a great triumph.

(75) Kustantinu Hatana stanzas 97-180; Queyroz 625; JCBRAS XI. 504-505; F.de Souza VI. 186

(76) Baptised as Don Jeronimo Alagiyawanna in the time of Azevedo.

De Sa de Menezes and Queyroz claim that eight thousand Sinhalese were killed in the struggle without the loss of a single Portuguese and that Kangara Aratchi, a renowned Sinhalese rebel leader was captured. Queyroz moreover states that forty mudaliyars of the rebels were killed in battle. Alagiyawanna maintained that thirty two mudaliyars were captured and mentions the names of four of them. ⁽⁷⁷⁾

Of the three writers only Alagiyawanna was a contemporary resident in Ceylon at the time of the battle. However his poem is obviously an eulogistic account of the activities of the general and allowance must be made for poetic licence. Alagiyawanna moreover was a Christian convert and had been in Portuguese service for many years. De Sa de Menezes when he wrote his ~~biography~~ father's biography would have been influenced not merely by filial affection but also by the expectation of material reward for his father's services. Moreover, when he composed his work over twenty years had elapsed since the battle of Lellopitiya. De Sa de Menezes had not ^{yet} visited the East. Of these writers therefore, only Queyroz can be expected to take a reasonable detached view. But Queyroz does not seem to have relied on contemporary documents. His account of the battle is taken

(77) Kustantinu Hatana stanzas 180; JCBRAS XI.505; Queyroz 625; F.de Souza claims that thirty five mudaliyars were captured.

from de Sa de Menezes's 'Rebellion de Ceylan' and a certificate of Francisco Barbosa da Andrade dated 3 June 1634. (78)

Internal evidence in these three accounts and their comparison with that of Faria de Souza suggests that the Portuguese victory has been considerably exaggerated. Even on the face of it the estimate of Sinhalese losses given in Queyroz and de Sa de Menezes is suspected in view of the low casualty figure quoted for the Portuguese. Faria de Souza claims that the force trapped numbered only five hundred men. A contemporary Jesuit report scales down the battle still further by asserting that only thirty three of the enemy were killed during the whole campaign. The account of the capture of Kangara Aratchi given by de Sa de Menezes and repeated by Queyroz is open to doubt, especially as Alagiyawanna fails mention him among the leaders seized. Queyroz himself gives another account of how Kangara Aratchi was captured. (79)

The events following Lellopitiya moreover support the view that it was merely a minor ambush. The Portuguese army continued to retreat towards Sabaragamuwa even after

(78) Jornada 9

(79) Queyroz 729; Kustantinu Hatana stanzas 177

the encounter. The only tangible result was therefore the safe return of the Portuguese force.⁽⁸⁰⁾ In fact the months which followed the battle saw an extension of the area under rebel control and continued attacks by Mayadunne on the lands of Kotte. But for this/^{the}chief reason probably lay in important developments in Jaffna.

The ruler of Jaffna had faced an unenviable task since 1591. He was pledged to favour Christianity and oppose all enemies of the Portuguese. On the other hand he had to conciliate the mass of his subjects who remained Hindu in faith. The ruler's difficulties were increased by the rise in power of the nobility during the last half of the sixteenth century. The nobility however were by no means united and while some of them were involved in trade relations with Kandy and south India, others who were converted to Christianity looked to the Portuguese for advancement. The whole situation was complicated by the attitude of the missionary priests some of whom like Fr. Pedro Betancor, relying on the support of the Portuguese in Mannar, behaved in an arrogant fashion.⁽⁸¹⁾ Sankili who had been confirmed governor by the Portuguese in 1617 was by no means fitted to deal with the delicate

(80) Queyroz 627; JCBRAS XI. 565. 508

(81) Queyroz 665-666

situation. He was as Queyroz described him 'proud, ambitious (and weak.' His difficulties were further aggravated by his unpopularity. Many in Jaffna resented the killing of some of the princes of the royal family in the coup by which he came into power. He also lost popular esteem by his open association with a woman dancer. The suspicion that Sankili intended to do away with the heir and make his own son-in-law king added greatly to the unrest in the country. Profiting by the general discontent two Christian mudaliyars Dom Pedro and Dom Luis with the support of the Portuguese casados resident in Jaffna raised a revolt against Sankili and drove him to Kayts in August-September 1618. Sankili immediately applied to the captain of Mannar for help against the rebels. The captain who provided a refuge for Sankili in ^aFranciscan monastery proved unwilling to give Sankili military assistance against a rising led by the Portuguese and the Christians. Sankili therefore turned to the Nayaka of Tanjore for help. The powerful Ragunatha Nayaka (1600-1634) was only too glad to aid a neighbouring Hindu ruler against what he thought to be a Christian revolt supported by the Portuguese. A force of five thousand men was sent from Tanjore under Varuna Kulattan. Meanwhile the efforts of the rebels to provide an alternative to Sankili by inviting the nephew of Pararajasingham who was living in Rameswaran met with little success and the

rebellion was swiftly crushed.⁽⁸²⁾

The subsequent policy of Sankili was determined by his own weakness in Jaffna. Henceforth his power rested largely on a contingent of troops from Tanjore. This force remained under the command of Varuna Kulattan who stayed in Jaffna and received high honours.⁽⁸³⁾ Being dependant on a foreign contingent to maintain power in his own kingdom Sankili could neither hope to take effective action against those who rebelled against him nor break with the Portuguese. Thus the casados and priests who did not forgive him for his alliance with Tanjore were allowed to remain unmolested though they formed a potential fifth column. These were not slow to point out to the captain of Mannar that Sankili had violated his agreement with the Portuguese by bringing Vadugai troops into the country.⁽⁸⁴⁾ Sankili seemed to have hoped that the Portuguese would ignore this infringement in the same way as they had tolerated Ethirmanne Singham's policy of aiding Kandy.

Portuguese policy towards Jaffna during this period was simple. Ever since the news had reached Lisbon that Jaffna was a route of supply to the Kandyan enemy, the king

- (82) Vriddagirison 76-77, 80-81, 91; DR.VI.195; Assentos I.11-13; Queyroz 467-468; P.da Trindade III.208-209
- (83) Queyroz 631. Varuna Kulata or Varuna Kulattan is the name given in Queyroz 468. F.de Souza VI. 214 calls him Chem Nayak, the king of the careas.
- (84) ~~Queyroz 636.~~ Vadugai and Bagadas as the Portuguese of the seventeenth century termed them were Telugu speaking people of the Madura area.

of Portugal had requested that Jaffna be conquered and incorporated into the Portuguese estado da India.⁽⁸⁵⁾ The viceroy Azevedo (1612-1617) however had found that the execution of this order required troops which he could not spare. Thus though he passed on the king's orders to Ceylon he also maintained normal relations with Jaffna and exercised the right of the suzerain in confirming the regencies of Arasakesari and Sankili.⁽⁸⁶⁾ The new viceroy Don João Coutinho at first held that Azevedo's letter of appointment to Sankili precluded the Portuguese from any hostilities against him.⁽⁸⁷⁾ By the end of August 1618 he had changed his mind and had accepted the wisdom of conquering Jaffna as soon as forces were available. By the end of that month reports from the captain of Mannar, the Commissioner of the Franciscans and the ouvidor or crown judge of Mannar had convinced the viceroy and his council that the time was ripe for the conquest of Jaffna. Instructions were therefore sent to Francisco de Miranda Henriques, captain-major of the Malabar fleet to accomplish this task.⁽⁸⁸⁾ Before Henriques could arrive in Jaffna, another expedition had been sent from Kotte against

(85) DR II. 465; TT.LM. 13.f.115

(86) F.de Souza VI.216; A.Bocarro 699; Queyroz 466; Vriddagirison 80

(87) TT.corpo chronologico part.I. maco 116.doc. 87

(88) DR II. 195; Assentos I. 11-13

Sankili by Constantino de Sa.

De Sa's expedition was not aimed at overthrowing Sankili to gain possession of Jaffna as was the viceroy's but was rather preventive in intent. Its military objective was to check any movement of south Indian mercenaries through Jaffna into rebel-held territory and to deal with rumoured attempts by Sankili to win over Senerat to renewed opposition, in alliance with Mayadunne, against the Portuguese. De Sa also apparently placed some weight on the story that Sankili had sought aid from the Dutch at Pulicat.⁽⁸⁹⁾ Further in March 1619 the captain-general received news from Mannar that one Pedro Rodrigues,⁽⁹⁰⁾ a cousin of the last Kunjali admiral of Calicut had appeared off Jaffna with five armed vessels,

(89) Assentos I. 52.59

(90) Born in 1578, he was taken prisoner in 1591 by Andre Furtado de Mendonça in his victory over the Kunjali fleet. He became a Christian and was henceforth called Don Pedro Rodrigues. Soon after he married a Portuguese orphan but was still not granted complete liberty. One night he escaped with his family and gathering a band of Malabari followers began attacking Portuguese shipping.

presumably at the request of Sankili and was plundering all Portuguese shipping.

In addition to dealing with these problems and strengthening the Portuguese position in Jaffna de Sa's expedition was intended to ensure the prompt payment of tribute which was in arrears ⁽⁹¹⁾ and to put an end to the competition of Jaffna elephant sales with those made by the Portuguese. The export of elephants from Kotte formed an important source of revenue for the Portuguese. These elephants

(91) Queyroz, ⁶³¹ states that Sankili owed the Portuguese tribute for ~~thirty~~ ^{three} years. This is unlikely as the question of tribute did not arise when Sankili asked for ~~against~~ aid against the two Christian mudaliyars who revolted against him in August-September 1618. The regimento of Constantino de Sa given to Filipe de Oliveira requires the latter to collect 'money of the elephants.' It is known that according to the treaty of 1591 the king of Jaffna was forced to pay annually ten elephants or thirteen thousand fanams a year. It is possible that the disturbances of 1618 made Sankili fall behind in his payment of tribute but in that case the tribute would have been owing only for 1618-1619. Another possible explanation of this demand for the 'dinheiro dos elefantes' is that it may refer to the elephants sent to Jaffna for sale in 1615 by the then captain-general Manoel Mascarenhas Homem and the vedor Antao Vaz Freire. Due to the viceroy's prohibition on the sale of elephants that year, these animals were left unsold in the care of the king of Jaffna. In any case this issue gained even greater importance due to the shortage of funds among the Portuguese as de Sa explained in his orders to Oliveira 'there is no money to pay the soldiers, nor for their food allowance, nor to buy rice for the winter save that obtained from (the sale of) elephants.' Assentos I.55-56,59; Regimentos dos fortalezas da India, (edited by P.S.S.Pissublenkar) 359-360.

were usually transported overland to Mannar or Jaffna for sale. Here they had to face competition from elephants sold by the ruler of Jaffna himself. The move into Jaffna would not only secure the control of the trading ground but also give the Portuguese greater control over the selling price.

Of the various reasons for action the fear that Sankili, with the aid of the Dutch and of Don Pedro's fleet might attack Mannar and thus endanger the Portuguese position in Ceylon was doubtless the strongest and the most urgent. This explains why ^{de Sa} ~~he~~ did not rest content with the appealing to Goa for aid. Despite the presence of rebels in Kotte itself, he prepared a strong expeditionary force of about two hundred and thirty Portuguese and three thousand lascarins.⁽⁹²⁾ This force was sent to Mannar in two detachments. The first consisting of about a hundred Portuguese with many lascarins sailed from Colombo in two galliots under João da Silva and João Madeira and ~~six~~ boats under Vitorio de Abreu.⁽⁹³⁾ The second led by Filipe de Oliveira consisted of a hundred and thirty Portuguese and the rest of the lascarins. This force marched overland across the Seven Korales to Pooneryn.

(92) BM.Add. Ms. 9853.f.158; F.de Souza VI.189; Queyroz 629

(93) Assentos I. 44-45, 52; F.de Souza VI.187-188; Queyroz 628; JCBRAS XI.507; K.Nambiar- The Kunjalis, admirals of Calicut, 142-143

The two forces were to safeguard Mannar, defeat the Malabar force of Don Pedro and obtain immediate payment of arrears ~~from~~ of tribute from Jaffna. If Sankili refused to pay tribute or was proved to have had treasonable dealings with Don Pedro, Oliveira was empowered to conquer the kingdom. ⁽⁹⁴⁾

The seaborne force reached Mannar first. The captain of Mannar strengthened the fleet with twelve small crafts of his own. Wishing to gain all the credit for the expulsion of the Malabar forces he decided that this combined squadron should attack Don Pedro without waiting for Filipe de Oliveira. However the incompetant handling of the attack resulted in the loss of twelve of the eighteen boats and over three hundred men. The Portuguese thereupon retired to Jaffna. De Oliveira meanwhile arrived at Pooneryn after an exhausting march across the arid lands separating Kotte from the northern kingdom. ⁽⁹⁵⁾ From Pooneryn he sent a message to Sankili asking for a ferry-boat to cross the lagoon to the Jaffna peninsula. Sankili complied. The casados of Jaffna also sent a vessel to help in the transport but the crossing took eight days to complete. ⁽⁹⁶⁾ After consultations with the captain of Mannar, Oliveira decided to appeal for naval assistance from Negapatam

(94) Assentos I. 52-54, 59; F.de Souza VI.189; Queyroz 629

(95) De Oliveira's march was slow due to sickness anotacted on the way. Assentos I.54; Queyroz 629

(96) Queyroz 629: F.de Souza VI. 187-188; Assentos I.55

The lagoon crossing was four miles wide and the boats could take only a few at a time. De Oliveira in a letter to the viceroy dated 8.6.1619 later complained that Sankili impeded the crossing by scaring away the sailors who would have helped to man the boats.

as he did not feel that the two galliots alone could safely attack the fleet of Dom Pedro. On news of Portuguese preparations however, Dom Pedro thought it ^{best} to sail away (97) and thus one of ^{de} Oliveira's problems disappeared.

Sankili's conduct during the whole of Dom Pedro episode had been impeccable. He had not only refrained from allying ^{himself} with this powerful enemy of the Portuguese but had even given valuable assistance to the Portuguese themselves. To the Portuguese fleet defeated by the Malabaris, Jaffna was made available as a port of refuge, while the advancing ^{de} Oliveira was furnished with ferry boats to cross the lagoon. His conduct therefore suggests that Sankili (98) still viewed the Portuguese as his allies and protectors.

De Oliveira's conduct during the next few days undeceived him. De Oliveira demanded the immediate payment of the tribute and the surrender of the commander of Sankili's south Indian mercenary troops. Compliance with the second demand would have meant the crippling of Sankili's power. He therefore declined to give up Varuna Kulattan and pointed out that some of the tribute demanded had already been paid.

(97) Queyroz 630; Assentos I.55

(98) If Sankili had been contemplating an anti-Portuguese alliance he would scarcely have missed the chance to attack ^{de} Oliveira's Portuguese forces while the Sinhalese lascarins were still in Pooneryn.

Sankili however was aware of his own position. The total force at his disposal did not exceed four thousand men. He therefore chose to negotiate and requested^{de} Oliveira to withdraw to Pooneryn ^{upon} for an immediate payment of five thousand pardãos and the payment of similar sum within the next three months. He also offered to send back his Vadugai troops to south India.^{de} Oliveira accepted the first payment as he was short of money to buy provisions for the troops, but instead^{de} of moving his troops across the lagoon he advanced to Vannarpannai. This led to a clash between the Sinhalese lascarins of the Portuguese force and the Jaffna army. The ensuing battle resulted in the total defeat of the latter after it had gained some early success. On this news Sankili and his family fled in a boat towards the south Indian coast but were blown back to Point Pedro. In his second attempt to flee Jaffna in a larger boat he was overtaken and captured by his Portuguese pursuers.⁽⁹⁹⁾ Vamuna Kulattan had better fortune and escaped to Tanjore.

DeOliveira occupied the capital Nallur, and established his headquarters at the great Hindu temple there. A part of the Portuguese force was left at the

(99) Assentos I. 55-57; Queyroz 631; F.de Souza VI. 188-190
P.da Trindade III. 21-212

Franciscan church in Jaffna under Francisco Pereira Velho. With the capture of Sankili, all resistance ceased.^{de} Oliveira thereupon annexed the kingdom to the Portuguese empire in the name of the king. As the land appeared quiet,^{de} Oliveira sent Antonio da Motta Galvão with one hundred Portuguese and most of the lascarins back to Kotte as he knew the general was in need of troops.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ Da Motta was also instructed to escort Sankili to Colombo from where he was sent to Goa for trial.⁽¹⁰¹⁾

The ease of the Portuguese conquest of Jaffna contrasts with their failure to conquer Kandy. The reasons for this could be seen partly in the differing locations^f and size, population and racial composition of the two kingdoms. Kandy situated in the central regions of Ceylon was far more difficult of access than Jaffna, whose capital was less than a day's march from the sea. The Kandyan kingdom moreover, being larger in size and rugged afforded the defeated monarch many places of refuge. In fact in Ceylon history^y Kandy has traditionally being the 'home of the lost causes' and the northernⁿ plains of Ceylon 'the

(100) Queyroz 631; BM.9853.f.158; Assentos I.50-51

(101) Sankili was tried in the Relação or High Court of Goa for treason and found guilty. He became a Christian before he was executed. The two nephews of Sankili were sent with him to Colombo for as^u Oliveira put it ' todo o q cheirar a principe he bom estar longe daqui.'

TT.LM. 15.f.62; Filмотека Reis Vizinhos 34/4-5, 37/1-2

first prey of the invader.' Furthermore the ruler of Kandy apart from his ability to rely on a larger population could always hope as a last resort to subvert the fellow-Sinhalese lascarin soldiers of the Portuguese. In Jaffna on the other hand the Portuguese could use the Sinhalese lascarins with confidence against the Tamil population. (102)

Another major reason for Portuguese success seems to have been a lack of Tamil leadership and unity in Jaffna.

Sankili as a leader compares unfavourably with any of the Kandyan kings who fought the Portuguese. He lacked the foresight to envisage the eventual clash between his loyalties to the Portuguese and those to Tanjore. Finally, note should be taken of the growth of a pro-Portuguese Christian minority within Jaffna. The Christians had been strong enough to make Sankili seek aid from Tanjore. During and after the conquest they provided a source of strength in Jaffna that the Portuguese never possessed in Kandy.

The conquest of Jaffna meant a great accession of strength to the Portuguese in India as well as in Ceylon. With Jaffna in their hands the Portuguese communications

(102) The original invasion force contained three hundred thousand Sinhalese lascarins, one thousand five hundred Sinhalese coolies and only two hundred and thirty Portuguese soldiers.

between the Malabar and the Coromandel coasts became much safer and the Dutch settlement at Pulicat began to look
 (103)
 even more isolated. The flow of south Indian mercenaries to Ceylon was checked to some degree. The lands of Jaffna itself though not as rich as those of Kotte became a useful means of rewarding the services of Portuguese soldiers. The possession of Jaffna moreover enabled the Portuguese to gain a greater measure of control over the supply of elephants from the Vanni and ^{over} the pearl fishery off Mannar.

It took some time however before the Portuguese hold in Jaffna became a secure one. The danger to Portuguese rule in the area was twofold. Firstly there was a risk of a revolt, by the anti-Portuguese Tamil element in Jaffna. Secondly there was the threat of invasion by the forces of Raghunathay Nayak of Tanjore. During the period June 1619 to February 1621 the Portuguese had to face the opposition of both these elements. The Portuguese forces in Jaffna ~~in this period~~ ranged between one hundred and one hundred and fifty soldados plus some twenty casados and about a
 (104)
 thousand Sinhalese lascarins. This force was sometimes

(103) The Dutch had set up a factory at Pulicat in 1610. The Portuguese destroyed it in 1612 and the Dutch promptly replaced it with a fort in the following year. The attempt of the Portuguese to seize the fort in 1615 failed but since that time its destruction had remained a cherished objective. The Dutch wished to maintain their hold on Pulicat rose from the desire to gain a supply of Coromandel cloth with which they traded in the East Indies.

(104) Ajuda 50-V-51.f.163; Reimers 56; P.da Trindade III.215

hard pressed by Tamil armies of up to five thousand men but the Portuguese had three great advantages; the support of the Christian Tamils of Jaffna, the possibility of obtaining reinforcements from Kotte and the information regarding Tanjore preparations provided by the Portuguese at Negapatam. These factors enabled them eventually to wear down the Hindu Tamils of Jaffna and the Nayak of Tanjore.

The first real challenge to Portuguese authority came in March 1620. By the end of 1619 Dom Luis, who had hitherto been one of the foremost supporters of the Portuguese in Jaffna was disillusioned by the role assigned to him in the Portuguese regime. He therefore fled to Tanjore taking with him two Tamil princesses who had been in his charge since 1616. In Tanjore he appealed to Raghunatha~~y~~ for aid to expel the Portuguese and to enthrone the only member of the Jaffna royal family outside Portuguese control, the prince of Rameswaram. Raghunatha~~y~~ was only too willing to seize a chance to re-establish the position he had enjoyed in Jaffna while Varuna Kulattan commanded Sankili's Vadugai troops. He promptly organized a new expedition to Jaffna. The prince of Rameswaram reassured by Raghunatha~~y~~'s assistance organized his army to take possession of

Jaffna. ⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ The arrival of the first ^{Danish} ~~Dutch~~ ship in the East with the new of further forces to follow gave Dom Luis and the prince hopes of a new ally against the Portuguese. ⁽¹⁰⁶⁾

The force organized by the Nayak was the first to land. It was only a thousand strong but Dom Luis who commanded it counted on the support of the Hindus of Jaffna. He was not disappointed for from the time the invading force landed at Talaimannar in March 1620 it grew daily in size and strength. *de* Oliveira was for once caught unprepared. The bulk of his forces had been sent back to Kotte. *de* Oliveira decided to make a stand at his headquarters at the Hindu temple at Nallur with about thirty Portuguese and a force of Sinhalese auxiliaries. In the settlement of Jaffna Francisco Velho organized the defence of the well built Franciscan church

(105) Queyroz 634 holds that the attempt of the prince of Rameswaram to expel the Portuguese was distinct from and prior to the first attempt made by Don Luis. However evidence in P.da Trindade III. 214-216 and F.de Souza VI.212-214 make it clear that the mudaliyar 'das Maminhas' who invited the prince to Jaffna was none other than Don Luis himself. What P.da Trindade III.214-218 and F.de Souza VI.212-214 depict as one great attempt by Varuna Kulattan, the prince of Rameswaram and Don Luis to seize control of Jaffna, Queyroz 633-638 presents as three separate attempts. Contemporary documents support the Trindade-F.de Souza version. (TT.LM.15 ff.59.67,190, 193; Filmoteca Reis Vizinhos I. 48/2-3
 (106) P.da Trindade III. 217-218. See pages 116 to 119 on the first Danish expedition to the East.

of Nossa Senhora dos Milagres with the aid of twenty casados and a number of Tamil Christians. A further detachment of Portuguese was detailed to defend Kayts. The combined Tamil and Vadugai force which now amounted to over three thousand men attacked both the church at Jaffna and the pagoda at Nallur. For almost a month the Portuguese were thus confined to these garrison posts.

It was sea-power which saved the meagre Portuguese forces in Jaffna. This enabled a supply of munitions sent by the casados of Negapatam to reach Jaffna safely. As important was the safe arrival of a force of two hundred Sinhalese under Antonio da Motta Galvao by sea. This force (probably sent to relieve a part of the Sinhalese detachment on garrison duty in Jaffna) proved to be of immense use. Moreover command of the sea enabled the Portuguese to send a request for aid to Constantino de Sa who promptly sent a relieving force of one hundred and twenty Portuguese and ~~one~~ ^{one} thousand five hundred Sinhalese lascarins under Luis Teixeira de Macedo by land and a fleet of six vessels under Andre Coelho by sea. The ^ecruel, ruthless measures of de Macedo ⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ cowed the inhabitants of Jaffna while the

(107) P.da Trindade III. 216 and F.de Souza VI.215 accuse de Macedo of cruelty - that he cut children in two, severed breasts of women and cut open the abdomen of women and pushed their babies inside. These accusations seem confirmed by contemporary documents. CALX III.25

inhabitants of Jaffna while the combined relief forces defeated Dom Luis and forced him to flee to Tanjore, leaving his own family in Portuguese hands.

Meanwhile the prince of Rameswaram unaware of the defeat of his allies had landed at Elaur with^a a contingent of one thousand fighting men. At this stage the Christian Tamils of Jaffna gave news of the new invasion to^{de} Oliveira, who being determined to check the revolt before it could spread sent de Macedo with a strong force against the prince. The prince was defeated and captured a few miles north of Nallur and the land returned to obedience once more. De Macedo and de Motta thereupon returned to Kotte with their troops and the captive prince was sent with them to Colombo.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾

The failure of his first attempt by no means discouraged Don Luis. On his return to Tanjore he appealed once more^{de} to Raghunathan^{de}. Raghunathan^{de} thereupon prepared a second and stronger expeditionary force. The new enterprise was put under the overall command of Varuna Kulattan, a veteran of the Jaffna campaign of 1618-1619.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾

The Portuguese at Negapatam kept de Oliveira informed

(108) AHU 501.f.185v; AHU Caixa XXII.4.8.1654; P.da Trindade III. 214-216; F.de Souza VI.212-213; Queyroz 635-638; Filmoteca Reis Vizinhos I. 45/5, 45-46/5-1, 46/1-2, 48/2-3

(109) P.da Trindade III.219 states ~~that~~ the command of the enterprise was given to Cheni (Chem Nayak) the chief of the Tanjore nobility while the general of the expeditionary force was Bornagolate (Varuna Kulattan). However evidence in F.de Souza VI. 214 and Queyroz 468 show that Chem Nayak, king of the Careas and Varuna Kulattan were the same person. Contemporary letters refer to only one leader - the king of the Careas.

of these developments. He in turn reported the matter to de Sa. De Sa's problem was that with the continuing revolt in Kotte he could not afford permanently to leave forces strong enough^{to}/defend Jaffna without assistance. Nor was the Portuguese command~~er~~ of the sea complete enough to prevent the landing of hostile forces from Tanjore. The best de Sa could do was to promise speedy assistance in case of attack. De Oliveira meanwhile did not stay idle. On the fifteenth of August 1620 he began to build a small fort with two bulwarks , surrounding the Franciscan church in Jaffna. The Portuguese forces at Nallur were withdrawn to this fort. In November the casados of Negapatam sent munitions to Jaffna with a warning that invasion was imminent. Eventually on 5 December two thousand men from Tanjore landed at Tondaimannar. Once more the Hindus of Jaffna joined the invaders.

De Oliveira advanced to meet the invading forces. The result was a ^adrwn battle at Nallur. As the Tamil forces proved stronger than expected de Oliveira retired to Jaffna to await reinforcements. The Tamils in their turn sent requests for further forces from Tanjore. Fortunately for de Oliveira the Portuguese relief force under Antonio da Motta Galvão arrived first. This force of ninety Portuguese and a thousand Sinhalese lascarins arrived on 14 January 1621.

De Oliveira attacked the enemy encampments at Nallur soon after and defeated the Tamils after heavy fighting. However it needed a further battle at Kopay in early February 1621 before the invasion force was completely destroyed and its (110) commander killed.

The challenge to Portuguese rule however was not yet over, for the Nayak of Tanjore despatched a fresh force prepared in response to Varuna Kulattan's call for aid in December 1620. By the time these forces arrived however de Oliveira was in control of most of Jaffna. The new force was ambushed at Achch^uveli by da Motta on 11 February 1621 before it could gain any support in Jaffna. The Tanjore dead included the new governor of Jaffna sent by the Nayak. With this defeat ended the second and final attempt of Raghunatha^u to conquer Jaffna. For the next six years therefore peace returned to Jaffna. These years were used by de Oliveira (111) to build up and consolidate Portuguese power in the kingdom.

It will be recalled that when de Sa sent his first expedition to Jaffna in 1619, he was also still engaged in the struggle in Kotte against both Mayadunne and Kuruwita Rala.

(110) P.da Trindade III. 219-221; F.de Souza VI. 214; Queyroz 638-641; TT.LM.15. ff.59.190.193
 (111) Queyroz 642-645; P.da Trindade III. 221-223; F.de Souza VI.215

These latter naturally profit~~ed~~ by the diversion of Portuguese attention. Kuruwita Rala promptly advanced into the Seven Korales while Mayadunne tried to establish himself in the Two Korales. To meet this new challenge de Sa himself led a strong Portuguese force to the Seven Korales and forced Kuruwita Rala to retire to Uva, while disava Don Constantino defeated Mayadunne. The main forces of the rebels were quickly driven out of Portuguese ter^ritory. ⁽¹¹²⁾

However, the defeat of Mayadunne and Kuruwita Rala did not restore peace in Kotte. It merely changed the nature of the conflict. Small bands of Sinhalese guer^rillas basing themselves on forested areas impeded Portuguese control of near-by villages. As each group numbered only about a hundred men their elimination proved a difficult task. Therefore for most of 1619 a large portion of the Seven Korales remained free of Portuguese control. The Portuguese task was made even more difficult by a new rising led by mudaliyar Ekanayake in Matara. Mayadunne and Kuruwita Rala too had their own problems for they had to carry on another campaign against Senerat in Kandy.

By the end of 1619 with the return of a part of the expeditionary force sent to Jaffna and the arrival of

(112) Queyroz 627; JCBRAS XI.510; BM.Add.Ms.9853.f.158

reinforcements from Goa the Portuguese were able to take the offensive. Disava ^{Dom}Constantino of Matara attacked and set fire to Mayadunne's mountain capital at Maddegama Nuwara. Military cooperation with Senerat also continued. On one occasion disava Dom Constantino led a hundred Portuguese and over one thousand lascarins up to Alutnuwara and joining with Senerat's forces penetrated south-east to Panawa. ⁽¹¹³⁾

In another expedition disava Dom Constantino captured Kangara Aratchi who was executed for treason in Colombo. ⁽¹¹⁴⁾

In March 1620 with the weakning of the Portuguese forces on the departure of Luis Teixeira for Jaffna, Mayadunne appeared once more in the Seven Korales. De Sa, with his captain-major Constantino de Sa de Miranda and the disava of the Four Korales Francisco Brito de Almeida, forced Mayadunne to retire from Talampitiya but was unable to dislodge him from Moratanne until Teixeira return from Jaffna. With the return of Teixeira, de Sa began a determined campaign to eliminate the power of Kuruwita Rala and Mayadunne. ⁽¹¹⁵⁾

Action against the rebels was made more urgent by a change in attitude on the part of Senerat. For Senerat, as for the Portuguese, the peace of 1617 was a rather

(113) Assentos I. 50-51; BM.Add. Ms. 9853 ff.157v-158; AHU aixa XXII. 4.8.1654

(114) Queyroz 729

(115) Queyroz 730; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.227v

unsatisfactory compromise, agreed on to gain time to deal with a more dangerous enemy. Senerat's main enemy Nikapitiya had lost all power by now. The Portuguese conquest of Jaffna in 1619 and the defeat of Mayadunne in the same year roused Senerat's fears of the Portuguese once again. By this time he had also received news that European aid was on its way to him. So early 1620 he made an informal truce with Mayadunne. Mayadunne was to become the king of Kotte while Senerat remained master of Kandy.⁽¹¹⁶⁾

The fleet Senerat based his hopes upon was the first Danish squadron to come to the east. Boschouwer, having failed to convince the director of the Dutch V.O.C. of the advantages to be gained in aiding Senerat, had proceeded to Denmark. There in March 1618 he made a treaty with King ~~Christian IV~~ Christian IV and his newly formed Danish East India Company. Consequently in August 1618 the 'Oeresund' under Roelant Crape set out for Ceylon, followed in December of the same year by four more vessels under the commander Ove Giedde. The arrival of Crape in Ceylon at the end of 1619 provided Senerat with the first inkling of what had happened. The main fleet under Giedde sighted

[116] Queyroz 730; JCBRAS XXXVII. 62. 73-77

(117)
Ceylon in May 1620.

The projected Kandyan-Danish alliance was beset with problems from the very start. Boschouwer in order to make sure of Danish assistance had not only exaggerated the resources of Senerat, but had even used forged credentials to make promises he was not empowered to do. Thus Giedde arrived in 1620 expecting an immediate payment of ninety five thousand dollars as Senerat's share of the expenses of the fleet.⁽¹¹⁸⁾ The death of Boschouwer on the way to Ceylon made matters worse, for Giedde was no diplomat. Moreover by the time Giedde arrived in Ceylon Senerat was officially at peace with the Portuguese and the cautious monarch wished for tangible proof that the Danes were actually willing and able to drive away the Portuguese out of Ceylon before he abandoned the treaty which had cost him so much to gain.

The eventual failure to establish a Kandyan-Danish alliance as ^a working concern however was not due either to the deceit of Boschouwer or to Senerat's reluctance to go to war, for Senerat eventually accepted the obligation to pay the sum demanded and signed a new treaty of alliance

(117) TT.LM. 12.f.5; JCBRAS XXXVII. 51-62; Vriddagarison 96-97
(118) TT.LM. 12.f.65; Vriddagarison 96-97; JCBRAS XXXVII. 51-62

with Denmark on 21 August 1620.⁽¹¹⁹⁾ The real cause of failure lay in the weakness of the Danish fleet and the differences in the objectives of the two parties.

Giedde had set out with a force of three ^{hundred} ~~thousand~~ ⁽¹²⁰⁾ soldiers from Denmark on 29 December 1618. One and a half years later this number had been reduced by death and desertion, while many of the survivors were sick. Senerat would no doubt ~~had~~ also heard that Roelant Crape had been forced to abandon ship by a Portuguese fleet under Andre Coelho, and had taken refuge in Tanjore. These factors explain why Senerat at first suggested that the Danes ally themselves with Mayadunne who was already at war with the Portuguese.⁽¹²¹⁾

Even after Senerat had agreed to a formal treaty of alliance, differences in aims between the two parties prevented effective cooperation. Senerat was interested in forestalling the Portuguese by building a fort at Trincomalee, and offered aid for the task to the Danes. Giedde on the other hand was more interested in procuring a cargo for his ship and left for the Coromandel coast two weeks after the treaty was signed. Despite the sending of a body of

(119) JCBRAS XXXVII. 63

(120) J.H.Schlegel gives the date as 25 August 1620 but Ove Giedde's diary proves otherwise. JCBRAS XXXVII. 80-86

(121) JCBRAS XXXVII. 62,63,66,74,77; ENL. FG. 7160 f.97; Queyroz 731; TT.LM. 12.f.5; TT.LM.15.f.67; Filmoteca, Reis Vizinhos I. 22/2

sixty men by Senerat to help in the construction work, the Danes who had occupied the Hindu temple at Trincomalee and made it their headquarters remained inactive and eventually evacuated it. Senerat therefore decided to give up his plans against the Portuguese unless the Danes arrived with a much larger force.⁽¹²²⁾

Meanwhile de Sa's new campaign against Mayadunne had gained striking success. By June 1620 the rebel leaders were once more expelled from Portuguese territory. Mayadunne himself was so hotly pursued that he was forced to take temporary refuge aboard a Danish ship at Kottiyar on 2 July 1620.⁽¹²³⁾ About a month later his chief general Kuruwita Rala was surprised and killed at Panawa by disava Don Costantino of Matara.⁽¹²⁴⁾ The death of Kuruwita Rala marked the end of effective opposition to the Portuguese in the low lands. Mayadunne having failed to gain Danish support for his final bid in March 1621 left Ceylon soon after.⁽¹²⁵⁾

(123) TT.Mss. Liv.1699.f.260; TT.LM.18.f.44; JCBRAS XXXVII.77-79

(122) JCBRAS XXXVII.68-70,86-87; TT.LM. 15.f.44; TT.LM. 18.f.135

(124) De Sa de Menezes (JCBRAS XI.510) gives another version of the death of Kuruwita Rala. Queyroz (626) seems to accept this. However the version given above is also present in Queyroz (731) and is supported by contemporary Jesuit letters (CALR.II.26,29), the diary of Ove Giedde (JCBRAS. XXXVII.78) and Fr. Manoel de Assumpcao's work (TT.ms.de Liv.1699.247) The only document which may lend support to de Sa de Menezes's version is a letter from the viceroy to the king dated 6 February 1620 which states that de Sa 'matou hum alevantado nosso que para elle se foi, capitao-mor e cabaca da mor parte da sua gente.' (DR .V.262) This ofcourse may refer to Kanagara Aratchi.

(125) TT.LM. 18.f.44; JCBRAS. XXXVII. 87

Thus from about 1620 until the great rising of 1630 Kotte enjoyed a period of relative tranquility.

For Kandy too, the early 1620's were a period of peace. Up to 1627 the legal basis of relationship between Kandy and the Portuguese remained the treaty of 1617. Though the relationship was not always a cordial one, no open conflict developed during this period. Peace however shortlived was welcome to Kandy after thirty five years of war. Senerat used it to consolidate his hold on the kingdom. He toured his lands, encouraged settlers from abroad to colonise abandoned and uncultivated land and was active in the repair of tanks and canals, the main-stay of rice cultivation.⁽¹²⁶⁾ Senerat also tried to make provision for a peaceful succession. As early as 1621 the kingdom was divided into three principalities, Uva, Matale and Kandy and these allocated to the three princes.⁽¹²⁷⁾ The princes remained with Senerat even after this as they were still minors but by 1625 Kumarasinha was exercising personal rule over Uva and was the commander of the forces of

(126) Mandaram pura puwata, stanzas 198-201

(127) TT.colleção de São Vicente, livro 19.doc.110;
Biker I. 224; Parangi hatana, stanzas 66-71.

that region.⁽¹²⁸⁾ With peace, Kandy prospered and trade increased not only with the Portuguese but also with Indian merchants.⁽¹²⁹⁾

After the last of the invaders from Tanjore had been dispersed in 1621 Jaffna enjoyed a period of peace which lasted till 1628. For most of this time Jaffna was dominated by the commanding figure of Filipe de Oliveira. He was responsible for the organization of the administration of the newly conquered kingdom in accordance with instructions sent from Goa.⁽¹³⁰⁾ His encouragement of the missionaries was one of the principal reasons for their success in Jaffna.

(128) Ajuda 51-VIII*40. ff. 220v, 222v. Kumarasinha was only twenty years of age at this time. Contemporary evidence contradicts the assertion of Pieris (II.178) that the partition of Kandy occurred in 1628. It is possible however that Maha Astana, the youngest son was set up as the prince of Kandy only at that date, for this would be in keeping with evidence in the Culavamsa. The mode of allocation in the three principalities may have been by lot as suggested in the Culavamsa, II. 231 and Knox 53, but Knox's story that Senerat craftily made sure that Kandy would go to Maha Astana is more dubious especially as Uva which fell as Kumarasinha's share was probably the strongest of the three principalities. The practice of dividing the kingdom among the sons of the king was not new. It is noteworthy that even in 1630 Maha Astana had no precedence over the other two princes.

(129) Ajuda 51-VIII-40. ff. 216v, 219, 222, 223, 225

(130) Assentos I. 50. The assertion of Queyroz 728 and of de Sa de Menezes (JCERAS XI. 516-517) that de Sa visited Jaffna and reorganized its administration during his first term of office is inaccurate.

de Oliveira was also responsible for the transfer of Jaffna's capital from the ancient city of Nallur to the Portuguese settlement at Patanam or Jaffna in 1621. (131) Jaffna being a port could be more easily defended and reinforced by sea while the maintenance of the Portuguese headquarters at Nallur necessitated the division of Portuguese forces to protect the township and to secure communications. The division of a limited force in a newly conquered land had proved to be unwise. de Oliveira, supported by de Sa, even suggested the transfer of the Portuguese headquarters to the island of Kayts. (132) This suggestion, made in 1624, reflects the insecurity felt by the Portuguese even five years after the conquest. The viceroy agreed that a fort be constructed on the island but referred the decision on the transfer of the capital to Lisbon. (133) Eventually however it was realized that the island of Kayts being ten miles in length would be as difficult to defend as a fort on the mainland. Moreover the cadado settler community in Jaffna town seemed quite content there. Thus even after Miguel Pereira (134) built a fort at Kayts Jaffna remained the capital of the

(131) The reasons for the abandonment of Nallur seem curiously akin to those which led to the abandonment of Kotte in 1565. P.E.Pieris (Ceylon II.137) incorrectly assume that Queyroz's statement 642 'Philippe de Oliveyra moved to Nallur on 2nd of February and ordered the large pagoda to be razed' means that de Oliveira transferred his headquarters to Nallur on 2 February 1621. In fact the temple at Nallur had been his headquarters since the conquest up to August-September 1620 when he moved to Jaffna. Queyroz here is referring to an incident in the campaign against the forces of the Nayak of Tanjore.

(132) TT.LM.19.f.40v (133) BNL. FG. 1982.f.51

(134) Reimers, 56

kingdom. The fortification of Jaffna itself was begun in 1624 but work progressed slowly.⁽¹³⁵⁾ The fort was built around the site of the old Franciscan church which for many years had served as a stockade in times of crisis. The work done in ^{de} Oliveiba's time however suffered as a result of the great tempest of 1627 and despite the efforts of Lançarote de Seixas, ^{de} Oliveira's successor, work on the ⁽¹³⁶⁾ fort was not completed till 1632. Though de Oliveira's term of office in Jaffna was a successful one from the Portuguese point of view, it was one of hardship for the people of Jaffna. The wars which raged until 1621 were followed by an epidemic of small-pox and a fever. Famine was a natural result.⁽¹³⁷⁾ The making of the tombo of the lands of Jaffna by Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara in 1623 and its completion and revision by de Oliveira himself in 1623-1627 resulted in the increase of dues to be paid to the crown.⁽¹³⁸⁾ The Portuguese gained large tracts of lands confiscated from the supporters of Sankili. The Hindu Tamils of course found life more difficult than their Christian counterparts for all offices were reserved for the favoured converts.⁽¹³⁹⁾

(135) TT. ~~Collesão~~ de St. Vicente, livro 19. doc.2; TT.LM.15.f.20; 16.f.561

(136) Queyroz 647-48; Baldaeuá, 86

(137) The wars resulted in over six thousand deaths. (Jornada 35) Queyroz 646-647

(138) Queyroz 646; AHU. Caixa2. 246; AHU.caixaIX. 20.11.1626

(139) Queyroz 645-646, 629

With the return of peace de Sa was able to pay greater attention to the problems of external defence. This aspect had been badly neglected by Azevedo who being convinced that the conquest of Kandy alone would bring security to the Portuguese within Ceylon had spent most of his eighteen years in the island in an attempt to wear down Kandyan resistance. When Azevedo left Ceylon in 1612 the only Portuguese fort in the island capable of offering worthwhile resistance to an attack by a well-armed European force was that of Colombo, but even in the fort the walls were in need of repair.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ As viceroy, Azevedo doubtless passed on the king's orders to fortify Colombo to his successors- Dom Francisco de Menezes and Manoel Mascarenhas Homem- for they rebuilt the walls of Colombo fort on the landward side.⁽¹⁴¹⁾ Nevertheless there is little doubt that the policy directives from Azevedo compelled the captain-⁽¹⁴²⁾ generals in Ceylon to consider Kandy as the prime enemy.

(140) The king had urged the strengthening of the Colombo fort in 1605, 1607, 1608 and twice in 1610- but little was done till 1613. A report on Ceylon about this time states that 'Colombo nao tem muros e os que tinha todos estao na chao abertos que entram os gados por elles e haõ ha baluartes' (DR.II.85)

(141) AHU. Caixa IV. 18.12.1616. Filmoteca LM.12. 86/1; TT.LM.13.f.147

(142) Bocarro 273-278; AHU.Caixa III. 23.4.1614; AHU.Caixa IV. 9.10.1615 The comprehensive regimento sent by Azevedo to de Menezes and Homem reflects this policy. A greater part of these regimentos is devoted to the Kandyan war while the fortification of forts is not even mentioned.

By the 1620's however the Dutch and English were too powerful in the East to be safely ignored. The English challenge to the Portuguese command of the trade of the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf had led to several encounters in which the Portuguese could claim no success. The Dutch under the able leadership of Jan Pieterzoon Coen were by now firmly established in the Indonesian Archipelago and were threatening the Portuguese strongholds of Malacca and Macao as well as their Far Eastern trade. The Luso-Spanish alliance in the East Indies had failed to check the Dutch advance and already rumours of an impending Anglo-Dutch alliance against the Portuguese had appeared in the East. (143)

De Sa who had served as captain-major of the fleet of Cape Camorin for about two years knew these dangers as well as any other man. That was perhaps why he began work on fortifying the coastal ports of Kotte even before the rebellion in his lands was over.

The first port he turned to was Galle. Next to Trincomalee, Galle possessed the best natural harbour in Ceylon. Its position on the south-west coast of the island

(143) Filmoteca, Reis Vizinhos I. 52/3/4; Botelho de Souza, III. 99-100; The Cambridge History of India, V. 32, 78-83. The agreement was actually concluded in July 1619. Definite news regarding the conclusion of the pact arrived in the East in early 1620.

taken in conjunction with the winds and ocean currents which prevailed gave its possessor a command over the sea routes from Arabia to Malacca and from the west to the east coast of India. The first proposal to fortify Galle had been made even before the death of Rajasinha of Sitawaka . By 1597 the Portuguese had constructed a small fort on a hillock a short distance from the harbour. The king realising the strategic value of Galle repeatedly urged the strengthening of the fort in the early seventeenth century.⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ In 1619 de Sa began to give his attention to the task.⁽¹⁴⁵⁾

The existing fort had been built of mud and reinforced by wooden palisades. Intended primarily as a base against the rebellious Sinhalese, it had been neglected when the adjoining lands were subjugated and pacified. The fort, moreover, though located on elevated ground was so placed that its guns did not command the entrance to the harbour. As Antonio Martins, a Portuguese fidalgo remarked in 1613-1614, the fort of Galle would have fallen to any single enemy ship that dared to attack it.

De Sa realised that the existing fort even if strengthened, would be of little use against European

(144) DR.I. 8, 58, 60-61, 387-388; DR.V. 138

(145) Queyroz 627; De Sa de Menezes 511; TT, Collecção de S. Vicente, livro 19.doc.271

enemies. He knew that the value of a fort in Galle in the context of the Anglo-Dutch threat to the Portuguese depended partly on whether Portuguese vessels could safely ride at anchor under the protection of the guns of the fort. He therefore proposed the demolition of the existing structure and the building of an entirely new fort on the promontory on the western side of the harbour.

De Sa reasoned that the rocky coast of the promontory itself was sufficient protection on the side facing the sea. The side facing the bay was to be guarded by a wall of beams and earth. On the southernmost point of the promontory de Sa planned to build a bastion to command the entrance to the harbour. Another bastion at the quayside was to protect the anchorage. The landward defence of the fort was to be secured by building a wall across the promontory at its isthmus.

The initial stages of the construction of the new fort was supervised by Fernão Pinhão, captain of Galle, 1620-1623. Financial difficulties slowed construction work which was however continued without interval till 1623.⁽¹⁴⁶⁾

De Sa however realised that the defence of Ceylon should be considered as a whole and that the coastal defences in

(146) Queyroz 828; Ribeiro 129; TT.LM. 21.f.139; TT.LM.24.f.458

Kotte itself would not suffice while the whole of the eastern coast remained unprotected. De Sa's predecessors ^{had} had repeated orders to fortify the two important ports on the eastern coast - Trincomalee and Batticaloa, but had failed to take any action. ⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ With the conquest of Jaffna, the maintenance of these proposed forts became a much easier proposition, for Trincomalee and Batticaloa when cut off from Kotte by monsoon winds were accessible from Jaffna and vice versa. The peace treaty of 1617 however placed both these ports in the ^rterritory of the king of Kandy. De Sa was not deterred by this. He evidently considered that the king of Kandy was too weak to break with the Portuguese while contending with a revolt in his own lands and he decided to proceed with the construction of the two forts. However the difficulties faced by the Portuguese in other parts of Asia as well as the death of the viceroy Dom João Coutinho, Conde de Redondo prevented the sending of sufficient money and artillery for the purpose and the

(147) DR.II. 465,478; DR.III.397,399; DR.V.260-264; TT.LM. 7.f.1; AHU.33.f.20; TT.LM.15.f.20; AHU.282.f.62
 The first order to fortify Trincomalee was made as early as 1602. The first request for a fort at Batticaloa was in ~~1622~~ 1613. Don Nuno Alvares Pereira however did try to obtain the possession of Batticaloa in the negotiations for peace in 1617. See ~~above~~ page .

project had to be postponed.⁽¹⁴⁸⁾

De Sa also tried to win the favour of the ^{Sinhalese} inhabitants of Kotte. He realised that their assistance was invaluable in the prevention and suppression of rebellions in Kotte as well as in the war against Kandy. De Sa believed that kind and just treatment would reconcile the Sinhalese to Portuguese rule. He therefore tried to ensure justice for all. De Sa also encouraged a renewal of missionary activity in the areas which had been under rebel control, for conversion to Christianity was one of the means of ensuring loyalties to the Portuguese.

By 1621 de Sa had secured peace within Kotte. Jaffna was by now firmly in the grasp of de Oliveira. The peace with Kandy was maintained, though much of the goodwill that had existed between the two sides had disappeared with the defeat of the rebels. The Danish threat was proving to be an empty one. Perhaps most important, the Portuguese possessions were for the first time beginning to pay their way and were soon to be a valuable source of income.

De Sa's activities were however suddenly cut short when in February 1621 the new Portuguese governor of India Fernao de Albuquerque decided to recall him to Goa and

(148) TT.LM. 12.f.50; DR.V.263; Filmoteca, Reis Vizinhos 52/3-4. ~~See chapter II. Page~~ below.

to appoint his own son Jorge de Albuquerque⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ as captain-general of the island. Jorge de Albuquerque already held the post of the captain of Colombo. His father pointed out to the king that Albuquerque was willing to serve as both captain of Colombo and captain-general of Ceylon for only the salary of the former post.⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ Saving money for the royal treasury was by no means the true motive of the father and the son, for with his letter of appointment Fernão de Albuquerque also gave his son a decree by which fifty bahars of cinnamon could be sold by him to his own profit despite regulations enforcing a royal monopoly of the product.⁽¹⁵¹⁾

Queyroz lays the blame for the appointment on the father who it is said could not bear to see the son of the governor of India subordinate to anyone but himself.⁽¹⁵²⁾ However, Fernão de Albuquerque had ruled the Portuguese in the East for over a year before he made this appointment. Three months before he recalled de Sa he wrote to the king stating

(149) Jorge de Albuquerque had married Dona Isabel de Souza, the daughter of Pero Lopez de Souza who died in Kandy in 1594.

(150) TT.LM. 15.f.67; TT.LM.16.f.45; TT.~~LM~~ Micellaneus Mss.da Convento da Graca, 2E. 557

(151) TT.LM. 21.f.277; TT.LM.18.f.247

(152) Queyroz 732

that he had decided not to change the captain-general in Ceylon.⁽¹⁵³⁾ Obviously it was the personal appeal of his son who visited Goa in early 1621 which caused him to change his mind.⁽¹⁵⁴⁾

Jorge de Albuquerque left Goa on the 10 February 1621 with Gomez da Silva da Cunha who had been appointed as the new captain-major of the field. Arriving in Ceylon with one hundred and fifty men on 12 March he took over from de Sa and ruled Portuguese Ceylon for just over two years.⁽¹⁵⁵⁾

De Albuquerque continued de Sa's policy of fortifying the ports of Kotte. The work on the fort at Galle was continued and completed in his time. De Albuquerque also built a quadrangular fort with two bastions defended by three pieces of artillery at Kalutara, twenty seven miles south of Colombo.⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ In other respects however his rule was a complete failure. He destroyed what little

(153) TT.LM.15.f.44

(154) This ofcourse does not absolve Fernão de Albuquerque. It merely explains the reason for his action. Lançarote de Seixas who was serving as the vedor of Ceylon at this time claimed in a letter to the king dated 29 November 1621 that the appointment of Jorge de Albuquerque was made against the advice of the viceroy's councillors, (AHU. 35.f.24) but de Seixas was a hostile critic and no confirmatory evidence is available.

(155) Queyroz 734; TT.Mss.da livraria 1699.f.247v; AHU. caixa XVII. 9.5.1645

(156) TT.LM.18.f.44; Ribeiro 35; Reimers 56; JCBRAS XI.526; It was built on the ruins of an earlier fort built by Azevedo in the 1590's. Ten casados were settled in nearby villages.

good will de Sa's concilliatory measures had gained among the Sinhalese. This was chiefly due to his arbitrary arrest of a prominent Sinhalese leader, Naide Appu. Naide Appu, or Manoel Mascarenhas Homem as he was called after his conversion to Christianity had served the Portuguese loyally for many years and had amassed a considerable fortune. Under de Sa he had served as the chief of the lascarins of the Seven Korales. De Albuquerque had Naide Appu seized and confiscated all his property and expelled him from the island on the charge that he had plotted to rebel. On the way to Goa by ship Naide Appu was thrown overboard and drowned.⁽¹⁵⁷⁾

De Albuquerque moreover could not resist making use of his position to enrich himself. In fact it was widely rumoured that Naide Appu died because of his wealth rather than because of any treachery. De Albuquerque certainly used his position to secure from his father the grant of an island off Jaffna despite a royal directive that lands in Jaffna should be given only to those who actually served there.⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ He also obtained the revenues of several villages in Kotte itself. The chief sources of his unauthorised income however were arecanut and cinnamon. He bought both

(157) P.E.Peiris, Ceylon, II.167; JCBRAS XI. 526; Queyroz 733; TT.LM.18.ff.44.171.219; TT.LM.19.ff.17,23; TT.LM.23.f.435
 (158) AHU.Caixa VIII.26.1.1625.; TT.LM. 17.ff.23.57

these products at low prices and made considerable profits. (159)

De Albuquerque's tendencies to reward only those whom he favoured led to discontent among both soldiers and settlers. The soldiers rose in mutiny against ~~him~~ their captain-major Gomez da Silva da Cunha and set up a council of twelve to represent their grievances to the general. Eventually de Albuquerque was forced to give way and appoint a new captain-major for the army. The casados of the camara of Colombo complained to the king mainly of the misuse of royal funds by the general. (160)

While the general fell into disfavour among Sinhalese and Portuguese alike, the work of administration was thrown into confusion by disagreements between the captain-general, the vedor and the ouvidor. The lack of able government was reflected in the elections to the misericordia which resulted in open fighting and the death of a soldier. (161)

(159) TT.LM.18.ff.243-244, 147; TT.LM.21.f.277

(160) Queyroz 734; TT.LM.18.ff.239-240; P.da Trinidade^{de} III. 129

(161) TT.LM.15.f.191; TT.LM.18.f.240; Biblioteca da Sociedade de Geografia, Restante D.Maço 4.doc. 52

An unsigned contemporary document (TT.LM.18.f.71) suggests that many of Jorge de Albuquerque's troubles might have arisen from opposition to him by the vedor, Lançarote de Seixas who was a friend and kinsman of Constantino de Sa. De Seixas apparently had considerable influence both in the army and among the casados of Colombo. De Seixas was certainly no friend of Jorge de Albuquerque. On 20 November 1621 he wrote to the king making many specific charges of corruption against the new general (AHU.35.ff.24-24v) but no conclusive evidence can be found to connect de Seixas with the mutiny in the army and the protests of the camara of Colombo.

Early in 1623 however, Jorge de Albuquerque received news of the arrival of the new viceroy Don Francisco da Gama with orders to reinstate Constantino de Sa in Ceylon.⁽¹⁶²⁾ In April, before de Sa could return to Ceylon de Albuquerque commandeered a vessel which had come to Ceylon to take some cinnamon to the Persian Gulf and took his family in it to⁽¹⁶³⁾ Goa.⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ De Sa set out from Goa for Ceylon in the same month.


The signifance of the rule of Jorge de Albuquerque lies in what he failed to achieve. Having the strongest ties of personal relationship with the Portuguese governor in Goa he was much better placed than de Sa to obtain the resources necessary to execute royal orders. He chose however to use his period of office for the pursuit of persohal gain. The Kandyan monarch thus received a further period of time to re-establish his authority over his kingdom, and to regain the confidence of his people. De Albuquerque's tactless measures moreover made deep inroads in the support among Sinhalese chieftains which de Sa had built up during his first period of office.

(162) The king had never agreed to the appointment of Jorge de Albuquerque, and he even ordered an inquiry to be held as to why de Sa was dismissed.

~~(163)~~ TT.LM.16.f.45; TT.LM.18.ff.233,326; TT.Collecão de S.Vicente 19. doc. 340


(163) Incidentally this deprived Ruy Freire de Andrade of much needed funds which would have been gained by the sale of this cinnamon.

(164) De Sa after he left Ceylon had resided in Goa until appointed commander of the squadron sent to relieve Ormuz. De Sa displayed little eagerness to reach Ormuz in time and his fleet was too late to save the fort. On his return to Goa his conduct of the expedition was investigated by the Relação where de Sa was cleared of all responsibility for the loss.



REFERENCES

1. Nallur
2. Jaffna
3. Gannoruwa
4. Gampola
5. Balane
6. Kalehiya
7. Menikkadawara
8. Attanagalla
9. Peliyagoda
10. Mulleriyawa



SCALE 1" : 28 miles

CHAPTER III

From May 1623 to August 1630 the Portuguese territories in Ceylon were governed by Constantino de Sa de Noronha. Until 1628 de Sa governed the country in peace, but evenⁱⁿ these years war never appeared far off. With the Estado da India hard pressed by European and local enemies in many sectors from East Africa to China, peace in Ceylon if it could be combined with security was obviously desirable to the Portuguese. From the point of view of Kandy too, as the weaker of the two protagonists, peace was much to be sought after. Senerat after 1621 was ready to postpone, if not give up completely, his plans for a fresh war against the Portuguese, for he realised that Kandy needed a spell of peace to recover from the effects of foreign invasion and civil war. Therefore, although determined to resist any further diminution of his power, Senerat was prepared to acquiesce in the increase in Portuguese power in Ceylon which had occurred between 1617 and 1621.

To the Portuguese on the other hand the very existence of Kandy presented a threefold threat to their security. Firstly, it increased the risk of foreign intervention in Ceylon. A kingdom outside Portuguese control within Ceylon was an encouragement for other European nations to try their fortunes in the island. Secondly, a strong Kandyan monarch was likely to exploit any Portuguese weakness to attempt to expel them from the island. Finally, the prospect of support from or at least a refuge in

the hill-country could in many ways be regarded as an inducement for low-country Sinhalese to rebel. Consequent Portuguese hostility towards Kandy however only served to arouse Kandyan suspicions as to Portuguese objectives.

The formulation of Portuguese policy relating to the overseas empire was supposed to be carried out in Europe. In theory all important policy decisions had to have the approval of the king of Portugal. At this time however as the Spanish and Portuguese crowns were united and the king usually resided in Spain, Portugal itself was governed either by a viceroy or by a board of three ⁽¹⁾governors. To avoid the delay inherent in this situation the following administrative procedure was devised. All normal and routine decisions regarding Portuguese policy relating to her overseas empire were made in Lisbon by a body known as the conselho da fazenda which worked in close conjunction with and often included the viceroy of Portugal. Whenever a matter of great importance had to be decided it was discussed in the conselho da fazenda and the recommendations sent up in a report to the conselho de Portugal. This latter body apparently moved with the king to keep in close touch with

(1) A list of these viceroys and governors is found in João Pedro Ribeiro's Dissertações chronologicas e criticas sobre a historia e jurisprudencia e ecclesiastica e civil de Portugal II, 195-199.

him and dealt with all important matters regarding Portugal and her empire. Co-ordination in policy matters between these two bodies was achieved by means of routine correspondence conducted between the conselho de Portugal on behalf of the king and the conselho da fazenda. The same objective was furthered by the ^{occasional} appointment of an influential and trusted councillor to both councils. For instance the prominent Spanish nobleman, the Duque de Vila Hermoza, conde de Ficalho was both president of the conselho de Portugal and a member of the conselho da fazenda in 1624.⁽²⁾

The viceroy of India was theoretically a subordinate official who was expected to execute orders issued by the conselho da fazenda on behalf of the king. However it often happened that the viceroy appointed was a man of some standing and his opinions were therefore generally respected and taken into consideration. In actual fact no important policy decision was taken in Europe without consulting the viceroy. Moreover, very often only the broad outlines of policy were indicated and the viceroy was allowed to determine the details of its execution. The slow communications between Lisbon and Goa - the return voyage took almost two years - were a factor which

(2) The Duque de Vila Hermoza dealt with some of the correspondence from the conselho da fazenda to the king for sixteen years, 1618-1634. The Duque was often in Lisbon during the months January to March when the conselho da fazenda dealt with correspondence to be sent to the East in the annual fleet. During the greater part of the year however he apparently lived with the court in Madrid, Salamanca, Valladolid or Seville.

added to the independence of the viceroy. However the conselho da fazenda once it decided on a policy, sent persistent orders for its execution until definite news arrived that this was done, thus reducing the viceroy's powers to those of delay. The viceroy in his turn was aided by an advisory council. He had the power to overrule his council but the proceedings of the council indicate that the viceroy often listened to the advice offered and sometimes even bowed to the decision of the majority when he was opposed to it.⁽³⁾

The other person who could be expected to have some influence in policy formulation for Ceylon was the man on the spot - the captain-general himself. He had the right to correspond directly with the king, which in effect meant with the conselho da fazenda. He was however thought of primarily as an officer who would execute policy decisions already made, though he might offer some useful suggestions. The conselho da fazenda, moreover, had access to other sources of firsthand information, for both the vedor da fazenda or controller of revenue and the camara or municipal council of Colombo had the right to correspond directly with Lisbon. Apart from these regular channels the conselho da fazenda also received special reports from individuals. The bishop of Cochim for example sent detailed information and

(3) C.R.Boxer - A glimpse of the Goan archives (Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XIV, 320)

suggestions for action, on practically every conceivable topic of interest to the Portuguese in Lisbon.⁽⁴⁾ Nevertheless it was possible for the captain-general ⁽⁴⁾ his influence felt by Lisbon. the determined advocacy of a certain course of policy, though the proximity of his immediate superior, the viceroy, at Goa greatly reduced his independence.

Thus it can be broadly asserted that Portuguese policy was generally formulated in Lisbon by the conselho da fazenda in the name of the king primarily on the recommendations of the viceroy in Goa and the captain-general in Ceylon. For the sake of convenience such decisions shall henceforth be referred to as the decisions of the king.

Though the weight exerted by each of these councils and individuals in the policy-making machine varied from issue to issue and period to period, the content of the policy itself was to a great extent a reflection of the Portuguese political, military and economic position in Europe as well as Asia. The resumption of the war with the Dutch at the end of the twelve year truce in 1621 imposed a considerable burden on Portuguese resources. The Dutch attacks on the valuable Portuguese colonies of Bahia and Angola and the consequent struggle for the reconquest of these areas absorbed much of the Portuguese war effort in

(4) TT.LM.16.ff.106,108-109

the 1620's.⁽⁵⁾ In the Indian ocean the situation was not much better. The Anglo-Dutch accord signed in Europe in June 1619 had provided for close co-operation, political and economic, between these two powers in Asia. And though the expectations of the parent companies in Europe were never matched by the actual co-operation between their officials in the East, the years which followed were marked by considerable Anglo-Dutch successes against the Portuguese. In 1622 an allied fleet attacked the Portuguese squadron bringing out the viceroy Dom Francisco da Gama, conde de Vidiguera, off Moçambique and destroyed three of the four galleons in the Portuguese fleet. The victorious Anglo-Dutch fleet later blockaded Goa for four months between December 1622 and March 1623 to prevent the departure of the annual Portuguese fleet to Lisbon. In 1622 came also the Dutch attack on Macao and the seizure of Ormuz by a Persian force supported by an English fleet. This last event was a tremendous psychological blow to the Portuguese and their main efforts in the East during the next few years were directed to regaining command of the Persian Gulf and the restoration of their prestige.⁽⁶⁾

These factors naturally led to a restriction on the amount of Portuguese resources in men, arms and equipment that

(5) H.W.Livermore - History of Portugal, 277

(6) The Cambridge History of India V, 83-84

could be diverted to Ceylon. The viceroy at Goa as the head of a hard pressed and far flung empire had to allocate to each according to ^{its} ~~their~~ needs and in comparison with others those of Ceylon/ did not look pressing. This explained why the figure of eight hundred soldados in the field, attained in the early years of Azevedo's regime was not reached again in Ceylon till the island was in danger of being completely lost in 1630-1631. (7)

shd. be underlined
V. cp.
18 198-
199

The problem of what was to be done with the little that could be spared for Ceylon was a question that gave rise to controversy both within and outside Ceylon. After 1617, two alternative uses appeared possible. The Portuguese could either preserve peace with Kandy and concentrate on the fortification of the ports of the island to prevent any other European from getting a foothold or renew the struggle against Kandy in the hope of conquering the kingdom, thus rendering secure their hold on the island. Both policies aimed at objectives desirable from the Portuguese point of view. They were viewed as alternatives simply because, with the resources at hand, at best only one of these objectives could be aimed at.

However, as the Portuguese found out in the 1620's these two policies were not true alternatives. The treaty of 1617 had granted the king of Kandy the whole of the eastern seaboard of Ceylon including the ports of Trincomalee and Batticaloa. Thus

any attempt to fortify all the forts of the island was likely to involve a conflict with the Kandyan kingdom. Similarly any further attempts to subjugate Kandy could well lead Senerat to appeal to the Dutch for aid by way of the east coast.

The authorities in Lisbon did not realise this problem for the letters of the king to the viceroy in both 1619 and 1620 contained requests that both Trincomalee and Batticaloa be fortified,⁽⁸⁾ while another dated 26 March 1620 instructed the viceroy to confirm the treaty of 1617.⁽⁹⁾ However the Portuguese governor of India, Fernão de Albuquerque who had earlier served as the captain of Colombo was under no such delusion. When he received these instructions he at once replied on 20 February 1621 that the peace treaty in question handed over to Kandy the lands of Batticaloa where the king of Portugal had asked for a fort to be built.⁽¹⁰⁾ Confronted by the alternatives of confirming the peace treaty of 1617 or of constructing forts at Trincomalee and Batticaloa with the risk of renewed conflicts, the king of Portugal unhesitatingly chose the latter. A letter of the king to the viceroy dated 8 February 1622 decreed that peace be made only on the condition that Batticaloa be left in Portuguese hands.⁽¹¹⁾ When Dom Francisco da Gama, conde de Vidiguera, de Albuquerque's successor as viceroy, pointed out in the

(8) DR V, 260-261; TT.LM.16.f.561

(9) TT.LM.13.f.133

(10) TT.LM.15.f.21

(11) TT.LM.16.f.79

following year that even Trincomalee was in Kandyan territory
 according to the peace,⁽¹²⁾ the king rejoined that ~~a~~ such a treaty,⁽¹³⁾
 so harmful to his interests, should not be confirmed at all.

The king's decision to continue the struggle with Kandy involved a change from the policy laid down in the instructions of 1617 to the outgoing viceroy Dom João Coutinho, conde de Redondo. Three reasons seem to have been responsible for this. By 1622 the king had received news that the rebellions in Portuguese territory were almost extinguished. Thus it could be safely presumed that renewed war with Kandy would not place too great^a a burden on the Portuguese forces in Ceylon. Secondly by this time news of the conquest and annexation of Jaffna had also been received in Lisbon. This accession of territory, the first in Ceylon for over twenty years, would have once more roused hopes of the subjugation of Kandy. Finally, by 1622 letters from the viceroy had informed the king that a Danish fleet had arrived off Ceylon in 1620 with the object of assisting the king of Kandy to drive out the Portuguese. These factors prompted the king to formulate a new course of action. Kandy was to be henceforth completely isolated from foreign contacts. This purpose was to be achieved by the construction of forts round

(12) TT.LM.17.f.8v

(13) TT.LM.20.f.1

the coast of Ceylon at Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Weligama, Galle, Kalutara, Negombo and Kayts. As the forts had to be strong enough to resist hostile Europeans as well as the Sinhalese army the king also requested that the viceroy send a qualified engineer to advise on their construction.⁽¹⁴⁾

However the king's decision to tear up the 1617 treaty did not result in armed conflict as the new viceroy Dom Francisco da Gama, conde de Vidiguera embarked on a policy of venture of his own. After consultations with Constantine de Sa, the viceroy realised that if the seizure of Trincomalee were done with tact and speed no conflict need necessarily result. The king of Kandy, weakened by a rebellion in his own domains which had lasted from 1617 to 1620, was as yet in no position to renew war. He was keen on a period of peace to bring up his three sons, the eldest of who was hardly eighteen years of age. Moreover having refused the offer of Danish aid in 1620-1621 he knew that he might well be without allies in a new war against the Portuguese.

In view of these factors, the viceroy ordered de Sa to proceed directly to Trincomalee and start work on building a fort there.⁽¹⁵⁾ At the same time he despatched a Franciscan, Father Eleverio de Santiago to Kandy to explain to Senerat that

(14) TT.LM.16.f.156

(15) TT.LM.16.f.16v; TT.LM.17.f.66; TT.LM.19.f.6v;
TT.Colleccao de S.Vicente XIX.Doc.154

this was merely an attempt to forestall the enemies of the
Portuguese who had planned to seize Trincomalee for themselves. (16)

De Sa set out from Goa in the first week of April 1623
with four galliots and two pinnaces, together with men, munitions
and eight pieces of artillery. He was also accompanied by Francisco
Pinto Pimenta who was well versed in matters regarding
fortifications. (17)
(18) De Sa had been delayed in Goa partly by the
Anglo-Dutch blockade of the port which lasted till 19 March
and partly by the inquiry into the conduct of the expedition
led by him for the relief of Ormuz. (19) Consequently he met with
adverse winds and was forced to put into Tuticodin. Thence he
crossed over to Jaffna on 16 May 1623. After spending a few
weeks regrouping his forces and taking in some fresh supplies
and lascarin troops from Jaffna de Sa sailed for Trincomalee
which he reached in July 1623. (20)

The port and the area surrounding Trincomalee bay was
under the rule of the vanniyar of Trincomalee and Kottiyar who
was a tributary of the king of Kandy. This ruler seems to have

(16) Queyroz 698; P.da Trindade, III,79

(17) TT.Colleccao da S.Vicente XIX.Doc.154; TT.Mss.da Convento da Graça, tomo 2E.pg.557-558; TT.LM.19.f.6v

(18) Pimenta had come to the East with Antonio Pinto da Fonseca, the military engineer sent by Philip II of Portugal (and III of Spain) to strengthen the Portuguese fortifications of the East. TT.LM.17.f.88v; TT.LM.16.f.16v; TT.LM.22.f.84

(19) TT.LM.17.f.4v; TT.Colleccao da S.Vicente XIX.Doc.271

(20) TT.Mss da Liv.1699 ff.248,260; It is possible that the reference in Queyroz 696 to a visit by de Sa to Jaffna in which he reorganized the administration of the area may well refer to this stay. Queyroz however seems to have been confused on this subject as he later makes out (Queyroz 757) that no captain-general had set foot in Jaffna up to 1627.

offered no resistance. The ruler of Kandy, Senera~~t~~ was by no means deceived by Portuguese professions of friendship but being unprepared for war contented himself with protests to the captain-general and the camara of Colombo reminding them of the peace treaty of 1617.⁽²¹⁾

The spot chosen for the fort at Trincomal~~ee~~ was the site of the famous Konesar temple. This temple had been one of the most known and most frequented Hindu temples in this region in the sixteenth century, and had made Trincomalee a pilgrim as well as a trade centre. It had been built on the isthmus of a promontory which protected Trincomalee harbour.⁽²²⁾ The Danes recognising its natural strength had entrenched themselves in it in 1620. However they had left the original structure more or less intact even when they finally evacuated it in 1621.⁽²³⁾ De Sa was not content with such a makeshift stronghold. He proceeded to demolish the old temple buliding and to use the material for the construction of a triangular fort with three bastions. The eight pieces of artillery brought from Goa were supplemented by the salvage of eleven guns from the Danish ship 'Copenhagen' which had sunk off Kottiyar in 1620. Of the three bastions the southernmost, Santa Cruz was built on the

(21) TT.Ms.de Liv. 1699.f.248; Baldaeus 86; TT.LM.17.f.88v
Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.222

(22) JCBRAS XXX 362; Queyroz 236

(23) TT.Ms.da Liv. 1699.f.248

site of the highest buildings of the former temple. It was provided with six of the largest guns to defend the harbour. From this key bastion one wall ran north^{-west}wards for about fifty paces across the isthmus to the bastion of S.Iago, cutting off the promontory from the mainland. Another wall extended northwards from Santa Cruz for one hundred paces and terminated in the sea at the bastion of S.Antonio. The stretch between S.Iago and S.Antonio was difficult of access from without, due to the rocky nature of the coast but the Portuguese built a wall on the topmost rocks to eliminate all danger of attack from the narrow sea beach. The township was established on the promontory and was thus cut off from the mainland by the fort.⁽²⁴⁾ The fort was a strong one though (as the Dutch discovered later) a hillock to the south of it enabled attackers to exchange fire with the bastion of Santa Cruz on almost equal terms.⁽²⁵⁾

The building of the fort necessiated the transport of stone and lime from Jaffna and other parts of the coast to the top of the rock.⁽²⁶⁾ Much of the labour force used for this work appears to have been brought from Jaffna. In fact the assistance of de Oliveira, the captain-major of Jaffna, in the procur^ering

(24) A.P.O.(New ed.) Tomo IV.Vol.2.Part 1.412; JCBRAS X.124
Reimers 57; Ribeiro 130; Filmoteca. Plantas Rola, III.

(25) JCBRAS X.125

(26) AHU Caixa 26. 31.1.1664

of supplies of food and munitions as well as a lascarin contingent for the expeditionary force proved invaluable.⁽²⁷⁾ After four months of work had placed the fort in a fairly defensible position, de Sa departed for Kotte leaving Francisco Pinto Pimenta as captain of Trincomalee with a force of eighty Portuguese and a hundred lascarins to defend the fort.⁽²⁸⁾ De Sa evidently considered it too dangerous to leave Kotte longer without a captain-general. Further delay would have made sailing even more difficult/ due to the onset of the north-west monsoon. He set off from Trincomalee in a pinnace and reached Colombo in October 1623.⁽²⁹⁾

Pimenta went ahead with the construction of the fort but met with several difficulties. In the first place the resources left were far smaller than those de Sa had enjoyed. The comparatively large fleet of four galliots and two pinnaces had been allocated to de Sa's expedition only because it was considered that the galliots could proceed in early 1624 to

(27) AHU 501.f.36; TT.LM.22.f.114; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.228
TT.LM.19.f.40v; A.Botelho de Souza III.328

(28) The estimate given above is that of Queyroz 737. Other estimates are as follows -

De Sa ~~IL~~ M 529- eighty Portuguese and five hundred ~~lascars~~ lascarins.

A.Botelho de Souza - sixty Portuguese and one hundred and fifty lascarins. In January 1624 the viceroy ~~to~~ ~~xxxx~~ wrote to the king that the force expected to be left in Trincomalee was seventy Portuguese and one hundred and fifty lascarins. These figures ofcourse do not include the labour force brought from Jaffna for construction work.

(29) TT.~~EX~~.Ms. da Liv.1699.f.248

(30)
 join the Coromandel fleet led by Diogo de Mello de Castro,
 and this the galliots proceeded to do. Thus Pimenta was
 reduced to the manpower of the garrison and such aid as had
 arrived from Jaffna. Secondly, Senerat realising the weakness
 of the Portuguese force at Trincomalee began to take measures
 designed to impede the construction of the fort and generally
 to discourage the Portuguese. Late in 1624, Sinhalese guer^Yilla
 bands began to raid the villages around the fort which the
 Portuguese had also brought under their control. This development
 certainly disconcerted the Portuguese who had hoped to obtain
 much of their supply of rice from neighbouring villages like
 (31)
 Tambalagama.

De Sa having heard of the problems faced by Pimenta
 decided in 1624 to venture once more to Trincomalee, taking
 with him a force of Portuguese strengthened by some detachments
 of Sinhalese lascarins. The whole force was under the overall
 command of the new captain-major-of-the-field Constantino de
 (32)
 Sa de Miranda. The disava of the Four Korales, Francisco de
 Brit~~to~~ de Almeida also made ready to accompany the captain-general

(30) TT.LM.19.f.9

(31) TT.Mss da Liv.1699.f.248; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.228v;
 Baldaeus 85; Filmoteca LM.15.38/1-5

This incidentally disproves the view advanced in Queyroz 698
 and Ribeiro 221 that Senerat was soothed into acquiescence in
 the Portuguese seizure of Trincomalee.

(32) AHU 501.f.292; Simancas S.P. 1530.f.30

with the men of his province. Senerat fearing de Sa's moves acted to forestall him. Kandyan agents began to foment disturbances in the Four Korales in the hope that de Sa would be deterred from leaving Kotte. Unfortunately for Senerat de Sa decided merely to send back de Almeida to pacify the Four Korales and himself continued on his way to Trincomalee where he spent another four months completing the fort. He also supervised the establishment of the new township where several casados sent from Goa were settled as residents.⁽³³⁾

De Sa had instructions from the viceroy to see to the strengthening of the forts of Kotte itself, and Trincomalee was fortified. This explains his visit to Galle in November 1623

(33) TT.LM.19.f.40v; Reimers 57; Filmoteca LM.20.9/10/4-2; AHU Caixa 16.ant.18.1.1644

The normal garrison in Trincomalee was about seventy five Portuguese. During the years 1623-1627 about thirty casados were settled in the township. Consequently the soldados in the garrison were reduced in number to thirty or forty men. It is noteworthy that three of the best known Portuguese writers of the seventeenth century who described the construction of the fort at Trincomalee - Fernão de Queyroz, (734-736) João Rodriguez de Sa de Menezes (527-529) and João Ribeiro (221) all maintain that the fort was begun only in 1624. They all assume that in 1623 de Sa went directly from Goa to Colombo where according to de Sa de Menezes the captain-general was opposed by his councillors regarding the plan to fortify Trincomalee on the grounds that the area around was too poor and uninhabited to support a large garrison. Authorities on Ceylon history have so far generally accepted the version given by these chroniclers. (eg. Fr. S.G. Perera - A history of Ceylon for schools, 88; P.E. Pieris - Ceylon II, 168) However contemporary documents clearly indicate that there were two separate expeditions - one from Goa in 1623 and one from Kotte in 1624.

soon after he arrived from Trincomalee. The fortalice planned by de Sa to command Galle harbour had been completed by Fernão Pinhão, captain of Galle in time of Jorge de Albuquerque. (34) The defense structure in Galle however was far from complete. The wall intended to cut off the promontory (on which the fortalice was built) from the mainland was not yet complete, while the seaward bastion of Santa Cruz, intended to command the entrance to the bay, still lacked the long range artillery necessary for this task. Nevertheless de Sa considered the situation at Galle sufficiently satisfactory to leave it alone until more (35) urgent tasks had been attended to.

Up to the end of 1624, de Sa followed the policy outlined by the viceroy. Peace was maintained with Kandy, while the Portuguese in Ceylon endeavoured to strengthen their position against external attack. However at the end of this year de Sa requested the viceroy for permission to resume open war against Kandy. In support of his view he attached a letter from João Cardoso da Pina, disava of Matara, an experienced Portuguese fidalgo, giving the reasons for advocating this course. (36) As neither letter survives it is not possible to say with certainty why de Sa became convinced that open war was preferable to working under

(34) TT.LM.18.f.44,57; TT.LM.24.f.458

(35) TT.LM.19.f.4,18,40v; JCBRAS XI,537

(36) BNL.FG.1982.f.59

the guise of peace. Apart from the Sinhalese guerilla attacks on the villages surrounding Trincomalee, several possible reasons may be advanced by way of explanation. Firstly the pretence of keeping the peace made it impossible for the captain-general to act against the trading activities of the Indian merchants at Batticaloa. De Sa must have realised that an open port at Batticaloa gave Senerat unimpeded access to foreign powers in his search for allies. War alone could check this. Secondly, about this time came Senerat's request for the daughter of Sankili, the late ruler of Jaffna, as consort for his eldest son. On Portuguese rejection of this plan Senerat procured from Tanjore two of Sankili's nieces (who had been taken to that principality by D.Luis when he broke with the Portuguese) as consorts for his two eldest sons, Kumarasinghe and Vijayapala.⁽³⁷⁾ These activities probably roused de Sa's fears regarding Senerat's intentions towards Jaffna. Thirdly, it is apparent from the records of the discussions of the viceroy's council that one of the reasons put forward by de Sa for the advocacy of war was the growing strength of the Kandyan king. During his first term, de Sa had seen Senerat

(37) P.da Trindade III.233; Queyroz 692

(38) Biker I.224; JCERAS XI.517,529-539; CLR 3 ser.I.152;
~~S.G.Perera - An expedition to Uva, 36~~ Tornado, 36

at his weakest, when the risings within his kingdom had confined his power to the Kandy-Matale region. Now on his arrival in Ceylon a few years later de Sa saw how useful the period of peace had been for the Kandyan monarch. He therefore (39) wished for war to arrest the growth of Senerat's power.

The viceroy-in-council was apparently unimpressed by the arguments put forward by de Sa and da Pina. By this time he had found a staunch supporter for his policy of peace with Kandy within his own council in Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira. ^{a former} Pereira, the captain-general of Ceylon (1616-1618), had returned from Moçambique to take a seat in the viceroy's council in 1624. As the only member in the council with first hand experience of the island, his views on Ceylon were listened to with respect. Pereira doubtless from conviction born of his own experience in Ceylon (which was perhaps reinforced by an urge to defend his own handiwork - the treaty of 1617) held the view that the best policy for the Portuguese at the moment was to preserve peace with Kandy. (40) It was therefore decided on 2 January 1625 to refuse de Sa permission to go to war.

The viceroy however considered that a matter as weighty as this could not be finally resolved without further evidence.

(39) BNL.FG.1982.f.59

(40) Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.216

He therefore requested the captain-general to summon twelve men named by the viceroy and to discuss with them the question of how to curb the growing power of Kandy and assure the security of the Portuguese possessions in the island. ⁽⁴¹⁾ Undoubtedly one of the aims of the viceroy in making this request was to gauge what element of support existed within Ceylon for his policy of peace. His letter of 7 January 1625 therefore contained elaborate instructions designed to ensure that these twelve men would voice their views without fear. After a full scale discussion, each was to go back to his own house and put his views in writing and then hand over this document to the vedor da fazenda who would seal it and despatch it to the viceroy. However, if the viceroy hoped to receive a vote for peace he was also open-minded in his search for information, suggestions and opinions. Thus each man was requested to state not only whether he was in favour of war or not, but if in favour of war, how many Portuguese soldiers, how much money and what supplies would be necessary, or if against war, what other measures could be taken to prevent Kandy from getting

(41) BNL.FG.1982.f.59 The twelve nominated by the viceroy were Luis Gomes Pinto, Filipe de Oliveira, Domingos Carvalho Cao, Lançarote de Seixas, Luis Cabral de Faria, Francisco Barbosa de Andrade, Luis Teixeira de Macedo, João Roiz Homen, Diogo da Souza da Cunha, Jeronima Taveira, Fr. Bernadino da Fonseca and the vedor Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara.

stronger. The twelve were also enjoined to give their opinions as to where the Portuguese army should be based and what other measures were necessary to ensure the security of Portuguese Ceylon.⁽⁴²⁾

The result of this inquiry provided a demonstration^{ry} of overwhelming support for the captain-general's view that war was the best course of action. Of the eleven Portuguese consulted (the twelfth Filipe de Oliveira, serving in Jaffna was unable to attend) nine unhesitatingly came out in favour of open war, one was non-committal and only one opposed the immediate⁽⁴³⁾ declaration of war. Apart from the two arguments in favour of war mentioned above - that peace allowed Kandy to contact the enemies of the Portuguese and that it enabled the king of Kandy to grow stronger daily, four other reasons were advanced by those who wanted war. Firstly, it was held that it was the existence of Kandy that made the Portuguese hold on the lowlands insecure, for rebellions in Kotte owed much to the encouragement given by Kandy.⁽⁴⁴⁾ As Lançarote de Seixas, the former vedor of Ceylon argued,⁽⁴⁵⁾ 'No man is safe with an enemy

(42) BNL.FG.1982.f.59; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.223v; De Sa de Meneses (JCBRAS XI.560,566) mentions this 'meeting of captains' but represents it as a council summoned by the captain-general to urge the viceroy to action. This story, repeated in P.E.Pieris's Ceylon II.173, needless to say, is inaccurate.

(43) Ajuda 51-VIII-50.ff.216-230

(44) Ajuda 51-VIII-40.ff.216,217,225,227,227v

(45) De Seixas had just returned to Ceylon after serving a year as the Provedor mor dos contos at Goa.

(46)
 in his own house.' The war against Kandy was thus advocated
 as a preventive measure. 'If we do not conquer Kandy' wrote
 Luis Teixeira de Macedo 'all the Portuguese will one day be
 killed in their sleep.'⁽⁴⁷⁾ Secondly, it was held that the time
 was ripe to strike. The Portuguese now had an able captain-
 general, a lascarin force in Ceylon and strong forces in India.⁽⁴⁸⁾
 Thirdly, it was contended that unless they made the attempt
 now, the Portuguese would soon be forced to do so under less
 propitious circumstances for the number of lascarins in
 Portuguese forces was gradually diminishing, for many were
 fleeing to Kandy to take service under Senerat.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Finally, the
 attention was drawn to the economic advantages which would result
 from the conquest, in greater revenue, customs dues and the
 like. Luis Teixeira de Macedo even argued that if Kandy was
 seized Ceylon could after half a dozen years provide money and
 material to support other wars in the East.⁽⁵⁰⁾

The viceroy of India, Dom Francisco da Gama remained
 unconvinced. The Portuguese in India at this time were engaged

(46) Ajuḍa 51-VIII-40.f.225

(47) Ibid. f.216v

(48) Ibid.f.216,225

(49) Ibid. ff.217,221,222,223,225

(50) Ibid.f.216

in one contest against the English for the Mughal-Persian trade, and another against the Dutch for the spice trade in the East Indies. ⁽⁵¹⁾ The viceroy did not wish to shoulder additional commitments if he could ^{avoid} it. Moreover Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira in the viceroy's council offered cogent reasons why he should not go to war with Kandy. Pereira pointed out that there was no guarantee that de Sa would succeed where others had failed - in completing the conquest of Kandy. Moreover he held that war normally involved a fall in revenue and a great rise in expenditure. Thus Ceylon, far from financing other wars in the East would need considerable aid for a long time to come. Finally he pointed out that conflict with Kandy ^{would} only encourage enemies of the Portuguese, whether Dutch, English or South Indian to open up a new front in Ceylon and this was something the Portuguese could not afford. ⁽⁵²⁾ Moreover the king of Portugal meanwhile had agreed in principle to the viceroy's advice to preserve peace and had begun to exchange friendly letters with the king of Kandy. ⁽⁵³⁾ The viceroy's wider view of the Portuguese position in Asia prevailed and de Sa therefore had to give up his aggressive plans for the time being. ⁽⁵⁴⁾

Since an attempt to conquer Kandy had been ruled out

(51) Of course there were English in the East Indies and the Dutch in western India. In fact the first Dutch ship to leave India directly from Europe sailed in 1624. But the contest was generally in the lines indicated above.

(52) Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.229

(53) Ajuda 51-IV-32.f.5v

(54) TT.LM.23.ff.53,141

de Sa had to return to the second route to security by way of command of the littoral. During the next few years his main efforts were directed to the fortification of the ports and the reorganisation of the administration of Kotte. Moreover, in 1624 the king had twice requested the viceroy to send him plans of all the ports in the island and to let him know what other fortifications were necessary and what action was being taken to deal with these gaps in Ceylon's defences.⁽⁵⁵⁾ In 1625 therefore de Sa turned his attention to Colombo fort. This was easily the largest fort in Portuguese Ceylon. It had been strong enough to withstand the attacks of the warlike Rajasinha of Sitawaka in the 1580's but had been neglected since. Thus the sixteenth century ramparts connecting the stone bastions had been made of taipa or mud and had collapsed in many places. The camara of Colombo had requested the king to ensure that Colombo was adequately defended,⁽⁵⁶⁾ and the authorities in Lisbon, having recognised the justice of this demand, had sent corresponding instructions to the viceroy of India.⁽⁵⁷⁾ The problem was, as it always had been, one of finance. In the time of Mathias de Albuquerque (1591-1597) the king had granted the

(55) TT.LM.20.ff.1,39

(56) DR.I.182

(57) DR.I.8, 58-61,182,332,388, DR.IV,138

money realised from the sale of an annual voyage to China for this work but none of the 24,300 xerafins realised from this sale was ever spent on Colombo. ⁽⁵⁸⁾ By 1613 however repeated instructions from home, the extension of English and Dutch activities in the western seaboard of India and the worsened state of the walls of Colombo had forced Azevedo's successor Dom Francisco de Menezes, to take action. He and his successor Manoel Mascarenhas Homen rebuilt the walls on the landward side ⁽⁵⁹⁾ for more than half their circuit. The lack of funds however, prevented the generals from using stone. Thus once the building and repair work ceased as it did in 1616 due to the revolt of Nikapitiya, the torrential rains of the south-west monsoon took their toll and by 1618 the walls had once again collapsed in many places. ⁽⁶⁰⁾

De Sa however did not pay attention to the problem of repairing the walls on the landward side. He evidently considered the prospects of a landward attack rather remote. He concentrated on the defence of the harbour against attack by sea, which had become more likely due to Dutch attempts to capture the trade in the Arabian sea in the 1620's. The headland which had

(58) TT.LM.15.ff.23,111; TT.LM.16.f.552

(59) TT.LM.13.f.147; AHU Caixa 4.18.12.1616; Filmoteca LM.12.86/3; DR.III.394-395

(60) AHU Caixa 6. 21.11.1618

formed the site for the original Portuguese fortalice at Colombo, called the point of S.Lourenço was fortified to form a new bastion called S.Cruz and provided with eleven pieces of artillery to defend the whole harbour.⁽⁶¹⁾ The casados of Colombo gave the captain substantial aid in this project which occupied most of 1625.

The viceroy had also instructed de Sa to fortify Puttalam. A stockade had been established there in the second decade of the seventeenth century to prevent the Kandyans from using the port. De Sa however was against the dispersal of Portuguese soldiers at too many fortified posts and wrote back to the viceroy that Puttalam was situated in a barren^f area unfrequented by Europeans and he abandoned the project.⁽⁶²⁾ De Sa could justifiably argue here that although Puttalam was undefended and although the fort of Chilaw established in the time of Azevedo⁽⁶³⁾ had been abandoned, the fort of Negombo built by Lourenço Teixeira de Macedo in the 1590's was adequate to defend the cinnamon rich areas of the Pitigal, Beligal and Alutkuru Korales. De Macedo who had been granted the captaincy of Negombo for life kept the fort in repair and maintained a small lascarin force for its defence from the revenues of the

(61) Queyroz 740; JCBRAS XI. 537-538; Reimers 52

(62) Reimers 54; BM.Add.Ms.9853.f.157v

(63) T.Abeyasinghe, 28

port and the villages attached to it. Apart from this force there were usually fifteen or twenty Portuguese soldiers plus another five officials. These were assisted in times of war by half-a-dozen married settlers who lived within easy reach of the fort. Negombo fort itself was triangular in shape and small in size with three well-built bulwarks - Nossa Senhora da Vitoria, Espirito Santo and S.Lourenço - furnished with a few small pieces of artillery.⁽⁶⁴⁾

By 1625 therefore the coastal belt of Kotte was defended by the four forts of Negombo, Colombo, Kalutara and Galle. In this year arrived a letter from the king to the viceroy requesting that an inquiry be made as to whether Weligama, eighteen miles south of Galle, should also be fortified.⁽⁶⁵⁾ This inquiry was the result of a petition submitted by one Diogo Vaz Freire, a Portuguese fidalgo who had seen many years of services in Ceylon. Freire pointed out that a fort at Weligama would be of great use to the Portuguese within Ceylon as well as in their conflict with the Dutch. The construction of a fort there, he argued, would enable the Portuguese to gain a greater hold over the southern part of the Matara disava. Furthermore he argued that such a fort would be of immense

(64) Filmoteca- Planatas Rola III; TT.LM.31.ff.42-43; APO (new ed) Tomo IV.Vol.2.Part I. 369-370; Ribeiro 130; Reimers 53

(65) TT.LM.20.f.365

value to Portuguese shipping. At this time the Dutch were attacking Portuguese shipping sailing to Goa from the Far East and Malacca at a point just to the south of Ceylon. Freire pointed out that a loss of a ship in 1619 and two more in 1620 could have been avoided had a fort at Weligama enabled the Portuguese to use Weligama bay as a refuge. Freire also contended that only the fortification of all such bays and inlets could eventually enable the Portuguese to control the trade of the island and ensure the conquest of the Kandyan kingdom. To clinch the issue he offered to spend between eighteen and twenty thousand cruzados for the fort if given the disava of Matara and later the command of the lascarin troops of the island and a grant of Weligama for life.⁽⁶⁶⁾

The king was obviously impressed with the offer, for, although he left the decision whether to construct the fort to the discretion of the viceroy, he asked that a hundred Christians be settled in the vicinity of Weligama to give added strength to the projected stronghold.⁽⁶⁷⁾ The viceroy and the captain-general however were both opposed to the scheme on the grounds that the fortification of Galle rendered that of Weligama unnecessary, that the rewards asked for by Diogo de Vaz

(66) TT.LM.20.ff.366-368

(67) TT.LM.20.f.365

Freire were excessive and that the port and villages of Weligama were already granted to another who could not be dispossessed of it save in a general re-allocation of lands and villages in Ceylon.⁽⁶⁸⁾

In the period 1626-1627 de Sa continued the work of strengthening the defences of Kotte. In 1626 he concentrated on the two inland centres of Malwana and Menikkadawara. Malwana, the residence of the captain-general since the time of Azevedo was provided with the square shaped fort named S.Helena. The garrison required for this fort had been estimated as seventy

(68) BNL.FG.1982.ff.121v-122; TT.LM.22.ff.113v-114; TT.LM.24.f.6v,117

From a letter from the king to the viceroy dated 19 March 1623 it would appear that Gaspar de Mello de Sampayo held Weligama during this period. (TT.LM.18.f.207) Despite the advice given by de Sa and the viceroy conde de Vidiguerra against the fortification of Weligama in 1626, the king continued to urge that the matter be investigated further. Action was delayed by the outbreak of war against Kandy. ~~Ew~~ Eventually in 1634 the captain-general of the day Dom Jorge de Almeida reported that Weligama could be fortified without detriment to the interests of the Christian converts of the area. By this time the viceroy conde de Linhares was also in favour of the project. Definite orders to fortify Weligama issued both by the viceroy and the king in 1636 were not carried out only due to the lack of funds.

Coimbra 459.ff.250, 280; Filmoteca LM.13A.4/2; A.Botelho de Souza III, 436; TT.LM.25.f.118; TT.LM.26.f.86; TT.LM.27.f.130
TT.LM.28.f.128; TT.LM.31.f.115; TT.LM.36.f.131;
TT.LM.37.f.83

soldiers though in actual fact, very often the force left to
 (69)
 guard the fort was much smaller.

The fort built at Menikkadawara was much larger in scale.
 It was intended partly as a base from which the Portuguese army
 could be supplied for any offensive or defensive campaign
 in the Four Korales, partly as a secure place of refuge to
 which a Portuguese force could retire after a tiring campaign.
 (70)
 Construction work on the fort was started in October 1626.

The fort itself, named the fort of Santa Fe was rectangular
 with four bastions. (71) The walls and the breas^twork were made of
 stone and mortar and a wall within the fort secured the water
 supply. The construction of a moat was begun but later abandoned.
 In the centre of the fort was the citadel called Forte Cruz.
 Work on the fort was continued till about May 1628. For much
 of the time the captain-general himself supervised the work but
 during his absence the captain-major-of-the-field, Francisco de
 Brito de Almeida was left in charge. (72)

One such period of absence was due to de Sa's departure
 in 1627 to finish the work on the fort of Galle which had been

(69) Reimers 61; Ribeiro 130; De Sa de Menezes 566; Queyroz 45,
 751; TT.Ms.Liv.1699.f.248v

(70) AHU.501.f.51v

(71) Called S.Iago, S.Boaventura, S.Jorge and S.Pedro. Reimers 62
 says there were only three bastions.

(72) Simancas 1530.f.130; TT.Ms.da Liv.1699.f.248v; AHU Caixa 16,
 ant.18.1.1644; AHU Caixa 23, 26.1.1655; P.E.Pieris's Ceylon II,
 173 assertion that the fort of Menikkadawara was built in a
 'few days' is an inaccuracy derived from Queyroz 751.

left incomplete in 1623. In 1627 de Sa attended to the task of constructing the defences of Galle on the landward side. The wall separating the settlement from the mainland was strengthened by three bastions, one at each end and the third at the centre. These were provided with seven small pieces of artillery.⁽⁷³⁾ De Sa's intention to strengthen the defences with a moat was given up due to lack of funds.⁽⁷⁴⁾

The years of peace (1623-1628) were thus used by de Sa to strengthen the Portuguese position in Ceylon. He had been forbidden to attempt a solution through a renewal of war with Kandy. But he had done what he could to isolate the mountain kingdom and to prevent any Kandyan contact with the European enemies of the Portuguese by his programme of coastal fortification. However he did not stop there for he realised that there could be a threat to the Portuguese territories in Ceylon from within. His construction work at Malwana and Menikkadawara served to counter threats within the lowlands as well^{as} from Kandy. He also built a gunpowder factory, designed to turn out about

(73) AHU Caixa 16. 18.1.1644; AHU Caixa 23. 26.1.1655; \$ Simancas, SP. 1530.f.30; APO (new ed) Tomo IV.Vol.2.Part I.406
Incidentally contemporary documents disprove the contention of de Sa de Menezes (De Sa de M. 537) that de Sa, his father completed the fortification of Galle in 1625.
(74) Queyroz 627

one hundred and sixty pounds of powder daily.⁽⁷⁵⁾ But most important of all, he sought to ensure the loyalty of the lascarins by the establishment of two fortified settlements for them near Colombo. One of these settlements was at Peliyagoda within three miles of the Portuguese fort of Colombo.⁽⁷⁶⁾ The other was probably located at Mulleriyawa, about six miles due west of Colombo.⁽⁷⁷⁾ The policy of putting the lascarins and their families within fortified settlements⁽⁷⁸⁾ had been urged by the king as early as 1607. It was realised that as long as the families of lascarins and their chiefs remained within forts in Portuguese power, the Sinhalese were unlikely to desert. However despite repeated orders by the

&(75) Queyroz (740), reports that the saltpetre was obtained from Madura. This, little difference from the military point of view as no provision was made for the storage of ingredients essential for the making of gunpowder, most of which had to be purchased overseas. It may be noted that in the 1640's Ribeiro observed a gunpowder factory on the same site as that established by de Sa. However he gives it a capacity (two quintals or about three hundred and forty pounds a day) double that mentioned by de Sa de Menezes. (De Sa de M. 538; Ribeiro 128)

(76) 'Deste lugar de Matnal para onde nasce o sol, espaco de tiro de esfera esta a cidade Nova que fez Constantino de Sa, sendo geral, pvoada da mulhere dos araches lascarins e mais gente de guerra e das sete corales para seguranca desta conquista.' Paulo da Trindade III. 136.

See also Queyroz 715 and R. Boudens - The Catholic church in Ceylon under Dutch rule, 35.

(77) This was also called Tranqueira Grande - the great stockade.

(78) T. Abeyasinghe, 59, 61

king no steps had been taken to put the recommendations into effect up to 1625.⁽⁷⁹⁾ The primary obstacle to the execution of this policy was the problem of land allocation. Such fortified village settlements ^{as} ~~ad~~ proposed, if they were to serve their intended purpose, had to be located near a major Portuguese fort, for otherwise in time of war the control of these settlements could be easily be lost. The lascarins who were paid by grants would naturally have to be allocated land near their settlements. The difficulty thus arose because all lands had already been allocated ~~to~~ and much of the land near Colombo was in the hands of the Portuguese casados who were reluctant to give it up.⁽⁸⁰⁾ However it soon became clear that even if the lascarins, ^{were} favourably disposed towards the Portuguese they had little choice if their families were exposed to retaliation by the rebels. The Portuguese settlers of Colombo thereupon propounded their own solution to the problem. In a letter of the camara of Colombo to the king dated 20 November 1615 they proposed that the casados be given the task of maintaining the lascarins. For every lascarin maintained the casado responsible was to be granted lands worth one hundred pardãos a year in

(79) TT.LM.16.ff.240, 101; DR.IV.46-47

(80) TT.LM.26.f.313

revenue. The camara, the stronghold of Portuguese settler interests, argued that this solution would ensure the obedience of the lascarins who would be thus be deprived of their leaders and placed in a position of dependence upon the Portuguese.⁽⁸¹⁾

However the Portuguese governor of India, Fernão de Albuquerque to whom the suggestion was referred, decided against it on the grounds that it was intended to serve the private interests of the casados who would retain and even add to their lands as well as obtain bands of retainers who might be used in personal quarrels as well as in times of war.⁽⁸²⁾

By the 1620's the opinion of senior Portuguese soldiers within Ceylon had swung strongly in favour of the scheme for fortified settlements. Of the eleven Portuguese who in 1625 sent secret reports on Ceylon to Goa at the viceroy's request^{'83)} five dealt with this problem. All these five were in favour of the fortified settlement scheme and three of them specifically stated that lascarins should be granted lands near Colombo taken from the Portuguese who could be compensated with lands further afield.⁽⁸⁴⁾ However it was apparent that such a step would meet

(81) AHU Caixa 6. 21.11.1618

(82) TT.LM.16.f.561

(83) See above page 155.

(84) These three were Jeronimo Taveira, Francisco Barboda da Andrade and Luis Cabral da Faria. The other two Luis Gomes Pinto and Domingos Carvalho Camp did not deal with the problem of how to obtain lands for the lascarins though the latter remarked that 'no accomodar desta gente bem veio ha dever dificuldades.' qualgus respeito. Luis Gomes Pinto advocated the establishment of such settlements near ~~Saldanham~~ Galle, Negombo as well as Colombo but the other four advocated settlements near Colombo only. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.ff.217,218v-219, 220-221v

with bitter opposition from the Portuguese settlers of Colombo and charges of favouritism and discrimination were sure to arise from those who lost by the changes. De Sa foresaw this. As early as 1 December 1623 he proposed to the king that a new tombo or register of lands be made. Once this was done, all villages save those whose grants were confirmed by the king could be resumed and then allocated according to royal instructions leaving sufficient lands in the neighbourhood of Colombo and along the strategic Kelany ~~valley~~ valley for settlement of ⁽⁸⁵⁾ lascarin forces. The plan envisaged the eventual settlement of ⁽⁸⁶⁾ about two thousand lascarins. Taking into account ⁿ all their dependents it meant the resettlement of about ten thousand men, women and children. During de Sa's time only a small fraction of this number were settled in the two fortified settlements ⁽⁸⁷⁾ set up, mainly because the work on the new tombo and the ⁽⁸⁸⁾ redistribution of land never got under way. One essential difference between the scheme urged by the king and that put into practice by de Sa should be noted. The king had originally urged that these fortified settlements be places of residence not only for

(85) TT.Collecao de S.Vicente 19. doc. 276

(86) Ajuda 51-VIII-40. ff.217,220-221v

(87) In Peliyagoda for instance on 23 November 1628 there were only two hundred Christian converts. (P.da Trindade III,136)

(88) TT.LM.24.f.335

the lascarins and their chiefs but also for the Portuguese settlers and Indian Christian colonists.⁽⁸⁹⁾ After the risings of 1616-1618 in Kotte the authorities in Goa apparently lost some of their optimism about Portuguese settlers living with security among the Sinhalese,⁽⁹⁰⁾ but there is no evidence of a change of policy in Lisbon regarding the fortified towns. De Sa had however no illusions regarding the salutary effects of mixing Portuguese settlers with lascarin forces. His object was to let the Sinhalese live in their settlements with the minimum interference from the Portuguese.⁽⁹¹⁾

De Sa and many of his contemporaries both within Ceylon and in Goa and Lisbon realised the value of ensuring the loyalty of the lascarins in the event of any rebellion or war. This accounts for the efforts made in the 1620's to assure economic as well as military security for the families of the lascarins. Hitherto land grants made to those other than Portuguese could be withdrawn at any time. In the early 1620's this was changed when the king, on the recommendation of de Sa, decreed that

(89) T. Abeyasinghe 59-61

(90) In a letter dated 20 March 1620 the king instructed the viceroy to consider the proposal that a wall of stone be built within the mud walls of the fort of Colombo and the lascarins and their families settled in the space between the walls. The Portuguese were to reside within the inner walls.

(91) 'Convinha he repertir se aquelle Ilha de Novo, dando aos naturaes quatro corlas vizinhas a suas cidades sem mistura dos Portugueses.' TT.LM.22.f.88

lands should be granted to native inhabitants for life.⁽⁹²⁾

However, this measure did not affect the right of the captain-general and the disavas to resume lands whose grants had not been confirmed by the king. This explains why the viceroy had to ask the captain-general in January 1625 to forbid the disavas to seize lands from the Sinhalese and the Tamils.⁽⁹³⁾ The captain-general de Sa and the vedor Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara were both convinced that the concessions granted to the lascarins did not go far enough. Both held the view that if the lascarins were given security and assurances of the continued well-being of their families, they were less likely to revolt. They doubtless realised that the grants of lands for life did not assure the Sinhalese or Tamil soldier that his family, even if it provided someone to take his place after his death would continue to hold the lands he now held. They therefore recommended in late 1625 that land grants should be made to the lascarins either for a period of three lives or in perpetuity. Such lands would return to royal hands only in case of absence of a male to perform the military service attached to the grant. In case of lack of children the lascarin was entitled to nominate a

(92) Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.225

(93) Ibid. f.223v

~~194~~

(94)
 relative to succeed him. This policy, which envisaged the grant of lands to the Sinhalese and Tamils on equal terms with the Portuguese did not fail rouse opposition among the settler element in Ceylon. Lançarote de Seixas, probably the wealthiest casado in Ceylon specifically recommended to the viceroy that in no case should a land grant be made to a native for more
 (95)
 than two lives. However the viceroy-in-council decided to accept the joint recommendations of the vedor and the captain-general. It was decided at a council meeting on 26 January 1626 that henceforth all land grants to natives in Ceylon should be for three lives. Records were to be kept of the exact area granted and the revenue it was expected to yeild to the holder. Moreover, it was specifically decreed that neither the disavas nor the captain-general himself had the power to resume these
 (96)
 grants.

Apart from trying to better the general lot of the lascarins de Sa tried to win the loyalty of their commanders by lavish patronage and by fostering a feeling that they too played a useful and vital role in the Portuguese regime in Ceylon.

(94) BNL. FG.1983.ff.88-89; TT.LM.22.f.87v

(95) Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.225

(96) BNL.FG.1983.ff.88-89

The viceroy's decision on land tenure was probably influenced by the consideration that longer tenure might induce the lascarins to agree to pay quit rents for their lands. For a discussion of the question of the payment of dues for lands held by lascarins see chapter VI.

Four Sinhalese leaders gained de Sa's favour and prospered in his time - Mudaliyar Kulatunga Wickramasinghe or Dom Cosmo, Amarakoon Mantri or Dom Aleixo, Siyane Korale Banadara or Dom Balthazar and Kattota Mantri or Dom Theodosio Barreto.⁽⁹⁷⁾
⁽⁹⁸⁾
 Dom Cosmo and Dom Balthazar as well as Dom Theodosio were representatives of the Sinhalese nobility. Dom Cosmo was the ⁽⁹⁹⁾ son of Weerasekera Mudaliyar, a very rich Sinhalese nobleman who lived at the end of the sixteenth century. The son gained favour among the Portuguese for his services in the revolt of Nikapitiya and was appointed head of the lascarins of the Four Korales. This enabled Dom Cosmo to build a large residence for himself at Peliyagoda, while his eldest son Dom Antonio was married to the daughter of Dom Manual, the standard-bearer of the captain-general.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ Dom Balthazar's power and

(97) The precise identification of these four leaders was first made by P.E. Pieris. (Ribeiro 252-253) from whose work much of the next paragraph is extracted.

(98) Le Grand holds that Dom Theodosio was a descendant of a Moor of Cannanore who had commanded one of four ships that brought aid to Rajasinha of Sitawaka. (Le Grand 88) A seventeenth century manuscript however described Dom Theodosio as 'Chingala de naçao parente dos reis daquelles reinos.'

TT.Ms.da Liv. 831.f.145

(99) Virasekera - Pieris renders this as Wijayasekera. (Ribeiro 252, P.I. Pieris- Ceylon, II. 175)

(100) JCBRAS XI. 582

Le Grand's version of Ribeiro holds that Dom Cosmo gave his daughter in marriage to Dom Manual. (Le Grand, 88)

influence was centred in the Siyane Korale, the area of the Four Korales nearest to Colombo. He was connected to Dom Theodosio's family by ties of marriage. ⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Dom Theodosio, the leader of the lascarins of Matara was probably the most powerful amongst them. He was ~~made~~ ^{made} a mudaliyar by de Sa. In ^{contrast} ~~contrast~~ to the other three Dom Aleixo rose from the ranks, his skill in war winning the patronage of Luis Gomes Pinto, an experienced Portuguese commander. Apart from these four leaders there were also Sinhalese leaders of lesser account favoured by de Sa, notably Dom Simão, leader of the lascarins of Sabaragamuwa and Rajapakse or Dom Jeronimo who led the lascarins of the Seven Korales. ⁽¹⁰²⁾

The efforts of de Sa to reconcile the Sinhalese in Kotte to Portuguese rule and to win their loyalty eventually ended in failure. The reasons for this lay partly in his inability to carry out the reforms he had advocated. The delay in the making of the second tombo frustrated his plans for a more equitable re-allocation of lands. Moreover despite his zeal for justice de Sa could not check all those petty acts of oppression which aroused anger against the Portuguese soldiers

(101) His uncle Amancota Aratchi married Dom Theodosio's aunt.

P.E.Pieris - Ceylon, II. 176; Le Grand 88

(102) TT.Ms. Ma Liv. 1699 ff.276-277

and settlers.⁽¹⁰³⁾ However, Sinhalese and lascarins discontent with de Sa's rule arose from acts of commi^ssion rather than of om^smission. De Sa's extensive programme^f of fort construction and the making of palisades of wood and taipa around lascarin settlements involved a great deal of labour, the major part of which fell on the shoulders of the subject Sinhalese and Tamils.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ Moreover de Sa, a devout Catholic himself, looked on conversion to Christianity as an index of loyalty to the Portuguese. The period 1623-1628 saw a great extension in church building and missionary activity. This naturally led to resentment in the hearts of those who believed ~~in~~ and revered the teachings of Buddhism and Hinduism.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ While for such reasons discontent grew among the rank and file, resentment also found its way to the Sinhalese leaders. De Sa, though he consulted the Sinhalese commanders in matters of importance, never appointed a Sinhalese to the coveted post of disava.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ This post had been last held by a Sinhalese in 1620 when Dom Constantino, a Sinhalese prince was disava of Matara and

(103) Queyroz 1053; TT.LM.30.f.253; TT.LM.37.f.88; Coimbra 459, f.360v

(104) Queyroz 1031

(105) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.306; TT.LM.30.f.253; TT.LM.31.f.42v

(106) P.E.Pieris is in error when he says (P.E.Pieris- Ceylon II, 175) that Dom Theodosio was the disava of Matara. As he himself states a few lines later the disava was João Cardoso da Pina, a Portuguese.

this rank was what the lascarin leaders hoped to obtain when they eventually deserted to Senerat.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

The colonization policy of the Portuguese had been devised in the context of the uncertain loyalty of the lascarins in the early seventeenth century. By the 1620's the earlier hopes of attracting large numbers of Portuguese colonists by means of land grants had disappeared. Though small numbers of Portuguese colonists continued to arrive the hopes of the king of Portugal now rested in the planned migration of Indian Christians. Three reasons lay behind the king's policy of

(107) It is by no means implied that the Sinhalese leaders went over to Senerat for the sake of ~~material~~ ground material gains alone but it is certain that these played an important part at least in the case of Dom Theodosio who returned to the Portuguese later on after a disagreement with the Kandyan princes. (see below pages 280-281.)

(108) T. Abeyasinghe correctly (62) points out that the number of Portuguese colonists was very small. However the estimate of 350 Portuguese civilian males in Colombo in 1634 (given in the Arquivo Portuguese Oriental (nova ed) Tomo. IV. Vol. 2. Part 1. 371) must not be taken as indicative of this situation in the 1620's. By 1634 six years of war had caused a decline in the number of Portuguese casados through death, disease and possible emigration, while the influx of settlers ceased almost completely. Though the estimate in Reimers (52) of four hundred casados within the fort and three hundred outside may be somewhat too high, it is certain that the casados population in Colombo in 1628 must have exceeded that of 1634. Apart from these, there were in Ceylon, one hundred and twenty settlers in Jaffna, twenty to thirty in Trincomalee and fifty in Galle, ten in Kalutara and small numbers in other coastal towns.
(APO. (new ed) Tomo IV. Vol. 2. Part 1. 371-379 ; Reimers 52-60)

advocating the settlement in Ceylon of Christians from Goa, Salsete and Bardes as well as the Coromandel coast. Firstly, it was held that these settlers could be used to cultivate the areas depopulated by war and migration of the inhabitants to Kandy. This, it was considered would result in increased revenue and a supply of food stuffs much of which was currently imported from abroad.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ Secondly, it was thought that the settlement of Paravar inhabitants of the so-called Fishery coast of Coromandel would strengthen the Portuguese hold over the pearl fishery.⁽¹¹⁰⁾ Finally, it was considered that these migrants would be more reliable allies than the Sinhalese themselves and would be of great use in the conquest of the island.⁽¹¹¹⁾

The attitude of de Sa to the introduction of Indian colonists gives us some indication of the extent of his trust in the Sinhalese lascarin forces he commanded. At the commencement of his second term he was full of confidence that he could win lascarin loyalty. Thus though he was in favour of the plan for the settlement of Christians from the Fishery coast he held

(109) TT.LM.25.f.106; TT.LM.23.f.57; TT.LM.20.f.39;
TT.LM.27.f.78; A.Botelho de Souza III, 102

(110) The Parvar were fishermen of the Tinnevely coast of South India.¹

(111) A.Botelho de Souza, III.102

that it would be of benefit only in so far as cultivation of the land and the organization of the pearl fishery was concerned. As for their military value he commented that 'in this respect your Majesty has been given inaccurate information for this conquest cannot be concluded without the (help of) the same natives with whom it was begun, and all other forces are of no use for this task as has been shown in the case of aid in the form of the Christians of S.Thome who were destroyed without achieving anything.' (112) However the efforts of the viceroy and the captain-general led to no result either good or bad, economic or military, for the inhabitants of Goa, Salsete and Bardes proved as reluctant to leave their homeland as the people of the Fishery coast. (113)

(112) TT.LM.21.f.147; TT.Colleccao de S.Vicente XIX.Doc.276
'E neste particular não foi VMge bem informado porque esta conquista não se ha de concluir senão com os mesmos naturais com que se principiou e toda a outra gente para a conquista não ha de nenhũ effeito com ja o tempo tem mostrado nos soccorros que a elle vierão dos Christãos de São Thome que sem fazerem nenhũ effeito acabarão.' TT.Colleccao de S.Vicente XIX.Doc.276, Constantino de Sa to the king 1.12.1623. ~~tt~~

(113) TT.LM.30.f.128

The only recorded instance when large number of Indian Christians declared themselves ready to settle in Ceylon occurred in 1631 when famine conditions affected most of North India. This occurred at a time when the viceroy-in-council, reacting strongly to what the Portuguese considered to be treachery on the part of the Sinhalese, was in favour of replacing the Sinhalese inhabitants in the lowlands not only by the Indian Christians but also by Negroes from Moçambique. The plan to send five hundred Negroes a year direct from Moçambique was never put into effect. However over one thousand one hundred Canarese and three hundred Negroes were sent from Goa to Ceylon in October 1631. (Continued on next page -)

During the period of peace de Sa also turned to the problem of the Muslims in Ceylon. Here again can be seen the perpetual search for security, both internal and external that the Portuguese were engaged ^{upon} in Ceylon. The Muslims in Ceylon were few in number and chiefly engaged in trading. Unlike in India where Moghul power was always a factor to be reckoned with, the Muslims in Ceylon presented no political threat to the Portuguese. The Muslims ~~had~~ of course had been the traditional enemies of the Portuguese. However Portuguese officials in Ceylon were ~~as~~ a rule not inclined to act against Muslims on religious grounds alone. In fact in the 1630's Diogo de Mello de Castro advocated trade with the Muslim Nawab of Bengal in preference to trade with the Hindu Nayak of Madura on economic grounds. The view in Europe however was normally a more dogmatic one. As heretics as well as rivals in trade the Muslims were regarded as 'enemies of king and God.' When the Portuguese arrived in Ceylon they found the Muslims in control of the local inter-village trade and much of the external trade of the island. Bhuvanekabahu, king of Kotte (1521-1551) knowing the Portuguese hostility towards the Muslims, expelled them

(113) Contd.,

These men were expected to settle in Ceylon. Many of the Africans died. Others deserted to Kandy. Of the Canarese many eventually returned to their former homes upon news of improved conditions there.

(TT.L M.30.f.128; TT.LM.36.f.89; Assentos I.360; also see below page .)

from his domains in order to obtain Portuguese support
 (114)
 against his brother in 1526, but half a century later, when
 the rising power of Sitawaka had confined the Portuguese to
 the environs of Colombo, the Portuguese realised how useful
 the Muslims could be in supplying their fort at Colombo with
 essential requirements. Thus the Viceroy Dom Antao de Noronha
 (1564-1568) passed a decree authorising the Muslims free entry
 into Portuguese forts in Ceylon. (115) Such a situation involved
 no problem as long as Kotte remained under the nominal suzerainty
 of the Sinhalese King Dharmapala. But after 1594 when the
 Portuguese claimed to be the rulers of Kotte of their own
 right there arose the contradiction of a Catholic monarch
 persecuting Protestants while harbouring Muslims in his own
 territory. This was realised by Dom Francisco da Gama, conde de
 Vidigueria when serving his first term as viceroy. (1597-1600)
 He sent word to the captain-general of the day ordering him
 to expell all Muslims from Kotte. Azevedo, though probably
 under pressure from ^{the} Franciscans, acted with caution. He realised
 that the Muslims of Kotte as sailors and traders were playing
 an important ^{role} in the economy of the region. On the other hand

(114) Fr. S.G.Perera - A history of Ceylon for schools/, the Portuguese and Dutch periods, 22. This measure probably affected only the foreign traders.

(115) APO VI.1079; DR.III.258

like most Portuguese of his time he regarded the Muslims as foes of his country. Thus, while he convinced the viceroy that expulsion was not politic, its probable result being the flight of Muslims to Kandy and the strengthening of that kingdom, he took measures to bring them under surveillance. All Muslims already resident in Kotte were ordered to settle in certain ports and carry on their trading and seafaring activities from there. No more Muslims were allowed to settle in Kotte. However as he himself admitted later, Azevedo's regulations were often broken by the village-holders who no doubt ^{found} these traders useful in their dealings with the Sinhalese. (116)

Soon after taking up of the post of viceroy of India in 1612 Azevedo sent an order to the captain-general of Ceylon outlining the policy to be followed in the case of Muslims. In his alvara or decree dated 22 April 1613 he made an important distinction between the Muslims resident in the country and those who had come from abroad merely for the purpose of trading with the inhabitants of Kotte. Those Muslims who had lived in Colombo since the days of Rajasinha of Sitawaka were allowed to live there as they had always done but newcomers were to be permitted to reside in the city only till the change of

(117)
 the monsoon enabled them to set sail. Notice was given to
 all those who had already overstayed their limit to leave
 within a month on pain of being sent to the galleys. (118) Foreign
 Muslim traders were still presumably allowed to remain for
 longer periods in ports other than Colombo though forbidden
 to take up permanent residence in the island. Before long
 this question began to receive the attention of the authorities
 in Lisbon. In February 1615 the king sent two letters to the
 Viceroy Azevedo on this subject. It is apparent from these
 letters that three main reasons had been advanced to persuade
 the king to take action against the Muslims. Firstly, it was
 argued that the tolerance extended to the Muslims was an
 impediment to conversion. Secondly, it was held that their
 presence encouraged rebellion within Portuguese territory.
 Thirdly, it was argued that they in part contributed to the
 depopulation of lands by buying or receiving as payment of
 debts youths of the land and taking them to India. (119) On these

(117) '...nenhun mouro seja moradar na cidade de Colombo, nem possa estar nella mais que de monção excepto os mouros naturais e moradores na mesma cidade do tempo do Raju que poderão nella viver...' APO.VI.950
 The reasoning behind this distinction was impeccable from the Portuguese point of view. Those who had lived in Colombo of their own volition and suffered during the two great sieges by Rajasinha could not have been hostile to the Portuguese.

(118) APO.VI.950-951

(119) In the seventeenth century Ceylon, Sinhalese could sell themselves or their children 'as slaves' to pay a debt. This 'slavery' differed greatly from the Western version in that a man retained all his rights (including that of holding property) during the period of 'slavery,' and did not lose his status which was determined by caste. This particular charge against the Muslims however seems unfounded and based on the imposition of Western concepts of Asian practice.

grounds the king decided that ^{not} only should there be a total ban on the entry of Muslims into Ceylon but that even those already resident should be expelled from the island. Severe penalties were threatened not only against those who violated these orders but also even against those who merely aided and abetted such violations. (120)

However neither the viceroy nor the captain-general, Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira was willing to risk the disruption of the Kotte economy which would result from the expulsion of the all/Muslims. The authorities in Lisbon therefore received letters explaining the disadvantages ~~of~~ this policy would entail and the obstacles that lay in the path of its execution. (121) This was perhaps why in the instructions of 21 March 1617 the king omitted all mention of the expulsion of the Muslims and merely reiterated his instructions to forbid their entry to Ceylon. (122) However as both Manoel Godinho de Eredia (123) and Dom Frey Sebastiao de S. Pedro reported in 1619, even this order was not enforced. (124) This may have been partly due to the rebellions within Kotte between 1616 and 1620 but it seems likely that

(120) APO VI.1029-1080; DR.III.258; AHU 33.f.19v

(121) Filmoteca LM.12.85/86/5-1

(122) DR IV.139

(123) A well known Portuguese cartographer of the early seventeenth century. See A.Cortesao and A.Teixeira da Mota - Portugallae monumenta cartografia, Vol.VI.258. Lisbon, 1960

(124) AHU Caixa 6. 1.2.1619; TT.LM.16.f.239v

many Portuguese officials ignored contraventions of the
 king's orders for motives of personal gain. (125) Nevertheless
 there /seems little evidence of any great influx of Muslim
 settlers to Ceylon in the early seventeenth century. The reasons
 for this are not far to seek. Though the Muslims were often
 able to make much money as traders, tailors and butchers
 their freedom within Kotte was very limited indeed. Though they
 were not forced to accept Christianity neither were they allowed
 to build mosques. Even in a Muslim village it was an exception
 to have their own quazis or judges. (126)

In February 1620, the Portuguese governor of India,
 Fernão de Albuquerque made a recommendation that compelled
 the complete re-examination of the issue. In response to a
 routine order by the king dated 26 February 1619 requesting
 that Muslims be forbidden to enter and settle in Ceylon he
 argued that the best Portuguese policy would be to encourage
 them to settle in the island and to treat them well. He emphasised
 the service they rendered as sailors and merchants and
 stated that from his experience in Ceylon the Muslims were a
 peaceful community who would not act against the Portuguese in
 time of war. (127)
 (128)

(125) The authorities at Lisbon strongly suspected as much.
 APO. VI. 1080; DR. III.258

(126) Queyroz 744-745

(127) He had served as the captain of Colombo.

(128) TT.LM.12.ff.241-242

On receipt of this letter Portuguese policy regarding the Muslims in Ceylon was once more discussed and finally decided upon. As far as the old Muslim residents of Colombo and the foreign Muslim traders who came to Kotte were concerned Azevedo's policy as embodied in the viceroyal decree of 22 April 1623 was repromulgated. The old settlers were considered to have proven their loyalty by long periods of service during the wars against Rajasinha. The merchants were allowed to remain in Kotte only until the change of the monsoon made it possible for them to return to their homes abroad. As far as all other Muslims of Kotte were concerned it was decided that they should be expelled on the pain of death. However due to the representations of Fernão de Albuquerque it was realised that such a measure would lead to hardship in Kotte. Therefore an exception was allowed for a temporary period in the case of Muslim sailors and it was left to the discretion of the viceroy as to whether these sailors be included in the general expulsion or be allowed to live in Kotte until expelled at some later date. If it was decided to let the sailors live in Kotte for any long time they were to be compelled to live in four ports chosen by the captain-general. The Portuguese officials in Ceylon were also ordered to make a register of

(129)

Muslims so that their number and whereabouts would be known.⁽¹²⁹⁾

This ofcourse represented a return to the harsh policy of expulsion.

These instructions dated 10 December 1622 reached India when Dom Francisco da Gama, conde de Vidiguerfa was serving as viceroy for his second term. They were followed by reminders in 1623 and 1624.⁽¹³⁰⁾ The captain-general of Ceylon in consultation with the viceroy apparently decided by early 1626 that the time had come for action. He therefore proclaimed a general order expelling the Muslims.⁽¹³¹⁾ It may be assumed that the old Muslims residents of Colombo were excluded from this decree. The decree moreover involved no ban on Muslim traders. However the option given by the king, to retain the Muslim sailors if necessary does not seem to have been exercised.

Lack of evidence makes it impossible to estimate the economic impact of this expulsion of a peaceful, industrious community. It involved the emigration of those who had lived many generations in settlements such as Beruwala.⁽¹³²⁾ Nor is it certain ~~that~~ what proportion of the Muslims accepted conversion

(129) TT.LM.16.f.548

(130) TT.LM.18.f.221 ; TT.LM.23.f.45

(131) JCBRAS XI.543; Queyroz 745; Jornada 10

(132) P.E.Pieris -The Ceylon littoral, 41. A Sinhalese manuscript in the British Museum Library entitled (BM.or.6611,52) Rabel Varnanava seems to indicate that the Muslims were replaced in inter-village trade in Kotte by the Sinhalese.

as a means of circumventing the order for expulsion. It is known however that at least four thousand of them fled to Kandy where they were well received by Senerat and accomodated in the fertile lands around Batticaloa where their decendents still form a significant proportion of the population. ⁽¹³³⁾

The opinion among the Portuguese in Ceylon as to the question of the Muslims appears to have been less rigid than that in Lisbon. Queyroz mentions the case of one Fernão Duarte who thought them dangerous and petitioned de Sa to make a list of them but even this was to ensure that any strangers were ⁽¹³⁴⁾ expelled rather than to oust the long settled. On the other hand it is known that people from Galle, Alutgama and Negombo petitioned de Sa declaring that Muslims enriched the area and should not be expelled. ⁽¹³⁵⁾ This factor probably explains why despite the ⁽¹³⁶⁾ order for expulsion some Muslims did remain in Portuguese Kotte.

It appears that during the period 1623-1628 while de Sa succeeded in strengthening the Portuguese military position by building a number of forts and stockades and keeping order

(133) Queyroz 745; JCBRAS.XI. 543; TT.LM.24.f.4v

(134) Queyroz 744

(135) Queyroz 745

(136) P.da Trindade III.167

S.Arasaratnam- Dutch power in Ceylon, 1638-1688, 204-205 says that investigation in the 1650's revealed that Muslims had been in Galle for generations and had valid legal titles to the property they held there.

and discipline among the Portuguese soldiers, he had less success in winning the confidence of the Sinhalese in Kotte. His action in expelling the Muslims, though it won the favour of his superiors did little to strength the Portuguese or reconcile the other elements in Ceylon to Portuguese rule.

Moreover his disputes with the vedor da fazenda, Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara prevented the smooth running of the administration. (137)

However by 1628 his rule appeared to be having unprecedented success. There was no sign of lascarin discontent and de Sa had every confidence in the Sinhalese chieftains he had patronized. The Portuguese missionary effort was more successful and Portuguese Ceylon had enjoyed a longer period of peace than ever before.

The maintainance of peace, however, owed little to de Sa who from an early date was of the opinion that it was best to fight and destroy the power of Kandy. The war faction in Ceylon almost succeeded in precipitating^a/conflict with the the highland kingdom over the death of a Portuguese called Damiao Correa. Correa was killed while within Kandyan territory. It was contented that the killing of a Portuguese in Kandy was an insult to Portuguese prestige and an act of hostility by the Kandyans but, as Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira pointed out

(137) See below pages 334-341.

in Goa that the death of Correa was a result of private
 venegence and not a hostile act ^{provoked} ~~provoked~~ by the king of Kandy,
 (138)
 the viceroy refused to sanction a war against Senerat.

Despite the mutual suspicion that coloured Luso-Kandyan
 attitudes in this period normal trading relations continued
 between the two powers. This policy did not lack critics. Kandy
 imported most of the salt and cloth she needed and many
 Portuguese were of the view that an economic blockade was
 the best way of reducing Kandy. At one stage the vedor Ambrosio
 de Freitas da Camara advocated the establishment of a monopoly
 of salt mainly to control the supply to Kandy. (139) Perhaps the
 strongest proponent of this policy was Diogo Vaz Freire, who
 put forward his views in a petition addressed to the king in
 (140)
 1623. When Freire was appointed captain of Trincomalee in 1625
 he tried to put this policy into effect by seizing some vessels
 of the king of Kandy, but was apparently restrained by de Sa. (141)
 De Sa himself was no advocate of this policy. He was, it is
 true in a difficult position, as he had been instructed by the

(138) Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.229v; BNL.FG 1982.f.122v

It is unknown what Correa was doing in Kandyan territory.
 Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira held that he had killed a Kandyan
mudaliyar and was killed in turn by the dead man's relatives.

(139) TT.LM.23.f.235

(140) TT.LM.20.f.366

(141) TT.LM.22.f.113

viceroys to maintain peace and a general trade embargo would certainly have meant war. Nevertheless, it is possible that de Sa's opposition to economic warfare was not based solely on reasons of state, for despite assertions by his son and biographer Joao Rodrigues de Sa de Menezes that de Sa stamped out private trade among Portuguese officials in Ceylon, contemporary documents show that he and most of his disavos were involved in trading relations with the Kandyan up to the outbreak
(142)
of war.

During the period 1626-1628 the main issue in dispute as far as Portuguese policy towards Kandy was concerned, was whether to fortify Batticaloa and if so, when to do it. The view taken by the conselho da fazenda in Portugal as reflected in the letters of the king to the viceroy during this period shows no change from earlier attitudes. Batticaloa was to be seized and fortified even at the risk of war. In fact instructions to this effect became even more urgent than before for it was rumoured that the Dutch intended to seize Batticaloa and use it as a base to attack the annual Portuguese China fleet.
(143)

(142) JCBRAS.XI.539-540; Queiroz 740; TT.Md da Liv.1699.f.248v Evora CXVI /2-3; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.ff.221,222v,223

(143) BNL.FG.1982.f.140 There was some basis for this fear for in January 1625 the Dutch sent five ships to intercept Portuguese vessels sailing from Macao and Malacca to Goa. The Dutch ships were instructed to lay in waiting off the point of Galle. (See De Vos's translations of the Dag Registers of Batavia in JCBRAS.XXX.94)

keen on the seizure of Batticaloa, for he considered that it would either lead to war which would enable him to conquer Kandy or at least would enable him to deny Senerat the use of his last remaining major port. The opposition came from the viceroy conde de Vidiguerra or rather from his council.

The viceroy's opposition stemmed from largely from the fear of a renewed conflict with Kandy. He stated as much in a letter to the king on 15 January 1626. ⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ However as he could ⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ not reject royal instructions off hand, he sought to give good reasons why the fortification of Batticaloa was not advisable. In this he was ably seconded by his councillors led by Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira. In response to the king's warning of a Dutch plan to seize Batticaloa these councillors rejoined that this was very unlikely as there were a number of unfortified bays and ~~in~~ inlets in Ceylon which would suit ⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ the Dutch purpose much better. In fact, the viceroy's opposition to the fortification of Batticaloa was less determined and less rigid than that of his councillors. This was clearly shown by certain developments in 1616-1617.

(144) TT.LM.22.f.84

(145) TT.LM.21.f.137

(146) Filmoteca LM.14.119/1-3

In 1626, following their expulsions from Portuguese territory, the Muslims of Kotte fled to Kandy. Senerat, who saw in them a reliable ally against the Portuguese, settled some four thousand of them in the lands around Batticaloa. This was intended to discourage ^{the} Portuguese from making a fort in this area. The immediate effect however was exactly the opposite. De Sa sent word to the viceroy rousing fears of ^a Muslim trading centre in Batticaloa developing outside Portuguese control. This in turn prompted the viceroy to write back to the captain-general in September 1626 requesting him to prepare for the fortification of Batticaloa and promising substantial aid for the project. ⁽¹⁴⁷⁾

A few months later the viceroy changed his mind and countermanded his former instructions. The reason for this was the influence his councillors, particularly Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira, exerted on him. In a crucial meeting in early February these councillors persuaded the viceroy that the construction of a fort at Batticaloa was inadvisable on two grounds - first, that Batticaloa did not have a harbour which allowed large ocean going vessels ~~operating~~ ⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ to enter it, and second that a fleet of six light vessels operating

(147) TT.LM.24.f.5; AHU Caixa 16.18.1.1644

De Sa's personal emissary Francisco de Brito da Almeida left Ceylon on 8 June 1626. He however reached Goa only on 5 September 1626. Having discussed the question of military assistance with the viceroy he set out on 27 September and reached Ceylon with the viceroy's instructions at the end of October 1626.

(148) '...Batticaloa não tem bahia para entrarem naos nem navios grandes sendo assi qui ha em Ceilam outras partes capazes disso...'

TT.LM.24.f.1

from Trincomalee could control trade in this area as effectively as a fort at a much smaller cost and with much less danger of a conflict with Kandy. This decision taken by the viceroy-in-council in February 1627 was upheld once more when the question came up (149) before the same body in September 1627.

Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira however, had not cleared all the doubt in the viceroy's mind, for at the end of 1627 when fresh instructions to fortify Batticaloa arrived from Lisbon, the conde de Vidiguery^a decided to instruct the captain-general (150) to prepare to fortify Batticaloa. If the viceroy had been convinced that the fortification of this fort was not advisable he could at least have postponed action on the grounds that the objection to this course of action contained in his letter of 20 February (151) 1627 had not yet been considered by the king.

(149) TT.LM.24.f.1; BNL.FG.1982.f.150

(150) Neither the letter of king to the viceroy giving this order nor the viceroy's instructions to the captain-general have ~~survived~~ survived. However both Queyroz (750) and de Sa de Menezes (JCBRAS.XI.566) hold that the captain-general was asked to fortify Batticaloa by the viceroy.

(151) It is interesting to note that had he thus waited, he (or rather his successor) would have received two contradictory orders on this question. One dated 20 March 1628 from the conselho da fazenda instructed the viceroy to build a fort as soon as possible. Another dated 10 April 1628 signed at Madrid and presumably from conselho de Portugal gave him permission to abandon the project. Neither letter arrived in time to affect the developments in Ceylon. The repetition of both orders in the following year on 26 February and 24 January respectively sheds some light on the lack of co-ordination between the two councils in these years.

TT.LM.25.ff.126,148; TT.LM.26.ff(82,78)

De Sa ^{made} careful preparation for the long ~~xxxxxxxx~~ awaited execution of the plan to seize Batticaloa. As early as March 1628 three ships were sent to the eastern coast of Ceylon to reconnoitre the area and strengthen the force at Trincomalee. ⁽¹⁵²⁾ On 2 July 1628 de Sa himself set sail for Trincomalee with over a hundred Portuguese and two thousand lascarins. ⁽¹⁵³⁾ From Trincomalee he marched southwards along the coast towards the Batticaloa lagoon. ⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ There, on the island of Puliyantivu, some three miles inside the lagoon de Sa laid the foundations of the Batticaloa fort.

The Portuguese seizure of Batticaloa resulted in the immediate outbreak of war with Kandy. Senerat was by now ready for war and was unwilling to see his last major port lost without struggle. When de Sa arrived at Puliyantivu in July 1628 the king sent him a message asking him to desist and de Sa made a conciliatory ⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ but evasive reply. Senerat having realised that the Portuguese

(152) AHU Caixa 22. 4.8.1654

(153) TT.Ms.da Liv.1699.f.249

(154) Fr. Manual de Assumpcao writing in 1630 (TT.Ms.da Liv.1699.f.249) says that de Sa crossed the island to reach Batticaloa and then proceeded to Trincomalee, but ^{the} journey by sea to Trincomalee and the subsequent march overland to Batticaloa are mentioned by de Sa himself in a certificate dated 8 November 1628 granted to a soldier who accompanied him.

AHU Caixa.22. 4.8.1654

(155) Biker II.48; BNL.FG.257.f.27-28; CALR.III.351; TT.Ms.da Liv.1699.f.260; JCBRAS XI.567; Queyroz 752

This is the Sinhalese version as given in a letter of Senerat to the viceroy dated 5 December 1632. De Sa de Menezes and Queyroz on the other hand maintain that Senerat was trying to maintain peace and even offered de Sa a bribe of eighty thousand xerafins to do so.

were determined to seize Batticaloa decided on action. Wijayakoon

(156)
Bandara, a trusted commander of royal blood was sent with two thousand men to Batticaloa to impede the making of the fort.

On news of this attack a Portuguese force under Jacinto Rebelo, disava of Sabaragamuwa and Domingos Carvalho Cão, disava of Matara set out from Kotte and marched overland towards Batticaloa. The king of Kandy thereupon requested his eldest son Kumarasinha to check the Portuguese relieving force moving towards Batticaloa and profiting by the division of the Portuguese forces himself launched an attack on the Four Korales. Unfortunately for Senerat in these initial stages the fortunes of war went against him.

The two Portuguese disavas making their way along the south-eastern coastal plain proved to be more than a match for the forces sent against them by Kumarasinha. Even before their arrival de Sa had attacked and defeated the troops under Wijayakoon Bandara. Finally, Senerat's offensive in the Four Korales was repulsed by the Portuguese army based at Menikkadawara led by the captain-
(157)
major-of-the-field, Diogo Mendes de Brito.

(156) He may have been Mudaliyar Wijayakoon of Tumpane or Mudaliyar Wijayakoon of Walalgama. Both later distinguished themselves at the battle of Randeniwela in 1630. [Ribeiro 255] Queyroz (755) refers to a Wijayapala who was a noble in the court who had been at the Sitawaka court in the early 1590's.
(157) Jornada 4-5; AHU Caixa 22. 4.8.1654; AHU Caixa 23. 26.1.1655
AHU 501.f.379; Evora CV/2/7.f.70

These successes enabled de Sa to continue work at Batticaloa, till early October. During this period he built one bastion and raised the walls all round to a height of about three feet. Then he left for Kotte leaving Damião Botado as captain of the fort of Nossa Senhora da Penha da Franca at Batticaloa. Botado was allotted^t a detachment of lascarins, fifty Portuguese and thirty topazes to aid in defence and construction work. De Sa himself reached Kotte on 12 October 1628.⁽¹⁵⁸⁾

Work on Batticaloa fort continued for the next two years despite continued war. As in the case of Trincomalee, Jaffna proved to be an invaluable source of supplies. The fort, when eventually completed was a rectangular structure with three bastions. The main bastion, that of S. Cruz commande^d the port and was provided with six pieces of artillery including three large cannon. The other two bastions had three pieces of each.⁽¹⁵⁹⁾

The fort was undoubtedly badly sited. As it had no supply of water within the circuit of the walls stockades had to built from the walls to the lagoon to protect those who went to fetch water. Access to the sea could only be gained by sailing for three miles along a narrow channel. Moreover although de Sa

(158) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.249v

(159) Four of the twelve pieces of artillery provided for Batticaloa were sent from Goa for this purpose.

TT.LM.27.f.22

planned to settle twenty or thirty families on the island, it soon became clear that the channel separating Puliyantivu from the mainland was too narrow to prevent the passage of Sinhalese from the mainland. Thus in time of war the safety of the settlers could not be guaranteed outside the walls of the fort. (160)

Although the responsibility for the war could be laid squarely on the shoulders of the Portuguese who provoked it by the seizure of Batticaloa, in 1628 they would have preferred Senerat not to have opened hostilities, for their pre-occupation with the fortification of Batticaloa hampered them in both 1628 and 1629. Once war commenced, however, opinion both in Ceylon and Goa hardened against a settlement with Kandy and it was resolved by both captain-general and viceroy that this opportunity should be used finally to subjugate Kandy. (161)

The Portuguese forces in Ceylon in the 1620's amounted to over seven hundred and fifty soldiers. (162) Of these however a large proportion were occupied in garrison duty. The defence of

(160) AHU Caixa 22. 4.8.1654; AHU Caixa 23.26.1.1656; Queyroz 1150-1151; APO (new ed) Tomo IV.Vol.II.Part I. 408-409; Ribeiro 130.

The bad siting of the fort led to many proposals in the 1630's to dismantle it and rebuild it on a better site. Nevertheless in view of the expenditure of forty thousand merafins already incurred on the fort, it was decided to leave the fort as it stood until a large sum of money became available for this purpose. This eventuality never occurred and the fort as it stood fell to the Dutch in 1638.

AHU Caixa 11. 7.12.1634; Filmoteca LM.14. 119/1-3; Filmoteca LM.13A. 32/3-5; TT.LM.36.f.214; JRAS XXXI.368; Filmoteca LM.13A. 34/1-4

(161) TT.LM.27.f.88; TT.Ms.da Lin.1115.f.48v

(162) Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.221

the kingdom of Jaffna occupied a hundred and fifty Portuguese soldados while a further hundred men were tied up in the defence (163) of the forts of Trincomalee and Batticaloa. The seven forts in (164) Kotte required at least another two hundred men. This left a mobile force of only three hundred men. However the captain-general could call on the services of over three hundred casados or married Portuguese settlers and a similar number of topazes or (165) men of mixed descent. These men, though they rarely served in the mobile army could be of great use to free Portuguese soldiers from garrison duty. The Portuguese forces in the army were reinforced by about four or five thousand Sinhalese lascars (166) and a few hundred Tamils.

Throughout the 1620's, de Sa by repeated appeals for (167) assistance to Goa tried to increase the number of troops available. From about 1626 both the viceroy and the king began to realise (168) that the danger of war did exist in Ceylon. However due to the small number of men available, the need to equip the high

(163) Reimers 56,57; See above page .

(164) Negombo, Colombo, Kalutara, Galle, Malwana, Menikkadawara and Sabaragamuwa.

(165) See above page and T.Abeyasinghe 188.

(166) TT.Ms.da Liv. 1699.f.262-263; APO (nova ed) II. Tomo II. Vol.2. 416

(167) Filmoteca LM.13A. 67/68/3-1; F.de Souza VI.293; Ajuda 51-VIII-51, f.41 In November 1627 de Sa made a special journey to Mannar to meet Frei Luis de Brito, then bishop of Cochim, who soon became Archbishop of Goa and in March 1628 viceroy of India. In his discussions de Sa would no doubt have explained his views and objectives in Ceylon.

(168) Ajuda 51-IV-32.f.5v; BNL.FG.1982.f.122v

seas fleet of Nuno Alvares Botelho and to repeal the threat to Malacca from Achinese and ~~the~~ Dutch forces, little could be spared for Ceylon. Statistical data of the number of Portuguese troops sent to Ceylon in this period is incomplete but it is apparent from a comparison of the strength of the Portuguese army in 1625-1626 with that in 1630 that the losses through death and departure were hardly compensated for by the new arrivals.⁽¹⁶⁹⁾ However the Portuguese forces in the first two years of the war were far stronger than those which had successfully and systematically devastated Kandy in the decade preceding 1617. Not only was the numerical strength of the Portuguese element almost doubled,⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ but the routes through which Kandy had obtained aid in the earlier period were to a large extent closed by the conquest of Jaffna and the seizure of the ports of Trincomalee and Batticaloa. This alone would explain the optimism of the veterans of the Kandyan war, that given a reinforcement of a further three or four hundred soldiers Kandy would be within their grasp.⁽¹⁷¹⁾

The war faction in Ceylon failed however to make sufficient allowance for three factors. Firstly, the efforts of the Portuguese to encircle Kandy and cut off her contacts with other powers had resulted in a dispersal of their forces. In the days of

(169) Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.221; Assentos I.525; Filmoteca LM.19D. 23/4; Evora GR.Arm.V-VI,14-5.f.166; TT.LM.27.f.222

(170) T.Abeyasinghe 64

(171) Ajuda 51-VIII-40ff.216v,217,218,221,221v,222v,219,224,225v,226

Azevedo it was the Portuguese operating from their main fort in Colombo, who had the advantage of internal lines of communication. In 1628 this advantage lay with Kandy. Secondly, almost ten years of peace had undone much of the damage wrought by the Portuguese in the first twenty years of the seventeenth century. The problem of depopulation in Kandy had been solved to a large extent by settling Sinhalese and Muslim refugees from Portuguese territory in abandoned lands. Small bands of colonists from South India as well as Bengal came into fill what gaps were left. Kandy was once more a relatively prosperous kingdom.⁽¹⁷²⁾ Finally, the complete defeat of his rivals and the achievement of Senerat in securing peace for his people had gradually enabled Senerat to win back the allegiance of all Kandyans. The lowest point of his power and prestige had been reached in 1617-1618 when Senerat found half his kingdom in rebellion against him. From that time onwards he had patiently rebuilt the foundations of his power. In the early 1620's his two elder sons had been appointed rulers of the provinces of Uva and Matale. In 1628, at the age of sixteen, his youngest son Maha Astana was acclaimed the prince of Kandy, the last of the three principalities into which the kingdom of Kandy was divided.

(172) Mandarampura Puvata, stanzas 179-209

It is therefore no surprise that throughout 1628 it was Senerat who took the offensive. After the failure of his attempt to check the fortification of Batticaloa in July⁽¹⁷³⁾ September 1628, he re-organised his forces and attacked the Portuguese in three fronts - Batticaloa, Jaffna and Kotte.

In late 1628, a Sinhalese commander with a strong force was sent to besiege Batticaloa and impede all construction work. This force successfully cut off the garrison from all outside contact but the defenders continued to resist even after reinforcements led by the king of Kandy arrived to strengthen the besieging force.⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ Senerat's ^{second} expedition was aimed at shattering the Portuguese hold on Jaffna. He realised⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ that the Portuguese position at Trincomalee and Batticaloa ^{less} would be much/strong if the base from which they were supplied - Jaffna-could be subdued. Moreover through their marriages

(173) 'Visiapu' was the name given to him by the Portuguese.

(174) Evora CV/2-7.f.70

(175) It was a tribute to the natural strength of Trincomalee that the Sinhalese did not attempt to capture it as they did Batticaloa. The Portuguese sources do not speak of any armed conflict at Trincomalee until the later stages of 1630 but it is clear from these sources as well as the Sinhalese manuscript Matale Maha Disava Kadayim Pota that a blockade was maintained on Trincomalee fort on the landward side from 1628 and that the fort received its provisions from Jaffna. AHU 501.f.379; AHU Caixa 22. 4.8.1654; BM.or 6606 (144)

to the nieces of Sankili, the two elder sons of Senerat had some sort of claim to the throne of Jaffna. Thus in 1628 Senerat despatched a small force to rouse the Tamils of Jaffna against their Portuguese rulers. Jaffna was ripe for rebellion. The years following the conquest had seen the expropriation of large amounts of land by the Portuguese. The new tombo begun by Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara in 1624 and completed in a revised form by Filipe de Oliveira in 1626 had meant a considerable increase in taxes and dues. The widespread destruction of Hindu temples in the days of de Oliveira had aroused great resentment, while the death of de Oliveira in 1627 had removed from the scene the man most feared by the Tamils. Thus with the arrival of the Sinhalese forces there was a general rising in all parts of Jaffna. Two Jesuits were killed on 16 September 1628. Thirteen churches erected in various parts of Jaffna were destroyed. The Hindus in their anger burnt all the crosses, Christian symbols and sacred ornaments they could lay their hands on. The factor of Trincomalee and a Portuguese adigar (or headman) who could

(176) Fr. Bernadino da Isena (Pecci) and Fr. Mathew Fernadez. D.Ferrolí -The Jesuits in Malabar I.443-445; Boudens 53; CALR III.124.IV.97-99
 (177) Simancas SP.1523.f.5

not reach the safety of Jaffna fort in time lost their lives. ⁽¹⁷⁸⁾

The captain-major of Jaffna, Lançarote de Seixas who had a force of sixty Portuguese soldiers, eighty loyal lascarins and many casados cautiously withdrew his forces within the fort of Jaffna, which was promptly beseiged by the combined Sinhalese and Tamil forces. The seige lasted for thirteen days during which the combined Sinhalese and Tamil army, a little over a thousand strong made one general assault on the fort. On the repulse of this attack after a conflict lasting the whole day the beseigers constructed a stockade behind the shelter of which they fired into the fort. By this time de Seixas had realised how ill-armed and ill-organised his opponents were. He therefore suddenly attacked the stockade and catching his opponents by surprise completely defeated them. The remnants of the Sinhalese forces and some of the Tamils fled from the peninsula. ⁽¹⁷⁹⁾

Senerat's attempt to rouse the people of Kotte by sending forces to the frontier districts was even less effective for the Portuguese army

and by the sea

Ø178) Evora C*V 2/7.f.70

(179) CALR IV.97., III.124; AHU 501.f.37v; Evora C-V 2/7.f.70

led by de Sa successfully defended the frontiers.⁽¹⁸⁰⁾

With his forces meeting with reverse for the second time within a year, Senerat decided to request a settlement of peace to avoid the devastation of his country. De Sa and his officers interpreted this as a sign of weakness and decided to refuse the offer and appeal to Goa for reinforcements to complete the conquest of the island.⁽¹⁸¹⁾

If in 1628 the military initiative lay with Senerat, in 1629 it was the Portuguese who took the offensive. Senerat's aim in the blockade of Trincomalee, the siege of Batticaloa, and the rousing of the people of Jaffna to rebellion had been not merely the seizure of these places but the diversion of the captain-general's attention from an invasion of Kandy.

(180) Evora C-V 2/7 f.70; AHU Caixa 14. ant.18.1.1644; JCBRAS.XI.572

It is interesting to note that de Sa's activities in late 1628, shown clearly as a defensive operation in contemporary documents (AHU Caixa 14. ant.18.1.1644) has been exaggerated into an attack in which he with fifty soldiers ravaged a greater part of Kandy in de Sa de Menezes 572 and Queyroz 757. By the time Ribeiro heard the story de Sa was reported to have marched with five hundred soldiers and burnt King Senerat's palace in Kandy! (Ribeiro 222) Baldaeus further elaborated the story. P.E.Pieris -Ceylon II, 176, and Fr. S.G.Perera-History of Ceylon for schools, 91 relying on de Sa de Menezes' and Queyroz mention this mythical campaign and ascribe it to 1627 on which year hostilities had not even commenced.

(181) Evora C-V.2/7.f.70

De Sa however had resolved to carry the war into Kandyan territory. In March 1629 after the dry month of February had transformed many of the Kandyan rivers into fordable streams he attacked the Kandyan kingdom. An invasion of the highland kingdom was not a task to be undertaken lightly. The normal Portuguese invasion route lay through Gantenna and Balane. The difficulty of advancing over the rising ground that lay before Balane was accentuated by the thick forests which covered the whole area. The snakes, the mosquitos^e and the leeches that abounded in this (tropical) jungle provided their own problems. De Sa however planned a raid rather than an invasion. His contingent of lightly armed men rapidly advanced on Balane and seized this strategic position with little resistance. Senerat withdrew further inland, but de Sa was not to be tempted and after the burning the fortification at Balane swiftly withdrew to Kotte.⁽¹⁸²⁾

De Sa decided to try his fortune once more in late June 1629,⁽¹⁸³⁾ taking the whole of the mobile army with him. On the occasion however he ran into greater difficulties as his forces

(182) Mandarampurapuvata, stanza 212; AHU 501.f.13

Contemporary documents make it clear that it was in early 1629 and not in 1628 as Ribeiro (221-222) makes out, that de Sa made his first invasion of Kandy. De Sa returned from Batticaloa on 12 October 1628. On 8 November he was still at Menikkadawara preparing for the next year's campaign. (AHU Uaixa 22.4.8.1654; TT.Ms.da Liv.1699.f.249v) Even by March 1629, the reinforcements he expected from Goa had not arrived. (Queyroz 758)

(183) TT.Ms.da Liv.731.f.386 A certificate of de Sa himself dated 23 November 1629 dates the begining of the campaign as 23 June 1629.

were exposed to the incessant rain of the south-west monsoon. Many of his soldiers were soon sick. 'They were scarcely able to defend themselves in the stagnant morasses and rivers over which they waded up to their necks with the greatest difficulty and fatigue marching barefoot and almost naked, they came out with their feet torn and lacerated, bitten by leeches and (184) reptiles which breed and swarm in these waters.' It is not clear why de Sa, a veteran campaigner decided to inaugurate a new campaign in such inclement weather. He may have been trying^k_A to forestall Kandyan counter-attack on the Four Korales. De Sa entered the capital city of Kandy and burnt it, but when he began his return journey Senerat decided to follow him with all the forces he could muster. After some preliminary manoeuvring the two armies met at Ambatenna. After a battle which raged from dawn till noon the Portuguese forced the Sinhalese forces to retire across the river. The Portuguese themselves were so badly shaken however, that de Sa continued (185) his retreat to Menikkadawara. Both sides claimed victory.

(184) JCBRAS XI.574

(185) Jornada 18 asserts that the forces of Uva did not flee but retired to a side of the river in close formation 'about which they afterwards mocked those of Candea and Matale.' Baldaeus states that on the other hand that 'encountering them near Ambatenna we forced them to retreat with considerable loss.' The Parangi Hatana stanzas 76-85 also gives the impression of a Sinhalese victory. The debate as to who won has been continued in the twentieth century by Fr. S.G.Perera and P.E.Pieris. (Pieris- Ceylon II, 179; Jornada 18)

The Sinhalese army failed to cut off the Portuguese from their base. But Ambatenna like Lellopitiya marked no gains for the Portuguese : it merely ensured their safe return to Menikkadawara. In this sense it could be described as a drawn battle. (186)

On his return the captain-general/^{was}greeted with grave news. Batticaloa was still besieged and the fort in danger of being lost. Batticaloa, unlike the other Portuguese coastal ports had its port three miles from the open sea. In the absence of a large Portuguese vessel the Sinhalese could use their fishing boats to blockade the narrow channel through which ships had to pass into the Batticaloa lagoon. This was what the Sinhalese under two of the sons of Senerat had done.

De Sa decided to relieve Batticaloa immediately. With a force of two hundred Portuguese and a thousand lascarins he marched eighty five miles to Galle. Though the monsoon winds had hardly abated de Sa himself embarked with some of his men in a pinnace and three champanas and made for Batticaloa by sea. (187) The rest of the forces under Domingos Carvalho Cao, disava of Matara proceeded overland along the coast through Matara. The captain-general also sent a message to Jaffna requesting that Miguel Pereira Borralho

¶(186) JCBRAS XVIII.169; Ribeiro 249; Jornada 18,36; AHU 501.ff.13.357; AHU 445.f.45v; TT.Ms.da Liv.751.f.386; P.da Trindade III.85
(187) TT.Ms.da Liv.1699.f.250

Champana - a boat of up to forty tons capable of carrying twenty five or thirty men.

captain-major of the fleet of Camorin who had arrived with five ships in Jaffna to leave the vessels there and march (188) overland with all his forces to Batticaloa. The captain-major-of-the-field Diogo Mendes de Brito, who was left in charge of Kotte was instructed to keep the pressure on Kandy by a policy of raids on that kingdom.

De Sa had taken a chance in dividing his forces. However fortune favoured the Portuguese once more. The Portuguese left behind at Kotte kept Senerat occupied by continuous incursions. Luis Gomes Pinto, a veteran Portuguese commander led the first incursion in August 1629. In September Diogo Mendes de Brito drove away a Kandyan detachment which had entered the Seven Korales (189) and made a counter-attack on Kandyan territory. Meanwhile de Sa had successfully relieved Batticaloa and supervised the continuation (190) of fort construction.

It was when he was at Batticaloa that de Sa received the word of ^a second Sinhalese attempt to seize Jaffna. This time Senerat had sent a strong force of nearly four thousand men under one of his kinsmen. The Sinhalese planned to rouse the Tamils against

(188) Filмотека LM.13B 5/63-2

Borrvalho was on a routine visit to Jaffna. De Sa probably felt he needed all the forces that could be spared. Due to the south-west monsoon winds Borrvalho could not sail southwards to Batticaloa. Leaving the ships behind was the only solution.

(189) TT.Ms da Liv.731.ff.375,392

(190) TT.Ms da Liv.1699.f.250

the Portuguese and with the help of a few Vadugai troops from Tanjore drive the Portuguese out of Jaffna. Very soon most of Jaffna passed under their control.⁽¹⁹¹⁾

De Sa despatched Domingos Carvalho Cão who had meanwhile, made his way to Batticaloa with a seaborne expeditionary force.⁽¹⁹²⁾ Making his way northwards along the ^{east} coast, Cão landed his forces at the isthmus of the Jaffna peninsula, his object being to cut off the paths of retreat left to the Sinhalese. The Sinhalese army was encamped in the plains of Pachchilappalai. The Sinhalese had found the Tamils after the failure of their revolt of 1628 reluctant to join them. Cão decided it was time to attack them. Leaving half of his force under Lourenco Teixeira de Macedo to advance north-westwards along the Jaffna peninsula, Cão marched along the southern shores of the Jaffna lagoon and crossed into the peninsula by Elephant Pass. He also sent a message to the captain-major of Jaffna Lançarote de Seixas to join in the assault on the Sinhalese. Before de Seixas could arrive however the two Portuguese detachments attacked and defeated the Sinhalese forces, whose commander was executed.

(191) Queyroz 654; Jornada 5; Ribeiro 222. Queyroz estimated the Sinhalese force at ten thousand. Ribeiro gives the figure of five thousand. The above estimate is given in the Jornada, 5.

(192) Queyroz's figure of two hundred Portuguese and seven thousand lascarins is obviously too high. Ribeiro too gives a high estimate of two hundred and ten Portuguese and six thousand lascarins. The expeditionary force could not have been much greater than the one brought by de Sa to Batticaloa.

The Vadugai troops sent to assist the Kandyans were also
 (193)
 defeated on their belated arrival near Mannar. The people
 of Jaffna escaped reprisals of the type seen in 1629, because
 of their reluctance to join the Sinhalese, but they were forced
 to take a fresh oath of allegiance. Jaffna made secure once more,
 (194)
 the Portuguese soldiers returned to Kotte along the western coast.

(193) AHU 501.f.9

(194) Queyroz 654-656; Jornada 5,36; Ribeiro 223

All these three sources refer to only one Sinhalese attack on Jaffna during the war. Contemporary documents however indicate that there were two separate attacks. A certificate of Lançarote de Seixas to Francisco Henriques mentions the first seige of Jaffna implying that there was a second. (AHU 501.f.37v) An extract from a petition of Lançarote de Seixas reads as follows, 'El Rey de Candea... as dito Reino de Jaffnapatam mandou hua esquadra de mil e tantos homens com palvara e consentimento dos naturaes della que todos se rebellaram e alavantarem matando dois padreis e queimando as igrejas em Xpõ que o dito Lançarote de Seixas nao tinha mais que duas estancias de soldados por lhe ter mandado hua e outra seryda com oitenta lascarins a castigar hum alevantado, porem tanto que lhe chegou e os inimigos ouviram cometer lhe sahio das tranqueiras com a gente que tinha os poz em fugida com mortos de alguns sem nenhuma perda sua e na noite seguinte de a colherem e nam pararam senam nos mattos e limite do dito Reino aonde estandosse reformando pera voltarem os fri o dito Lançarote de Seixas de mandar tanto que lhe chegou a sua istancia e o socorro que o dito cap^{am} geral lhe mandou de Baticaloa de lascarins encontrando os teve dellos segundo vitoria matando e captivando muitos, tomando muitas armas e que mandolhe os mantimentos com que ficou o dito Reino obediente a VM^{ge}....' (Simancas SP.1523.f.5)

Ribeiro holds that seven thousand of the Sinhalese died in this battle. The estimate of one thousand six hundred given in the Jornada appears nearer to the truth for it is also repeated in a contemporary document. (AHU 501.f.13)

P.da Trindade III.85 gives a much higher estimate of three thousand Sinhalese killed.

At the end of 1629 Senerat again¹ offered to negotiate for peace. Although his kingdom had not suffered greatly by war he saw how difficult it was to dislodge the Portuguese from the lands they held. He therefore offered a peace probably on the basis of a return to the status quo/ante. The Portuguese both in Goa and Ceylon however had not yet lost all hopes of conquering Kandy and refused to agree.⁽¹⁹⁵⁾

De Sa returned from Batticaloa afflicted with a fever. His sickness at times grew so bad that he made a codicil to his will recommending that in case of his death peace be concluded with Kandy.⁽¹⁹⁶⁾ By this time he had despaired of obtaining reinforcements from Goa and it was apparent to him that the conquest of Kandy was a more difficult project than he had anticipated. Meanwhile de Sa's quarrel with the vedor Ambrosio da Freitas da Camara had reached such an acrimonious pitch that the new viceroy Dom Miguel de Noronha, conde de Linhares who had taken up office in October 1629 was compelled to direct Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara to work on a new tombo while the captain-major of Jaffna, Lançarote de Seixas was ordered to proceed to Colombo and take up duties as the new vedor da fazenda.

(195) JCBRAS XI. 576

(196) This was 22 January 1630. Queyroz 759-760; JCBRAS XI.577-579

For the vacant post of captain-major of Jaffna was appointed Miguel Pereira Borralho who knew the area well. All these changes were completed by June 1630.⁽¹⁹⁷⁾

The first campaign of 1630 proved to be an indecisive one. Senerat advanced with his forces up to Attapitiya on the frontier of Kotte. The captain-major of the Portuguese forces at Menikkadawara advanced with his forces to meet the Kandyans but finding the king strongly entrenched awaited reinforcements which were brought up by de Sa. Senerat seeing the strength of of the Portuguese force retired. De Sa followed the Kandyan forces across the frontier but after a fortnight's campaign⁽¹⁹⁸⁾ returned to Kotte.

De Sa's sickness at the end of 1629 had taken much of his zest out of him. The meagre reinforcements sent from Goa further discouraged him. He had asked for four hundred ~~xxx~~ Portuguese soldiers. A ship which arrived in early ~~May~~ May brought him only fifty.⁽¹⁹⁹⁾ The dispirited captain-general remained in Colombo in April, May and June, recuperating and hoping for more aid⁽²⁰⁰⁾ and better fortune. Senerat on the other hand, proved as active

(197) Assentos I. 266; AHU Caixa 16.ant.18.1.1644

(198) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.252v-257; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.47,156; Jornada 21-22

(199) Filmoteca LM.19D 23/4; Filmoteca LM.13A. 67/68/3-1; AHU Caixa 14. 18.1.1644; Evora CR.Arm.V-VI.14-5.f.166; Ajuda 51 -VIII-51.ff. 41,52,62,67,74,95

(200) TT.Ms da Liv.1099.f.257

as ever. In March-April 1630 a Kandyan force began to blockade Batticaloa once again. ⁽²⁰¹⁾ The war of conquest was slipping out of Portuguese control.

The Portuguese position was however much worse than de Sa ever imagined. By early 1626 the lascarin commanders^s of Kotte had become disillusioned with the Portuguese regime despite the efforts of de Sa to ensure a fairer deal for ~~them~~ them. The allowance paid by the state to the lascarins and their chiefs had been discontinued during the second decade of the seventeenth century due to financial exigencies. Nevertheless the Portuguese had insisted that they should continue to pay quit rents for all lands they held. ⁽²⁰²⁾ The Sinhalese felt that this was unfair and that with the removal of cash payments the return of the old service tenure system for lascarins was the only answer. While the rank and file were discontented for financial reasons the leadership was more alarmed by the general lines of Portuguese policy. The expulsion of the Muslims coupled with the encouragement of Portuguese and Indian Christian^s colonists roused fears in their minds as to the ultimate intentions of the Portuguese regarding the Sinhalese

(201) Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.78

(202) T.Abeyasinghe 128.

(203)
people. They were therefore in a mood receptive to any proposals to overthrow the Portuguese.

The exact date when the Sinhalese mudaliyars decided to attempt to overthrow Portuguese power in Kotte is uncertain. (204)
Queyroz holds that their conspiracy originated in March 1626. It is more likely that the details of the conspiracy were worked out much later even if actual discontent had existed as early as 1626. The mudaliyars must have gradually realised that their efforts would have little chance of success unless they enlisted the support of the king of Kandy. Here the role played by an individual, Domingos Fernandes proved vital.

(205)
Domingos Fernandes was a sword smith living in Colombo. Fernandes sent a letter to Senerat that he was really the son of Rajasinha of

(203) Queyroz 762-763. Queyroz attributes the following ~~the~~ words to D. Cosmo. '...nor do you reflect on the unhappy fate of your children for ~~is~~ by our weakness and irresolution we are reduced to slavery, they will have either a certain death or banishment before them; because if today they will let you enjoy our property (in order to have men to accompany them for our ruin) tomorrow they will become their owners; either with the death and extinction of the Chingala name or at least with the banishment and transmigration of all your families...'

(204) Queyroz 755

(205) Queyroz 753

Queyroz relates the story that he was a native of Tanjore and that he was the son of a Moor and a Parava woman. The sword smith was a bachelor.

Sitawaka and asked for aid to ~~throw~~ gain the throne of Kotte. Senerat who was preparing for war at this time, knew quite well that Fernandes was an imposter, for in his very court he had two nobles who had themselves witnessed the death of Rajasinha's son. However he decided to use Fernandes to contact the mudaliyars of Kotte. Fernandes thereupon contacted Dom Theodosio, Dom Aleixo, Dom Balthazar and Dom Cosmo who decided to accept him as their leader.

Having achieved his objective of opening communications with the Sinhalese commanders of Kotte, Senerat decided to remove the possibility of Fernandes becoming a second Nikapitiya. Therefore in 1629 he persuaded Fernandes to flee to Kandy. On his arrival in court the pretender at length discovered that Senerat had known him to be an imposter all along. However the king of Kandy did not prove ungrateful to one who had, though inadvertently, done him a great service. On condition that he gave up all claims to kingship, Fernandes was granted lands in Wellassa.

Meanwhile the four Sinhalese leaders ~~who~~ had won others

(206) Queyroz 753-756; Jornada 43-48; AHU 501.f.379

Fernandes was joined in Wellassa by his brother who was later killed in a skirmish in 1631. Queyroz states that Fernandes becoming disappointed at the end of his hopes to become king fled to Wellassa and became an anchorite, thus drawing a moral that traitors never prosper.

to their cause. Among them were Dom Andre, the mohottiyar or secretary of the captain-general and Dom Manual, who was a Sinhalese so trusted by de Sa that he had been awarded the post of shield-bearer of the captain-general himself. Dom Simão, leader of the lascarins of Sabaragamuwa was another recruit. The first two played a vital role in supplying the conspirators with information as to de Sa's intentions and policies while the adherence of Dom Simão completed the alienation of all the prominent lascarin leaders from the Portuguese cause. A negro Muslim who had nominally accepted Christianity to avoid expulsion also joined in when offered leadership of the Muslim community (207) in Kotte.

After the departure of Fernandes, those conspirators continued to correspond with Senerat and apparently decided to accept him as their leader when it became known that Fernandes was an imposter. Early in 1630 they planned means by which a final overthrow of Portuguese power in Kotte could be achieved with minimum risk to themselves. It was decided to wait until the next large invasion of Kandy took place. At a favourable

(207) Queyroz 762; JCBRAS 581-582, 584

This Muslim is described as an armourer and was probably the same person who served as the kanakapulle of Antonio de Souza Coutinho in 1630. See below page 234.

opportunity the Sinhalese were to desert to the Kandyans and destroy the Portuguese force thus isolated. It was however realised that while the Portuguese held Colombo any Sinhalese victory would have but a temporary effect. Moreover their forces in Colombo would be able to seize the lascarin families left behind at Peliyagoda and Mulleriyawa. Therefore the plan was extended to include the seizure of Colombo. Two of the key figures Dom Andre and Dom Manual were to be left behind in the city. They, together (208) with the Muslim negro and two other men were to remain in Colombo with their followers. The mudaliyars promised to send them news of the desertion as soon as possible, and on the night that they received the news they were to set fire to all the ~~casados~~ houses of the casados, within and outside the walls of the city. It was estimated that, in the confusion, profit~~ing~~ by the element of surprise the six hundred Sinhalese and Muslims who were at the disposal of the plotters could seize Colombo fort and hold (209) it till the others arrived.

The plan so carefully arranged almost went awry. In March 1630 just before the captain-general set off towards Kandy an

(208) Chuti Naide (Cutti naide) and Chavan (Xaban) according to Jornada 38.

(209) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.251v-253v

(210)
aratchi of the paduwa caste who had taken^a message from the
mudaliyars of Kotte to Kandy gave word of the plot to
 Fr. Paulino da Madre de Deus, an Augustinian serving in Kalutara.

(211)
 Fr. Madre de Deus was not himself fully convinced but sent the
aratchi to the captain-general, who refused to listen to these
 charges thinking that it was merely a Kandyan move to create
 dissention within Kotte. The aratchi therefore sought the aid of
 a Franciscan Fr. Antonio de Peixoto, who served at Matara. (212)

Fr. Peixoto was clearly convinced but his open charges against
 Dom Theodosio only roused that Sinhalese noble to make things so
 difficult for the aratchi that he fled from Kotte. The flight of
aratchi and Dom Theodosio's marriage to a lady of mixed descent
 in Colombo increased de Sa's trust in this leader especially
 as Dom Theodosio wore European dress for his marriage ceremony. (213)

During the short campaign of 1630 the Sinhalese apparently
 had no opportunity of putting their plan into effect. By this
 time however they were convinced that delay would be dangerous
 in view of the chances that the plot might be discovered. They

(210) 'Pache' - P.E.Pieris (Ribeiro 144) identifies pachas with the paduwa caste. According to B.Ryan - Caste in modern Ceylon, 67 paduwas were palanquin bearers, lascarins and coolies.

(211) For he merely sent the man with a note of introduction saying that he had some important news to impart.

(212) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.254-256v; F.de Souza VI.370; P.da Trindade III. 108-109; Jornada 19,20

(213) P.E.Pieris (Ceylon II.178) incorrectly assumes that the Franciscan referred to in Faria de Souza was Fr. Negro.

therefore requested Senerat to make a provocative attack from Uva in the hope of persuading de Sa to lead a retaliatory raid into Uva, thus providing an opportunity to destroy the main Portuguese army. In response to this call, Kumarasinha, Prince of Uva crossed the frontier and with the aid of mudaliyar (213) Abhayasinha who had deserted the Portuguese forces, ravaged (214) much of the Two Korales for a month. The garrison of Sabaragamuwa fort made up of sixty Portuguese and a hundred and fifty lascarins (215) was too small to take effective measures against the invaders.

De Sa thereupon decided to make a retaliatory raid on Uva. João Rodriguez de Sa de Menezes maintains that this was partly in response to the appeals of the Sinhalese lascarin commanders who pretended to be zealous in the defence of Kotte to ensnare the captain-general. This could well have been a significant factor specially as the senior Portuguese (216) soldiers were divided on the advisability of the campaign. However there is little doubt that the crucial factors which influenced

(213) Abhayasinha was one of the lascarin leaders of Sabaragamuwa. It is uncertain as to when he deserted from the Portuguese.

(214) Queyroz 765; JCBRAS XI.585; Ribeiro 226; Ajuda 51-IV-32.f.6

(215) Jornada 9,17

(216) Those who opposed the expedition included Francisco de Brito de Almeida and Lançarote de Seixas. (TT.Ms da Liv.1699.f.259) De Sa de Menezes (JCBRAS XI.587-88) says there was a diversity of opinions. Lourenço Teixeira de Macedo, captain of Negombo in a letter to the king dated 4.12.1630 stated that de Sa's expedition was undertaken against the advice of all, but Francisco Barbosa da Andrade in a document dated 3 August 1634 maintained that all four disavos agreed to the expedition. (TT.LM.31.f.43; Jornada 9) Jornada, 21 states that Luis Gomes Pinto, who had offered to lend money to finance the expedition, changed his mind after he met the people of the Four Korales and Sabaragamuwa and advocated a small scale raid by the captain-major while de Sa remained at Malwana.

de Sa's decision were the letter received from the viceroy, ⁽²¹⁷⁾ *the* conde de Linhares.

The conde de Linhares, since his arrival in India in October 1629 had received many letters from both de Sa and the vedor, Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara complaining about each other. The viceroy who had no doubt heard of de Sa's achievements in Ceylon, considered him the man best fitted to deal with Portuguese problems in the island. This was why on finding that de Freitas and de Sa did not get along well together, he decided to remove de Freitas. Nevertheless he was also convinced that the greater blame in the dispute should really be apportioned ^{to} ~~by~~ de Sa.

He therefore wrote to de Sa that, 'the general attend to war and leave matters of finance ⁽²¹⁸⁾ to the vedor.' Moreover the viceroy was convinced that de Sa's involvement in private trade was prejudicial to Portuguese interests as it distracted the captain-general from the war. Thus his letters included injunctions in strong terms that an effort should be made to conquer Kandy and also contained remarks to the effect that the true function of ⁽²¹⁹⁾ the captain-general was war and not commerce. De Sa was deeply

(217) Queyroz 765, 769; JCBRAS XI.585-590

(218) Assentos I.265

(219) Queyroz 769; JCBRAS XI.590; Jornasa 21; Assentos I.265-266; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.259v; BNL.Pombalina 490.f.195; Filmoteca LM.13B. 13/14; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.270

The viceroy had probably no doubts as to the honesty of the captain-general. He simply wished to prod him to action. This explains why when on 14 September 1630 the viceroy-in-council decided to recall the vedor Lançarote de Seixas to Goa to answer charges of manslaughter, it was decided to leave the control of the finance as well as war with de Sa.

hurt by these reprimands made by his superior and kinsman and decided to risk no further taunts as to his inactivity. In July 1630 he assembled his forces at Menikkadawara for an invasion (220) of Uva,

De Sa's expedition to Uva is easily the best documented (221) of the Portuguese invasions of Kandy. De Sa set out with the forces he had assembled at Menikkadawara on 3 August 1630 and marching by leisurely stages arrived at Sabaragamuwa about forty miles away on the seventh of the month. There the army rested for two days until Luis Gabral Pinto arrived with further men. The combined forces now amounted to five hundred and eighty Portuguese soldiers, one hundred and twenty casados and topazes and almost four thousand five hundred lascarins. On 9 August 1630 this army left Sabaragamuwa and began to make its way (222) towards Kandyan territory.

The southern route to Uva across the Idalgashinna pass was perhaps even more difficult than the well-known invasion route to Kandy proper through Balane. The Portuguese army had to

(220) TT.Ms da Liv.1699.f.257v

(221) Three distinct accounts of the campaign written within ten years of it are available to us, (viz., Jornada; Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.257-269; JCBRAS XI.593-605) Besides many contemporary letters and a chronicle of a later date.

(222) TT.Ms da Liv.1699.ff.261v,263; Jornada 22; Assentos I. 525 Jornada-Lomba 89; P.da Trindade III.110; Queyroz 770; Ribeiro 226; De Sa de Menezes 592-593.

The diverse estimates of de Sa's forces are tabulated below.
(Contd., in next page.)

take a circuitous route through Pelmadulla gap to avoid the mountainous terrain of the Rakwana hills. After sixty miles of marching through lands forested and criss-crossed by numerous streams the invading army would arrive at Haldumulla, three thousand feet above sea level. From here lay the difficult part of the journey, a climb of two thousand five hundred feet within two miles, through tropical jungle up to Idalgashinna. This was the ideal country for guerilla warfare as the invading marching through the sparsely populated land also had to carry their provisions with them. From Idalgashinna onwards however the obstacles were few. The invader marching

(222) Contd., from
Sources and date of
source.

| | <u>soldados</u> | <u>casados and</u> <u>topazes</u> | <u>lascarins</u> |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------|---|------------------|
| TT.Ms da Liv.1699.f.263. Dec.1630 | 350 | 40 | 4300+ |
| Assentos I. 515- 3.1.1631 | 508 | 120 | 5000 |
| Jornada 24 1.4.1635 | 450 | (<u>soldados and</u> <u>casados</u>) | 5000 |
| JCBRAS XI. 592-593 - 1630's | 500 | - | 13,000 |
| P.da Trindade III.100- 1630's | 400 | - | - |
| Jornada-Lomba 89- 1630's | 400 | 80 | 3,000 |
| F.de Souza VI.370- 1675 | 400 | - | - |
| Queyroz 770- 1680's | 500 | 200 | 13,000 |
| Ribeiro 226- 1685 | 400 | 100 | 20,000 |
| Baldaeus 88- 1680's | 1300 | 1700 | 8,000 |

The estimates in Assentos I. ~~accepted here~~ are accepted here as they represent the official figures quoted by the viceroy to the king within six months of the campaign. The figures quoted by Fr. Assumpacao (Ms.da Liv.1699 f.263) for the Portuguese are considered too low, as the number of Portuguese who fell into Sinhalese lands numbered over two hundred and fifty.

northwards came into more open country and had the advantage of descending from the mountains to a country with gently undulating hills covered with grass and small trees. In the centre of this Uva Basin was the capital city of the province, Badulla.

De Sa's invading army however had an unexpectedly easy passage in the first stages. As the Kandyan intention was to draw the Portuguese as far as possible into their territory, little resistance was offered to the invading army which reached Idalgashinna on 15 August 1630. Three days later the Portuguese were at Badulla. Badulla, though the provincial capital was little more than a small village, for apart from the residence of the Prince and the temples, little had been built after (223) the settlement was sacked by the Portuguese in 1615.

The invading army set fire to the settlement. The majority of houses having roofs thatched with straw caught fire easily. Thereupon the Portuguese set up their headquarters at Muthiyangana Vihara which was protected by the Beli-Hul Oya on one side and a stone wall and a ditch on the other. From this base they sent out foraging parties on the 18 and 19 of August to collect

(223) Jornada 22-23; Jornada-Lomba 88; TT.Ms da Liv.1699.f.263; Bocarro 406-407; F.de Souza Vol.6.pg.78; Paranagi Hatana, stanzas 85-94 (in Ribeiro 250); Maha Hatana, stanzas 41-45; Mandarampura-puvata, stanzas 212-218.

provisions and burn the ripening rice crop in the areas
 (224)
 around Badulla. Meanwhile the Kandyan had completed their
 preparations. The king and the princes having raised the
 largest army they could muster gradually advanced up the
 Beli-Hul Oya and took up positions around Badulla on
 20 August 1630. The total Kandyan force numbered about twelve
 (225)
 thousand men, of whom at least a thousand had muskets while
 (226)
 the others were armed with swords, pikes and bows and arrows.

On the very day that the Kandyan army appeared a series
 of events at length convinced de Sa that the lascarin commanders were
 at the point of revolt and that the Portuguese army being so
 far away from their nearest fort and having no hope of relief
 were in great danger. Early in the morning a loyal lascarin
 found a message from the Kandyans to the mudaliyars revealing
 the plot. Still the general was unconvinced, fearing that this
 was merely a Kandyan strategem to sow mistrust. Soon after
 (227)
 however a Sinhalese aratchi named Dom Jeronimo (or Dharmasuriya)

(224) JCBRAS XI.594; Queyroz 771; Jornada-Lomba 89; Baldaeus 88;
 F.de Souza VI.370; Maha Hatana, stanza 55

(225) TT.Ms da Liv.1699.f.267 The Portuguese normally exaggerate
 the number of their opponents involved and frequently fail to mention
 the numbers of the auxilliary troops that supported them. In this
 respect Fr. Assumpcao is better than most and the above estimate is
 the one given by him. Other estimates are as follows -
 De Sa de M.596 -20,000; Queyroz 771- 40,000; Jornada 26-30,000;
 Baldaeus 88- 23,000

(226) Parangi Hatana stanzas 94-114(In Ribeiro 250-251)

(227) 'Adamanasuri' according to Jornada 23 and 'Idrumaraturi'
 according to JCBRAS XI.594

who had fallen out with the conspirators on a question of leadership came over to de Sa and gave all the information he had about the plot. The aratchi advised that the best course of action would be to arrest the leaders of the plot for the mass of lascarins who as yet knew nothing about it might remain loyal. De Sa however was reluctant to risk a battle within his own camp while the Kandyans remained close at hand. He therefore summoned the mudaliyars and asked for their advice on the course of action to be taken ~~against~~ against the Kandyans. The mudaliyars advised retreat as the purpose of the retaliatory raid was now achieved. De Sa thereupon feigning friendship, praised them for their services, restored to them the posts of vidana of the foundry workers which the vedor had taken from them and swore an oath to retain them in their posts as long as he remain captain-general. All surplus stores and spoils accumulated in the campaign were collected and burnt and the army prepared for the retreat planned for the following day keeping supplies sufficient only for a two (228) day's march.

This sudden display of generosity did not divert the lascarin commanders from the course they had planned for so

(228) Queyroz 771-772; JCBRAS XI. ~~De Sa de M.~~ 594; Ribeiro 226-227; Jornada 24; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.263v

long. At day break on 21 August before the retreat began they asked to be placed in the van of the Portuguese forces. De Sa agreed to place some of them but by keeping the lascarins in the van and the rear as well as in the two flanks he hoped to create a conflict between them and the Kandyans before the leaders could act. Moreover by the disposition he kept
(229)
the Portuguese forces unbroken in the centre.

As the Portuguese emerged from Badulla they found the troops of Kandy blocking the route of retreat. Before battle could be joined Dom Jeronimo Rajapakse at nine in the morning deserted with the men of the Seven Korales leaving the Portuguese flanks unprotected. At the same time Dom Cosmo, killing the
(230)
Portuguese nearest to him, deserted with his forces followed by Dom Aleixeio, Dom Theodosio and Dom Balthazar.

De Sa re-organized his forces. His position was a desperate one. It is true that many of the lascarins, who were unaware of the plot were taken by surprise, remained for

(229) Queyroz 774; De Sa de M. 598; Jornada 24-25

(230) His name was João Bernades and he was a casado. Jornada 25, states that he marched near Dom Cosmo at Dom Cosmo's own request.

(231)

the moment with the Portuguese forces. However it was clear that only a minority of these men could be relied on to stay with them especially if conditions became difficult. Those who deserted exhorted the lascarins who remained to follow suit and join them in the expulsion of the hated foreigner. Moreover the route through which de Sa had come up to Uva, through the Idalgashinna pass, was so well defended that the captain-general in retreat was forced to move south-eastwards instead of south-westwards thus reducing even further his chance of survival as he had now a much longer distance to traverse before he could reach friendly territory.

On 21 August the Portuguese made considerable progress towards the frontier. By determined efforts they cut through the Kandyan forces and advanced up to the Lunugala hills which separated the Uva Basin from the south-eastern lowlands. On the other hand they suffered considerable losses. Many of the lascarins made away when the opportunity arose and

(231) Ribeiro 227 holds that only a hundred and fifty lascarins remained with the Portuguese. Fr. Assumpção's account (TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.267) however asserts that two hundred loyal lascarins were killed on the first day of the battle. Queyroz 775 indicates that at least five hundred remained with the Portuguese to the last. Therefore the evidence in Jornada 25,27 that at least half the lascarin troops remained with the Portuguese at the outset appears likely. This could explain how six hundred Portuguese and topazes resisted fifteen thousand men for two days.

late in the day the Sinhalese cut off the rear guard led by disava Luis Teixeira Macedo and took twenty two (232) Portuguese prisoner. On the following day, Tuesday 22 August 1630, the Portuguese army was completely surrounded in an open field at Randeniwela near Wellawaya and annihilated by the Sinhalese forces led by the king and the three princes. (233)

The battle raged from morning until mid-afternoon. At two in the afternoon, after two hundred Portuguese had fallen,

(232) TT.Ms da Liv.1699.f.267-268; Ribeiro 227-228; Jornada 24-28; Queyroz 774-775; De Sa de M. 599-604; Jornada-Lomba 89-91; Paranagi Hatana stanzas 115-134 (In Ribeiro 251-253) Mandarampura puvata stanzas 220-229

Queyroz basing his account on Jornada states that the Portuguese struggled for four days. All other accounts (except Jornada-Lomba) agree that the Portuguese army was defeated on the second day. Ribeiro maintains that a shower of rain which fell on the night before the final battle prevented the use of fire-arms by the Portuguese. Other Portuguese accounts however mention the use of fire-arms in the last day of fighting. It is possible therefore that only a part of the Portuguese stock of powder was affected by the rain.

(233) Queyroz 771,780 asserts that Senerat who had caught a fever was not on the battle field. Sinhalese sources however indicate that he was present and that he returned to Senkadagala only after the battle.

Rajavaliya 101; Mandarampura Puvata, stanzas 214-241

(234)
 The captain-general himself was killed. The Portuguese continued
 to struggle for another hour under Luis Gomes Pinto but on
 (235)
 his death they eventually surrendered. The Sinhalese losses^{ses}
 (236)
 must have amounted to well over two thousand men. It was a
 (237)
 victory hard earned.

The significance of Randeniwela lay in the complete
 destruction of the Portuguese army. At Lellopitiya and Ambatenna
 de Sa had managed to preserve his army intact and had retreated
 to a position of safety. At Randeniwela he failed to do so. His
 defeat in 1630 marked the greatest Sinhalese victory against
 the Portuguese since the annihilation of the expeditionary
 (238)
 force of Pero Lopes de Souza at Danture in 1594. Though perhaps

(234) The captain-general himself is said to have killed many
 Sinhalese before his death. (TT.Ms da Liv.1699.f.305; Queyroz 777)
 This may have due to Senerat's orders to seize him alive. There
 are many versions as to how de Sa actually died. Knox's version,
 that he stabbed himself with a knife of a Kaffir servant
 appears unlikely in view of the accounts of the battle
 available to us. Queyroz 778 (following Jornada 30) states
 that de Sa was accidently shot by a Portuguese João da Fonseca.
 It is more likely however that he was killed by the Sinhalese
 as stated by his son (JCERAS.XI.604) Fr. Assumpção (Ms da Liv.
 1699.f.306) F.de Souza (Vol.VII.372) and in the diary of the
 conde de Linhares. (Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.399)

(235) One hundred and thirty Portuguese and a hundred lascarins
 formed the Portuguese forces which eventually surrendered.
 CLR 3 ser.352; Queyroz 774; JCERAS XVIII.169-171; Baldaeus 96;
 Assentos I.525

(236) Queyroz claims that the Sinhalese lost nearly four thousand men.

(237) Queyroz 775-778; De Sa de M. 599-604; Jornada-Lomba 91;
 Jornada 28-30; Maha Hatana stanzas 56-66; Parangi Hatana stanzas, 135-
 209; (In Ribeiro 253-256); Mandarampura Puvata stanza 230;
 Ribeiro 228; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.268-269v

(238) Queyroz 483-488; S.G.Perera- A history of Ceylon for
schools, 80-82 --.

less politically decisive than the battle of Danture,
 Randeniwela really left the Portuguese in Ceylon in a worse
 military position. In 1594 the Portuguese defeat did not
 involve any risk of a Kandyan attack on the lowlands. The
 captain-in-charge of the Portuguese forces in Kotte had not
 participated in the campaign and was able to organise resistance. (239)
 The army which had been destroyed had consisted chiefly of
 soldiers who had arrived in Ceylon a short while before
 for the specific task of invading Kandy and thus the regular
 Portuguese forces were more or less intact. (240) In 1630 on the
 other hand the captain-general lay dead on the field of battle
 and his chief officers were either killed or taken prisoner.
 Except for a mobile force in Jaffna which was hardly adequate
 to defend even that kingdom the Portuguese now had only the
 garrisons of their forts. In Kotte itself the Portuguese had
 hardly five hundred able-bodied casados and soldados with
 two or three thousand lascarins of a rather dubious loyalty.
 Even these forces were scattered throughout the land though
 mainly in and around the seven forts of Colombo, Negombo, Kalutara,
 Galle, Sabaragamuwa, Menikkadawara and Malwana. (241) The fortunes

(239) Queyroz 494

(240) Queyroz 479

(241) Queyroz 771; Jornada-Lomba 91; Jornada 40; Ajuda 51#VIII- 51.
 f.303; AHU Caixa 16. 18.1.1644; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.
 274v, 275v, 279, 297, 313

of war had at last swung on to the Kandyan side.

The campaigns of 1628-1630 demonstrated how great a recovery Kandy had made after the peace treaty of 1617. While in the first two decades of the seventeenth century the Portuguese in Kotte invaded and ravaged Kandy almost at will, stronger forces under de Sa, who was as good a leader as any, failed to get the upper hand in 1620's. A large share of the credit for this change in position must be allotted to the refugees - Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims -who fled from Portuguese territory and revived the cultivation of the areas abandoned during the wars of the earlier period. A part of the credit can also be claimed by Seherat whose wise policy of encouragement of settlers from abroad was a factor in the growth of the Kandyan population during this period. ⁽²⁴²⁾

De Sa's military defeat was in a sense a reflection of his failure to gain the confidence and loyalty of the conquered Sinhalese. De Sa wished to win their support and adherence and there is little doubt that he won genuine affection and respect from many of the Sinhalese who came to know him. However by birth, upbringing and position he was firmly committed to certain policies which were clearly unpopular with the majority of the people of Kotte. His activity in the destruction of temples ⁽²⁴³⁾ and in the propagation of the Christian faith in

(242) Mandarampura Puvata stanzas 179-209

(243) Jornada 15

a land where Buddhism had deep roots, his usage of the custom~~s~~ of rajakariya to build forts for the Portuguese by Sinhalese labour, his war-like policy towards Kandy and his expulsion of the peaceful Muslim community, were factors which more than counteracted a kindly nature and a passion for justice and fair play. De Sa forgot that no conqueror could afford to be liberal to the conquered and depend on their support unless he completely identified his interests with theirs, and he eventually paid the price for this.

CHAPTER IV

The destruction of the Portuguese army at Randeniwela was merely the first step of a programme devised to expel the Portuguese from the island. The next step was to be the seizure of Colombo fort from within by a band of lascarins organised by Dom Manual and the Kanakapulle of Antonio de Souza Coutinho. The success of this stage of the plot depended a great deal on the timing of the revolt within the army under de Sa and ^{it} was here that the weakness of the whole plan lay. The four lascarin commanders who planned to desert could not give their confederates in Colombo a definite date on which the rising would take place. Their plan was to strike whenever an opportunity presented itself and then to send a swift message to their compatriots in Colombo. Thus everything depended upon whether Dom Manual received the news before the Portuguese did, for he had only some six hundred men with him in Colombo and therefore needed the element of surprise to succeed. The rebel leaders were all the more conscious of this because the families of Dom Cosmo~~s~~, Dom Balthazar and Dom Aleixo lived within a few miles of the fort of Colombo and would be in great danger if the Portuguese got word of the plot. This was why they despatched Dom Aleixo with a force of two hundred

men to Colombo as soon as victory was secured.⁽¹⁾

Dom Aleixo's task was thus two fold - to remove the families of the rebel leaders to places of safety and to instruct and aid Dom Manuel in the rising which was planned to take place within the fort. Marching swiftly across the country Dom Aleixo reached the environs of Colombo on the night of Monday 26 August 1630 having covered over a hundred miles in four days. On his arrival Dom Aleixo found that he could not send a message into the fort because it was late and the gates of the fort closed. He therefore decided to use his time to take the families of the lascarins to places of safety⁽²⁾ in the interior. Meanwhile Antonio Gomes, a lascarin loyal to the Portuguese, had made his escape from Uva to the fort of Malwana. There he related to its captain Francisco de Brito de Almeida ^{what} ~~what~~ he had found out about the conspiracy to defeat de Sa and to seize the fort of Colombo from within.⁽³⁾ News was at once sent to Colombo and was in the hands of the vedor Lançarote de Seixas early on the twenty seventh before the

(1) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.270; P.da Trindade III. 111,167

(2) Fr. Assumpcao suggests that immediate attack was ruled out because Dom Aleixo preferred to save his own family before attacking the Portuguese but the other Sinhalese leaders apparently did not hold him responsible for the failure to seize Colombo for Dom Aleixo continued to hold high posts in later years.

(3) TT.Ms da Liv.1699.ff.270-271; AHU Caixa 16 ant. 18.1.1644, ff

Sinhalese could set the plot in motion.

De Siexas acted promptly, organising two mobile forces - one to raid the residences of rebels outside Colombo, to try to seize their families and goods, and the other to round up the plotters within the city. A strong guard was placed at the city gates.⁽⁴⁾ Dom Manual was arrested and was at once made prisoner. When questioned he confessed the complicity of the Kanakapulle of Dom Antonio de Souza Coutinho who was arrested after a sharp struggle in which one Portuguese and six Sinhalese were killed. In all about one hundred and eighty conspirators were arrested but more than twice that number who could not be identified,⁽⁵⁾ later escaped to join the Sinhalese forces. Colombo had escaped capture from within; its fate was now to be decided by the seige from without.⁽⁶⁾

Meanwhile in Uva Senerat had decided to return to Kandy to celebrate his triumph and perhaps also to recruit further forces and organise supplies. The Portuguese prisoners followed under strong guard, while the princes reorganized their forces for the march on Colombo across the Two Korales.⁽⁸⁾ However, even

(4) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.270-271v

(5) Ibid. ff.271v-272v; Jornada-Lomba 92

(6) Perhaps the Sinhalese might have fared better had the rebels sent an urgent message to Dom Manual immediately after their defection on 20 August instead of waiting for victory.

(7) Mandarampura Puvata, stanzas 241-242

(8) Jornada 53; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.269v

before the troops could be set in motion, news of the defeat of the Portuguese had spread and the lands of Kotte had risen. Isolated Portuguese in the villages, whether soldiers, casados (9) or priests were attacked and killed. When the Sinhalese forces under the princes arrived, they found the lowlands already in Sinhalese hands, except for the Portuguese forts. In the absence of any strong supporting Portuguese field army the inland forts, too, soon proved vulnerable. Many of the forts had been badly garrisoned and what garrison there was, consisted of old, sick, injured or convalescent soldiers who had not been able (10) to make the journey to Uva. Only the coastal forts were safe, thanks to the inability of the Sinhalese to threaten Portuguese supremacy at sea.

The first of the inland forts to go was the base at Malwana, where the garrison had included only seventeen Portuguese. Francisco de Brito de Almeida reported from here that six thousand Sinhalese were expected shortly and that even if he had the support of loyal lascarins, he would not be able to hold out for long due to the lack of a regular water supply inside the fort. Because there was a great shortage of men in Colombo, de Seixas after consulting a hastily summoned council

(9) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.273-273v, 295v; Jornada-Lomba 93

(10) TT.Ms da Liv.1699.f.274v; TT.LM.31.f.42v; AHU Caixa 16 ant. 18.1.1644

of advisers, instructed de Almeida to withdraw. Already the countryside had risen against the Portuguese and de Almeida could get to Colombo only under the cover of night after jettisoning all his surplus powder and shot in the Kelani river. He did succeed however in bringing with him two small cannon, some small arms, and a little rice. The morning after (11) he left, a Sinhalese force arrived and occupied the fort.

Shortly afterwards the fort of Santa Cruz at Sabaragamuwa, the key to the whole disava fell but this time with the loss of the whole garrison. The fort here was in good condition. It was equipped with three pieces of artillery and had fifty Portuguese and some lascarins to defend it. However, though the captain João de Seixas had two days notice of the approach of the Sinhalese, instead of preparing to resist or withdraw, he fled from the fort alone, lost his way and was eventually (12) killed by the Sinhalese. His successor offered to surrender the fort to Dom Theodosio and the Prince of Uva on condition that the lives of the garrison were spared. This being agreed to,

(11) TT.Ms da Liv.1699.ff.274-275; Jornada-Lomba 93; Queyroz 782; P.E.Pieris- Ceylon II.189; AHU Caixa 18, 16.1.1646; AHU Caixa 16, ant. 18.1.1644

(12) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.273; Jornada 39; Jornada-Lomba 92

the Portuguese were sent to Kandy under escort and the Sinhalese occupied the fort.⁽¹³⁾

In strong contrast to the cowardice displayed at Sabaragamuwa was the tenacity of the garrison of the fort of Santa Fe, at Menikkadawara. This fort commanded the upper reaches of the Kelani Valley and had often served as a base for incursions against Kandy. The fort itself was strong, having been built in 1627 by de Sa. It was amply provisioned and had a regular supply of water within the walls. The captain, Manual Mendes de Motta with his garrison of seventy Portuguese hung on determinedly from August to mid November though there seemed no possibility of relief from Colombo which was by then closely invested.

(14)

However when Maha Astana and Senerat appeared before the fort on their way back from Colombo to Kandy further resistance seemed hopeless. Nine soldiers had already deserted. Therefore Mendes de Motta offered to surrender on condition that each Portuguese would be allowed to take his arms and all the property that he himself and his servants could carry. This being agreed to the Portuguese marched out and the Sinhalese took possession

(13) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.273-274; Jornada 39; Queyroz 782; JCBRAS XVIII,170,226; P.E.Pieris -Ceylon II. 190

(14) P.E.Pieris (Ceylon II. 190) probably basing his account on Rajasinha's letters to the Dutch (JCBRAS XVIII.170, 226) says that it was Rajasinha (or Maha Astana as he was called before he became king) who captured Menikkadawara but the accounts of the Jornada and Fr. Assumpção make it clear that the Portuguese negotiated with Senerat though Rajasinha was with him. Jornada 49-50; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.299-299v; Assentos I. 526

(15)
of the fort.

With the fall of Menikkadawara the last vestiges of Portuguese control over the lowlands of Kotte were swept away and for the time being they were reduced to their strongholds upon the coast. Even these had not been preserved intact for Manual Corea de Brito, the captain of Kalutara retired with all his men northwards to Colombo as soon as he heard of the defeat of de Sa and the imminent Kandyan invasion. De Brito maintained that of the twenty two Portuguese in his garrison, some were sick and that in any case there were no munitions or provisions in the fort. Unlike de Almeida however, he had not obtained permission to abandon his post. Moreover he had left three pieces of artillery behind. De Seixas later argued that de Brito should have defended Kalutara until he was reinforced or ordered to withdraw from the fort. The disapproval de Brito had to face in Colombo was by no means lessened when the Sinhalese used the artillery he had left behind to fire against the Colombo fort. However, the loss or retention of a minor post like

(15) Jornada 49-50; Jornada-Lomba 93; Queyroz 787; JCBRAS XVIII.170; P.E.Pieris- Ceylon II. 190; Assentos I. 529; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.299-299v;

(16) P.E.Pieris -Ceylon II. 189; Queyroz 782

(17) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.275-276; Jornada-Lomba 92

(18) TT.LM.30.ff.158; Filmoteca LM 13A 21/3; Queyroz 782.

Queyroz is wrong when he says that de Seixas ordered the garrison of Kalutara to withdraw.

(19) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.291 De Brito was eventually tried for the offence. See Filmoteca LM.19B 56-75/1-4

Kalutara was unimportant. The key to the Portuguese-Sinhalese struggle was now Colombo. That this was so must have been clear to the Sinhalese and Portuguese alike, and it is necessary therefore to consider how effectively the Sinhalese pushed their advantage after Randeniwela. Queyroz maintains that the Princes delayed so long in their march from Uva to Colombo that they gave the city twenty six days to prepare and he argues that this was one of the chief reasons for the successful defence of the city. The princes, he writes, 'marched to Sofragao in ten days and resting a day, they spent four [days] on the one day's march to Colombo.' The Jornada even enlarges on this account by asserting that the princes, '~~regaling themselves~~ after taking the fort at Sabaragamuwa spent eight days 'regaling themselves ^{with} dancing girls.' (20)

For this period the only evidence available is Portuguese, nevertheless it is easy to show that the picture of Sinhalese ineptitude and folly given above is wrong both in detail and probably in general. Note had already been taken of the speed with which the preparations for an insurrection within Colombo was set on foot after de Sa's final defeat and death. Dom Aleixo, marching light with his small force was under the walls of the

(20) Queyroz 780-781; Jornada 38-39

city by the evening of the twenty sixth of August, just four days after the final victory at Randeniwela. Eleven days later the princes with the main Sinhalese army had reached Colombo (21) and begun its seige. To have reorganised their troops and supply and baggage trains after victory and then to have marched some one hundred and twenty miles through jungle-covered hills in the tail of the monsoon, securing the surrender of the Fort Santa Cruz on the way, so as to reach Colombo on 7 September does not seem to leave much room for a supposed eight days dalliance with dancing girls. It may be that even more speed could have been achieved and that as Faria de Souza argues the princes relied too confidently on the success of the rising within Colombo by Dom Manual and the Kanakapalle. Again the illness of the king at this moment may have distracted the attention of the princes Kumarasinghe and Vijayapala who were by no means content with the size of the principalities awarded to them or with the special favours shown to their brother Maha Astana. It may be, as Portuguese sources say, that the princes delayed so as to let the king come from Kandy and take command of the assault on Colombo. But there is little need to call in these explanations for there are more obvious military

(21) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.276

reasons for some delay in setting off. No army was likely to be able to move off directly from a major battle to a distant ^{ie} seige, quite certainly not a Sinhalese one, for the peasant levies were not obliged to serve in offensive wars beyond the frontiers of their land. On this occasion it is known that the forces of Uva refused to participate in a campaign against the Portuguese in the kingdom of Kotte, despite an offer of four fifths of the plunder to be taken. The princes must therefore have had to recruit fresh troops, in part at least, for their advance on Sabaragamuwa and thence on Colombo. Under such circumstances their advance from Randeniwela to Colombo in sixteen days - not twenty six as Queyroz states - represents (22) a very vigorous effort to follow up victory.

The Portuguese in Colombo did not even have sixteen days warning, for as has been seen the first news of the disaster did not arrive from Malwana until the morning of 27 August. They therefore had just eleven days to prepare for the forthcoming struggle. It must be admitted that even this short space of time was of immense value to the Portuguese. Their first task was to install a new leader to replace de Sa. This was soon done, for the day after the plot of Dom Aleixo had been crushed the members

(22) F.de Souza VI. 372-373; Queyroz 69-70, 585

of the camara and other important officials gathered in the council chamber and opened the letter of succession left by the captain-general when he marched for Uva. This named Lançarote de Seixas, the vedor, who was at once accepted as the new captain-general until further orders could arrive from
(23)
Goa.

The next task was to strengthen the defences of the city. The fort at Colombo was the strongest held by the Portuguese and well protected by nature. However the last repairs to the fort had been made five years earlier and even then attention
(24)
had been concentrated on the bulwarks protecting the harbour. Most of the walls were in a poor state and had fallen down in parts while some of the lake front of Colombo was entirely unprotected. During the limited time he had at his disposal Lançarote de Seixas had the walls rebuilt, repaired or supported by coconut and arecanut trunks. Repairs of specific parts of the walls was allocated to certain fidalgos. Some of the trees that had been allowed to grow up near the walls of the city were also cut down so that Portuguese artillery could have the maximum effect. Finally, when the repairs were completed

(23) Jornada 76; F.de Souza VI.373; Assentos I.298,307; TT.LM.31.f.143v; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.271v,311v; Añuda 51-VIII-51. f.291; Filmoteca LM.14 115/1-2

(24) JCBRAS XI. 537-538; Queyroz 740; Reimers 52

twenty nine new watch towers (guaritas) and stockades were constructed on the walls to supplement the eleven bastions which defended
(25)
the fort.

To arm the new defences was the next task and in this the garrison had one piece of great good fortune in the earlier arrival in Colombo of a galley taken from the Achinese by Nuno Alvares Botelho, the admiral of the high sea fleet. This was on its way from Malacca to Goa under the command of Antonio de Souza Coutinho who had undertaken to deliver it to the camara of Goa as a gift from the admiral. Besides its own armament this galley also contained six pieces of artillery being sent to the vedor at Goa to be set against the expenses of Botelho's fleet, as well as two more pieces for the city of Cochin. When the galley arrived the vedor and the officials of the Colombo camara had begged Coutinho to remain with his crew for ~~some time~~ time since the departure of so many casados with the captain-general had left the city defenceless. Fortunately for the Portuguese, Coutinho had agreed, so that when news of Randeniwe~~la~~a arrived and the defences of Colombo were hurriedly set in order much needed men and guns were available from the galley.


(25) Jornada 39-40; P.da Trindade III. 111-112; Jornada-Lomba 92; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699, ff.278, 312; Assentos I. 308, 525; AHU Caixa ~~XXXX~~ 18, 16.1.1646; AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644

REFERENCES

1. Factor + 4 cannon
2. Manuel Vaz Barretto +
Lascarins
3. Ovidor + 15 Portuguese
4. 12 Portuguese + 7 cannon
5. João Gomes da Lima
+ 2 Portuguese
6. Gonçalo Alvares +
6 clerics + 3 cannon
7. Antonio Segredo +
20 Portuguese + 3 cannon
8. Jorge Coelho de Castro
+ 16 Portuguese + 4 cannon
9. Balthazar Moriz +
100 Lascarins
10. 10 Portuguese +
Servants.

THE SIEGE OF COLOMBO, SEPT-OCT 1630

Scale 5" : 1 mile



When de Sa left Colombo the fort had only sixteen pieces of artillery but by ^{the} ~~this~~ time the main Sinhalese forces arrived before its gates, it had forty. All these extra cannon except for two from Malwana came from the galley as well as many
(26)
smaller weapons and much ammunition.

Having repaired and strengthened the walls and provided them with additional artillery, Lançarote de Seixas set about apportioning soldiers to their defences. To the south-west the rocky sea coast was so inaccessible that apart from the bastion of Santa Cruz which protected the harbour, a dozen lascarins were considered sufficient to patrol the whole area. The bastion itself which was not expected to be threatened was defended by the factor and the customs officials with the aid of the Jesuits. Ten other Portuguese and their servants were posted to keep a look out towards the sea, both to give the alarm in case of a surprise attack and to prevent any
(27)
attempt at desertion by sea. The eastern side of the fort which was protected by the lagoon, was the most neglected. In many areas the walls had collapsed completely. To prevent the Sinhalese

(26) Queyroz 782; P.E.Pieris - Ceylon II. 189-190; Jornada 39; Assentos I. 308, 520-521, 529; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.281v;285v; F.de Souza VI.374; O cronista de Timor I.47; TT.LM.29.f.6v; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.ff.303,306; Filmoteca LM.14.114/3-5, 115/1-2, 115/2-4; Filmoteca LM 16 13/5
(27) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.284-284v; Queyroz 782; P.E.Pieris - Ceylon II.190

from making use of this opportunity to enter the city sixteen stockades and guard towers were built in this stretch which was placed under the overall command of Antonio de ~~Silva~~ (28) Souza de Coutinho.

However, the areas most exposed to attack were the north, north-west and the south. In these sectors the walls of the fort were further protected by deep moats connecting the lake with the sea. (29) The southern wall, from the sea to the lake was divided into two sectors by the captain-general and the captain of Colombo, Diogo Boto Machado, was entrusted with the defence of one one of them while Francisco de Brito de Almeida, the newly appointed captain-major-of-the-field, was entrusted with the other. The former commanded the area from the sea coast to a point almost halfway between the bastions of Mapane and St. Jeronimo. He was aided by Manual Vaz Barreto, who was in charge of Mapane, and by Pero de Abreu de Caza who now/~~th~~ held the post of Wickramasinghe or commander of the lascarins. This sector was strengthened by four new stockades and guard towers. The area commanded by de Almeida included three guard

(28) P.E.Pieris -Ceylon II.189-190; Jornada 39; Queyroz 782; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.285

(29) S.G.Perera -The city of Colombo, 1505-1656. 13

towers manned by Franciscans, Augustinians and lascarins
(30)
respectively.

In the north the key bastion of S.João was placed in charge of Jorge Coelho de Castro. The north-western coast up to the harbour was protected by three newly built stockades, two of them being manned by the Jesuits and Dominicans respectively. The north-eastern sector up to the lake was well protected by the three bastions of S.Estevão, ~~S.Sebastião~~ ⁽³¹⁾ S.Sebastião and Madre de Deus.

Lançarote de Seixas, having thus organised the static defence of the city, also created two reserve companies of soldiers who were to aid any point which was hard pressed. These men were also to patrol the walls of the fort regularly. The lack of shot was made good by using the material available in the galley brought by Antonio de Souza Coutinho but the need for powder was even more urgent, for the gunpowder mill constructed by de Sa was no longer functioning. The making of powder was entrusted to Manual Barros, Jeronimo de Azevedo and Balthazar Moniz who together made about four barrels a day.

(30) P.E.Pieris -Ceylon II. 189; Simancas SP 1530.f.130; AHU Caixa 16.ant 18.1.1644; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.283-284, 312; TT.LM.31.ff.31,35; Queyroz 782
(31) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.279v-280v; AHU 501.f.36

The storage and distribution of the powder and shot was entrusted to Domingos Pereira da Araujo and Antonio Rebelo, ⁽³²⁾
casados of Colombo.

Altogether, Lançarote de Seixas had no more than three hundred and fifty Portuguese in his force, for most of the casados had either gone with de Sa or were posted at Menikkadawara and Sabaragamuwa. He could also count upon ~~tw~~ some two thousand slaves and a thousand servants of the resident Portuguese, and less certainly upon the one thousand three hundred lascarins ⁽³³⁾ still in the city. With these five thousand men he had to hold the whole circuit of the walls. Two great advantages however were his - he possessed an effective artillery whereas the enemy lacked any guns capable of battering the walls, and he had the sea behind him, of which his countrymen were the masters.

The Sinhalese who appeared before Colombo were organised into four divisions consisting chiefly of the men of Matara, Sabaragamuwa, the Four Korales and the Seven Korales. Each division

(32) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.286-287

(33) Estimates of Portuguese forces within the fort in August 1630 are as follows -

| | |
|---|------------------------------------|
| F.de Souza VI.373 | - 400 Portuguese including priests |
| Jornada 40 | - 200 Portuguese including priests |
| Jornada-Lomba 91 | - less than 300 Portuguese |
| TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.279v, 301 | - 240 Portuguese, |
| 60 priests and 20 clerics apart from the garrisons of Kalutara and Malwana. | |

was strengthened by a detachment of Kandyan troops. The men of Matara led by the prince of Uva and Dom Theodosio entrenched themselves in the plains of Mapane, to the south of the bastion of that name. The forces of Sabaragamuwa under Dom Simão were stationed near the bastion of S. Sebastião and Queen's Gate. The king and Maha Astana had their headquarters in the house of Luis Gomes Pinto and were with the men of the Four Korales led by Dom Cosmo, Dom Balthazar and Dom Aleixo. Finally, Vijayapala of Matale and Dom Jeronimo Rajapaksha led the men of the Seven Korales to positions near the bastion of S. João and the sea. ⁽³⁴⁾

Though the rebel lascarin commanders were allowed to lead their men, there is no doubt that the overall command of operations rested with the king and in his absence with the princes advised by the Kandyan general Maratana Bandara. The king himself and Maha Astana seem to have organised supplies and reinforcements for the besieging force, for they made journeys to Kandy twice within the first three months of the struggle. ⁽³⁵⁾

(34) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.276-277; JCBRAS XVIII. 226; P.E.Pieris- Ceylon II.190; Queyroz 782

(35) JCBRAS XVIII. 170, 227; Queyroz 781; P.E.Pieris - Ceylon II. 189; F.de Souza VI. 421; Assentos I. 526; AHU Caixa 16, ant 18.1.1644

The numerical strength of the besieging force has been variously estimated but it could not have exceeded fifteen thousand men. A small proportion of the men had muskets but a majority were armed with swords, bows and spears. Save for a few small pieces brought up from Sabaragamuwa and Kalutara, the Sinhalese had no artillery. Neither did they possess war elephants in sufficient numbers to try to batter down the gates of the fort. The odds were therefore more even than the Portuguese chroniclers would have up believe.⁽³⁶⁾

(36) Apart from omitting to mention the Sinhalese level on the side of the defence most Portuguese sources exaggerate the numbers of the besiegers. eg.,

| | |
|---------------------------|------------|
| Queyroz, 782 | 60,000men |
| Jornada, 40 | 60,000 men |
| F.de Souza VI. 421 | 50,000 men |
| AHU 501.f.180 | 40,000 men |
| Ajuda 51-V-31.f.76 | 20,000 men |
| TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.276v | 30,000 men |

Queyroz (640) estimates that the number of lascarins in Kotte in the 1590's at 12,000. By the 1640's the number had fallen to under 5000. (Queyroz 33, Ajuda 51-VIII*40.f.266) It is also known that de Sa's attempts to avert the decline had only limited success. Thus despite the high estimate of 13,000 given in Queyroz (770) the number of lascarins in de Sa's expeditionary force must have been short of 10,000. Fr. Assumpção (TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.276v) says that Senerat brought 7000 Kandyans with him. Even so the total besieging force could not have been over 15,000 men especially as detachments had been sent against Negombo, Galle and Menikkadawara.

The first move of the Sinhalese once they had entrenched themselves was to send a captured Dominican priest on 9 September with a message from the king to Lançarote de Seixas offering permission for the Portuguese to live peacefully in the island in return for the surrender of the fort. The proposition was predictably rejected by de Seixas and the Sinhalese, who had occupied houses within a hundred paces of the walls, began to exchange fire with the Portuguese. Realising however that their muskets and small arms had little effect on the Portuguese within the fort while the Portuguese artillery inflicted some loss on them, the Sinhalese decided to use their superiority in numbers in a general assault. Accordingly on 16 September a general attack was delivered on the fort both from the north and the south. On the northern side ^{was seen} of the main attack with the aid of scaling ladders and elephants, against the bastion of S. João by men of the Seven and Four Korales, led by Dom Balthazar and Dom Jeronimo Rajapaksha. Against the southern walls came the men under Dom Theodosio, reinforced ~~by~~ by detachments under mudaliyar Abeyasinghe and Dom Aleixo and Maha Astana himself. The fighting was fierce but the Sinhalese being exposed to Portuguese^e fire suffered heavy

(37) losses and were eventually forced to withdraw. (38)

Having failed to gain the fort by direct assault the Sinhalese now began to construct stockades of wood around northern and north-eastern walls of the fort. These were built up to an elevation higher than the walls of the fort so that they not merely enabled the Sinhalese to protect themselves but also gave them an opportunity to fire at the defenders within the bastions and the walls of the city. Similar use was made of the taller coconut trees which remained within gun-shot of the city's walls, as snipers' posts.

De Seixas now began to fear that the Sinhalese would mine the city walls. The fire from the stockades was also restricting movement within the walls, so on the 22 September he organised a force of forty Portuguese led by Francisco de Brito and four hundred lascarins led by Joao de Abreu and Balthazar Moniz and ordered them to sally from Queen's Gate and destroy the stockade in the north-east. The party took the Sinhalese guards by surprise and successfully executed

(37) Over 500 Sinhalese are said to have been killed that day.
 (38) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.287-289; Evora CXVI/2-3; Jornada-Lomba,92; P.E.Pieris- Ceylon II. 190; Queyroz 782; AHU Caixa 18, 16.1.1646; AHU Caixa 16, ant 18.1.1644

the mission. The other stockade was also destroyed, but this time by means of a strategem. By the end of September the shortage of food within the fort had become acute and the Portuguese periodically drove numbers of Sinhalese who could not bear arms out of the main gates. The besiegers received their fellow countrymen into their lines. Jorge Coelho de Castro decided to send three loyal lascarins with the next batch of people pushed out of the city from the Gate of S. João. They were instructed to carry with them three bags of inflammable material, fix them to the stockade and set them on fire. This was successfully executed, for (39) the dry wooden stockade caught fire easily.

The Sinhalese however reconstructed the stockades and began firing into the city once again and the defenders were facing a difficult period when five Portuguese vessels appeared off Colombo on the 9 of October. The Sinhalese fearing that substantial reinforcements had arrived, gave up their positions and retired a few miles inland. The vessels were only the regular fleet sent to take away the annual consignment of cinnamon, and the captain-major of the squadron, Gaspar Gomez, had no intimation of the siege until

(39) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.289-291; Jornada-Lomba 92-93; JCBRAS XVIII.227; AHU Caixa 18, 16.1.1646; AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644

he came to Colombo. His arrival, however, marked the end of the first stage of the siege of Colombo, for the Sinhalese having retired from their positions did not henceforth try to invest the city closely. From then on they aimed at restricting the Portuguese to Colombo fort and denying them all supplies, hoping thus to make their stay in Ceylon worthless to them. On the other hand they did not give up hopes of sieging Colombo but merely decided to wait more (40) favourable circumstances for a further attack.

The first stage of the siege of Colombo thus ended without a clear victory to either party. The Portuguese could claim some measure of success in that they had survived the most dangerous period of initial assaults and had eventually forced the Sinhalese to withdraw some miles inland. Moreover their war casualties were light, amounting to a little more than a dozen Portuguese and a few dozen Sinhalese, while the Sinhalese had lost Dom Simão, the leader of the men of Sabaragamuwa and a much larger number of men. On the other hand the Sinhalese had merely retired to defensible fortified posts within six miles of the city walls and bands

(40) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.291-291v; F.de Souza VI.421; Assentos I.526; AHU 510.f.180; Jornada-Lomba 93; Queyorz 783; P.E.Pieris-Ceylon II.190; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.ff.282,305,379; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.76v; Filmoteca LM.14. 115/2-4; AHU Caixa 16, ant 18.1.1644

of armed men sent from these posts, ambushed any Portuguese foraging parties which ventured beyond the walls. The siege having begun before the harvesting season and moreover having caught the Portuguese by surprise, there soon arose a shortage of food stuffs in the city. Within a month prices had risen five-fold. The poor within the fort began to die in increasing numbers from starvation and disease. The welcome that the Sinhalese gave to those pushed out of the gates had cooled noticeably after the burning of the stockades. (41) Thus the struggle for Colombo was by no means over.

The arrival of one hundred and fifty Portuguese in the cinnamon fleet (42) greatly encouraged de Seixas and the defenders of Colombo, especially as they had hopes of receiving further supplies of men, munitions and provisions from India. When the Sinhalese appeared before Colombo, the Portuguese realising the urgency of summoning aid had sent Manual Pacheco for this purpose. Pacheco set out from Colombo in a fishing boat on 11 September 1630 and reached Negapatam

(41) Jornada-Lomba 88; Queyroz 783; P.E.Pieris- Ceylon II.190 F.de Souza VI. 373, 421; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.313v,315

(42) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.291-291v; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.ff.282,305, 379; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.76v; AHU 501.f.180; AHU Caixa 16, ant. 18.1.1644; Assentos I. 526; Filmoteca LM.14. 115/2-4; F.de Souza VI. 421; P.E.Pieris -Ceylon II. 190; Queyroz 783; Jornada-Lomba 93

on the east coast of India by the 16th. He sent a message to the viceroy at Goa, to Dom Filipe Mascarenhas at Cochin and to Dom Bras de Castro, captain-major of the Portuguese fleet of the Coromandel coast. Pacheco himself remained at Negapatam collecting provisions and munitions to aid the forts still held by the Portuguese.

On 14 September de Seixas sent a second messenger, Fr. Francisco de Santa Apollonia, a Franciscan, in case Pacheco had been lost on the way. Fr. Santa Apollonia reached Negapatam by the end of the month and left overland for Goa on 8 October to explain matters personally to the viceroy. (43)

The quickest response to the appeal for aid came from Dom Filipe Mascarenhas, captain of Cochin. He heard the news of the siege on 3 October and immediately prepared to embark on a vessel belonging to one Manual de Costa, a casado of Cochin. His relief force included about seventy casados and soldados of Cochin and their servants. The ship set out on 9 October and reached Colombo on ~~the~~ 16 October. The arrival of Don Filipe was doubly welcome as he brought eight candils of rice and three barrels of gunpowder (both

(43) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.293-294v; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.322

of which were in short supply) as well as a quantity of
 (44)
 saltpetre.

Meanwhile the viceroy had made great efforts to send a ship with men and supplies to relieve Colombo. As no suitable vessel was available in Goa the viceroy gave orders to unload a pataxo belonging to one Ruy Dias d@ Coutinh@ which had just arrived from Moçambique and to prepare it for the journey. With some difficulty eighty Portuguese soldiers and twenty sailors were collected and the pataxo was loaded with one thousand and two hundred ⁽⁴⁵⁾fardos of rice, one hundred and twenty barrels of gunpowder, sixty candils of wheat, ten barrels of cheese, six barrels of olive oil and five hundred muskets. Having set off from Goa on 17 October, this ship, The Nossa Senhora da Penha da Franca under Francisco Ribeiro, the chief pilot of Goa, sailed into Colombo harbour at noon on 1 November. The men abroad were immediately disembarked with their personal belongings but little else was done that day. The Portuguese were to regret this inactivity for during the night a storm broke out which

(44) Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.322; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.77; Queyroz 783; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.307,312,286v; TT.LM.29.f.6v; TT.LM. 31.f.44; Filmoteca LM.14. 115/116/5-1; F.de Souza VI. 374,421; Assentos I. 308,526; Estimates of the size of the reinforcements brought by Dom Filipe range from thirty (Queyroz) to hundred and thirty (Assentos I. 308, Ajuda 51-VIII-51) but Fr. Assumpção and Assentos I.526 state the figure of seventy men.
Candil is equal to five hundred pounds or fourteen bushels.
 (45) Fardo is a bale normally 100-125 lbs in weight.

increased in intensity on the following day to such an extent that the cable which held the ship snapped, and the vessel was lost with all supplies on board. This was a great blow. Had the rice been got ashore much of the civilian loss due to hunger and disease, which in the first three months of the siege alone carried off over two thousand five hundred persons might have been avoided. (46) Soon after this however Dom Antonio Mascarenhas arrived with two pinnaces (47) from Malacca bringing two hundred men.

More substantial aid had been expected from the fleet of the Coromandel coast. Dom Bras had left Goa with twelve ships in February 1630 but by September his fleet had been reduced to seven vessels. On receiving the appeal from Ceylon he set out on 19 September but was delayed first by a conflict with a Dutch ship and then by a great storm; on each occasion losing one more ship. When he eventually arrived in Jaffna he sent one of his five remaining vessels with supplies and men to Batticaloa. He himself sailed southwards with the four other ships, and appeared off Negombo

(46) AHU Caixa 18, 16.1.1646; AHU Caixa 16, ant. 18.1.1644; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.307v-308v, 313v-316; Evora GR.Arm.V-VI, 14-5.f.166; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.ff.290, 292, 293, 294, 297, 305; Filmoteca LM.14.114/3-5; Filmoteca LM 19D. 294; Queyroz 783; Assentos I. 298, 302, 308, 527, 529; P.E.Pieris-Ceylon II.191
Queyroz and the AHU Caixas mention that eighty men arrived from Goa. Fr. Assumpção estimates one hundred. Filmoteca, Ajuda, Evora and Assentos estimate between a hundred and hundred and fifty besides thirty sailors.

(47) Queyroz 783; Ribeiro 94; TT.MM.29.f.7

(48)
on 26 November 1630.

From 9 October 1630 up to 4 January 1632 the Portuguese were more or less continuously confined by the Sinhalese forces to a small area around Colombo. The Sinhalese concentrated on preventing the Portuguese from gaining any supplies from the country. Thus all the land from the walls of Colombo to the Sinhalese encampments a few miles away was devastated. On the three main highways to Colombo were posted three groups of lascarins - the men of the Four Korales at Nakalagama, Abeyasinha and the men of Sabaragamuwa at S. Sebestião and Dom Theodosio Barreto on the road to the south. As these men set upon any small group of Portuguese who ventured beyond the walls, the captain-general forbade anyone to leave the city without his permission. However over sixty of the casados in Colombo at that time had houses in the area which had become a no man's land, and being anxious to save what articles they could, they sent out their slaves and servants to bring back anything that remained. Moreover food being increasingly scarce the Portuguese could hardly resist sending out their servants to look for coconuts and

(48) Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.305; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.309-309v; Assentos I. 308, 529, 521-523; Filmoteca LM.14. 62/1-5; TT.LM.29.ff.6-6v; F.de Souza VI. 374; Queyroz 783

fruits. The Sinhalese sometimes provided a bait by cattle to stray within sight of the walls, and then attacked anyone who ventured out to try and seige them.⁽⁴⁹⁾

The Portuguese made several sallies, the most successful being that made on 11 November 1630. On that day de Seixas marched to Nakalagama and defeated the Sinhalese forces on the south bank of the Kelani and forced them to retire across the river. Even on this occasion, however, the Portuguese made no attempt to seize the ferry or pursue the Sinhalese beyond the river.⁽⁵⁰⁾ In fact an attack made on 29 November just after the arrival of the fleet of Dom Bras revealed once more the weakness of the Portuguese forces and the uncertain loyalty of the lascarin levies. While returning from a successful raid on Sinhalese positions, a group of lascarins suddenly jumped into the jungle and opened fire upon the Portuguese, killing two and wounding several others. The Portuguese force did not feel strong enough to do other than beat a hasty retreat.⁽⁵¹⁾

Meanwhile the viceroy the conde de Linhares had decided to appoint Dom Filipe Mascarenhas as captain-general of Ceylon, despite the difference of opinion that had existed

(49) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.300v-303, 292v-293, 308v

(50) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.303v-306v; Assentos I.526; Queyroz 783-784; Jornada-Lomba 93; AHU Caixa 18. 16.1.1646; AHU Caixa 16. 18.1.1646

(51) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.310v-311v

(52)
 between them since the viceroy arrived in India. The viceroy had been looking for a successor from the time that he had heard of the fate of de Sa; the appointment of Lançarote de Seixas as captain-general was obviously meant as a stop-gap, for the viceroy before he had heard of de Sa's valedictory nomination of de Seixas had requested him to take only the title of captain-major. (53) Mascarenhas took over as captain-general in December 1630 and de Seixas continued to serve under him as the vedor. (54)

When he handed over the captain-generalcy to Mascarenhas, Lançarote de Seixas had held that office for some three months. All this time ~~he~~ had been spent in war with the Sinhalese forces investing Colombo, and though the enemy had been compelled to draw back a few miles, there had been little opportunity for constructive action. The main ^{task} of de Seixas had been to ensure the survival of the Portuguese coastal strongholds. He had also exercised the functions of the vedor, but here too there was little he could do except by way of

(52) Ajuda 51-VIII-40. ff. 192-194; Assentos I. 308;

Mascarenhas however considered this new appointment an attempt to deprive him of a better post to which he felt he was entitled. ~~he~~

(53) Assentos I. 299, 307, 526

(54) Assentos I. 308; Queyroz 784 suggests that the citizens of Colombo who did not like Lançarote de Seixas removed him and elected Dom Filipe Mascarenhas and that the viceroy's approval was granted subsequently. There is no evidence to support such a proposition. The viceroy had decided to appoint Dom Filipe as early as 23 October 1630 and even a week earlier de Seixas himself had offered the post to Dom Filipe, who had refused. Assentos I. 308, 527; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.307v

retrenchment and economy, notably by reducing the number of disavas to two. Jorge Coelho de Castro was appointed disava of the Four and the Seven Korales. Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo, the nephew of the former viceroy of that name, and de Seixas's (55) own son-in-law, was appointed disava of Sabaragamuwa and Matara.

Dom Filipe Mascarenhas had no ^{wish}~~wish~~ to be captain-general of Ceylon as at this stage he was hoping to gain the captaincy of Moçambique as soon as it fell vacant. He therefore wrote immediately to the viceroy asking him to name someone else for the post in Ceylon. Mascarenhas also found that the forces available in Colombo were inadequate for the task they had to perform. The inflow of reinforcements did not improve the situation very much as some of the defenders of Colombo who had come in during the time of acute danger left that city, now that the Sinhalese had pulled back. The cinnamon fleet and their crew sailed for Goa on 28 November and some of the casados whom Dom Filipe himself had brought over from Cochin set off for their homes. The viceroy on the other hand being displeased with Mascarenhas's refusal to serve in Ceylon thought (56) his requests for reinforcements and supplies inordinately large.

(55) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.313

(56) Ajuda 51*VIII-40.ff.396, 193v; BNL.FG.939.f.13a, 39a; Assentos I.528

Dom Filipe had seven hundred and thirty Portuguese troops in 1630. By the end of the year he asked for a further two thousand Portuguese and two ^{thousand} hundred others, until the continuing stalemate forced his hand, the viceroy was prepared to send only two hundred Portuguese and two hundred others.

To replace Dom Filipe Mascarenhas the viceroy chose Dom Jorge de Almeida^{ei} who though old was willing enough to accept a post which was by no means sought for in Goa. With great difficulty he collected a hundred and sixty nine men including eighty Portuguese and set out on 29 February 1631 in the same Achinese galley that Antonio de Souza Coutinho⁽⁵⁷⁾ had brought to Colombo from Malacca in 1630. The galley though large and well armed had been somewhat battered by long service and war and the viceroy, foreseeing the dangers of a shipwreck, asked the captain of another ship taking provisions to Ceylon to sail within sight of the galley. As it turned out, however, the two vessels were separated in a storm and the galley was lost with all on board save Dom Jorge de Almeida himself and twenty eight others who managed to get into the ship's boat and reach the Maldives. After remaining in the islands for about a month de Almeida and his companions made their way to Cochin but soon after arrival there de Almeida fell sick and took several months to recover. It was not until 17 October that de Almeida was able to recruit new troops, collect provisions and begin his second attempt to reach Ceylon.

(57) F.de Souza VI.422 and P.da Trinidadade III.124 give the date as 23.2.1631 and Queyroz 785 and Ajuda 51-V-36.f.79 say he left Goa on 19.2.1631, but the diary of Conde de Linhares makes it clear that he was still in Goa up to the ~~twenty~~ twenty eighth of February.

BNL.FG. 939.ff.1a,3a,4a,5a.

Thus for the major part of 1631 Dom Filipe Mascarenhas
 remained captain-general of Ceylon.⁽⁵⁸⁾

During this period Mascarenhas had the greatest difficulty
 in obtaining funds to pay the troops, being driven eventually
 to borrow money from the misericordia of Colombo for
 the purpose.⁽⁵⁹⁾ He was also put to great straits to find sufficient
 food for the city, for all north India, both on the east and
 west coasts was at this time in the grip of famine. He was
 active militarily, often venturing out of the fort to
 skirmish with the Sinhalese, but though he once penetrated
 as far as Panadura, sixteen miles south of Colombo, he was
 unable to dislodge the Sinhalese from the two great stockades
 they had built six miles east of Colombo on either side of
 the Kelani river.⁽⁶⁰⁾

The Sinhalese on their part had not yet abandoned
 the hope of seizing Colombo. What they had failed to win
 through force, they attempted to gain through guile. They
 negotiated with Vicente da Silva, a captain of the lascarins
 to let the king's forces into the fort at Queen's Gate. The

(58) Queyroz 785; F.de Souza VI.ff.422-425; Ajuda 51-V-36.ff.76-90; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.419; BNL.FG.939.ff.1a,5a,23a,28a,29a,39a; Botelho de Souza III. 488; TT.LM.29.ff.6v,37,197; P.da Trindade III. 123-126

(59) The Santa casa de misericordia or the Holy House of Mercy was an institution assigned to relieve the suffering of the poor and the needy.

(60) Queyroz 783; Jornada 77; BNL.FG.939.f.13a; BNL.FG.7640.f.7v; V.A.Smith - Oxford history of India, 377-378

reasons which impelled da Silva to agree to the plan are not clear for he was one of those who fled from Wellawaya and brought the news of the defeat of de Sa. He is said to have been the first lascarin of the army of de Sa to reach Colombo. According to Queyroz he was moved by the promise of the disavaship of Matara or alternatively the governorship of Jaffna. In any case the plan came to naught for a mudaliyar called Ekanayake revealed the plot to Francisco de Brito de Almeida who had da Silva shot from the mouth of a cannon to instill terror into would-be deserters.⁽⁶¹⁾

The viceroy was by this time getting increasingly concerned regarding the situation in Ceylon. Eight months had passed by since the defeat of de Sa and forces amounting to over nine hundred men as well as provisions and munitions had been sent to Ceylon at a cost of over eighty five thousand Goa xerafins. Yet the Portuguese in Kotte were still restricted to the three forts of Colombo, Galle and Negombo and there seemed no prospect of a victory in sight. There was as yet no news of Dom Jorge de Almeida and his galley and it was feared that he and his men were all lost. Disputes had arisen between the vedor Lançarote de Seixas and the captain-general Dom Filipe Mascarenhas. Hardly any cinnamon had arrived from Ceylon

(61) Queyroz 784; Jornada 77; AHU Caixa 16. 18.1.1644

since the cinnamon fleet of 1629 and this represented a loss of seventy thousand xerafins a year, if not more. Therefore on 14 May 1631 the viceroy suggested in council that he himself should go to Ceylon with a force of one thousand two hundred Portuguese and two thousand other troops as soon as the annual fleet arrived from Lisbon. The galleons of the fleet themselves were to be used for the transport of the forces. The viceroy intended this expedition to have a twofold purpose. The first and most important was to recover the lands of Kotte and to conquer the kingdom of Kandy, thus completing the conquest of the island. A subsidiary objective was the expulsion of the Dutch from Pulicat for which a force was to be sent to join Diogo de Mello, captain of the Coromandel coast, after the subjugation of Ceylon. The plan was a bold one and if successfully executed could have dealt a heavy blow to the expansion of Dutch power on the Coromandel coast. The loss of Pulicat would also have hurt the cloth trade of the Dutch which was so vital to their economic relations with the East Indies. From the Kandyan point of view the arrival of such a large Portuguese force would have presented that kingdom with a challenge it might well have found difficult to overcome.

The scheme however depended on the safe and early arrival of the fleet from Portugal. As the galleons were expected

start their return journey to Portugal by December-January time became a very important factor, for unless the galleons left Goa for Ceylon before the end of September they would not have time to return safely before the north-~~east~~ monsoon set in. During the five months from May to September the viceroy made elaborate preparations for the expedition, recruiting over one thousand two hundred Canarese from Bardes, Salsette and Goa as well as about five hundred Kaffirs. One thousand Parava Christians were expected from ~~xxx~~ the Fishery Coast. By the end of August 1631 the viceroy's advisers had convinced him that it was better not to risk the galleons in the north-~~east~~ monsoon winds ~~which prevailed~~ and that his expedition should sail from Goa in the faster pataxos which could also more easily avoid an attack by a Dutch fleet. Eventually the reinforcements which the viceroy expected from Portugal in the annual fleet failed to arrive even by the first week of October, and the viceroy reluctantly gave up his grandiose plan. As an alternative he decided to send all possible aid to de Almeida to help him to recover the lost territories. It was with this objective that on 6 October two pataxos were sent from Goa with three hundred and thirty seven Canares and a hundred Kaffirs to join Dom Jorge de Almeida at Cochin with instructions to proceed to Ceylon. On 13 October

four other ships with supplies of food , money and munitions as well as eighty Portuguese, eight hundred Canarese and two hundred Kaffirs sailed directly from Goa to Colombo.⁽⁶²⁾

A few days later the viceroy-in-council decided to send the fleet of Dom Alvaro de Castro to serve in Ceylon. This fleet of ten ships with almost two thousand men was originally intended for Malacca but the viceroy apparently decided ~~in~~ that it was more urgently needed in Ceylon. With the arrival of Dom Alvaro on 17 October and Dom Jorge de Almeida on 21 October the Portuguese after a year's defensive activity were⁽⁶³⁾ once more in a position to attack. The landward blockade of Colombo only broken in January 1632 when the Portuguese advanced up the Kelani valley, had lasted sixteen~~th~~ months~~m~~. During that time the Sinhalese had lost a few hundred men in battle, the Portuguese perhaps rather less. The Portuguese casados lost their villages and possessions. But the real sufferers were the Sinhalese Christians who had remained within the fort. Without any form of equitable rationing system or adequate medical service over four thousand of them died of⁽⁶⁴⁾ disease and starvation.

(62) Ajuda 51-V-36.ff.90v, 210; JCBRAS XXX.95-96; Assentos I. 347-350, 353, 359, 366-376, 379-381, 354-355; TT.LM.29.ff.37v-38, 91, 103, 127, 133, 141; Filmoteca LM.17.13/2-2; 14/4; BNL.FG. 939.ff.25a, 26a, 27a, 29a, 31a, 38a, 39a, 43a, 45a, 48a, 49a, 54a, 59a, 64a, 65a, 71a, 73a, 77a, 81a

(63) Ajuda 51-V-36.f.90v; BNL.FG.7640.f.117; Queyroz 791
Queyroz implies that Dom Alvaro de Castro arrived in Ceylon

Meanwhile the forts of Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Negombo and Galle had continued to be held by Portuguese troops against the attacks of the Sinhalese forces. Trincomalee fort itself was not frontally attacked though its captain Francisco de Mello de Noronha and his seventy men were ready to face an assault. The chief aspect of the conflict here was the naval one, for the king of Kandy being the master of most of Ceylon tried to export its produce to obtain valued munitions of war in return. The dozen Portuguese ships based on Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Jaffna made it their task not merely to supply the beseiged forts with provisions but also to impede the commercial ventures of the Kandyans and their Muslim allies. (65)

The captain of Batticaloa, Manual Pessoa de Carvalho, did have to face a Kandyan attack, but by January 1631 he had received enough reinforcements to raid the nearby villages on the mainland. In August 1631 his successor Theodosio Affonso da Gama (66) made a raid further inland.

(63) Contd., after de Almeida but in fact Dom Alvaro arrived earlier and served under Dom Filipe Mascarenhas for a few days. Dom Jorge de Almeida took over his post only on 24 October 1631. Simancas SP.1530.f.59v

(64) Jornada-Lomba, 88; P.E.Pieris - Ceylon II, 190; Queyroz 783; F.de Souza VI.373, 421; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.315

(65) AHU 445.f.55; AHU Caixa 23. 26.1.1655; Simancas SP.1530.f.11v; Filмотeca LM.20. 9-10/4-2; AHU 501.f.124

(66) Simancas SB. 1530.f.11v; Queyroz 785; AHU 501.f.379

Galle and Negombo faced heavier onslaughts. In early September a part of the rebel forces numbering about five hundred men was placed under Andre Godinho, a native of Colombo and directed to attack Galle. The captain of the fort Joao Teixeira Meireles had about sixty Portuguese including soldados, casados and priests, besides a few hundred lascarins under his command and these with the artillery of the fort proved to sufficient to keep the Sinhalese at bay. However realising that the force they saw might be merely the vanguard of a stronger force the Portuguese prepared for a longer ~~siege~~ siege. As Meireles was old and unable to direct the forces actively he was replaced by common consent by a casados Antonio da Cunha as captain till a new captain was named from Colombo. Da Cunha appealed to Colombo for aid and de Seixas sent him twenty men with powder, shot and saltpetre in three fishing boats. In October after the arrival of Dom Filipe Mascarenhas in Colombo, de Seixas sent a further reinforcement of ten men with provisions and sometime later twenty more in a ship under Dom Lourenço Sotomayor.

While the Portuguese garrison was thus being strengthened the Sinhalese forces outside had increased in number. As communications with Colombo were being carried on by means of tones or fishing boats the Sinhalese tried to prevent these

boats from leaving the port. The Portuguese could not allow this threat to their communications, especially as it would have also meant the end of the valuable supply of fresh fish that the fishermen brought in. So they sent armed guards with their fishing boats and beat off the Sinhalese vessels. Failing in this venture the besiegers tried to persuade the lascarins to deliver the fort to them. The plot was well advanced when the accidental death of a lascarin revealed the existence of the scheme. ⁽⁶⁷⁾ The ring leaders were promptly executed. ⁽⁶⁸⁾

By April 1631 Galle had gained many reinforcements and the garrison was organised under Dom Antonio Mascarenhas, the captain-major of the forces at Galle who organised attacks on the villages near the fort. In this he was assisted by the new captain of Galle, Manual Pinto and the two leaders attacked Kathaluwa, Belitota and Weligama. They also made raids on coastal towns up to Dondra. Despite these efforts however, the Portuguese in Galle, like those in Colombo remained more or less confined to the fort up to early 1632. ⁽⁶⁹⁾

(67) Fr. Assumpcao relates how a Portuguese let off his gun accidentally and killed a lascarin. While the lascarin was being carried away a palm leaf letter hidden in his clothes fell out. This revealed a plot to betray the fort.

(68) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.296v-298v, 312v; Filmoteca LM.14,115/1-2 Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.303

(69) Simancas SP. 1530.f.11v; AHU 501.ff.180, 1553; P.da Trinidade III. 115

Negombo had a stronger force than the other outlying Portuguese forts chiefly because the captain, Lourenço Teixeira de Macedo had acted swiftly on hearing the news of the defeat of the Portuguese army in 1630. He had immediately recruited five hundred men of the Seven Korales to aid the forty Portuguese in the fort and was thus able to keep control of the surrounding villages and obtain provisions from them long after the commencement of the siege of Colombo. In October 1630 a force of one thousand five hundred Sinhalese led by Dom Jeronimo Rajapaksha and the Prince of Matale was sent to attack Negombo but this force was beaten off by the lascarins led by Manual Gil, a casado of Colombo who was at the time serving in Negombo. As the Sinhalese continued to attack across the river as well as on the landward side of the fort and laid siege to it, Lourenço Teixeira appealed for help from Colombo and was sent twenty men under Jorge Fernandes de Abreu.

De Seixas had also meanwhile devised a strategem. He told Lourenço that when Dom Bras de Castro appeared with his fleet he was to ask that all the men be landed secretly and arrange that the ship should sail away the following day. Then with all his forces together with those of Dom Bras he was to attack the Sinhalese who were entrenched before the fort, hoping to catch them by surprise. However when Dom Bras appeared ^{on} 26 November

the plan fell through as neither he nor Lourenço Teixeira was willing to take charge of the operation as both feared to take responsibility for the task. The Sinhalese profiting by the Portuguese delay brought in reinforcements and Dom Bras de Castro eventually left without accomplishing anything. Negombo remained besieged by five hundred men up to the end of 1631 during which period the Sinhalese made several attacks on the fort without success. (70)

In the north the feared Kandyan invasion of Jaffna with the aid of South Indian troops did not materialize and the Jaffna peninsula itself remained securely in Portuguese hands. The rumours of an attack were however sufficiently strong to make all the priests to take refuge in the fort of Jaffna. The Kandyans did attack Mannar whose captain Francisco Telles de Menezes beat off their assaults, but apart from this all that the captain-major of Jaffna, Miguel Pereira Borralho (1630-1633) had to contend with were a few skirmishes in the Vanni region. However the work of conversion, always a good index of Portuguese authority, was not resumed till 1632. (71)

(70) BNL.FG. 939.f.1a; 7940.f.7; AHU 501.ff.9,379; Assentos I. 529; TT.LM.31.ff.42-43; AHU Caixa 23, 26.1.1655; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.296v, 298v-299, 309-310v, 313; TT.LM. 29.f.125v; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.1309
 (71) Assentos I. 529; BNL.FG.7640.f.7-8

Everywhere the Portuguese held their ground through 1631, beating off attacks and in some places counter-raiding with gradually increasing freedom. With their command of the sea they were able to deny to the king of Kandy any great extension of his trade with the outside world which would have enabled him to arm his troops more effectively. They were also able to bring in troops in increasing numbers in preparation for a struggle for the domains of Kotte. With the crossing of the Kelani river by the Portuguese army on 5 Januray 1632,⁽⁷²⁾ that struggle was begun. Contrary to what Queyroza states de Almeida did not delay for two months in Colombo awaiting the outcome of negotiations for peace. Such negotiations did not in fact commence till August 1632. The delay is better explained by the cautious disposition of de Almeida himself. The heavy rains which fell in November and December had made the countryside marshy and de Almeida favoured waiting for better weather and making use of the time thus made available for the reorganization of the armed forces and the collection of supplies and munitions. Miguel Fernão de Castelbranco was appointed the captain-major-of-the-field and Dom Antonio Mascarenhas, Jorge Coelho de Castro, Antonio de Motta Galvão and Antonio Barbosa

(72) Queyroz 791

were made disavas of the Seven Korales, Four Korales, Matara
(73)
and Sabaragamuwa respectively.

De Almeida's major problem was that of supply, for there was a great lack of coolies. As his first target was the Kelani valley he hoped to circumvent this problem by using ships sailing up-river as transports of food and munitions. He therefore asked Andre Coelho for six of his smaller vessels to be made ready for the task. This was the first time the Portuguese had used sea-going vessels on a river in Ceylon for military purposes. The success of the experiment itself was a limited one, for one of the six caught fire, another ran aground and two more failed to proceed beyond a few miles from
(74)
the river mouth.

To understand de Almeida's military plans it is essential to review the defence plans of the Sinhalese. The Kelani valley was not merely a fertile agricultural region but the main route from Colombo to the highlands. The king of Kandy was therefore determined to hold it and for this purpose had built stockades to form two lines of defence. About six miles to the east of Colombo were two large stockades of wood and mud on either side of the river. These were fortified by several pieces of artillery captured from the Portuguese. The second line of

(73) Ajuda 51-V-36.ff.91v-95; BNL.FG.7640.f.17; Queyroz 791-792; TT.LM.29.f.219; F.de Souza VI. 425-426

(74) Ajuda 51-V-36.ff.95-96v; Queyroz 792; F.de Souza VI. 426-427

defence was a fort at Kaduwala to the south of Kelani and another at Malwana to the north. A few miles west of Malwana yet another stockade had been built to strengthen this system. The forces of the Four and the Seven Korales reinforced by a strong contingent of Kandyans under Maha Astana and Vijayapala were ready to defend these places. De Almeida's plan - somewhat conditioned by his supply problem - was to advance eastwards along the northern bank up to Malwana and then to cross the river and return along the southern bank destroying all the forts on the way.

Leaving a strong force to garrison Colombo, de Almeida took with him four thousand men, one third of them Portuguese, one third lascarins and the rest Kaffirs and Canarese. He marched eastwards along the northern bank with great caution. The two stockades on the northern bank were taken after heavy fighting on 7 and 8 January 1632 and de Almeida reached Malwana, twelve miles from Colombo on the ninth, four days after he had set out. The Sinhalese recognising the strength of his force did not offer open battle and at Malwana Maha Astana abandoned the fort, doubtless hoping to draw de Almeida further away from his base. The old soldier however stuck to his plans and having successfully attacked and demolished the stockades on the southern bank stationed himself with his forces a few miles outside Colombo

where he sent his sick and wounded. Having thus secured fourteen villages within a dozen miles of Colombo de Almeida turned to (75)
Raigama, Salpiti and Pasdun Korales.

During this period de Almeida took great pains to ensure the loyalty of the lascarins for he realised that this was the key to the conquest of the lands in Ceylon. Those who brought back heads of the Sinhalese killed in battle were given (76) liberal rewards on the spot. With the seizure of the stockades a special bonus of ten xerafins each was presented to each of the lascarins. One of the newly conquered villages was ceremoniously handed over to a lascarin. Those who returned to obedience (77) were given red berets as a sign of approval. On the other hand the rebels once captured were treated roughly. Many were distributed as slaves and servants to the captains and audaliyars and one was even handed over to the ^Acaribal Kaffirs who killed (78) and devoured him in front of his own family.

By now the Sinhalese were organized into two main mobile units - the army of the West and the army of the South. The first consisted of the men of the Four and Seven Korales aided by forces of Maha Astana and Vijayapala. The second was led by

(75) ENL.FG. 7640.ff.17-18; Ajuda 51-V-36.ff.97-108; Queyroz 792; Jornada 79; F.de Souza VI. 427-429; AHU 501.ff.4,38

(76) Ajuda 51-V-36.f.97; F.de Souza VI.427

(77) Ajuda 51-V-36.ff.100v-101v

(78) Ajuda 51-V-36.f.102; F.de Souza VI.428; Queyroz 792

Kumarasinha and Dom Theodosio and was made up of men from Matara, Sabaragamuwa and Uva. After posting a garrison to protect Colombo from sudden attack, de Almeida attempted to subjugate the Four and Seven Korales. The Sinhalese army of the west led by the two princes was defeated at Daladagamwela and Methiangane, and in the latter conflict Vijayapala narrowly avoided capture. It was to contain this advance that the two princes called in the forces of the south. To meet this combined force de Almeida advanced to Vadaruwa, sixteen miles west of Methiangane where he fortified his position with a stockade. Once more however fortune favoured the Portuguese for Dom Theodosio fell out with the princes and retired to Kalutara pursued by a force of Kandyans led by
(79)
Kumarasinha.

The reasons for the estrangement between Dom Theodosio and the princes are not clear. Dom Theodosio during the past two years had emerged as the strongest of the rebel leaders. Senerat had made him disava of Matara and Dom Theodosio set up his headquarters at Dondra where he rebuilt the ancient temple. It may well have been that he resented the authority of Kumarasinha who had been designated king of Matara by his

(79) Queyroz 794-795; Jornada 80; BNL.FG.7640.f.118; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.107v; AHU 501.ff.16v,47; Raghavan- The karava of Ceylon, 27

father. The loyalty of the men of Matara were to Dom Theodosio and not to Kumarasinha, the nominal king, and this may have made co-operation between the two difficult. It may also have been that Dom Theodosio disagreed with the strategy of the princes who wanted to concentrate all forces on the Kelani, for that left his own principality open to Portuguese invasions. (80)

The results of the break were decisive. Dom Theodosio's troops amounted to nearly four thousand men- about a third of the forces the Sinhalese had in the field. Finding himself besieged in Kalutara by the Kandyans under the prince of Uva Dom Theodosio offered to submit to the Portuguese. De Almeida accepted the offer and sent Antonio da Motta Galvão with troops to aid him, whereupon Kumarasinha withdrew to Uva. Thus the whole disava of Matara passed into Portuguese hands with little difficulty. (81)

At sea too the Portuguese soon began to reassert their power. Shortly after raising the blockade of Colombo, de Almeida appointed Francisco Tenreiro as captain-major of the coasts of Ceylon with instructions to disrupt the trade the Kandyans had started with south Indian merchants. By this time Chilaw had become a centre of exchange of arecanut, cinnamon and elephants

(80) F.de Souza VI.431; Queyroz 794-795; AHU 501.f.236v; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.107v

(81) F.de Souza VI.430; Queyroz 795; Jornada 80; AHU 445.f.55

for rice, saltpetre and cloth from south India. The Portuguese raided Chilaw twice. On the first occasion the traders received a warning which enabled them to escape but on the ~~other~~ second one hundred and thirty vessels fell into the hands of the Portuguese. The ports of Matara, Dondra and Alutgama were also attacked and put to the flames.⁽⁸²⁾

During the second half of 1632 de Almeida took measures for the collection of revenue from the areas recovered. Captains were appointed to the ports of Kalutara, Alutgama and Weligama.⁽⁸³⁾ De Almeida also attempted to organise the cinnamon peelers for the collection of this spice. It was this step which brought him into conflict with the Franciscans. The Franciscans claimed that all the properties of those who had abjured Christianity and died in the war should be confiscated while Dom Jorge de Almeida refused to enforce this measure due to the need to attract men back to the lowlands. The dispute soon degenerated into a personal one between one of the Franciscans and the captain-general.⁽⁸⁴⁾

It was not that Dom Jorge de Almeida had hitherto lacked enemies. He was very old and infirm,⁽⁸⁵⁾ and in the campaigns over the marshy Kelani valley he had to be carried in a palanquin.⁽⁸⁶⁾

(82) AHU 501.ff.16v,38,47v,199,236v; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.108; Queyroz 795; BNL.BG.7649.f.17; TT.LM.32.f.270; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.ff.309,402; BNL.FG. 939.f.59a

(83) Filmoteca LM.15, 20-21/2-5

(84) TT.LM.31.ff.595-597; TT.LM.30.ff.253,264v; TT.LM.36.f.443;

TT.LM.37.f.375; Filmoteca LM.20. 36/2; Evora GR Arm. V-VI.14-5.f.108-109

(85) TT.LM.35.f.37; TT.LM.36.f.13; Queyroz 797

(86) Ajuda 51-V-36.f.96v

For this he was subjected to criticism by the soldiers as unwarlike in conduct. The soldiers had little appreciation of the engineering skill he displayed in the construction of the bastion of Mapane,⁽⁸⁷⁾ while he lost respect also due to his extreme caution in the field. It was charged that he rewarded his friends liberally while those who served in the army were forgotten.⁽⁸⁸⁾ The unpopularity of his associates certainly reflected on him. He was seen as an old man surrounding himself with other old men unaware of the needs of the army and the needs of the casados.⁽⁸⁹⁾ Perhaps his greatest fault was that he was moved to anger easily.⁽⁹⁰⁾ It was this that led him into altercations with his subordinates, in one of which a casado was killed,⁽⁹¹⁾ while the general himself was twice injured.

To add to de Almeida's difficulties a violent tempest on 29 November 1632 damaged many buildings and brought down some of the walls of the fort of Colombo. The lake overflowed

(87) Queyroz 797

(88) Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei da India, 63

(89) At least two of his officers Lançarote de Seixas (vedor) and Manuel Freire de Andrade (captain of Colombo) were very old and very corrupt.

(90) TT.LM.35.f.37

De Almeida himself was above corruption, but the suggestion in Queyroz 797 that efforts to check corruption may have caused his unpopularity had no further evidence to support it.

(91) Queyroz 797; F.de Souza VI.431; Jornada 78-79; TT.LM.30.ff.158, 253; Ajuda 50-V-38.f.184v

and the rains continued until only the Franciscan monastery and a small church remained standing. The annual fleet sent to Ceylon to take cinnamon to Goa was lost with many other vessels (92) that were in the harbour. Moreover the Portuguese forces having been weakened by the departure of the fleets of Andre Coelho, Dom Alvaro de Castro and Dom Bras de Castro during the course (93) of 1632, were checked after they had recovered Matara, a part of Sabaragamuwa, the coastal sector of the Seven Korales and (94) the Kelani valley up to Pitigaldeniya. Though de Almeida recruited many lascarins to compensate for the decline in the number of Portuguese, by 1633 he had lost the confidence of (95) the clergy, the casados and the army. On the receipt of this news and on the complaints of the casados of Colombo the viceroy decided to recall Dom Jorge de Almeida and replace him with (96) Diogo de Mello de Castro, captain of S.Thome.

(92) BNL.FG. 7640.f.66; Filmoteca LM.19A.22/2-3; TT.LM.31.f.199; TT.LM.30.f.264v; AHU 501.f.199; 326; JCBRAS. XXX.97

(93) The viceroy did send reinforcements when the annual fleet arrived in 1632 (Filmoteca LM.19A. 17/1) but these were too few. Evora GR.Arm. V-VI. 14-5ff.84-85

(94) P.da Trindade III. 118

(95) Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei da India, 21, 65; Queyroz 796

(96) BNL.FG. 7640.f.61; Evora CXVI/2-3.f.114; Ajuda 50-V-38. f.182v; ~~Filmoteca~~ LM.

Meanwhile negotiations for peace had started between the Portuguese and the king of Kandy. The Portuguese successes on land and sea in 1632 had made Senerat willing to consider peace. He and his people were weary after five years of continuous warfare. Though the Portuguese blockade of Kandyan trade was by no means complete, supplies of food were irregular and sometimes salt was in short supply. Senerat himself was ageing and saw divisions arising within the Sinhalese ranks. Dom Theodosio had already rejoined the Portuguese. The prince of Matale was becoming increasingly discontented with the favours shown to Maha Astana. In fact as early as 1631 Vijayapala had attempted to desert to the Portuguese by marching to Batticaloa with some of his own men and twenty two prisoners. It was only the opposition of his own men that had stopped him from doing so. Finally the Kandyan efforts to seize Mannar and Jaffna had been effectively checked by Miguel Pereira Borralho, captain-major of Jaffna (1630-1633). In fact by 1631 Borralho had begun raids into the Kandyan controlled Vanni districts. (97)

By August 1632 the viceroy too had realised the advisability of a peaceful settlement. The past two years had been difficult ones for the Portuguese in the East. In 1630 the loss of

(97)
 AHU 501. ff. 38, 379; Filmoteca LM. 15. 20/21 /2-5;
 P.E. Pieris - Prince Vijayapala of Matale -25; AHU Caixa 22,
 4.8.1634

Nuno Alvares Botelho with his high seas fleet in the straits of Malacca had been added to the defeat of Constantino de Sa in Ceylon. In 1631 came disorders on the Zambesi with over three hundred Portuguese deaths and the loss of Mombaça to the rebellious forces of Dom Jeronimo Chingulia. No aid arrived (98) from Portugal in 1631, and in Bengal the Portuguese were heading for direct conflict with Mughal authorities. In such circumstances a peace treaty was obviously desirable. It would release the two hundred Portuguese prisoners held by the king of Kandy and free other troops tied up in Ceylon for services elsewhere. Peace would also bring to an end the outpouring of men and material to Ceylon which had cost over two hundred thousand xerafins in the last two years, and would permit the exportation once again of such lucrative commodities as cinnamon (99) and arecanut. Within Ceylon the casados represented by the camara of Colombo were strongly in favour of peace. Two years of campaigns in Kotte had deprived them of their major source of income - the revenue from the villages. The rising cost of foodstuffs was an added blow. To the casados of Ceylon therefore

(98) E.Axelson - The Portuguese in South Africa, 1600-1700, 76-77, 86-87; C.R.Boxer - Commentaries of Ruy Freire de Andrade, 315 V.Smith -

(99) BNL.FG.939.f.139a; TT.LM.29.f.197; TT.LM.30.ff.108,264v; BNL.FG. 7640.f.7; Filmoteca LM.16. 43-44/4-1; Queyroz 786; F.de Souza VI. 425

peace represented their chance to return to normalcy and
(100)
prosperity.

While willingness to suspend war existed on both sides, difficulties arose regarding the terms of peace. The two main issues in dispute were the possession of Batticaloa and the payment of tribute. After preliminary soundings through
(101)
Fr. Antonio Peixoto, de Almeida sent an ambassador to offer Senerat peace on the terms of 1617 on condition he agreed to Batticaloa remaining in Portuguese hands. Senerat on the other hand held that Batticaloa was a part of his kingdom and refused to pay any tribute in the future.

As the Portuguese envoy would not agree, Senerat dismissed him and decided to send an embassy to Goa. The decision to send envoys to Goa was also influenced by another factor. Senerat considered that a treaty made directly with the viceroy would not be set aside with impunity by a subsequent captain-general. De Sa's disregard of the treaty of 1617 apparently disillusioned him on treaties made with the captain-generals. Jayasundara Mudaliyar, disava of Udunuwara and Kuruppu Rala were chosen as the king's envoys. Domingos Carvalho Cam, Gaspar da Costa and

(100) Evora CXVI ¶ 2-3 and 114

(101) Jornada 72 and Queyroz 790 name the ambassador as Jeronimo Taveira. Biker II.49 and 3 CLR ser III.352 name him as Jeronimo Oliveira da Cunha.

Miguel de Fonseca accompanied them as the king's procurators while Dom Diogo was the official interpreter.⁽¹⁰²⁾

Cam, a veteran soldier of Ceylon tried to persuade the viceroy that leniency was the best guarantee of a stable peace with Kandy. The former sergeant-major, Miguel de Fonseca opposed this view arguing that leniency would be taken for weakness. Ambrosio Freitas da Camara who had difference with Cam while serving in Ceylon was also an advocate of the policy of hard negotiation. As Ambrosio de Freitas was the only person in the viceroy's council with a first hand knowledge of Ceylon his influence must have been decisive in the council meeting of 11.3.1633 which resolved that neither Batticaloa nor the tribute could be dispensed with for the sake of peace.⁽¹⁰³⁾ As the Portuguese stood firm the Sinhalese envoys were compelled to yield and on 3 April 1633 sign a treaty involving both payment of tribute and the cession of Batticaloa. Senerat was to pay two elephants a year to the Portuguese apart from the arrears of tribute for the past seven years. However for the first six years after the signing of the treaty this payment was temporarily limited to one elephant a year.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ The fort of Batticaloa and all land within two thousand paces or an artillery shot from

(102) CLR / ser.III.291-293; P.da Trindade III. 118-120; Biker II.38-40;47; Evora CXVI/2-3f. 114; Assentos I.573 Assentos I names the interpreter as Dom Rodrigo. So does Biker II.38. but Biker II. 47 names him as Dom Diogo.

(103) Assentos I. 467-468; CLR 3 ser III.291; Queyroz 790-791; Ajuda 50-V-38.f.181

the walls was to belong to the Portuguese. The revenue from
 (104)
 the customs duties was to be shared.

The viceroy also refused to agree in toto to two other proposals of Senerat. Senerat had suggested that those who fled from the Portuguese to Kandy or vice versa should be allowed to live in the land they wished to. The viceroy, probably realising the problems this would create in time of a rising in Kotte included the proviso that this would apply only to
 (105)
 persons who had not committed treason. Senerat had also requested letters of authority for his ships to trade on the high seas, with the protection of the Portuguese but here the viceroy inserted a clause which meant that control of the trade in arms and
 (106)
 ammunition remained in Portuguese hands.

Thus the draft treaty of 1633 while it ceded Batticaloa to the Portuguese, awarded Senerat little more than what he had obtained in 1617. He still remained a vassal of Portugal. It is true that he now had specific permission to trade in goods other than arms. Moreover at his insistence a clause had

(104) Clause 9. Record of the treaty negotiations are available in Portuguese in Assentos I.573-577 and Biker II. 42-47 and in English translation in CLR 3 ser III.291-295, 350-354, 402-405.

(105) Clauses 7 and 8

(106) Clause 3

(107) Clause 7

been inserted stipulating that no captain-general could make
(108)
war without good reasons for doing so to the viceroy. But
these were small comforts after six years of war. It is not
surprising therefore that Senerat rejected the terms agreed
to by the envoys at Goa.

There was considerable speculation in the Portuguese camp
as to what reasons prompted Senerat to take this step. One
of them was probably the sudden arrest of Dom Theodosio by
the Portuguese at the end of 1632. The Portuguese probably
never forgave Dom Theodosio¹ for his role at Randeniwela. His
opponents within the Portuguese camp were led by Fr. Antonio
Peixoto who had suspected Dom Theodosio's fidelity even in
the days of de Sa. Antonio da Motta Galvão with whom Dom Theodosio
had never been on good terms was now appointed as his superior.
When Senerat offered to negotiate for peace and his envoys
set out for Goa Dom Theodosio's value to the Portuguese diminished
greatly. On the first rumour of treachery therefore he was
arrested and sent to Goa for trial. To Senerat, Dom Theodosio's
fall was a relief. It ensured at least for the time being the
loyalty of the other rebels and weakened the Portuguese hold
over the lascarins of Matara who no doubt resented the arrest

(108) Clause 6

If the captain-general did not observe this clause
the king of Kandy was expected to inform the viceroy through the
camara of Colombo.

(109)
of their respected leader. Another factor which may have swayed Senerat was the paucity of the Portuguese reinforcements. As the considerable Portuguese forces sent from Goa in late 1631 to recover Ceylon and Mombaca had hardly been made up by the arrival of fresh troops from Lisbon there was not much the viceroy could have done to make up the deficiency. The year 1632 had not seen many Portuguese successes in the East, save in Ceylon. The Mughal siege of the Portuguese fort at Hugli (June to September 1632) had ended with the abandonment of their position by the Portuguese after ~~their~~ three hundred of their number as well as seven hundred native Christians had been killed. In both 1632 and 1633 the Dutch were active in the Arabian sea and in the latter year alone five of the Portuguese ships trading between Ceylon and Goa fell into their
(110)
hands. But the weakness of the Portuguese forces was at most a contributory factor to Senerat's decision. The chief reason was, without doubt, the insistence of the Portuguese on the retention of Batticaloa. From the Kandyan point of ^{view} View the main reason for the outbreak of war in 1628 was the unauthorised construction of a Portuguese fort on Kandyan soil in Batticaloa. Furthermore it was apparent that this fort was built to control and restrict Kandyan trade and foreign relations.

(109) Queyroz 796; CLR 3 ser.III.291; P.da Trindade III.117

(110) Jornada 75; Queyroz 798; Ajuda 51-V-38.f.183v;
JCERAS XXX.97; V.Smith - Oxford history of India, 379-380.

Thus when Diogo de Mello arrived at Colombo on 22 November 1633 to take up his appointment as captain-general he was faced with the prospect of continued war. With great efforts he was able to muster four hundred Portuguese, a thousand Kaffirs Canarese, and five thousand lascarins for his army. The (111) Sinhalese at this time were organized into two armies ; that of Maha Astana and Vijayapala defending the upper regions of the Four Korales and that of Kumarasinha which fought in Matara. Maha Astana fortified himself at Attapitiya and Vijayapala at Moratenna while the king himself was reported (112) to be at Ganetenna on the Kandyan frontier. The military situation had not apparently changed very greatly for de Mello had no more troops than de Almeida had but de Mello was able to unite all elements behind him and though perhaps less gifted as a tactician he probably inspired the troops with his greater aggressiveness. He seized the stockade at Moratenna and marching up to Attapitiya made ready to attack the positions held by Maha Astana who had been joined by the king and the two other princes. The Kandyans had sixteen thousand men ready

(111)Jornada 75; Queyroz 798; Ajuda 50-V-38.f.183v;

(112) Queyroz 798/ states that there were seven hundred Portuguese. The statement in a letter of de Mello that he had only one hundred and fifty Portuguese soldiers when he took up office is certainly a misrepresentation (Diario 62) but his final figure of seven hundred men in all (Diario 65) tallies with that of Queyroz. Jornada 84 gives the figure of four hundred Portuguese and five thousand lascarins.

for battle but de Mello's venture was a success for Maha Astana after vain efforts to extract better terms agreed without
(113)
fighting to ratify the draft treat drawn up in Goa.

If the war was a drawn battle, the peace was a Portuguese victory. The Kandyans had to give up fourteen Korales which they had held since 1630. Two hundred and twelve Portuguese prisoners held in Kandy for three years returned once more
(114)
to take their places in the Portuguese army. But when the peace
(115)
was signed on 14 January 1639 at Attapitiya Senerat secured one advantage. It was Maha Astana, now calling himself Rajasinha, king of Kandy who signed the peace treaty. This to Senerat was the culmination of a long effort to have his youngest son
(116)
installed and recognised as the rightful king of Kandy.

The way in which Rajasinha and Senerat agreed to terms they had rejected before~~d~~, after a mere show of force, was to leave an unfortunate impression in the mind of Diogo de Mello. He was convinced that the king of Kandy had merely postponed

(113) Queyroz 798; Jornada 84; AHU 201.f.38; Diario de 3^o conde de Linhares vice-rei da India, 65.

(114) Queyroz 798-799; Diario do 3^o conde de Linhares vice-rei da India, 65; P.da Trindade III. 121

(115) CLR 3 ser. III.405; Biker II.46; Jornada 13

(116) Diario do 3^o conde de Linhares vice-rei da India, 68; Filмотeca LM19D. 34/1-2

Maha Astana had been administering Kandy on behalf of Senerat for many years but before this had not taken himself the title of king of Kandy or the name Rajasinha.

the day of reckoning and would make war on the Portuguese again, once he thought the opportunity favourable. Having served fourteen years on the Coromandel and the Malabar coasts he knew how interested the Dutch were in gaining the cinnamon trade of Ceylon. He considered that the only way to secure the island was to conquer the kingdom of Kandy. Thus just three and a half months after signing the peace treaty he wrote to the king of Portugal warning that peace would not be kept for long and that the Portuguese should make war against the king who ^{had} defeated de Sa and brought discredit on them. He attempted to convince the king of Portugal that the peace was of greater advantage to Kandy than to the Portuguese by pointing out that under its protection the king of Kandy used Portuguese ports to sell his elephants to the Nayak of Tanjore.

(117)

These views of the captain-general received no support from ~~xxx~~ the viceroy, conde de Linhares who being hard-pressed to meet existing commitments in Asia had no wish to undertake new ones. The viceroy was glad enough that the costly war had ended. He considered that other projects, notably the defence of Malacca gravely threatened by the Dutch were questions of higher priority. He thus looked forward to a

(117) TT.LM.36.f.116

(118) P.E.Pieris - Ceylon II, 200

considerable reduction in the expenses of Ceylon. This fundamental divergence of views led to a clash between the captain-general and the viceroy on almost all aspects of policy.

The expenses of Ceylon had far exceeded ^{its} ~~the~~ revenues in the past few years. The viceroy now aimed at readjusting the balance. Until the 1620's the Ceylon authorities had received the proceeds of land revenues and money from the sale of crown commodities, most notably cinnamon, and in the years before 1628 and the outbreak of war, these revenues had generally been sufficient to cover the total Portuguese expenditure. War obviously quite upset that balance, but the cinnamon monopoly was thereafter so handled by the conde de Linhares as to produce a considerable surplus over the peace-time costs of ^{the} Ceylon government. The viceroy in 1634 proposed that while quit rents and revenues from the sale of government products should go as before to the vedor of Ceylon, virtually the whole of the cinnamon revenues should go to the central government at Goa. He also concluded an agreement in 1634 with the Nayak of Madura by which he agreed to exchange the elephants caught in Ceylon for saltpetre. To make good part of the loss to the Ceylon exchequer caused by these two changes, he also provided for a subvention from Goa. This he fixed in 1634 at the low figure of thirty thousand xerafins of Goa -which was to be the

maximum grant per year. Not content with/^{this}quite drastic change in the handling of Ceylon revenue^e, the viceroy, in consultation with de Almeida and Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara, the ex-captain-general and ex-vedor of Ceylon, drew up a new regimento for Ceylon which among other instructions, proposed to receive further economies by cutting the rice ration to
(119)
troops in Ceylon.

The policy of stringent economy laid down by the viceroy made inroads on the military strength of the Portuguese in Ceylon. It seriously affected the repair and rebuilding of the forts, which were now ~~in~~ certainly in a bad state. De Almeida had repaired some of the damage done to Colombo by the tempest of 1632, and during the time of de Mello, the captain of Colombo was busy repairing the stretch of wall from the bastion of S.Iago to the sea and in constructing a new bulwark - that of
(120)
S.Augustino. But besides the repair work on the fort of Colombo de Mello envisaged a vast scheme to refortify all the old Portuguese strong points. The defences at Kalutara, Malwana and Sabaragamuwa had been almost completely destroyed by the Sinhalese during the war, the fort at Menikkadawara needed extensive repairs, while Mannar, Batticaloa and Galle also

(119) TT.LM.36.ff.4,15-15v

This regimento which was sent to Ceylon, does not seem to be now extant, and it is by inference that the rearrangement of the revenues and the cut in the rice ration are here attributed to it.
(120) AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644

needed attention. De Mello considered that Chilaw too should be fortified to prevent the Kandyans from using it to obtain (121) supplies during any future conflict. He also pointed out that forts, especially those situated ~~from~~ far away from Colombo should be provided with supplies for at least a year to enable (122) them to stand a long siege.

The viceroy himself appreciated the need for the repair of forts, and in 1634 he conceded to Colombo the revenue from the forty bahars of cinnamon allowed to the city for five years in advance, as well as a further grant of twelve thousand Goa xerafins, all of which was to be used to repair the fort. However though he agreed with the policy of repairing the forts on the coast he did not see any urgency in the re-construction of inland forts as the Portuguese were at peace with Kandy. For the same reason the viceroy considered that the size of (123) the standing army could safely be reduced.

Diogo de Mello having failed to convince the viceroy appealed to Lisbon. He complained that the viceroy's policy was unrealistic for when cinnamon and elephants were taken by the Goa government other revenues were insufficient to meet

(121) TT.LM.36.f.24

(122) TT.LM.36.f.15v

(123) Filmoteca LM.19a,22"2-3; Coimbra 459.f.360v

(124)
 the expenses of the island. The viceroy's agreement with Madura
 he claimed, was disadvantageous for the price stipulated for
 elephants was low while that fixed for saltpetre was very
 (125)
 high. Moreover even this sacrifice did not secure for the
 Portuguese a monopoly of saltpetre which the Nayak of Madura
 (126)
 was also selling to the Dutch. To circumvent the authority
 of the viceroy over the supply of soldiers he requested that
 three hundred soldiers be sent direct from Lisbon to Colombo,
 assuring the king that he would not lose financially as the
 ship that was used ~~was~~ to transport them to Colombo could
 return with a cargo of saltpetre, pepper, cloth, cinnamon and
 (127)
 precious stones.

Diogo de Mello did not rest content with complaining to
 the king. It would have taken at least two years for him to
 receive a royal order reversing the decisions of the viceroy,
 and de Mello had not the patience to wait that long. Moreover
 his problems were immediate. By June 1634 the payments to soldiers
 (128)
 were already one year in arrears, and early in 1634 the captain-

(124) TT.LM.36.f.15

(125) TT.LM.36.f.17

(126) TT.LM.36.f.16

The motives of de Mello in opposing the agreement with
 Madura may not have been entirely disinterested, especially in
 view of his interest in trade. (Ribeiro 97-98) It is noteworthy
 that he abandoned all opposition to this treaty during his
 second term of office.

(127) BM.Add.Mss. 42056.ff.2,4

(128) TT.LM.36.f.15; Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei
 da India, 145

major-of-the-field Antonio da Motta Galvão had complained of the lack of coolies and provisions. He had also recommended that the reduction of the rice ration, one of the economy measures in the viceroy's new regimento, be done away with. (129)

In October 1634, nine captains of the army sent a representative to Colombo to voice their grievances. (130) Thus Diogo de Mello had a choice between violating the orders of the viceroy and facing a mutiny in the troops. He chose the former.

With the concurrence of the new vedor, Amaro Roiz, de Mello prevented the despatch of elephants to Madura and used the proceeds of their sale for the expenses of the island. (131) When this proved insufficient he sent some of the cinnamon for sale to Negapatam in defiance of royal and viceregal orders regarding the cinnamon monopoly. To keep the forces contented he and the vedor assumed possession of villages which had been granted to private individuals and used their revenue and services for the army. De Mello also granted villages on his own authority without consulting the junta that had been set up

(129) Assentos II.52-53 says that de Mello after consulting the captain of Colombo, the vedor and the guardian of the Franciscans decided not to enforce the cut in the ration till his representations to the viceroy were answered. The cut was even more resented because of the general scarcity of rice at this time. P.da Trindade (III.121) asserts that the fields had not been cultivated for three years due to war. This assertion however may have been true only for parts of Kotte.

(130) TT.LM.36.ff.10,20; TT.LM.35.f.37

(131) For this he had a good excuse for the drought of 1634-35 made the taking of elephants across the one hundred and twenty miles of dry land from Colombo to Mannar a very difficult and risky task.

(132)
for land allocation.

These acts incensed the viceroy who earlier had viewed
(133)
Diogo de Mello with favour. In particular he resented the
sabotaging of his arrangements to sell elephants. The Portuguese
envoy had promised the Nayak of Madura the first consignment
of elephants by August 1634 and then by November or December
at the latest. By January 1635 no elephants had yet been
delivered and consequently no saltpetre could be obtained. (134)

The viceroy also heard that some of the cinnamon sold by de Mello
had found its way into the hands of the Dutch at Musalipatam (135)
and it was also about this time that he found that the captain-
general ^{had} written letters against his policy to Lisbon. (136)

By the end of 1634 the viceroy had decided to remove both
the captain-general and the vedor from office. The judicial
inquiry which had investigated the disturbances in the time of
Dom Jorge de Almeida had completely exonerated him and it was
considered necessary to send him back to Ceylon as captain-general
to satisfy his honour. In place of Amaro Roiz who had aided

(132) TT.LM.36.f.7; Filmoteca LM.19B. 26/3-5

(133) Evora GR.Arm.V-VI, 14-5.f.164

(134) Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei da India, 260

(135) TT.LM.39.f.31; TT.LM.40.f.40; TT.LM.34.ff.9-9v;
TT.LM.37.f.1; Filmoteca LM.19B.26/3-5

(136) Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei da India, 260

de Mello to defy him, the viceroy appointed Antonio Pinho da Costa. (137)
 Antonio da Motta Galvão who^m de Mello had dismissed from his
 post was reappointed as captain-major-of-the-field. (138) These
 moves seem to have been made to secure a complete change of
 all the principal officers in Ceylon, for at the same time
 the viceroy also removed Balthazar de Camara da Noronha,
 captain-major of Jaffna, 1633-1635 and appointed in his place
 Lopo Gomez de Abreu, the son-in-law of Antonio Pinho da Costa. (139)
 Amaro Roiz was directed to continue the making of the tombo
 of Jaffna. (140)

De Almeida set sail from Goa on 1 April 1635 with a force
 of sixty nine men. The timing of his appointment was hardly
 a fortunate one. Just over a year earlier he had aided the
 viceroy, conde de Linhares and the secretary of state,
 Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara to draft the new regimento for
 Ceylon. This, among other things, had ordered a reduction ~~of~~
 in the allowance of rice allotted to each soldier, from two to
 one and a quarter Goa measures a day. Great unrest in the army
 (142)

(137) TT.LM.34.ff.9-9v, 11

Da Costa did not take up his post, offering to work in
 Jaffna with his son-in-law, the captain-major of Jaffna. Roiz
 therefore continued as vedor.

(138) Queyroz 799

(139) TT.LM.34.f.11; TT.LM.40.f.33; TT.LM.42.f.66v; AHU 501.
 ff. 293,379, 24,102v; Filmoteca LM.19D. 41-43/115,35/1

(140) TT.LM.35.f.5; TT.LM.34.f.9-9v

(141) TT.LM.34.ff.9-9v; TT.LM.35.f.37; Coimbra 459.f.361

(142) T.Abeyasinghe 190; TT.LM.36.ff.20,10; Assentos II.52

From evidence available it appears that thirty eight to
 forty two Goa measures was the equivalent of twenty five Ceylon
 measures. The actual reduction in the ration to be made in Ceylon
 was from one and a half to one Ceylon measure.

had followed and de Mello had himself found trouble in keeping order. The arrival of one of the very men who had drafted the regimento, as the captain-general, was a signal for further unrest. Unrest developed into open mutiny when de Almeida insisted on the army accepting Galvão as their captain-major. The soldiers selected Luis Teixeira, who had served as their captain-major since the dismissal of Galvão, to speak for them. Teixeira conveyed the soldiers' demands that the old rice ration be restored and someone other than the unpopular Galvão be appointed as captain-major. When de Almeida refused to yield the soldiers marched on Colombo and forced him to
(143)
accept their terms.

De Almeida thereupon tried to win the support of the ecclesiastics by a vigorous policy of aid in their mission work. He granted many villages to them. He expelled all Buddhist and Hindu priests from Portuguese lands and forbade them to return
(144)
on pain of death. His rule nevertheless remained as unpopular
(145)
in 1635 as it had been in 1633. The casados of Colombo alleged that de Almeida seized villages which they had held to give
(146)
them to his personal followers. The viceroy-in-council heard renewed complaints about de Almeida and eventually decided to

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- (143) TT.LM.31.f.251; TT.LM.35.f.29; Assentos II. 52
 (144) TT.LM.45.f.303
 (145) TT.LM.33.f.266; TT.LM.35.f.43v; TT.LM.37.f.423
 (146) TT.LM.39.f.31; TT.LM.40.f.31

recall him. When this news reached Ceylon, a group of soldiers set out from Menikkadawara to settle accounts with him before he left the island.⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ De Almeida had to embark hurriedly even before his successor arrived but having escaped his enemies he died at Mangalore on his way to Goa apparently from old age and exhaustion.⁽¹⁴⁸⁾

Before he left Ceylon de Almeida alleged that the mutiny of the soldiers against him had been organised with the encouragement of Diogo de Mello. At the enquiry which followed⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ de Mello was cleared of all responsibility. De Mello's movements during this period however give rise to suspicion that he did not expect de Almeida to last long in his post. He did not leave Colombo until September 1635 and then went on to Mannar⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ where he stayed till early 1636. It was here that he heard of his reappointment by the new viceroy, Pero da Silva who had⁽¹⁵¹⁾ brought orders to this effect from Lisbon.

The mutiny itself showed the rising indiscipline in the Portuguese forces in Ceylon and the inability of the authorities to deal with this problem. The army was immobilised

(147) TT.LM.37¹ff.1,423; TT.LM.38.f.396

(148) Queyroz 799; F.de Souza VI. 432; TT.LM.37.ff.1,423; EM.Ad.Mss.41996.f.64

(149) TT.LM.42.f.66; TT.LM.40.f.31

(150) Queyroz 799; TT.LM.35.f.5; AHU Caixa 16.ant. 18.1.1644

(151) De Mello may of course have delayed in order to avoid meeting the conde de Linhares who was due to be recalled. De Mello's connivance in the mutiny cannot be proved.

for twenty three days. The mutineers were led by the most experienced soldiers in Ceylon - those who had been prisoners in Kandy for three years. The viceroy confessed that due to lack of troops these men could not be punished as they could not be replaced. One of them, Thome Gomez was arrested as an example to others but even he was eventually released for service in other parts of Portuguese India. The old ration of rice was restored. To replace Galvão the new viceroy appointed Constantino de Sa de Miranda, a soldier who had held the post of captain-major once before in Ceylon. Such a policy of dealing with an army mutiny would have been unthinkable in the time of Azevedo or de Sa.

Perhaps one of the reasons for the leniency was the worsening of relations with Kandy. After the conclusion of peace there had appeared divisions among the three princes. Kumarasinha and Vijayapala, the two sons of Vimaladharma Suriya united against Rajasinha and his father Senerat. Before they could take any action however Kumarasinha died in mid 1634. While the prince of Matale stood irresolute, Rajasinha seized

(152) TT.LM.40.f.31; TT.LM.39.f.31; TT.LM.37.f.423;
TT.LM.42.ff.66-66v; Assentos II.52

(153) TT.LM.39.f.31; TT.LM.40.f.31; TT.LM.31.f.251;
TT.LM.35.f.29; Assentos II. 54

(154) Diario do 3 conde de Linhares vice-rei da India, 145.

(155)
 Kumarasinha's principality of Uva. Some of the men of Uva
 apparently preferred Vijayapala for they killed the disava
 sent by Rajasinha and fled to Batticaloa. The captain of
 Batticaloa, Pero Soares de Brito promptly gave them refuge. (156)
 The Portuguese had in fact even earlier been encouraging
 dissension within Kandy and Rajasinha was aware of the exchange
 of friendly correspondence between Vijayapala and the Portuguese
 even before this overt action of de Brito. These factors led (157)
 Rajasinha to seek foreign aid to expel the Portuguese from
 the island. A policy of encouraging dissension within Kandy
 had proved incompatible with a policy of peace with that
 kingdom. The Portuguese noticed that the king of Kandy had
 become hostile. He omitted^t to send the customary messenger
 to welcome the new captain-general, Dom Jorge de Almeida in
 April 1635. Nevertheless, due to the death of King Senerat (158)
 in mid 1635 Rajasinha was in no position to interfere with
 the affairs of the Portuguese. (159)

When de Mello arrived in early 1636 he determined to

(155) P.E.Pieris - Prince of Vijayapala of Matale, 17

(156) JCERAS XVIII, 170; Baldaeus 97; TT.LM.34.f.9;
 Filmoteca LM.19D. 41-43/1-5

(157) P.E.Pieris- Prince Vijayapala of Matale, 29-33; Assentos II.52;
 TT.LM.31.f.251; TT.LM.35.f.29

(158) TT.LM.34.ff.9-9v

(159) TT.LM.31.f.251; TT.LM.35.f.29

to take vigorous measures to strengthen Portuguese power in Ceylon. Realising that discontent among their Sinhalese subjects could be a dangerous threat to the security of Portuguese possessions he encouraged them to put forward their grievances. The result was a giant petition presented in December 1636⁽¹⁶⁰⁾. The remedial measures taken by de Mello after consultation with the junta and proclaimed on 28 March 1637 removed some of the worst elements of oppression. For instance a Sinhalese could no longer be forced to pay for arecanut due according to the tombo if the total produce of his garden fell short of this amount. After paying dues the Sinhalese were allowed to sell their surplus products freely. Portuguese and Sinhalese landowners were forbidden to live in the villages they held, for this compelled the inhabitants to feed them.⁽¹⁶¹⁾ Yet de Mello's reforms fell far short of his own ideal that the conquest of Ceylon must be founded on justice⁽¹⁶²⁾ and reason. The reason for this is not difficult to see.

(160) TT.LM.31.f.251; TT.LM.35.f.29

(161) Queyroz 1020-1022

Queyroz is our only source on this petition which he states was put forward by the lascarins and by headmen and other local leaders. He provided a long list of grievances voiced for which the reader is referred to Queyroz. The measures adopted regarding arecanut had already been advocated in the viceroy's regimento to Antonio da Fonseca Ozouro on his appointment as vedor on 13 September 1636.

Goa Regimentos e instruccoes, III. 2-3

(162) Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei da India, 66

Portuguese power in Ceylon ultimately depended on the army and the casados. They were the two elements no general could afford to alienate. ⁽¹⁶³⁾ Thus natives were forbidden ~~to~~ travel ⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ in palanquins but not the Portuguese. Similarly reforms which could hurt the exchequer were not considered. Thus though the price at which arecanuts had to be supplied to the vedor was raised to five xerafins an amuna, the compulsory purchase of arecanut was retained as government policy. ⁽¹⁶⁵⁾

De Mello also continued the work of repairing ~~the~~ and rebuilding the forts. Repairs to the walls of Colombo went on. The work of rebuilding Malwana begun by de Almeida was continued under de Mello. The new viceroy, Pero da Silva encouraged him in the policy and also instructed him to see to repairing the fort of Mannar. In Jaffna Lopo Gomes de Abreu was entrusted with the rebuilding of a part of the walls of Jaffna fort. ⁽¹⁶⁶⁾

Diogo de Mello had been instructed by the viceroy to take no steps which might precipitate war. Pero da Silva agreed with the policy followed by the conde de Linhares in as much

(163) Dom Jorge de Almeida did so at his cost.

(164) Queyroz 1017

(165) Goa regimentos e instruccoes, III. ff. 2-8

An amuna was equivalent to 24,000 -25,000 arecanuts in the sixteenth century. The Portuguese demanded up to 33% more nuts for an amuna in the 1630's.

(166) TT.LM.37.f.410 The finances for these works were available as the king in response to de Mello's letters of 1634 had instructed that all revenues from cinnamon and elephants be used to provision and supply the forts of Ceylon.

as he considered the Dutch to be the primary enemy and the re-fortification of the coastal ports the first priority.⁽¹⁶⁷⁾

Diogo de Mello adhered to these instructions for a time. In fact when he received a letter in March 1637 from the queens⁽¹⁶⁸⁾ of Kandy offering to come over to the Portuguese side, he replied in a non-committal fashion and referred the whole matter to⁽¹⁶⁹⁾ Goa.

Eight months later the whole picture had changed. In the first place a personal dispute had arisen between Rajasinha and de Mello. According to Ribeiro this followed from the seizure of an elephant gifted by Rajasinha to a Portuguese and consequent retaliation by the king, who confiscated two⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ horses belonging to the captain-general. Queyroz states that the dispute arose because of the seizure of some jewellery⁽¹⁷¹⁾ which de Mello had sent for sale to Kandy. Both maintained that this was the immediate cause of the invasion of Kandy in 1638.

Thus personal motive however could not have been as⁽¹⁷²⁾ important as has hitherto been made out. The letters of the

(167) TT, LM. 37.f. 423

(168) The widowed queen of Senerat and the queen of Rajasinha.

(169) TT, LM. 40. ff. 31v, 94v, 285; Assentos II. 174-175

(170) ~~Queyroz~~ Ribeiro 231-235

(171) Queyroz 801

(172) P.E. Pieris- Ceylon II, 203-204

Professor K.W. Goonewardane correctly points out that the dispute must have occurred before 21 November 1637 and not after as Pieris makes it to be.

camara of Colomboto Diogo de Mello before his invasion of Kandy and to the viceroy after it, make no mention of de Mello's individual animosity towards Rajasinha. From Rajasinha's point of view he did not need personal enmity to be hostile to de Mello for de Mello's action in giving continued protection to the rebels who fled to Batticaloa, was reason enough for that.

About this time there was also a change of policy in Goa. In March 1637, even before the news of the offer of the queens of Kandy reached Goa, despite opposition from some members of his council, the ^{viceroy} swung around to the view expressed by de Mello since 1634 - that despite the peace treaty the Portuguese should be ready for war at any time and should seize any favourable opportunity to conquer Kandy.

More significant, in 1637 for the first time de Mello obtained permission to use the enormous revenue that cinnamon now annually provided, to strengthen the defences in Ceylon. De Mello's arguments against the policy of conde de Linhares in reducing the defence expenses to a minimum as expressed

(173) TT.LM.43.ff.105-108

(174) Baldaeus, 97

(175) TT.LM.43.ff.94v,285

in letters written during 1634 in his first term of office in Ceylon, had won the day in Lisbon. The king in a letter dated 28 January 1636 ordered that Ceylon's revenues should be used to provide Ceylon's needs. The revenues could be used for other areas only if a surplus occurred. This reversal of the policy of the conde de Linhares was discussed and approved in the conselho do estado at Goa on 4 March 1637.⁽¹⁷⁶⁾

Nevertheless even if none of these events had occurred it is quite likely that war would still have broken out in late 1637, for on 27 October 1637 a Dutch ship appeared off Batticaloa. This was in response to an appeal for aid by Rajasinha in September 1636.⁽¹⁷⁷⁾ The Dutch envoys landed at Kalmunai and sent messages to the king. Eventually they were led to Pangaragama, a village near the Mahaveli where they negotiated with Rajasinha and his ministers from 19 to 26 November. After this they departed for their ships accompanied by three Sinhalese officials to discuss the final terms with the Dutch commander.⁽¹⁷⁸⁾

(176) Assentos II. 161-162; Coimbra 460. ff. 228-230

The letter written on behalf of the king embodied the recommendations made by the conselho da fazenda on 24 November 1635.

(177) TT.LM.43. ff. 176-178; P.E. Pieris- Ceylon II, 201-202; Mahahatana, stanza 116;

Kirimatiyawe names the envoy as Galtembuwe Mantree. Manual Pinto, captain of Batticaloa in a letter to de Mello says that the Dutch came at the request of Acidappa Chetim. Valentyn states that the messenger was a brahmin - viz. translation in the Orientalist IV. 53. The version of Kirimatiyawe receives further support from the Matale Kadayimpota published in pages 103-105 of D.D. Ranasinghe's Purawaritha. For the Dutch point of view on these negotiations (Contd.,)

Diogo de Mello heard of the arrival of the Dutch on 18 November. The following day he proposed to the captain of Colombo and the officials of the camara that the Portuguese should declare war and invade Kandy. He was advised to await more definite news of the king's activities. (179) De Mello complied partly because his forces were inadequate and partly because the weather was inclement. Confirmation of the negotiations of the king of Kandy with the Dutch was not long in coming; Fr. Frei Christavão de Madre de Deus, a priest resident in Kandy sent an urgent message that a combined Kandyan-Dutch attack on Colombo should be expected shortly. A trader-spy Chettynagar swore to the captain-general that the Maravas of south India led by the Nayak of Madura were also being invited to join the alliance. Their adherence seemed more than likely for they had attacked Mannar unsuccessfully (180) in March 1636. De Mello also received letters from Baerent Pessaert, president of the Danes in the east warning him of a Dutch (181) attack.

De Mello sent Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo as a personal

(177) Contd. see K.W.Goonewardane, 14-16

(178) P.E.Pieris - Ceylon II. 202-203; Baldaeus 92-93

(179) TT.LM.43.ff.188-189

(180) TT.LM.43.ff.179-180; AHO 501.f.155

(181) Danvers - Report on the Portuguese archives, 134,152

In 1637 the Danes offered to aid the Portuguese in exchange for trading rights in cinnamon, arecanut and elephants. This offer was rejected by the Portuguese but renewed again by the Danes in 1638. Pessaert, a former VOC employee was bitterly hostile towards the Dutch. (JCBRAS XVIII,253)

emissary to the viceroy asking for aid. In the meantime he opened hostilities by sending his nephew Fernão de Mendonça with fifty Portuguese and five hundred lascarins to attack a Kandyan supply depot at Magama. De Mello had his own problems with the army. The indiscipline which had grown in the time of de Almeida had not yet been suppressed. There were reports a mutiny in Mannar, where the garrison encouraged by two priests, drove out the captain Miguel de Almeida de Sampayo out of the fort.⁽¹⁸²⁾ The garrison of Batticaloa refused to accept Manual Pessoa de Carvalho as their new captain in 1637, as he had not brought forces to relieve those Portuguese who had completed their period of service in the fort.⁽¹⁸³⁾ De Mello himself had disagreements with Constantino de Sa de Miranda, his new captain-major-of-the-field. By the end of 1637 however, this last problem had been settled by the return of de Miranda to Goa and the appointment of Damião Botado in his place.⁽¹⁸⁴⁾

By early 1638 reinforcements had arrived from Goa. Two ships under Gaspar de Araujo and four more under Miguel Rangel de Castelbranco arrived, bringing two hundred men in all.

(182) The two priests were a Franciscan Fr. Jeronimo Nossa Senhora and a Dominican Fr. Domingos Beltrao.

(183) TT.LM.43.f.176v; TT.LM.40.f.94

(184) TT.LM.40.f.95; Assentos II. 198-201,228

Further aid was expected from Cochin. In February 1638 six ships led by Gonçalo de Souza Chichorro together with two more under Antonio Soares da Guerra and two other merchant⁽¹⁸⁵⁾ ships called at Colombo on their way from Malacca to Goa. On 18 February de Mello invited the leaders of the squadrons to the house of the captain of Colombo, Francisco Barbosa da Andrade, and in the presence of the new vedor, Antonio da Fonseca Ozouro⁽¹⁸⁶⁾ and the ouvidor, Joao Nogueira Coelho and many other fidalgos, asked them to remain in Ceylon that winter and help to defend it. He also pointed out that if the ships proceeded to India they might well encounter the Dutch fleet returning from the blockade of Goa. It was decided that the information as to the state of Malacca which was brought by Chichorro should be sent by a messenger to Goa. The Dutch prisoners aboard the fleet were to be sent in the cinnamon vessels.⁽¹⁸⁷⁾

At this stage ^{there}~~there~~ arose two views among the Portuguese as to what course of action would best serve the interests of the state. The vedor, ouvidor, captain of Colombo and the members of the camara considered it best to remain on the defensive. They argued that the Sinhalese of Kotte could rebel

(185) TT.LM.41.ff.7v-8; TT.LM.43.ff.17-18

(186) Ozouro was sent as vedor in 1637 to replace Amaro Roiz who was recalled to Goa.

(187) TT.LM.43.ff.181-181v

at any moment and that if they did so the supply line to any force attacking Kandy would be cut off. Moreover, many of the troops newly arrived were still too inexperienced for use in a full scale campaign in Ceylon. Finally they argued that while an invading army was in Kandy the Dutch might well attack Colombo. They therefore recommended that the captain-general should merely make a demonstration of force by marching up to Menikkadawara. This view would have been strongly supported by the casados who feared to lose all in one attack, and had the backing of men of experience such as Francisco de Brito de Almeida.⁽¹⁸⁸⁾

Diogo de Mello and his captain-major advocated the bolder though riskier policy of invading Kandy. They argued that the best chance of victory lay in fighting and defeating the king of Kandy before Dutch aid reached him. De Mello pointed out that the Dutch would not attack Colombo without support on the landward side. He assured the camara that the city was safe.⁽¹⁸⁹⁾ De Mello's resolve to strike soon must have been strengthened by the fact that he knew the men from Malacca would leave in a few month's time. The viceroy's council was

(188) TT.LM.43.ff.17-18v,187; TT.LM.41.f.7v

(189) TT.LM.43.f.188

also divided into those who advocated defensive measures against the Dutch in Colombo and Galle and those who urged the fortification of Balane and the conquest of Kandy. The viceroy urged the fortification of Colombo and Galle and asked de Mello to consult others on the advisability of fortifying Balane. His views however had little effect for his instructions of 5 March 1638 and 6 May 1638 arrived only after de Mello (190) had left for Kandy.

Learning of the Portuguese preparations to invade Kandy, Rajasinha sent envoys to the captain-general and the camara of Colombo admitting his dealings with the Dutch but laying the blame for his action on the Portuguese themselves and asking for peace. It is impossible to determine whether this was merely delaying tactic but it is likely that it was so. De Mello however determined to go through with the invasion and was undeterred when the king sent an Augustinian to request peace once more. De Mello also had hopes of enticing Vijayapala (191) to the Portuguese side.

In fact the whole campaign turned on the attitude of Vijayapala. Whatever de Mello may have hoped to achieve, he

(190) TT.LM.41.f.8v; TT.LM.43.f.18; Assentos II. 230-232
 (191) Queyroz 802-803

could not really have expected to conquer Kandy with a force of only seven hundred Portuguese, three hundred Kaffirs, two hundred Canarese and five hundred lascarins aided by a regiment ⁽¹⁹²⁾ topazes. None of his four disavas had previously served in an active campaign in Ceylon. Moreover having recruited all available Portuguese soldiers, he had to leave the defence of the inland forts to the sailors of the fleets. He knew that he had no reserve left.

De Mello left Attapitiya on 26 March 1638 and reached Kandy next day without meeting with any resistance. The city was burnt and the Portuguese began to withdraw. At this moment Rajasinha struck. The way back to Balane was obstructed and the Portuguese were forced to camp for the night for the near the banks of Mahaveli. Having first prevented them from crossing the river, the Sinhalese then moved in at nightfall and beat off all detachments sent out to bring supplies of water. The following day 28 March 1638, Rajasinha ignoring ⁽¹⁹³⁾ a plea for peace brought in forces amounting to fifteen

(192) Queyroz 802-803; TT.LM.41.f.8v; TT.LM.43.f.18; BM.Ad.MSS.41966, f.66 Queyroz mentions nine hundred Portuguese, all other sources mention seven hundred. Rajavaliya, 102 estimates de Mello's forces at nine thousand men in all.

(193) Ribeiro 236-237 says that de Mello sent de Mendonça with an offer of peace on the basis of a return to the status quo if allowed to return to Colombo and that Rajasinha handed him over to Vijayapala. Baldaeus 94 says that de Mello sent two priests to offer terms. The former account is unlikely to be true as each brother kept his own captives and Queyroz 805 states that de Mendonça was wounded and escaped death with the aid of Vijayapala.

(194)
 thousand Sinhalese reinforced by a thousand men of Madnra.
 Vijayapala remained loyal to him and the Portuguese were
 surrounded. A shower of rain just before battle reduced the
 effectiveness of their fire arms. The Sinhalese by a well
 directed attack seized the Portuguese baggage train and cut
 their army in two. The Portuguese attempted to reform but
 the lascarins who had by now lost all hope deserted. The
 Portuguese were then completely defeated and de Mello and
 (195)
 Botado both killed.

Militarily the battle of Gannoruwa was a greater disaster
 to the Portuguese than even the battle of Randeniwela. It
 weakened them at a moment when they needed all their strength.
 Moreover unlike events in 1630 when the Portuguese army had to
 be lured a long distance away from their land, in 1638 they
 were annihilated within a dozen miles of the frontier. A further
 contrast between the two battles stands out clearly. In 1630,
 Senerat was intent on capturing alive as many Portuguese as
 possible with a view to a future settlement. In 1638, Rajasinja
 had already burnt his boats, and so while there were two
 hundred Portuguese prisoners at Randeniwela only thirty three

(194) JCBRAS (new series) V.163

(195) Queyroz 804-805; Baldaeus 94-95; Ribeiro 236-237;
Rajavaliya 101-102; TT.LM.43.f.185;

Of the expeditionary force over two thousand and five
 hundred were killed.

(196)

Portuguese were spared at Gannoruwa. This meant that the Portuguese losses at the latter engagement was almost double those at the former.

The significance of Gannoruwa could be exaggerated.

P.E.Pieris implies that the battle saved Kandy and its people
(197)

from the Portuguese. This was hardly the case for though the campaign of 1638 was fought on Kandyan soil the battle itself was forced by Rajasinha in an attempt to destroy the Portuguese army. Even had de Mello won he would merely have saved the Portuguese army. Nevertheless the Kandyan victory showed that the balance of power in Ceylon had altered somewhat since the days of de Azevedo and de Sa. For the first time since the days of Rajasinha of Sitawaka, a Portuguese army had been defeated in the field before the desertion of the lascarins. In the wider context of the Kandyan-Dutch alliance Gannoruwa thus means the beginning of the end of Portuguese dominance in Ceylon.

(196) Ribeiro 237; estimates the number of prisoners as thirty three; Baldaeus 95 as seventy and Queyroz 805 as one hundred.
(197) P.E.Pieris - Ceylon II. 212

CHAPTER V

During the twenty one years from 1617 to 1628, the administrative structure of Kotte remained, in the main, that which had crystallized under the direction of Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo in the early years of the seventeenth century. The basis of this structure was the old Sinhalese administrative organization modified and altered to suit the needs of the conquerors.

The system thus evolved had been adequately discussed
(1) elsewhere. However a short account of this system seems a necessary prelude to a discussion of what further changes it underwent during the period under consideration. The Portuguese domains in Kotte were divided into four disavas or provinces each administered by an official also known as the disava. The province or disava was in turn divided into smaller territorial units called korales. Each korale was placed in charge of an officer named the korale vidane who had a number of officers to aid him. Some of these officials like the mohottalas and the kanakapulle were concerned with the keeping of accounts and records, others like the headmen were executive

(1) T. Abeyasinghe 69-74

The contents of the next paragraphs unless otherwise indicated are drawn from Dr. Abeyasinghe's work.

officials who carried out the orders of their korale vidane or disava. The disava himself had immense power. He appointed (2) all subordinate officers within the province. Up to 1614 much of the land allotment was done by the disavas. He also led the provincial lascarins in war and had judicial powers within his province. The korale vidane, besides having a more restricted authority was in charge of a smaller area and had no military powers.

In addition to the ter^Yritorial divisions, under officials whose functions were mainly political or military, there were other departments, concerned with the collection of revenues or utilization of labour services. These departments were not (3) divided geographically but by function, covering as they did the relations of the state with members of particular castes or crafts throughout the island. These departments necessarily interpenetrated the ter^Yritorial administration. They were usually organized under vidanas, assisted by mohottalas and kanakapulles.

Under the captain-generalship of Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo there had occurred two important changes in the Sinhalese system.

(2) S.G.Perera (trans.,) The tombo of the Two Korales, 30/ records the appointment of a gamea (gamaya in Sinhalese) or headman by disava Dom Constantino Barreto.

(3) The organization for the administration of Bulatgama was an exception.

Firstly the Sinhalese in the higher posts tended to be replaced by Portuguese. Secondly there was a relaxation of central control over the disavas resulting in a substantial increase in their power. During the quarter century that followed Azevedo's departure from Ceylon the trend regarding the change of personnel in the higher reaches of the administrative system continued unabated. The last Sinhalese to hold the post of disava was Dom Constantino Barretto in 1621. Thenceforth it became a matter of policy to appoint only Portuguese to this key post. (4) The other notable change, the increase in the power of the higher administrative officials was recognised as an evil and efforts were made to curtail it. One of the powers gained by the disavas in the early years of Portuguese rule was that of granting lands within their province. During the time of Azevedo apart from a few grants by the captain-general himself all grants of service lands to the Ceylonese were made by these disavas. (5) The establishment of a junta made up of the captain-general, the vedor and the captain of Colombo or the bishop of Cochin, in 1614 could in a sense ~~be~~ be viewed

(4) Dom Constantino Barretto was succeeded as disava of Matara by Joaõ de Freitas. Evora CXVI/2-3.f.67-67v; AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635; Filmoteca LM.15.38/2-3; S.G.Perera(trans.,) The tombo of the Two Korales, 5
 (5) T.Abeyasinghe 110-111

as an attempt to curtail this power of the disavas for the junta was expected to be the sole source of revenue grants in the years to come. However it is clear that the disavas did not lose all rights to grant land. When Miguel Pereira Ravasco made the tombo of the Two Korales in 1622 he recorded fifteen of the twenty eight of the Ihala Pattu of the Meda Korale as having been granted by the disava, only one by the captain-general and none by the junta. The Two Korales however may have been exceptional in that it was a land recently subjugated and not included in Vaz Freire's tombo, for it is known that the junta was active in making land grants as early as 1614. Nevertheless it is difficult to escape the conclusion that ^{to} the disavas continued/have a hand in land grants especially as Vaz Freire's tombo had inadvertantly omitted a number of smaller villages and thus deprived the junta of information regarding them. However by the 1620's the power of the disavas to grant land seems to have been limited by the activities
(6)
of the junta.

The disavas had also increased their judicial powers during the early years of Portuguese rule. For instance ~~they~~ they acquired the right to sentence people to death. In his

(6) S.G.Perera (trans.,) The tombo of the Two Korales, 4-32; AHU Caixa 4, 18.1.1615

first term of office, Constantino de Sa attempted to reverse this trend by transferring the judicial powers of the disavas to Portuguese judges each of whom was to be in charge of about ten korales. The scheme was abandoned due to opposition from the king who, probably influenced by reports of the disturbances of 1616-1620, forbade any radical alteration (7) in the existing administrative system. Despite this, the extensive powers of the disavas induced the Portuguese to look for further means of reducing their powers. The plan advanced by Lançarote de Seixas in 1625 was perhaps the most radical of these. De Seixas proposed that the post of disava be abolished altogether and the four disavas replaced by ten or twelve other officials each in charge of two or three korales. Whereas the disavas had been granted lands for their ~~subsistence~~ subsistence, these new officials were to be paid servants of the state receiving cash salaries, and were to be entrusted with judicial and administrative duties as well (8) as those of revenue collection. This plan never bore fruit, owing to the reluctance of the Portuguese in Lisbon and Goa to risk rebellion by innovations.

(7) TT.LM.16.f.802

(8) Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.225-226

In one respect however the power and authority of the disavas did suffer a decline in the first four decades of the seventeenth century. This was a direct corollary of the replacement of Sinhalese by Portuguese officers. The Sinhalese disavas of Kotte like Dom Constantino Barretto and Simão Correa had inspired feelings of personal loyalty among the lascarin troops of their provinces. By the 1620's and 1630's however the policy of appointing Portuguese alone to these posts led to lascarin loyalty being transferred to the most senior Sinhalese official, the mudaliyar. Thus in 1630 the lascarins of Matara preferred to follow Dom Theodosio or Kattota Rala rather than their disava Domingos Carvalho Cam. When Dom Theodosio returned to Portuguese allegiance his lascarins followed suit. Nevertheless it was only on rare occasions that the Sinhalese mudaliyars dared to challenge the authority of the Portuguese disavas and on the whole in 1638 the disavas had little less power than in 1617. However the exclusive appointment of Portuguese to this post ^{reduced} ~~eliminated~~ the political dangers likely to arise from the existence of over mighty subjects.

To assure themselves of political control over Kotte

the Portuguese conquerors had created new posts which were incorporated into the Kotte administration. The most important of these were those of captain-general of Ceylon, vedor da fazenda or controller of revenue, ouvidor or the crown judge and the factor. Of the occupants of these posts the captain-general was undoubtedly the most powerful. In theory his appointment and dismissal was a prerogative of the king of (10) Portugal. In practice the slow communications between Goa and Lisbon often allowed and sometimes forced the viceroy to take the task on himself; thus only one of the four captains-generals of the period was directly appointed by the king. However the authorities in Lisbon kept a strict supervision over the viceroy's actions for whenever a captain-general was removed from office without convincing reasons (11) prompt orders were sent for his reinstatement.

The captain-general once appointed was subordinate (12) to the viceroy of India and had to obey his orders. However

(10) Such appointments were to be made by the king on the recommendation of the conselho da fazenda, a body which dealt with political and economic affairs related to Portuguese colonies. The appointment of Don Nuno Alvares Pereira in 1615 and the need to delegate authority to choose his successor in 1618 shows clearly that the appointment was one to which the viceroy had no claim of right.

(11) Two such instances occur in this period: the dismissal of Constantino de Sa in 1621 and that of Diogo de Mello de Castro in 1635. (see above chapters II and IV) In the case of the removal of Francisco de Menezes Roxo in 1614 however the conselho da fazenda apparently accepted that it was a desirable measure.

(12) Diogo de Mello de Castro was removed from office in 1635 on the grounds of disobedience to the viceroy.

he had the right of direct communication with the king of Portugal, though the fact that the vedor da fazenda or the controller of revenue , the captain-major of Jaffna and the camara or the municipal council of Colombo had the same privilege somewhat reduced its value. The relationship between the captain-general and the viceroy depended largely on the personality of the individuals who occupied the respective posts but generally the captain-general's opinion if not always accepted was held in high regard, if only for the fact that he was the man on the spot.

Within the island, the captain-general had wide powers and was not obliged to consult anyone in the exercise of these
(13)
powers. On occasion however he consulted a council chosen by himself to advise him on an urgent problem. This step is known to have been taken in 1617 and again in 1638. As the name of his office indicates he was the supreme commander of all the armed forces in the kingdom. He could declare war and
(14)
make peace. He was also the head of the civil administration and till 1630 had the power to mint coins. The captains of

(13) Evora CXVI/2-3.f.67

(14) The king on 2 January 1607 held that the generals of Ceylon had no right to declare war - only to act in self-defence.

However as events proved the distinction was difficult to draw.

TT.LM.2.f.45

the Portuguese forts as well as the disavas or rulers of provinces in Kotte were all responsible to him. The missionary clergy looked to him for support and patronage. Although revenue matters were considered outside his purview, until such time as the island was fully subjugated the captain-general had the right to incur extraordinary expenses on condition that he requisitioned the money from the factor alone, showed the requisitions to the vedor and sent a statement of expenditure (15) to the viceroy. Furthermore, the captain-general had judicial powers and could investigate all crimes, including cases of suspected murder and manslaughter. Though in cases of crimes committed by captains or fidalgos he could only arrest them (16) and send them to the viceroy at Goa for sentence, he was empowered to pass the sentence of death upon other Portuguese (17) and Sinhalese. The captain-general could also authorize the confiscation of all the property of those who plotted or (18) rose against the Portuguese. Moreover with the conquest of Jaffna the area under the captain-general's jurisdiction was greatly extended.

Nevertheless the powers envisaged for the captain-general

(15) T.Abeyasinghe 85-86; Goa C.Pe AS VI.f.345-352

(16) TT.LM.36.f.13v

(17) This power was also possessed by the disavas. T.Abeyasinghe 82

(18) TT.LM.16.f.571; AHU 33.f.21

by the Portuguese authorities in Lisbon fell far short of the powers formerly wielded by the local rulers whose grandeur
 (19) he inherited. The captains of the principal forts of Kotte
 (20) were all nominated by the king of Portugal. Though the disavas or provincial rulers were generally appointed by the captain-general even this office was occasionally granted by the king
 (21) to fidalgos of merit. The highest revenue official, the vedor da fazenda owed no allegiance to the captain-general who moreover had no authority over the appointment and dismissal
 (22) of even the lesser revenue officials. The grant of land and the consideration of other financial matters were entrusted to
 (23) the junta of which the captain-general was but one member. Finally in the sphere of justice the civil jurisdiction of the captain-general had an upper limit of cases involving one hundred mil reis or thirty three and one third xerafins while

(19) T.Abeyasinghe 76

(20) As there was always a waiting list for each post, the captain-general rarely had a chance of making his own nomination. BNL.FG. 1982.ff.125v-126; TT.Chancellarias, Filipe II(Doacoes) livro I.105v; Filipe III. livro 32.f.232v
 The forts in Ceylon to which appointments were made from Lisbon included Colombo, Weligama, Jaffna, Mannar, Galle, Kalutara and Batticaloa.

(21) BNL FG.1982 .f.150 records the grant of the disava of the Seven Korales to Jacinto Rebelo by the king. Queyroz 1044 mentions another instance. However the conde de Linhares, viceroy of India held that the appointment of the disavas was best left to the judgement of the captain-general and that appointments should not be made without consulting him.

TT.LM.27.f.116; Filmoteca LM.14 6/2

(22) T.Abeyasinghe 86; AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635; AHU Caixa 8, 17.1.1624

(23) APO VI 804; Simancas SP 1473.f.278 also see below page 339, 341.

the maximum fine he could impose was fixed at five hundred
(24)
mil reis.

By 1617 however the captain-general had already found ways and means to circumvent some of the restrictions. This was done partly by reviving institutions that had formed part of the Kotte administration in the sixteenth century and had since fallen into abeyance. One such body was the Sinhalese mahanaduwa or high court. The revival of this court enabled Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo and his successors to acquire civil jurisdiction beyond the limits allowed to
(25)
them by the king's ordinances. The captains-general also resorted to extra-legal acts to extend their power. This is best illustrated in the case of land grants. In the regimento issued on 27 February 1608 by the king to Antão Vaz Freire newly appointed as vedor of Ceylon it was specified that once the tombo or land register was completed a junta consisting of the captain-general, the vedor da fazenda and the bishop of Cochin was to be set up. In the absence of any one of these three persons the captain of Colombo was to deputise. The

~~222~~ (24) TT.LM.13.f.13v

(25) T.Abeyasinghe 77

Some Sinhalese institutions were also revived to serve the personal requirements of the captain-general. One such was the post of bhandagarika rala (bandigarrala according to TT.LM.45.f.360v) or treasurer whose function now became the collection of the personal income of the captain-general.

The junta was to fix the quit rents for the villages and grant lands according to the king's instructions. All such grants were subject to confirmation by the king of Portugal. (26) As few village grants were actually confirmed by the king of Portugal, the captains-general throughout this period took advantage of this loop-hole in the law to resume grants made by the junta and grant them provisionally to those whom they wished. The position of the captain-general was further strengthened by an order of the viceroy Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo authorizing the captain-general to resume any lands heeded to sustain or reward the armed forces. Repeated royal instructions forbidding the generals to deprive village holders of their lands apparently had no effect. (27)

During the period 1614-1638 the most important limiting factor on the powers of the captain-general was the presence of the vedor da fazenda. Though the post of vedor da fazenda of Ceylon had existed since 1597, the holder of this post was allowed to exercise little power by the captains-general (28) Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo and Dom Francisco de Menezes Roxo.

(26) APO VI.804-805

(27) TT.LM.12.ff.374,423; TT.LM.16.ff.500,580; TT.LM.45.f.305; TT.LM.35.f.5v; TT.LM.44.f.63; AHU Caixa 7, 4.3.1622; TT.LM.18.f.240v As late as 1622 Jorge de Alberquerque, captain-general of Ceylon granted the village of Panane to a Sinhalese mudaliyar. S.G.Perera trans., The tombo of the Two Korales, 28

The basis of the authority of the vedor was the regimento of Antão Vaz Freire. The functions of this officer could be conveniently divided into five categories. Firstly, he was expected to secure the efficient working of the machinery of revenue collection. It was his duty to seek to maximise royal revenue and to submit proposals to this end to the viceroy and the king. Accordingly he was given the power to appoint and dismiss all minor revenue officials. In 1615 the vedor also received the authority to fine persons up to five hundred cruzados in matters dealing solely with revenue. Secondly, it was his duty to compile a tombo or land register. This aspect of the vedor's functions was closely connected with revenue collection for the tombo was intended to be a record of all the services due and the taxable produce of each village. Thirdly, all normal government expenditure was under the control of the vedor while he had the right to be

(28) T. Abeyasinghe assumes that Antão Vaz Freire, appointed in 1607 was the first vedor. However it is clear from the tombo of Kotte compiled by Jorge Frolim de Almeida in 1597 that de Almeida himself was appointed as vedor da fazenda of the conquest of Ceylon though he may have been allowed less power than Vaz Freire. It is however unlikely that de Almeida remained in Kotte until the arrival of Antão Vaz Freire.

T. Abeyasinghe 89, 129; TT. Manuscritos do Convento da Graça, tomo 6D. ff. 325, 333

(29) AHU Caixa 6, 2.11.1618

(30) AHU Caixa 6, 24.11.1615

notified of all extraordinary expenses requisitioned for by the captain-general. Fourthly, as one of the three members of the junta he had a share in the allocation of the villages and lands to those who had petitioned for them. Finally, he was also instructed to fortify the important (31) ports of Kotte. The conquest of Jaffna in 1619 added further responsibilities to the vedor who was thenceforth expected to supervise the work of the factors of Jaffna and Mannar and also to complete the land register of Jaffna.

In the execution of these functions the vedor was responsible only to the viceroy of India. Indeed Dr. T. Abeyasinghe has pointed out that the regimento of Antão Vaz Freire did (32) not require him even to subordinate himself to the viceroy. However in practice the vedores including Vaz Freire received and obeyed orders from the viceroy. Although in the early stages the post of vedor was usually filled by persons directly nominated by the king, in the 1620's and the 1630's

(31) T. Abeyasinghe 84-85; APO VI 802-808;
 Filmoteca Reis Vizinhas I. 40/2-4
 (32) T. Abeyasinghe 86

the appointment of the vedor became almost exclusively the
 (33)
 task of the viceroy. The viceroy also certainly acquired
 the right to dismiss any vedor who refused to carry out

(33) Antão Vaz Freire was the first vedor appointed by the king of Portugal. On receipt of news that Vaz Freire wished to return to Portugal, the king on 8 January 1617 appointed Paulo da Serra de Moraes to succeed him. De Moraes was unable to come to the East due to sickness and the king thereupon requested the viceroy-in-council to make a choice between Lançarote de Seixas and Pedro de Almeida da Cabral. After de Seixas had been chosen and had served for some time, in 1623 the king nominated Joao Pereira Borracho to succeed him. Borracho died before the orders reached India. (DR IV.221, DR V.106; TT.LM.17.f.83; TT.LM.20.f.269; TT.LM.37.f.425; TT.LM.40.f.94; TTLM.41.f.253; AHU 501.f.287v; AHU Caixa 5, 1.2.1618; AHU Caixa 5, 6.1.1618)

The vedores da fazenda of Ceylon 1597-1639 were as follows-

Jorge Froilim de Almeida (1597- ?)

Antao Vaz Freire (1608-1616)

Manoel de Oliveira de Azevedo (1616-1618)

Lançarote de Seixas (1618-1622)

Miguel Pinheiro Ravasco (1622-1623)

Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara (1623-1626)

Constantino de Sa de Noronha (1626-1627)

Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara (1628-1630)

Lançarote de Seixas (1630-1631)

Andre Simoes (1631)

Jorge de Almeida (1631-1633)

Amaro Roiz (1633-1636)

Antonio da Fonseca Ozouro (1636-1638)

Gaspar da Arajo (1638-1639)

Diogo Mendes de Brito (1639-16 ?)

(34)
his orders. Complaints against the vedor were investigated
in the conselho da fazenda or treasury council at Goa, just
as those against the captain-general were discussed in the
viceroy's conselho do estado or council of state. (35)

Indeed the need for a supervisory authority over both
the captain-general and the vedor was enhanced by the
continual conflicts that occurred between the two officials.
These conflicts were chiefly the result of the lack of precision
in the differentiation^{er} of their functions and respective spheres
of jurisdiction. For example it was directed that the
vedor should be in charge of all normal expenditure and accordingly
submit annual accounts of revenue and expenses to the viceroy. (36)
However, the right of the captain-general to requisition
funds from the factor for extraordinary expenses made the
vedor's control over expenditure a farce. The situation (37)

(34) Late in 1634 the viceroy conde de Linhares decided to
remove the vedor Amaro Roiz from office for precisely this
reason. Amaro Roiz was able to continue in office only because
the successor nominated by the viceroy, Antonio Pinho da Costa
was reluctant to sacrifice his business and trading interests
to take up residence in Colombo and because the viceroy himself
was replaced by a successor who partially reversed his policies.
The conde de Linhares also removed Ambrosio Freitas da Camara
from the post of vedor in 1630. (See above chapters 3 and 4)

(35) The viceroy's council-of-state (conselho do estado) dealt
with questions of importance to the security of the state.
Its membership usually included the viceroy himself, the
vedor da fazenda of India, the chancellor, the inquisitor, the
arch-bishop of Goa, the captain of Goa and others chosen by
the viceroy. The conselho da fazenda dealt with financial matters
and consisted of revenue officials.

(36) APO VI.1219; TT.LM.13.f.193; TT.LM.17.f.85; TT.LM.16.
f.355; TT.LM.38.f.396v

perhaps difficult to avoid in time of war, continued even in times of peace for since the term 'extraordinary expenses' was not defined, despite the protest of the vedor the captain-general continued to use this loophole in the law (38) to obtain funds for diverse purposes. On the other hand, the vedor could sabotage or at least delay the schemes of the captain-general by pleading lack of funds. This was what Ambrosio de Freitas did in respect of the fortification of Batticaloa and Menikkadawara. In these circumstances the only resource open to the captain-general was to spend his own money and later reclaim it from the royal treasury.

Another example of overlapping jurisdiction was to be seen in respect of the fortification of the ports of Ceylon. The instructions given to Vaz Freire by the king clearly show that the fortification of the ports of Kotte was considered to be a part of the vedor's functions. The captain-general

(37) Luis de Seixas in a report to the conselho da fazenda in Lisbon argued that the vedor could not fulfil his functions as the captain-general held the factor in subservience. Of the factor he states 'que esta tremendo quando fallacem o geral' (AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635)

(38) AHU Caixa 6, 7.11.1618; AHU 210.f.124v;

Both Lançarote de Seixas and Antonio de Fonseca Ozouro are known to have protested against this practice. They suggested controls such as a maximum limit on extraordinary expenses, the enforcement of the general's liability to submit accounts to the viceroy which had hitherto been ignored and a definition of what constituted 'extraordinary expenses'.

naturally resisted this intrusion into the politico-military sphere which he regarded as exclusively his own concern. At ~~not~~ time during the two decades under review did the vedor succeeded in asserting his control over the building of forts. On the other hand he established the right to advise the viceroy on political and military affairs and came to be regarded as a valuable source of critical comment on the politics of the captain-general. This was to prove an irritant to the captain-general especially when, as in the case of Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara, the vedor had views distinctly opposed to those of the captain-general. However the captain-general's protests were of no avail. The regimento issued to Diogo Mendes de Erito on 8 February 1639 not only requested him to give his opinion on the advisability of fortifying Kalutara and on the ~~state~~ state of the fort at Negombo but even instructed him to keep a close check on the work of fortifying Colombo. (39) Yet another instance of overlapping of authority may be found in the divided responsibility for the lascarin forces. The lascarins as soldiers were subject to the captain-general and his subordinates. Yet they were rewarded for their services by land grants. As landholders they were also under the jurisdiction of the vedor.

(39) APO VI. 805; TT.LM.45.ff.363-363v; Filmoteca LM.14.119/1-3

Defects in delimitation of authority alone however would not explain all the clashes between these two ~~authorities~~ important officials. The problem lay partly in the fact that the Portuguese attempted to take over the institutions of Kotte and make only ^{piecemeal} ~~peaceful~~ changes to suit their immediate objectives. Such a policy inevitably led to unforeseen problems which affected the smooth working of the administration. Under the king of Kotte only the king had the authority to make proclamations. The Portuguese took the powers over revenue that belonged to the king and invested them in the vedor but the captain-general insisted on retaining the sole power to make proclamations by issuing the document in ola or palm leaf. The persistent efforts of Amaro Roiz (vedor 1633-1636) failed to convince the viceroy-in-council of the need for any change in procedure and throughout this period the vedor had to depend on the co-operation of the captain-general in (40) issuing new orders regarding revenue.

Nevertheless such problems did not necessarily lead to clashes. As in many other instances in seventeenth century Portuguese Ceylon individuals and personal attitudes mattered a great deal. In 1630 Constantino de Sa de Noronha declared that he was willing to work with anyone except Ambrosio de Fretas

(40) TT.LM.36.ff.11,28,30,32

da Camara. Lançarote de Seixas, twice vedor of Ceylon worked amicably with Constantino de Sa on both occasions but had (41) disputes with both Jorge de Albuquerque and Dom Filipe Mascarenhas. However, an administrative structure which left so much room (42) for disputes^s was clearly in need of reform. The disputes between the two premier officials in Ceylon threatened to bring the administration to a standstill and this was something the (43) Portuguese could ill-afford.

The solution advocated by two of the ablest captains-general of this period - Constantino de Sa and Diogo de Mello was simple though drastic. They proposed the abolition of the post of vedor da fazenda. The captain-general was to take over the duty of general supervision of the collection of revenue and the preparation of accounts of revenue and expenditure. The routine administration of financial affairs^{is} was to be delegated to the factor. Many arguments could be advanced in favour of this solution which had been advocated by the bishop of Cochin as early as 1619. Diogo de Mello pointed out

(41) Filмотека LM.13B.11/3-5; Assentos I.265,53,353; TT.LM.18. f.240v

(42) Constantino de Sa who turned so bitter against Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara in later years had written a letter to the king on 1 December 1623 warmly praising him for good work as vedor. Thus the animosity he later acquired was a product of their relationship in 1624-1625.

(43) TT.LM.24.f.21v; Filмотека LM.21.26/2-4

that to have both a vedor and a captain-general was like having two heads to one body. The concentration of power in the hands of the captain-general, it was held, would lead to greater efficiency. Moreover this measure would save the substantial emoluments paid by the treasury to the vedor. These were the arguments that induced the conde de Vidiguera, viceroy of India to accept Constantino de Sa'a offer to perform the task of vedor as well as captain-general. (44)

The authorities in Lisbon did not agree. The vedor da fazenda was considered not merely as a revenue official but also as a useful check on the powers of the captain-general. The whole of the Portuguese administrative system in the East had been based on this system of 'checks and balance.' The factor, a minor official could not be expected to fulfil this aspect of the vedor's functions. This was why the king refused to agree to proposals to dispense with the vedor. (45)

However it was soon realised that greater co-operation between the vedor and the captain-general was an urgent need. Apart from the viceroy's authority the main instrument used to ensure this co-ordination was the junta. The junta as defined in the instructions of Antão Vaz Freire and as set up in 1614

(44) TT.LM.24.ff.61v-62; BNL FG.1982 f.147,123-123v; AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635; AHU 33.f.22; Ajuda 51-VIII-40. ff.216v,217,221,227; TT.LM.22.f.91v

(45) TT.LM.26.ff.319,335; AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635; AHU Caixa 16, 28.1.1644

was a council consisting of the captain-general, the vedor and the bishop of Cochin or in the absence of anyone of these the captain of Colombo. Its original objective was to define the quit rents to be fixed after the completion of the land register of Kotte and to distribute the villages to persons (46) of merit. In a sense it could be viewed as an attempt to gain for the vedor a hand in the grant of lands which had hitherto been dealt with mainly by the captain-general and his disavas. However by the second decade of the seventeenth century the king of Portugal had already begun considering this body as one which should have much wider functions. Thus on 23 February 1615 for example he wrote to the viceroy requesting that the junta be asked to make inquiries as to how chaleas resident in ~~villages~~ villages held by private persons could be regained (47) for the king's services. Accordingly by the 1620's the junta had become a council of finances as well as a mesa da reparticao or a board of (land) allocation. With the completion of the tombo and allocation of land, all that remained of the junta's original functions was to review petitions for lands that had fallen vacant. It was therefore now reviewed ~~as~~ also as a body

(46) APO VI. 804; T.Abeyasinghe 122

The junta set up on 22 May 1614 was suspended in May 1615 by the viceroy Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo on the grounds that it did not adhere to the king's instructions. Following protests by Antão Vaz Freire it was reinstated on the king's orders a few years later. (AHU Caixa 4, 19.11.1615; AHU Caixa 4, 7.9.1615; TT.LM.12.f.175)

(47) APO VI.1078; T.Abeyasinghe 110

where the vedor and the captain-general could exchange views on problems of finance. In 1619 the king recommended the council to be enlarged to accomodate a Franciscan. The junta continued to function throughout the 1620's and the 1630's during which period it sometimes acted as a judicial body. During the brief periods when the general took over the functions of the vedor, as in 1626-27 and 1631-33, the vedor's place was filled first by an Augustinian Fr. Frey Jacinto de Jesus and then by (48) the veteran soldier Lourenço Teixeira de Macedo. However, continued disputes between the vedor and the captain-general show that the junta too failed to cope with the problem of inter-departmental conflict.

In comparison with those already discussed the post of factor was a minor one. The primary responsibility of the factor lay in the collection of revenue under the overall supervision of the vedor. The factor's functions were confined to the day-to-day administration of revenue matters and the keeping of records as to the amounts received from each local collector while the vedor determined policy decisions relating to revenue. The factor was entrusted with the recording of all regulations sent by the king and the viceroy and those proclaimed by the captain-general. He also had minor judicial powers. Each factor

(48) DR V.1978 358; AHU Caixa 8, 27.1.1625; TT.LM.30.f.284v; TT.LM.24.f.349; TT.LM.12.ff.113, 175-76; TT.LM.22.f.13v; TT.LM.16.f.409; TT.LM.20.f.225; BNL.FG.1983.f.136; APO VI.1185-1186; TT.LM.45.f.355v

served for a three year term. There were two factors in Kotte during this period - the factor of Colombo and the factor of Galle. There had also been a factor in Mannar since the sixteenth century and with the conquest of the Jaffna kingdom another such office was created to deal with revenue collection (49) in Jaffna. Each factor had a writer to assist him.

The only Portuguese official whose functions were exclusively judicial, was the ouvidor or judge. The evidence available

(49) P.E. Pieris - The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 1645, 2,37; Assentos I. 50; Panduronga S.S. Pissurlencar - Regimentos das fortalezas da India, 511; AHU Caixa 5, 29.1.1618; T. Abeyasinghe 89 T. Abeyasinghe points out that the factor of Colombo served as the chief police officer (alcaide mor) and superintendant of works (vedor das obras) and sometimes also as trustee for the property of the dead (provedor dos defunctos). He also served as Juiz de alfandega or chief customs officer.

The following are known to have served as factors of Colombo -

Dom Bras Viera de Moraes 1614-1616

Francisco Quizante 1.11.1619-31.3.1622

Joao da Costa 1.4.1622-31.1.1633

Jorge de Abreu 1.2.1623 -31.5.1626

Francisco Tristao 1.6.1626 -31.3.1629

Thome de Gouvea 1636-1639

The factors of Jaffna included-

Antonio Teneles 10.1619-4.1634

Manoel de Barros 4.1624-4.1625

Fransisco de Mello de Silva early 1630's

does not precisely indicate the extent of his jurisdiction but the regimento issued to the vedor Diogo Mendes de Brito in 1639 indicates that he could not sentence in case of major crimes except with the concurrence of the captain-general. In other settlements of the Portuguese colonial empire the ouvidor's powers were usually restricted to the imposing of fines, corporal punishment and imprisonment for minor officials. However during this period the ouvidor was responsible for the preliminary investigations into all charges after which the major cases were tried by the captain-general and the ouvidor together or sent up to the junta in Ceylon or the relação or high court in Goa. The ouvidor also certified all affidavits, grants and copies of these documents. In 1618 there were two ouvidores in Kotte - the ouvidor of Colombo and the ouvidor of the conquest of Ceylon. On the recommendations of Jeronimo de Brito, a judicial officer (desembargador) was sent from Goa to investigate to complaints in Ceylon, the king in 1620 ordered these two posts
(50) (51)
to be amalgamated. This was done in 1621. In 1617 there was also an ouvidor in Mannar and another such official was appointed

(50) From 1612-1616 the two offices had been held by the same person but the two posts were regarded as distinct ones. The bishop of Cochin also recommended the amalgamation but the authorities in Lisbon had decided on it before the bishop of Cochin reached there. (TT.LM.13.f.253; TT.LM.16.f.571)

(51) The ouvidor of Colombo also held the office of magistrate of the provinces (corregedor da comarca) and the judge of the native people (juiz de jurisdicção da gente da terra). In case of the absence of the ouvidor the most senior alderman of the camara

to Jaffna after the conquest of the kingdom in 1618. By 1638
(52)
there was a separate Portuguese magistrate (juiz) in Galle.

The ouvidor was accountable for his judicial functions only to the high court at Goa. However due to the need for a close working relationship with the captain-general, the ouvidor of Colombo often tended to be subservient to him. This must have placed him in a rather awkward position due to the conflict between the vedor and the captain-general, for the ouvidor was expected to render accounts of fines imposed and collected by him to the vedor and he also received his pay from him. In fact direct conflicts between the vedor and the
(53)
ouvidor are known to have occurred in the early 1620's.

(51) Contd.,

(vereador mais velhos) of Colombo took his place.

Goa C.Pe As VII. ff. 34-36

(52) TT.LM.45.f.355v; AHU Caixa 15, 29, 12, 1643; AHU Caixa, 22, 4.8.1654; TT.LM.16.f.794; C.R.Boxer and C.de Azevedo Fort Jesus and the Portuguese in Mombasa, 1593-1729. 4-44

The foral of Jaffna (1645) indicates that there was a fixed scale of judicial fees (eg. fanams to register a patent, two fanams to make an entry in the tombo and to issue a certificate etc.,) and that the ouvidor in Jaffna had no power to act against revenue collectors (recebedores) except in charges of assault. P.E.Pieris - The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 1645. 2, 38

(53) TT.LM.15.f.191; TT.LM.17.f.59; TT.LM.13.f.253

TT.LM.18.f.240v; Filmoteca Reis Vizinhos I. 11/2

The administration of the newly acquired territories was kept separate from that of Kotte, partly ofcourse due to geographical reasons but partly also as a matter of policy, for the Portuguese had learnt in Kotte that the existing administrative structure could often be made to serve their purposes more or less satisfactorily. The chief Portuguese officer in Jaffna was the captain-major. He was responsible for the defence of the areas under direct Portuguese rule, namely the Jaffna peninsula itself, the adjacent islands and the island of Mannar. In the 1620's the newly constructed forts of Trincomalee and Batticaloa, more accessible from Jaffna than from Kotte, were also placed under his overall supervision. The captain-major of Jaffna was theoretically under the command of the captain-general of Ceylon but, with the exception of Constantino de Sa, no captain-general ever visited Jaffna while in office during the twenty one years from 1617-1638. Moreover the captain-major had the right to communicate directly with the viceroy, and was solely responsible for the grant of villages.

Like the captain-general in Kotte, the captain-major in Jaffna tended ^{to} use local traditions connected with the local royalty to enhance his prestige and position. He moved about

(54) P.E.Pieris - The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 1; Assentos I.50; APO (New ed) IV.Tomo II.Part A. 417
 (55) TT.LM.26.f.291v

the country surrounded by a guard of eighty lascarins and ten Portuguese. The beating of tom-toms announced his approach and like the king of Jaffna he had the service of two shield-bearers (rodeleiros). However the powers of the captain-major like those of the captain-general were restricted in the sphere of revenue. It is true that the first captain-major of Jaffna, Filipe de Oliveira, not merely had the right to appoint revenue officials but was even authorized to complete the land register begun by the vedor Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara. However from the outset the collection of revenue and the disbursement of expenditure was made the responsibility of the factor in Jaffna who worked under the supervision of the vedor of Ceylon. By the early 1630's the administration of Jaffna had been brought completely into line with that of Kotte by the separation of revenue from other aspects of administration. The conde de Linhares, viceroy of India (1629-1635) decreed that revenue officials (recebedores) could henceforth be appointed only by the viceroy of India or the vedor da fazenda of Ceylon and forbade the captain-major to interfere in their work.

Of the working of the lower reaches of the administration in Jaffna little evidence is available. Civil administration continued to be in the hands of the mudaliyars as in the days

(56) P.E.Pieris- The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 1645, 1; AAsentos I.50 TT.LM.45.f.362-363

of the Tamil kings. However the mudaliyars having lost their best lands to the Portuguese were never the power they had been in the late sixteenth century. For revenue purposes the traditional four fold divisions of Valikamam, Vadamarachchi, Tenmaradchi and Pachchilaippalai remained. The islands off the coast were attached to the proximate revenue division on the mainland. The revenue collection itself was done by means of recebedores or collectors who had adigars to aid them. In the 1640's the two province of Vadamarachchi and Pachchilaippalai were placed under a single recebedor. The other provinces had one each. These posts were usually held by Tamil mudaliyars. The land rents of the Portuguese were collected by a separate official called recebedor dos foros. The collectors were paid 1% of the collection they made. They were appointed for life in the ^{early} ~~early~~ years of Portuguese rule but abuses of office soon compelled the Portuguese to limit their tenure to three years. The first captain-major, Filipe de Oliveira had the right to appoint collectors but after him it was decided that either the vedor of Ceylon or the viceroy of India should make these appointments. Like the vidanas of Kotte, the adigars of Jaffna were revenue collectors, not only of territorial areas but of caste groups. They themselves were sometimes assisted by caste headmen called Talaiyars and pattangutties.
(57)

(57) P.E.Pieris - The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 19; S.Navaratnam - Tamils and Ceylon, 167-168; TT.Ms da Liv.731.f.359v; TT.LM.45.ff.362-363

The mainland to the south of the Jaffna peninsula too (58)
 had some revenue officials but except along the coast the
 Portuguese never exercised any real authority in the area
 and were content with collecting tribute from the local chieftains.

As in the decade preceding 1617, in the two decades that
 followed that year ^{the} main constructive work of the Portuguese
 administrative system was the making of the tombos or land
 registers. The urge to make a detailed survey of Ceylon's
 lands and resources was primarily economic. The Portuguese wished
 to obtain the maximum revenue from the lands they had subjugated.
 In consonance with their view of the Sinhalese and Tamils as
 'traidores por natureza' the best means of making sure of
 the maximum revenue seemed to be to build up a detailed knowledge
 of the resources of the country for themselves. However it is
 difficult to resist the conclusion that tombo making had political
 overtones too. One of the difficulties the Portuguese faced
 after conquering lands in Ceylon was their dependence on
 native officials for information. This factor had enabled the
disavas in Kotte and the mudaliyars in Jaffna to increase
 their powers and influence in the early years of Portuguese
 rule. The tombo was thus regarded as a means of checking and
 even reversing this trend. This was most successful in the case

(58) Nallur, Achchuvely, Mallakam, Sanderupay, Araly, Uduppidy
 and Kachchai according to Tamil chronicle Yalpana Vaibhava
Malai. (S. Navaratnam - Tamils and Ceylon, 167-168)

of land grants. In Kotte for instance up to 1614 most lands were granted by the disavas. After 1614 the junta became the chief instrument for the allocation of lands. (59)

By the beginning of our period the making of the tombo had already advanced considerably beyond the early efforts of Jorge Frolim de Almeida. De Almeida's work though called a tombo by the compiler himself was more a foral or record of revenue. Apart from twenty ports and coastal settlements, the only villages entered in de Almeida's work were the royal villages or gabadagam. (60) A little over thirteen years later the second vedor da fazenda of Ceylon had begun a new attempt at a land register. (61) This was a more ambitious venture and aimed at recording not merely the number and names of villages, the extent of cultivable and cultivated land, and the type of crop, but even the average yield per acre, the number of craftsmen in each village and all customary dues owed to the king. The task was a monumental one for existing Sinhalese records had to be translated and the Sinhalese officials of each area consulted. However despite various difficulties Antão Vaz Freire and his writer Balthezar Marinho completed the tombo in twenty two months. The foral or register of royal

(59) T. Abeyasinghe 81-83, 110-111; TT.LM.21.f.141 The captain-general as the dominant voice in the junta retained his control over land grants to a great extent.

(60) TT.Ms da Liv. Tomo 6D ff.325-411

revenues based on the tombo was completed six months later
 (61)
 on 6 July 1615.

Thus at the commencement of the period under consideration there was already a fairly comprehensive account of the available resources of the former kingdom of Kotte. However before long suggestions arose as to how to supplement, revise and even re-make the tombo. One of the disadvantages of the Portuguese tombo was that it became out of date soon after it was recorded. The tombo merely established the situation existing at a particular time. There was no way in which changes in land ownership or in the extent of cultivated land could be inserted and the tombo revised periodically. Moreover in Kotte the rebellion of Nikapitiya (1616-1617) and the campaigns of Mayadunne and Kuruwita Rala (1616-1620) had caused devastation in the inland areas. Thus by the early 1620's the dues fixed for many of the villages had begun to be unrealistic. On the other hand other villages had grown in size and population but the income derived from them by the state had
 (62)
 remained static.

Moreover, the Portuguese were now getting to know the

(61) T. Abeyasinghe 127-134; AHU Caixa 4, 28.10/ 1615; AHU Caixa 4, 20.11.1615 In November 1615 Vaz Freire wrote to the king that the tombo completed on 26 January 1615 covered thirty five korales and 4,640 villages as well as eleven ports. It was inscribed in four books containing 1,834 folios.
 (62) TT.LM.21.f.171; TT.Collecao de S.Vicente XIX.Doc 276

country better. Vaz Freire's tombo after all had been in many ways a pioneer effort. With the passage of time it was discovered that many of the small ~~settlements~~ ^{settlements} had been overlooked by the compilers of the tombo and it was soon evident that the revenues of some villages had been greatly underestimated. This was not remarkable as Vaz Freire had not the time to visit each of the small villages scattered all over Kotte. In fact much of the tombo was made in Colombo at the vedor's residence with the help of local Sinhalese officials summoned before the vedor. These officials had much to gain by not disclosing all sources of revenue and the Portuguese often had no means of checking their accounts as the old Sinhalese records had in many cases been destroyed. With the restoration of peace in Kotte in 1620 came an increasing awareness of what had happened and a desire to remedy it by revising the tombo. (63)

Two further reasons for the making of a new tombo were advanced by Constantino de Sa in a letter to the king dated 1 December 1623. The first of these was primarily economic. The foral of Kotte made by Antão Vaz Freire estimated the foros or quit rents due from land at 22,000 xerafins. Of the sum 4,700 xerafins were due from Portuguese landholders, and the rest from Sinhalese, mostly lascarins. These lascarins had

(63) TT.LM.16.ff.238.717; TT.LM.22.f.88; P.E.Pieris - The Ceylon littoral 1593, 6,22,47

originally been paid some sort of stipend and thus like the Portuguese had held lands on condition of paying quit rents. By the end of the second decade of the seventeenth century however the payment to lascarins had been stopped due to reasons of economy. The lascarins therefore maintained that thenceforth they should be ~~relieved~~ of paying dues for their lands which they now held in lieu of pay. De Sa held that the only solution to this dispute was to make a new tombo and resume all lands (64) and regrant them on more favourable terms to the lascarins.

The other reason for advocating a new tombo was primarily military. De Sa believed that in view of the likelihood of renewed warfare with Kandy the lascarins could be used to best advantage by settling them in areas of the Four Korales near Colombo. This, it was felt, would not merely enable the Portuguese to provide security for the families of the lascarins within fortified posts near Colombo but would also secure the communications between Colombo and Malwana along the Kelani valley. This plan could also have provided the Portuguese with a strong force, based centrally and capable of being mobilised easily when necessary. The problem was that the lands near Colombo which could have been allocated to lascarins were already granted to others. De Sa seems to have felt that a new tombo and a general redistribution of lands was the only way to overcome

(64) TT. Collecao de S. Vicente XIX Doc. 276;
AHU Caixa 6, 13.11.1619

this difficulty without undue bitterness and recriminations by those who would be forced to exchange villages in the (65)
Four Korales for those further afield.

De Sa's request for a new tombo in Kotte did not receive sanction from Lisbon. The authorities in Lisbon who had as yet not seen Vaz Freire's work were reluctant to embark on (66)
the expensive task of re-making the whole tombo. So the work of the next two decades in Kotte was one of supplementing Vaz Freire's work by the addition of separate volumes covering areas newly subjugated and villages newly discovered. Thus in 1622 the vedor Miguel Pinheiro Ravasco made a tombo and a foral of the Two Korales covering a hundred and fifty three villages. He was assisted by three of the Sinhalese officials who had assisted in Vaz Freire's work * Dom Jeronimo Basnayaka, Dom (67)
Jeronimo Alagiyawanna and Dom Jeronimo Samaradiwakara. A few years later another vedor Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara made a

(65) TT.Collecao de S.Vicente XIX 276; TT.LM.22.f.88

(66) AHU Caixa 8, 23.1.1625

(67) The tombo of the Two Korales is preserved as manuscript FG 2637 at the Biblioteca Nacional in Lisbon and has been translated into English and published by Fr. S.G.Perera. The tombo covers the whole of the Meda Korale and that part of Kadawatu Korale that belonged to the Portuguese. It also included the villages of the Kandavel Pattu of the Atakalan Korale that were not included in the tombo of Vaz Freire.

tombo of villages discovered since the days of Vaz Freire, which covered another hundred villages. Finally Amaro Roiz (vedor da fazenda 1633-36) added another supplement covering the villages found to be omitted from all former tombos. The regimento issued to the vedor in 1639 requested him to continue (68) this work. Apart from these works it is known that Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara made a foral or list of revenues of all (69) the pagoda villages. All these works were however much smaller (70) in scale than the monumental labours of Vaz Freire.

With the conquest of Jaffna, the need for a tombo in that kingdom became apparent. In this area there were two Portuguese officials responsible for revenue collection - the factor of Mannar and the factor of Jaffna. The factor of Mannar was responsible for the collection of revenues of the pearl fishery, the island of Mannar itself and the tributary payments from the area on the mainland of Ceylon immediately opposite the island. The factor in Jaffna was in charge of collecting the revenue from the Jaffna peninsula and receiving the tribute from the Vanni area. There is no evidence that the factor in Mannar

(68) TT.LM.45.f.304v; TT.LM.45.f.355

(69) TT.LM.21.f.175 Pagoda villages or viharagam and devalagam as they are known in Sinhalese were lands gifted by the king and other persons to the Buddhist and Hindu temples. The king of Portugal had ordered these to be separated from other villages and used for the maintenance of the Catholic missionary effort. TT.Ms da Convento da Graça Tomo 6D.f.332

(70) The tombo of the Two Korales for instance covered only seventy folio leaves.

was in any sense subordinate to the factor in Jaffna. In fact the former had the right (or perhaps the duty) to send reports directly to the viceroy regarding the condition of the local inhabitants and related matters. Both were equally subordinate to the vedor da fazenda of Ceylon. This perhaps explains why the Portuguese sought to make two separate tombos - one for Mannar and Mantota and the other for the Jaffna peninsula (71) proper.

The making of a tombo of the lands of Mannar and Mantota had been advocated as early as 1590's by Matias de Albuquerque, (72) viceroy of India. The work on the tombo however never actually got under way. In June 1620 Lançarote de Seixas, vedor of Ceylon visited Mannar and reorganized the collection of revenue but the (73) lands remained unregistered. Seven years later when Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara was ordered to take up the task, he asked for the power to confiscate lands from those who had usurped possession and also the right to grant such lands to others, arguing that this was the best means of discovering hidden (74) sources of revenue. Amaro Roiz is known to have visited Mannar twice - in March 1635 and August 1636 but on neither occasion did he have time to do much more than issue a series of regulations on the collection of revenue and the disbursement of

(71) P.E. Pieris - The kingdom of Jaffnapatam 1645, 2,37

(72) Panduronga S.S. Pissurlencar - Regimentos das fortalezas da India, 481

(73) AHU 35.f.24

(74) TT.LM.26.f.292v

(75)
expenses.

Probably because its revenues were larger the Jaffna peninsula attracted more attention than Mannar from the Portuguese revenue officers. Barely a few months after the conquest of Jaffna the viceroy's council in Goa agreed that a responsible person should be sent to the area to ascertain its revenues. (76) Accordingly in June 1620 the vedor of Ceylon, de Seixas visited Jaffna, remained there for a few weeks and made a foral or (77) list of dues based on the information given by the local mudaliyars. However due to the disturbed state of the kingdom at the time and the short period of his stay the vedor's list could not have been either detailed or complete.

The primary objective of the Portuguese in Jaffna in the early 1620's was to provide for its defence. For this purpose sufficient revenue to pay the soldados and sufficient land available to attract Portuguese casados were the primary requirements. It is therefore no surprise that the authorities in Goa decided that a tombo and foral to secure these ends were urgent requirements (78) in Jaffna. The king of Portugal had urged the same measure in (79) a letter dated March 1622. It was however not until 1623 that the first positive steps in this direction were taken. In that year the viceroy Dom Francisco da Gama, conde de Vidiguera

(75) TT.LM.41.ff.253-254

(76) Assentos I.113

(77) AHU 35.f.24; TT.LM.18.f.284

(78) TT.LM.15.f.45

(79) TT.LM.26.f.291v

requested the then vedor of Ceylon Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara to visit Jaffna, make a tombo of its lands and ascertain whether the expenses of the garrison, the officials and the missionary priests in Jaffna could be met from the available revenues of the province.

Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara arrived in Jaffna in April 1623. His work however suffered greatly due to disputes which sprang up between him and Filipe de Oliveira, captain-major of Jaffna. De Oliveira who by mid 1623 had had almost four years experience in governing Jaffna seems to have offered much advice that de Freitas was slow to appreciate. Moreover de Oliveira, being by far the most powerful and feared Portuguese official in Jaffna seems to have expected de Freitas to report to him on progress made with the tombo. De Freitas on the other hand held that his obligation was only to report to the viceroy. As vedor he insisted on a guard of lascarins and Portuguese in his travels in the peninsula. Two issues strained the relations between the two officials almost to a breaking point. One was the desire of de Freitas to obtain complete control over the revenue aspects of the administration. This could hardly be achieved while de Oliveira had the right to appoint revenue officials and had the sole power to allocate lands. De Freitas however tried his best by protesting to the viceroy and by sending orders to the factor of Jaffna without consulting the

captain-major. The other issue was the resentment of de Oliveira at the powers given to de Freitas to report on military questions, the number of troops required, the number, size, position and strength of forts necessary and the like. The essential outcome was that while de Oliveira argued that the revenue estimates of the vedor were greatly exaggerated the vedor claimed that de Oliveira had expropriated customary payments due to the king instead of paying them to the treasury. (80)

The viceroy tried to induce a more amiable relationship and on his instructions de Freitas, who had returned to Colombo after a few months in Jaffna made a second visit to the peninsula. However as both de Oliveira and de Freitas remained unyielding the effort ended with each writing to the viceroy refusing to work with the other. Despite these disputes however de Freitas completed a tombo and foral of Jaffna. Almost inevitably there came critical comments from de Oliveira. (81) De Oliveira's chief objection was that de Freitas with a total stay of less than eight months in Jaffna had no understanding of the revenue collection in the area. He argued that the Tamil documents could not be always relied upon, for the warfare of the past decade had caused considerable destruction. In support of this contention he pointed out that during the

(80) TT.LM.26.f.293v; AHU Caixa 9, 20.11.1626

(81) AHU Caixa 8, 26.1.1625; TT.LM.23.f.93

the past few years there had often been a short fall in revenue by two thousand to three thousand cruzados. De Oliveira also held that the commutation of customary payments in goods for fixed payments in cash would lead to hardship among the poorer classes. Finally he claimed that the distribution of burdens (82) done on the advice of the mudaliyars was unjust.

The viceroy recognised the weight of the arguments of one who had ruled Jaffna for five years and decided in view of de Oliveira's excellent record that he himself should be entrusted with the task of revising the tombo. By 20 November 1626 de Oliveira was able to report that the chief province (Waligamam) was already dealt with but it is ^{not} known ~~that~~ how much more work was done before de Oliveira himself died on (83) 22 March 1627. That the revision of the tombo remained incomplete is evident from the fact that on 1 September 1627, just five months after the death of de Oliveira, the viceroy's council at Goa discussed whether to send de Freitas back to Jaffna to work on it. Ambrosio de Freitas however was at this time engaged in a dispute with the captain-general de Sa and had little time to spare. Being reluctant to leave the finances of Kotte in the hands of the factor Francisco Tristão who was proving to be a partisan of de Sa's, de Freitas suggested that instead of the vedor making a journey to Jaffna, the

(82) TT.LM.23.f.213

(83) BNL FG. 1983.f.45; 85-85b; TT.LM.22.ff.11v, 88v, 114, 132; TT.LM.25.f.267; TT.LM.26.f.335

mudaliyars of the northern kingdom be requested to journey to Colombo and Malwana to aid the vedor in the making of the tombo. He suggested that meanwhile Portuguese could be appointed by the vedor to the posts of vidana or adigar to find out more about the revenues. Langarote de Seixas, the new captain-major of Jaffna, agreed to these suggestions but due to the bitter personal dispute that developed between de Sa and de Freitas as well as the outbreak of war with Kandy and the consequent disturbed conditions in Jaffna the work of registering lands and revising the tombo was further postponed. In June 1630 de Freitas, finally removed from office because of his disputes with de Sa, was requested to proceed to Jaffna and complete the tombo, but as he did not remain very long in Jaffna itself, it is unlikely that he completed the process of revising the tombo during this third and final visit of his to the area. (84)

Hardly three years after de Freitas had left the island the newly appointed vedor of Ceylon Amaro Roiz was requested by the viceroy to make a tombo of Jaffna. Certainly, by this time there were very strong reasons for making a new land register. After fifteen years of Portuguese rule much of the land had passed into the hands of the conquerors. The Kandyan invasion of 1628 and the rising of the Tamils that followed had accelerated this development. Moreover the need for detailed information about Jaffna was greater than ever, for

(84) TT.Ms da Liv. 731.f.359v; BNL.FG 1982.ff.147,154v; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.40; Simancas SP 1522.f.20; TT.LM.40.f.345; TT.LM.26.f.290

with the death of Filipe de Oliveira and Lançarote de Seixas there were few Portuguese left with a thorough knowledge of the Jaffna kingdom.

Nevertheless it is possible that one of the reasons for the viceroy's desire to register the lands of Jaffna may have been the destruction of the old tombo by accident or design. No seventeenth century document dated later than 1630 refers to the tombo made by de Freitas. Amaro Roiz in a report dated 30 November 1637 declared that the sources for his land register were the old Tamil ola documents, information received from the local officials and opinions given by Portuguese who knew the area. The report made no reference at all to any previous (85) tombo.

The work on this new tombo was organised methodically by Roiz. Roiz spent the whole of his first visit to Jaffna, lasting seven months from March to October 1635, collecting information for his land register. During his second visit from August 1636 to January 1637, he enlisted the aid of Lopo Gomes de Abreu, the captain-major of Jaffna in the actual making of the register itself.

To Amaro Roiz the tombo was not merely a record that would ensure an accurate estimate of revenues due. It was by reason of its stating exactly what was due and expected from

the village holder, a safeguard against excessive demands upon the subject. Thus his tombo specified not merely the names of the holders of lands, the nature and extent of these lands and the dues owed to the king but the regulations passed by Portuguese authorities on matters relating to revenue.⁽⁸⁶⁾ Roiz intended that this tombo should eventually be translated into Tamil, to be used as a guide by the local revenue collectors.

The tombo itself was made up of six volumes, two of which covered Waligamam. Each of the other three provinces Tenmaratchi, Wadamaratchi and Pachchilappalai were registered in a separate volume. The ~~six~~^{sixth} volume contained a register of lands of all the islands off the Jaffna peninsula. The lands of the Vanni and of Mannar and Mantota were not registered. A foral based on this tombo was also begun by Roiz but was left incomplete. The outbreak of war with Kandy in 1638 and Dutch intervention in Ceylon in the same year delayed the completion of this task till 1645 when the foral of Jaffna was completed under the direction of Dom Filipe Mascarenhas. By this time it had become the duty of the vedor of Ceylon and the factor of Jaffna to keep the tombo up to date.⁽⁸⁷⁾

(86) For instance the regulations regarding the monopoly of elephants were all recorded.

(87) TT.LM.41.ff.253-255; TT.LM.45.f.361v; TT.LM.43.f.91; TT.LM.40.ff.31,95; TT.LM.39.f.31; TT.LM.44.f.230v
The foral of Jaffna is preserved as codice 220 of the Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon. It has been summarized by P.E.Pieris - The kingdom of Jaffnapatam 1645.

To conclude the survey of Portuguese administration in Ceylon two more institutions have to be considered. The camara or municipal council of Colombo and the Portuguese ~~armed~~ *forces*. Although the earliest reference to a municipal council of Colombo occurs in 1580 there are reasons to believe that ~~that~~ camara of Colombo was organized as an effective body even earlier. In fact it is probable that the Portuguese in Colombo formed such an organization not long after the abandonment of Kotte (88) in 1565. In the last two decades of the sixteenth century not only the local monarch Dom João Dharmapala but even officials of the king of Portugal recognised the existence of such a (89) body. However it was not until the direct annexation of Kotte that the Portuguese in Colombo applied for a charter of privileges. Portuguese colonial settlements in the seventeenth century received two types of charters. Larger and more important settlements like Goa obtained the privileges of Lisbon. Smaller settlements like Macao and Cochin were awarded the more limited (90) privileges of Evora. The Portuguese in Colombo aspired only to gain the latter. The provincial grant of these privileges by *the* viceroys Ayres de Saldanha and Affonso de Castro apparently

(88) T. Abeyasinghe 93; Evora C-V/2-2 ff. 216-221

(89) T. Abeyasinghe 94; AHU Caixa 6, 10.11.1618

(90) C. R. Boxer - Portuguese society in the tropics, 5-14, 45

lapsed due to lack of confirmation by the king. The petition of the camara in the 1620's also had no appreciable effect. However in the early 1630's the conde de Linhares, viceroy of India, probably influenced by the sacrifices made by the Portuguese casados in the war against Kandy once more granted the privileges of Evora to Colombo. This grant was finally confirmed by the king in 1641.

No direct evidence exists on the composition of the senate of the council (senado da camara). However from the signatures of the petitions forwarded by the council it appears that there were six regular members apart from the escriv o or writer. It seems reasonable to assume that in Colombo as in Macao these six officials consisted of three vereadores or aldermen elected by the citizens, two juizes ordinarios or magistrates and the procurador or procurator. Elections to the camara were annual and involved a complicated system of ballot and lot. The writer of the camara of Colombo was appointed for life.

Disputes between the camara and the chief administrative

(91) AHU 210.f.257v-258; AHU 211.f.130; TT.LM.18.f.241v
TT.LM.55.f.23

(92) AHU Caixa 10, 7.12.1632; AHU Caixa 5, 22.10.1617;
AHU Caixa 6, 21.11.1618; AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644; TT.LM.43.f.186v;
Filmoteca LM 14.115/1-2; C.R.Boxer - Portuguese society in the tropics -5-7, 45

(93) Filmoteca LM.14 6/2

officials were by no means rare. They were usually the result of the attempt of a vedor to impose some dues on the casados of Colombo or the attempt of the camara itself to spear-head (94) opposition to an unpopular general. However the lack of a charter of privileges crippled the camara. Thus when Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira arrested the officials of the camara and sent them to Goa in 1617 for trial they could only plead for a pardon as they had no legal status and therefore no (95) judicial immunity. Nevertheless the lack of a formal charter did not prevent the camara of Colombo from exercising many of the rights it claimed. The oficiais da camara could and did correspond directly with the king. They collected revenues due from municipal lands and provided public facilities with (96) the funds thus obtained.

During the 1620's and 1630's there was little change in the council's power and influence. Already in 1618 the council had obtained an order from the king specifically forbidding the captain-general to interfere with the administration of the city. In 1623 following representations by Fernão ^{de} Albuquerque and

(94) These factors explain the council's clashed with vedor Vaz Freire and captain-general Manoel Mascarenhas Homem, Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira and Jorge de Albuquerque. There were no recorded disputes in the times of Azevedo or de Sa.
DR III.398; DR IV.46-47,355; APO VI.1147;1218,1220-1221;
TT.LM.16.f.582

(95) TT.Corpo chronologico part I.maco 116 doc.87; ~~Simancas~~ SR.1473 ff.539

(96) TT.LM.18.ff.240v-241v; TT.LM.19.f.24v; TT.LM.12.f.134;
Simancas SP.1473.f.539

The necessities given priority were the making of a storehouse for provisions, a slaughter house for the supply of meat, a new building for the camara and a jail.

his son Jorge de Albuquerque, the governor of India and the captain-general of Ceylon respectively, the king forbade the camara to issue testimonials of merit for services rendered to the crown. However in practice this prohibition seems to have had little effect for such testimonials were issued even as late as 1630. The camara had no statutory duty to advise the captain-general on matters of policy but in times of crisis such as 1617 and 1638 the captain-general invariably (97) consulted the camara to obtain advice and support.

The revenue of the camara was obtained partly by renting some of the ferries across the Kelani river within a few miles of Colombo. In January 1607 Azevedo had granted to the council the revenues from all ferries within the limits of (98) the city. Up to the late 1620's however, only three of the four ferries so granted were handed over to the council as a Portuguese settler Fernão Sanches had successfully asserted his (99) rights to the ferry at Wattala. Apart from this revenue it is possible that the camara gained some income from the rents of municipal property, taxes on non-staple food and fines imposed (100) on those who violated municipal regulations. However, the bulk

(97) T. Abeyasinghe 98; DR IV.355; APO VI.1147; TT.LM.16.ff.118, 582; TT.LM.17.f.12

From the correspondence and records of the membership of the camara it appears likely that it was a body representing the Portuguese settler interests.

(98) T. Abeyasinghe 95-96

(99) TT.LM.21.f.133; Filmoteca LM 12. 1/2-3; TT.LM.24.f.450; AHU Caixa 4, 2.1.1616

(100) C.R. Boxer - Portuguese society in the tropics -10

of its income must have been derived from the right to export forty bahars of cinnamon.

This 'liberty' was one which the Portuguese casados had obtained from the last Sinhalese king of Kotte, Dom João Dharmapala. The original purpose of the grant was that money derived from the sale of cinnamon should be distributed among (101) the poorer settlers. This continued undisturbed under Portuguese rule till 1614. The establishment of the monopoly of the production and sale of cinnamon in that year struck at this lucrative source of revenue for the camara. It was effectively argued that the city's 'liberty' should be abolished as any relaxation of the monopoly of cinnamon would defeat its very purpose - the maximization of royal revenue by control of its supply. The council was therefore compelled to find reasons to justify the continuance of these grants. In response to the petitions of the camara, the king on 14 February 1615 requested that this (102) question be examined by the junta in Ceylon. The recommendations of the junta are not known, but it is clear that despite the monopoly the camara continued to collect and sell forty bahars of cinnamon annually till 1619. In 1619 Lançarote de Seixas, the vedor, forbade this practice on the grounds that it was

(101) T.Abeyasinghe 94, AHU Caixa 6, 10.11.1618

(102) DR II.224; TT.LM.15.f.182; AHU Caixa 7, 11.2.1622; TT.Collecao de S.Vicente XIX doc.144

contrary to the viceregal order enforcing the monopoly of
 (103)
 cinnamon and moreover reduced royal revenue. At this stage
 the city council brought in a new issue. It was pointed out
 that the settlement in Colombo was growing rapidly and was
 still without many basic public facilities. ~~like x jolly~~ As
 the revenues of the camara apart from those derived from
 cinnamon were very small it was held that only the restoration
 of the permission to export forty bahars of the product would
 provide necessary funds. Fernão de Albuquerque, the Portuguese
 governor at Goa still did not favour the request of the
 (104)
camara and it was only after the camara obtained the support
 of his successor the conde de Vidiguera that the king agreed
 (105)
 in January 1624 to restore this 'liberty'. A year later however
 he qualified this grant. On 26 March 1625 he ordered that
 all revenue from this source should in future be used for the
 (106)
 fortification of Colombo. This requirement was adhered throughout
 the next fifteen years, the cinnamon revenue being used to
 (107)
 rebuild walls, cast^{le} artillery and buy arms. In the 1640's

(103) Filмотeca Reis Vizinhos I. 40/5 ; TT.LM.18..ff.240-241

(104) The governor's opposition to the grant was perhaps
 influenced by the camaras vociferous opposition to his
 son's rule in Ceylon. (AHU Caixa 7, 11.2.1622)

(105) TT.LM.18.ff.240-241v; TT.LM.19.f.24v

(106) TT.LM.21.ff.131,159; Simancas SB. 1519.f.25v;
 AHU Caixa 8, 15, 12.1625

(107) Filмотeca LM 19A. 22/2-3

in view of the Dutch threat the grant was increased to one
(108)
hundred bahars of cinnamon a year.

The camara in the 1620's and 1630's appeared to champion the interests of the married Portuguese settlers in the island. This is best seen in the dispute over the payment of customs dues. On 3 October 1584 king Dom João Dharmapala had granted the Portuguese casados and their descendents freedom from the payment of customs dues at Colombo. In 1597 following a request by the casados to confirm this grant the viceroy Dom Francisco da Gama agreed to respect this privilege. However when the camara asked that this privilege be confirmed by the king in 1612, the authorities in Lisbon decided against it. Nevertheless for some unknown reason the king's orders
(109)
were not executed. In the 1620's when the growth of the number of Portuguese settlers began to have increasingly harmful effects on customs revenues in Colombo the issue was revived again. By the end of 1624 the conde de Vidiguera, viceroy of India had instructed the vedor of Ceylon to apply the exemption from customs dues only in the case of casados who had actually helped King Dharmapala. The descendents of these casados were also entitled to this privilege but only if they continued^t

(108) TT.LM.57.f.145

(109) DR III.224; AHU Caixa 4, 2.1.1616; AHU Caixa 3, 20.10.1613
Filmoteca LM 12. 1/2-3

to reside in Colombo. All new settlers thus lost the privilege of exemption from customs dues. This decision was confirmed in an assento or resolution of the conselho da fazenda at (110) Goa on 17 March 1625. When this matter was put before the king in 1627 he laid down two principles that were to guide the settlement of the issue. Firstly, no one was to have complete exemption from customs dues. Secondly, some concession in the form of payment of lower duties might be allowed to those who had hitherto benefited by King Dharmapala's (111) grant. However, no such settlement seems to have been arrived at. During the viceroyalty of the conde de Linhares (1629-1635), the guiding principle remained the assento of 17 March 1625. Meanwhile the camara continued its efforts to secure the grant of this privilege to all Portuguese settlers of Colombo. The council eventually achieved success in the early 1640's. With the arrival of the Dutch in Ceylon it was realised that Portuguese strength in the island had to be maintained at all cost and for this greater inducement to potential settlers was one necessity. This was all the more so

(110) Panduronga S.S.Pissurlencar - Regimentos das fortalezas da India, 510; TT Ms da Convento da Graça, tomo 6D.328-329; BNL.FG 1983.ff 62v-63; Filmoteca LM.19D.101/3-4

(111) AHU 285.f.70 ;; TT.LM.24.f.375

in an age when warfare limited revenue from land. Thus on 5 March 1643 the conselho da fazenda decided that all settlers (112) in Colombo should be allowed exemption from customs dues.

The camara achieved a swifter victory in its efforts to obtain favoured rights for the casados who held garden lands in the environs of Colombo. The rights of the settlers to these lands dated from the days of Azevedo, who, when captain-general, ordered the settlers to take possession of and cultivate the waste lands around the city. By the time Vaz Freire began making his tombo the settlers had held these lands for years without paying any dues. Vaz Freire wished to impose the standard quit rent of 12½ % of revenue on these lands or failing that at least the tax on coconut palms (pol aya). However, as a result of representations made by the council which also held some of these lands in its corporate capacity, orders were sent from Lisbon in the (113) 1620's granting these lands in perpetuity free of all dues.

The last branch of the administration which has to be discussed, the mainstay of Portuguese rule in Ceylon, is the armed forces. Of these forces the naval arm is less well-known, but its role was vital and it will be treated first.

(112) AHU 210.f.257v; TT.LM.52.f.73

(113) T.Abeyasinghe 96-97; AHU 31.ff.197v-198 ; Simancas SP 1473.f.539; DR V.366

While the army secured effective possession of the lands and revenues of Kotte and Jaffna, the Portuguese naval forces ensured that the communications and supply routes to Goa and other parts of the estado da India remained open. At least once within our period - in 1630 - Portuguese naval strength saved them after their army had been disastrously defeated. The role of the navy in Ceylon however, was not confined to conveying supplies and reinforcements and protecting Portuguese trade, important though these functions were. Naval power gave the Portuguese army in Ceylon greater mobility and enabled it to take the enemy unawares. This was best seen in 1630-31 when the Portuguese were confined to a few coastal ports in Kotte. Surprise attacks by sea on unfortified ports and villages held by the Sinhalese not only enabled them to deliver telling blows upon their opponents, but also secured quantities of much needed provisions. (114)

De Sa's relief of Batticaloa in 1628 provided another instance of the use of sea power in campaigns in Ceylon. Finally, naval power enabled the Portuguese to blockade Kandy during years of war and cut off her trade and communications with powers outside the island. Even during years of peace the kings of Kandy did not find communications with the Dutch

(114) AHU Caixa 23, 26.1.1655

an easy task due to Portuguese control of the seas around Ceylon.

The only regular naval force stationed in Ceylon in the first four decades of the seventeenth century was the one used to guard the pearl fishery and blockade the eastern coast in time of war. This fleet was originally stationed at Mannar and numbered only three vessels in the early seventeenth century. ⁽¹¹⁵⁾ Soon after 1605 however, when the Portuguese decided on an intensified economic blockade of Kandy, the number of ~~vessels~~ vessels was increased to six of which three were to ⁽¹¹⁶⁾ remain at Mannar. The two duties of guarding the pearl fishery and of blockading the eastern coast did not clash with each other for the normal period of trading activity in the eastern coast of Ceylon was from March to November while the pearl fishery was usually ^{held} held in February-March. In any event the pearl fishery was not held between 1604 and 1634. In the 1620's this fleet was made more effective by the ~~the~~ availability of two more bases at Trincomalee and Batticaloa. The only other state owned vessel which was based on Ceylon was a river-craft on the Kelani which was used to transport supplies from ⁽¹¹⁷⁾ Colombo to Malwana.

(115) DR I.10; In 1571 however there were ten vessels guarding the pearl fishery. By 1574 the number had fallen to eight.

(Ajuda 51-V-36.f.37; Studia Vol.IV. 264)

(116) DR I. 58-59, 113,138

(117) APO (New ed) Tomo IV. ~~Ruck~~ Vol.II Part I. 385

The potential strength of Portuguese naval power in
(118)
Ceylon however was by no means limited to this fleet.

Many of the casados in Ceylon owned armed vessels ranging from forty to a hundred tons which were used in coastal trade. As at Goa, these vessels were sometimes requisitioned by the Portuguese authorities for use in military expeditions. The expedition to Jaffna in 1619 saw the requisition of two such vessels. De Sa in 1628 no doubt resorted to the same expedient when he arrived at Galle on his way to relieve Batticaloa. One cannot be certain whether the vessels based on Ceylon, state or private owned, used for military or commercial purposes, were actually built in the island or not. Shipbuilding had been carried out in the ports of Kotte in the sixteenth century. In 1614 however, the king of Portugal had decreed that owing to the shortage of wood necessary for the construction of dwellings and the like, the making of vessels over one hundred tons burden in Ceylon was forbidden. The construction of smaller vessels however undoubtedly

(118) The contention that no large ships were based in Ceylon is supported by a letter of the viceroy to the king dated 5 October 1631 which gives the location of the navios do reino. Muscat 22, Diu 11, Armada of the North 24, Goa 10, pepper fleet to Cochin (Malabar fleet) 7, Canara coast (fleet of Cape Camorin) 15, Malacca 10; Ceylon 16. Total 115. The figure of sixteen ships in Ceylon is explained as ten ships of the Malacca fleet and six of the Coromandel which were temporarily in the island helping in war. (TT.LM.29.f.38)

continued, for in the 1620's the viceroy gave serious attention^s to the possibilities of transferring the shipyards of Goa to Ceylon in the interests of economy and of increased
(119)
output.

The ships based on Ceylon were supplemented at various periods by visiting fleets. The most regular of these was the cinnamon fleet^s. In the early years of the seventeenth century a single large vessel had conveyed the cinnamon of Ceylon to Goa. By the 1620's the increasing threat of a Dutch attack had forced the Portuguese to resort to five or six smaller but swifter ^{vessels} ~~vessels~~. The cinnamon fleet of 1632
(120)
consisted of eleven vessels - eight galleys and three pinnaces. This fleet arrived in early October and usually left by the end of the month after unloading supplied and loading the cinnamon. The three Portuguese ^{fleets} off South India - the Malabar fleet, the Coromandel fleet and the fleet of the Cape Camorin
(121)
occasionally called at Jaffna for repairs. The annual China fleet also called at one of the ports of Kotte on its return
(122)
journey to Goa.

(119) Evora CV/2-7.ff.58-69v; DR III.51,61; TT.LM.45.ff.358-358v; Evora CXVI / 2-3.f.68 da

(120) Goa Regimentos e instruccoes, Vol III.f.9; TT.MMs/Liv. 816.ff.257v,260

(121) P.E.Pieris - The kingdom of Jaffnapatam , 11

(122) See chapter II.page 61 .

Though in the twenty one years under consideration Portuguese Ceylon was hardly even in danger of being completely cut off from the rest of Portuguese Asia, challenges to Portuguese supremacy at sea came often. It was a challenge of this kind - by Dom Pedro, a Kunjali corsair - which ~~precipitated~~^{it} precipitated the expedition to Jaffna in 1619.

The arrival of the Danish fleet in 1620 provoked another crisis. Once more however, the Portuguese resources proved adequate to deal with a small isolated ^asquadron. The Dutch ^{though} threat, ~~was~~ slower to develop was more difficult to resist, for the Dutch by 1617 like the Portuguese were a well established power in Asia. In 1619 the Portuguese captain Andre Coelho barely escaped with his life after his ship was ⁽¹²³⁾ sunk in an encounter with the Dutch in the Gulf of Mannar.

By the 1620's with increasing English and Dutch pressure on the Portuguese in the Arabian Sea, the ⁽¹²⁴⁾coasts around Ceylon were becoming unsafe for Portuguese shipping, and the viceroy at Goa was beginning to breathe a sigh of relief every time a Portuguese fleet returned safely home. The loss of the high seas fleet of Nuno Alvares Botelho in 1630 made the position

(123) BM.Add Mss. 28432 f.97

(124) The Dutch factory at Pulicat formed an adequate base for trading and privateering expeditions.

even worse. When the Dutch fleet under Westerwoldt arrived off Ceylon in May 1638 no Portuguese fleet strong enough to challenge him was available.

The army, the Portuguese relied on defend their possessions and even conquer Kandy was a heterogeneous one made up of Sinhalese, Tamils, Canarese, and Kaffirs besides the Portuguese themselves. The core of the armed forces however was a body of seven or eight hundred Portuguese ⁽¹²⁵⁾ soldados or unmarried soldiers. These were organised in companies (estancias) of thirty to thirty eight soldiers each under captains, ensigns (alferes) and sergeants (sargentos). Three hundred and fifty to four hundred of these soldiers were stationed under the captain-major-of-the-field at ⁽¹²⁶⁾ Menikkadawara as a large mobile force. Another one hundred soldiers were stationed at Jaffna fort to repel any attack ⁽¹²⁷⁾ upon that kingdom. The rest were distributed in the forts of Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Kayts, Mannar, Negombo, Colombo, Kalutara, Galle, Menikkadawara, Malwana and Sabaragamuwa. Though the Portuguese dispense^d with the use of armour due to the climate and the terrain, they were well armed with muskets and swords. Perhaps due to the difficulty of transport however,

6

(125) Evora CV/227 2-7.f.80

(126) APO (New ed) Tomo IV.Vol.II.Part I.378-379; Ribeiro 132

(127) P.E.Pieris - The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 3

they did not take any artillery with them while on the march. The heavy munitions and the food supplies of the Portuguese were carried by native coolies. In camp too, the tasks of cooking and cleaning were performed by Sinhalese and Tamil servicemen.

The Portuguese casados or married settlers and the topazes or descendants of Portuguese-native marriages were not members of the regular army. Being retired soldiers however, the casados often voluntarily enlisted for a particular campaign. They could ^{not} be compelled to take up arms except in (128) defence of their homes or in a grave emergency. The casado contingent in the Portuguese army never exceeded a hundred in any mobile campaign but as each settler often took his servant or slave with him to carry a spare musket, to help him in loading it and to transport his food rations, they often formed a very useful acquisition in the field. When the news of the loss of a large number of casados in de Sa's ill-fated expedition reached Lisbon, it was decided that to ensure the security of Colombo, the casados should not be used in offensive campaigns in the future. This directive however was violated in the very next invasion of Kandy led by Diogo de Mello (129) de Castro.

(128) TT.LM.15.f.19

(129) TT.LM.36.f.49; TT.LM.37.f.11

The lascarins formed a vital part of the Portuguese army. In Jaffna, where the Tamil army had for long been mainly a mercenary force only a small contingent of a few hundred Tamil lascarins was retained. In Kotte, where the land tenure system provided a lascaring force at little actual expense, Sinhalese lascarins formed much more numerous force. The lascarins attached to the Portuguese army appeared to have declined steadily in numbers throughout the seventeenth century whether due to appropriation of land by the Portuguese, emigration to Kandy or death in war. Contemporary estimates in the 1630's as to the actual size of the lascarin contingent ranged between four thousand and seven thousand men. In view of the overwhelming evidence of a gradual decline in their numbers, the total in the 1620's must have been a few thousand more. The lascarins fought with their traditional arms - bows, swords, spears and daggers but a small proportion of these militia-men were also provided with muskets.

Finally, there were the Canarese and the Kaffirs. The Canarese were mercenary troops from the West coast of India. The Kaffirs were mainly Portuguese slaves trained in war. Both these elements appeared in sizable numbers in the Portuguese army

(130) Ajuda 50-V-51.f.163

(131) T.Abeyasinghe 117-118

(132) P.da Trindade III. 9; Diário do conde de Linhares 145
In the rebellions of 1617-1618 alone over seven thousand men are estimated to have died.

(133) Coimbra 459.f.361; Evora CXVI /2-3.ff.68-68v

(134) BNL FG. 939 .f.54a

only in late 1631. By 1634 all the Canarese had returned to
 (135)
 their homes and only two hundred eighty Kaffirs were left.

The Kaffirs introduced a new weapon to Ceylon - the assagai -
 (136)
 a short wooden spear with a metal point.

The Portuguese soldiers were paid twenty xerafins
 a year as salary. They also received a monthly payment of
 one xerafin a month as curry allowance(conduto) together with
 two measures of rice a day. These two last items however,
 were handed over to the captains, each of whom provided his
 company with food. The captains themselves were paid two
 (137)
 hundred xerafins a year, together with ten larins a month as
 curry allowance and five measures of rice a day. The soldiers
 were provided with arms and ammunitions by the state and when
 wounded given medical attention at the hospitals in Colombo,
 Mannar and Jaffna. The casados were paid on the same terms but
 only during periods of active service. The lascarins were
 usually paid by land grants and were expected to bring their
 own provisions during campaigns. When on continuous duty the
lascarins were paid an allowance ranging from three hundred and
 thirty to four hundred and fifty seis ($1 \frac{1}{10}$ to $1 \frac{1}{2}$ xerafins)

(135) APO (new ed) Tomo IV.Vol.II Part I.383

(136) BNL FG. 1939f.85a

(137) Ribeiro 134 states that the captain's pay was only fifty
pardaos a year. The above estimate is based on Queyroz 1036.

a month. They too were provided ^{with} arms by the state. There is no information available on rates of pay for the Canarese but the Kaffirs were allowed a rice ration of two measures a day, a payment of eighteen xerafins a year and were (138) also ~~was~~ allowed a certain amount of cloth for their dress.

(138) Ribeiro 130; APO (New ed) Tomo IV. Vol. II. Part I. 380, 383, 386-387

The lands granted to lascarins varied in extent and value so that their annual income ranged between twenty five and fifty five xerafins a year. (JCERAS XXXVI. 181)

CHAPTER VI

This study of the revenue and expenditure of the Portuguese administration in Ceylon falls into two parts. The first is concerned with sources of revenue. The chief sources of income to the crown - cinnamon, elephants, arecanuts, land rents and the pearl fishery are examined in that order. This is by no means an exhaustive list but the items omitted are either very minor ones or those adequately discussed in
(1)
other works.

The second part is an examination of the budgetary problems of the Portuguese in Ceylon and is mainly concerned with whether the Portuguese crown did make a profit out of its possessions in Ceylon. In this respect a note on the currency used appears relevant. All figures mentioned in this chapter, and in this whole study unless otherwise specified are given
(2)
in Kotte pardão-xerafins. For the purpose of converting other

(1) T. Abeyasinghe 164-183; P. E. Pieris- The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 6-22

(2) Coins were minted in Ceylon during the captain-generalships of de Sa and Azevedo. (Codrington- Ceylon coins and currency, 99, 101-102) An indication of the purchasing power of a Ceylon xerafin is given by Fr. Manoel de Assumpção who reports that it could buy in Colombo in 1630 two hundred and forty coconuts or twelve to fifteen fowls or three large loaves of bread or thirty to thirty six measures of rice.

currencies to this unit the following table has been used. ⁽³⁾

| | |
|---------------------|---|
| 4½ Goa <u>reis</u> | = one Kotte <u>fanam</u> |
| 90 Goa <u>reis</u> | = one Ceylon <u>larim</u> |
| 270 Goa <u>reis</u> | = one Kotte <u>pardão</u> or one Kotte <u>xerafin</u> |
| 54 Goa <u>reis</u> | = one Jaffna <u>fanam</u> |
| 270 Goa <u>reis</u> | = one Jaffna <u>xerafin</u> |
| 450 Goa <u>reis</u> | = one Jaffna <u>pataca</u> |
| 540 Goa <u>reis</u> | = one Jaffna <u>pardão</u> |
| 300 Goa <u>reis</u> | = one Goa <u>pardão</u> or one Goa <u>xerafin</u> |

SOURCES OF REVENUE

CINNAMON

Cinnamon was undoubtedly the greatest single source of revenue the Portuguese possessed in seventeenth century Ceylon. Cinnamon grew wild in the Kelani valley and in a broad coastal stretch of Kotte from Chilaw to the Walawe Ganga. When fully grown, the cinnamon tree (cinnamomum zeylanicum) was twenty five to forty feet in height. The inner bark of the tree, when peeled and dried was extensively used in south Asia and Europe as a condiment. The Sinhalese also used cinnamon oil, extracted from the fruit of the tree, for medicinal purposes but unlike the bark, the oil was not produced for sale abroad during the

(3) The sources used to formulate the table include-
 Codrington - Ceylon coins and currency, 92; P.E.Pieris-
The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 59; APO (new ed)IV-II-I. 379-403

(4)
period of Portuguese rule.

In the sixteenth century, the production of cinnamon had become accepted as the caste occupation of a group of people known as the chaleas. The chaleas are said to have been a group of immigrants from south India and it is probable that the Sinhalese kings of Kotte assigned the task of peeling cinnamon to them some time after their arrival in the island. By the beginning of the seventeenth century the collection of cinnamon had become well regulated. The chaleas themselves were organised into three departments or baddas - the mahabadda, the sulubadda and the kunambadda. Those chaleas who belonged to the first two departments were obliged to peel cinnamon under the overall superintendence of their vidanas. The men of kunambadda were exempt from this duty as they acted as palanquin bearers to the captain-general. Within each badda there were a number of durayas or chalea headmen who supervised the peelers. The durayas were responsible to the vidana who was in turn responsible to the vedor da fazenda.⁽⁵⁾ Once the cinnamon was collected and dried, it was made into bundles (fardos) wrapped in mats(esteiras) and tied with rope (cairo). In the sixteenth century some officials who supervised

(4) Ribeiro 161-162

(5) T.Abeyasinghe, 135-138; S.Arasaratnam - Dutch power in Ceylon, 1658-1688, 184; AHU Caixa 3, 30.6.1613

the collection of cinnamon as well as those who bundled the produce were paid wages in cash by the Portuguese. In the seventeenth century these payments were commuted for land grants. (6)

The obligations of the chaleas in the sixteenth century were apparently ^{related} ~~related~~ to the tribute the king of Kotte agreed to pay the Portuguese. From 1518 or some time afterwards this tribute was fixed at three hundred bahars of cinnamon a year and this amount had to be provided free by the chaleas of the mahabadda in return for the lands they held. Cinnamon produce^d in excess of this amount was bought by the Portuguese at a price of three pardãos a bahar. During the second half of the sixteenth century the peelers had imposed upon them the additional obligation of providing a further one hundred bahars free of charge to the king of Kotte. With the death of King Dharmapala in 1597, the chaleas were thus obliged to supply four hundred bahars a year to the Portuguese, the new rulers of Kotte. (7)

During the next half century the demands of the state

(6) Diogo Velho - Orçamento do estado da India, 130; Queyroz 1028; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.38; Ajuda 51-VIII-58.f.291v; Studia IV. 266

(7) Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho - Os descobrimentos e a economia mundial II. 39-40; Studia IV. 265; Diogo Velho, 129; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.38; AHU Caixa 6, 10.11.1618

on the chaleas grew inexorably. In the time of Azevedo the introduction of a larger measure, increased the burden on the peelers by a third. By 1615 they were required to supply a thousand bahars annually to the state. In 1632-1633⁽⁸⁾ captain-general Dom Jorge de Almeida increased this amount by a further three hundred and fifty bahars.⁽⁹⁾ In the 1640's Dom Filipe Mascarenhas, serving as captain-general reported that one thousand five hundred to two thousand bahars of cinnamon were produced per year for the government without charge.⁽¹⁰⁾ While the government demand rose, the quantity produced by the chaleas to satisfy individual requirements did not fall. At least until the 1630's it seems clear that one thousand five hundred to two thousand bahars were produced by the peelers for private individuals.⁽¹¹⁾

This cinnamon increase in output was achieved with the aid of two significant developments in the organization of cinnamon production. Firstly there was a general increase in individual burdens. The highest quantity any peeler was expected to provide as recorded in the extant parts of Vaz Freire's

(8) T.Abeyasinghe, 142,150

(9) Evora CXVI/2-2.f.115v; APO(New ed) IV-II-I.392

(10) EM.Add Mss. 41996.f.7

(11) P.da Trindade III.20; TT,Ms da Convento da Graça , tomo 6D.336; TT.LM.12.f.599; EM.Add.Mss.20893.ff.9-10; Filмотeca LM.13B11/3-5; Queyroz 34

tombo was eleven arrobas or about three hundred and fifty pounds. Some peelers in the early seventeenth century
(12)
delivered only a fifth of that amount. By the end of the Portuguese regime in Ceylon, however, the average obligation
(13)
per peeler had risen to some five hundred pounds. Secondly the obligation of peeling cinnamon was extended to cover people of castes other than the chaleas. This process was begun by Azevedo when he required the woodcutters and the pannayas (or those who supplied fodder for elephants) of the Seven Korales to supply cinnamon instead of providing their traditional
(14)
services. This policy of replacing outmoded or unnecessary services with useful ones, apparently met with little opposition for, in seventeenth century Kotte the caste system had not yet developed into a rigid and inflexible form. After all, the chaleas themselves when they settled in Kotte were originally weavers. Thus in the first half of the seventeenth century increasing numbers of non-chaleas Sinhalese were recruited for cinnamon peeling. By 1650 these included people of the Hunu, Paduwa and Karawa castes, lime burners, palanquin bearers and fisher folk respectively. The change of occupation did not

(12) P.E.Pieris - The Ceylon littoral, 64

(13) Queyroz 1028; S.Arasaratnam 185-186

(14) TT.Ms.da Convento da Graça, tomo 6D. 333

(15)

enhance or detract from their status vis-a-vis the chaleas.

It is likely however that once the obligation of peeling cinnamon was foisted on a group of people there was little likelihood of their getting rid of it. (16)

During the first half of the seventeenth century there also occurred a fundamental change in the basis of the obligation of the peelers. When Vaz Freire made his tombo the chaleas were obliged to peel cinnamon in return for the land they held and the obligation of each depended on the extent and quality of land held. By the end of the Portuguese period however the obligation had become associated with the person rather than the land. By 1650 all chaleas over twelve years of age were obliged to peel cinnamon though the amount to be produced varied according to the land holding. The basis for this development was the growth of the theory advanced by the Portuguese to serve their needs, that the chaleas were slaves of the king and were therefore obliged to serve the state free of charge. By the middle of the century the obligation of every male chalea over ~~twenty~~ ^{twelve} years of age to supply a fixed quantity of cinnamon irrespective of land held had

(15) TT.LM.60.f.287

(16) When the Dutch conquered Wallallawiti Kozale in the 1640's they found there one or two villages inhabited by pannayas who were bound by custom to peel cinnamon.
(K.W.Goonewardane, 142)

(17)
become accepted practice.

When the Portuguese obtained de facto control of the cinnamon lands of Kotte in the early 1590's they also inherited the system of open trade in cinnamon that had prevailed in the previous decade. Production of cinnamon was under no restriction. Export of the spice, other than the quantity specifically made for the state, was done by private individuals who had obtained licences to do so. Almost from the outset Portuguese officials urged that a closer control of the cinnamon trade was desirable from an economic as well as a political point of view. Stricter control, it was argued would avoid the loss of revenue caused by the export of cinnamon from ports outside Portuguese control in Ceylon while the same measure would effectively deny revenue from cinnamon to the political opponents of the Portuguese, principally the rulers of Kandy (18) and the Dutch.

Several measures designed to promote greater control over the cinnamon trade were promulgated in the 1590's. Colombo was designated as the only port from which the export of cinnamon was legally permitted, while cinnamon could be

(17) T.Abeyasinghe, 139-140; S.Arasaratnam 185-186;

TT.LM.60.f.287

(18) T.Abeyasinghe 142-143

(19)
 disembarked only at an Indian port. More important, in 1595
 the export of cinnamon was declared a private monopoly of the
 captain of Colombo who was required to sell a fixed a
 proportion of his exports at cost price to the state. (20)

These measures though ^{they} ensured a greater degree of control
 over the trade in cinnamon, failed to check the fall in
 cinnamon prices that was causing great concern among the
 Portuguese. In the three decades preceding 1590 cinnamon
 prices had remained at a relatively high level due to
 interruptions in supply caused by warfare. In the 1590's
 with the subjugation of the whole of the old kingdom of Kotte
 and increased production by the chaleas prices fell to a lower
 level. This trend continued in the first decade of the
 seventeenth century when the death of Vimaladharmasuriya
 removed the immediate threat to the Portuguese hold on the
 lowlands. The only means of reversing this trend was a

(19) The first contract between the state and the captain of Colombo
 was made in 1590. By this agreement the captain promised to sell
 a third of the cinnamon he collected to the state at cost price.
 It is not known whether in return he obtained the position of sole
 private exporter, though this appears likely. In 1595 this
 definitely did occur. The contract made between Thome de Souza Ronches
 captain of Colombo and Diogo Caiado, juiz and diseembargador who
 acted as the representative of the king on 7 November 1595 specified
 that '... o q fizerẽ canela forados este contrato a perdera a
metade p^a que accuzarẽ co sinco (annos) mais de degedo p^a
Maluquo...' (AHU Caixa 6, 10.11.1618) In return the captain of
 Colombo had to sell a fifth of the first five hundred bahars he
 exported from Colombo at cost price to the state. The monopoly
 was however modified by the right of several persons and institutions

(Contd.,)

restriction of supply and this was a measure which any
(20)
individual contractor was unlikely to welcome.

Thus after experimenting with other forms of contracts
(21)
with persons other than the captain of Colombo, it was
decided in 1614 to make trade in cinnamon a royal monopoly.
Cinnamon could be exported only on behalf of the state and
the annual exports were fixed at a thousand bahars. Production
in villages privately held by the Portuguese was not forbidden
but the sale of cinnamon so produced to any person other than
the vedor or his official representatives was liable to be
punished by a sentence of five years service in the Far-Eastern
(22)
fleet. Moreover as the authorities in Ceylon made arrangements
to have the whole of the thousand bahars made in state held
(23)
villages any production by individuals appeared superfluous.

The cinnamon trade under royal monopoly in the period
1614-1638 falls into two distinct phases. During the first

contd.,

(29) to export fixed quantities of cinnamon. These exceptions
were as follows - captain-general Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo,
150 bahars; other Portuguese captains in Ceylon, 100 bahars;
camara of Colombo, 40 bahars; factor, 12 bahars; escrivao,
6 bahars. After the arrival of Jorge Froilim de Almeida (vedor of
Ceylon 1597-?) this agreement^s was amended to oblige
de Souza Ronches to sell to the state at cost price, 15% of
all cinnamon exported by him in excess of five hundred bahars.

(20) T. Abeyasinghe, 151-153; DR IV.241-244

(21) In 1607, for instance Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo was awarded the
sole right of export of cinnamon for three years in return for
a payment of twelve thousand pardaos.

(22) T. Abeyasinghe, 149; AHU Caixa 3, 22.4.1614; AHU Caixa 3,
3.10.1614

(23) T. Abeyasinghe, 150

extending from 1615-1628 the monopoly was largely an ineffective one. The main purpose in establishing a royal monopoly, namely the rise in cinnamon prices and revenue was not achieved. In 1628 the price of cinnamon remained on the average what it had been in 1614-1615. Four possible reasons may be advanced for this. The first was the vice-regal decree Azevedo himself issued on 3 October 1614. The casados of Colombo on receiving news of the establishment of a royal monopoly by the viceroy's decree of 22 April 1614, protested that they had already, at considerable expense to themselves collected quantities of cinnamon for export and appealed to the viceroy to postpone the date of enforcement. The viceroy thereupon decided on 30 October 1614 that cinnamon produced before the publication of the decree of 22 April 1614 could be sold freely until 1 January 1615. This was just the leeway speculators were hoping for. In the months of November and December a record quantity of cinnamon was exported from the island. The vedor Antão Vaz Freire estimated the amount exported at about two thousand bahars. It was reported that five ships loaded with cinnamon from Ceylon arrived at Cochin alone during the last few days of December 1614. Prices therefore fell even further in the first year of the monopoly. ⁽²⁴⁾

(24) AHU Caixa 4, 3.2.1616 The fall in prices was so sharp that the viceroy felt constrained to send a judicial officer to Colombo to investigate its cause.

This effect however was obviously short-lived.

Secondly the royal monopoly like the private monopolies that had preceded it, was breached by special privileges awarded by both king and viceroy to private individuals granting them the right to engage in the cinnamon trade. Some of these privileges had been grants of long standing. For example the right of the family of the conde de Vidiguera, descendants of the famous Vasco da Gama to import a fixed quantity of cinnamon had been granted to them in the days of Dom Manuel(1495-1521). This privilege had been re-affirmed and amplified on 4 November 1593 when the king granted Dom Francisco da Gama the right to send sixty bahars of cinnamon without any payment to the crown save a small sum to the Order of Christ. A similar privilege had been granted to Dona Catherina, a relative of the king. The camara of Colombo maintained its right to export forty bahars on behalf of the casados of the city. The captain of Colombo in recompense for the loss of his income was allowed a further sixty six bahars. The viceroy Azevedo is also said to have conceded licences to collect and export cinnamon to many of his friends and companions. His successors continued this practice.

(25) AHU Caixa 13, 20.12.1639; Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda II. ff.71-72

(26) AHU Caixa 5, 15.7.1617

(27) See above page

(28) AHU 33.f.12

(29) BM.Add.Mss. 20893.f.9; Goa Ae CR.I.f.161

The bishop of Cochin in a report on Ceylon in 1619 estimated that these licences allowed the export of three thousand
(30)
bahars of cinnamon. This may have been an exaggeration, but one should note that important recipients of such licences appear^f to have included the captain-general and the vedor da fazenda, the two officials responsible for the protection
(31)
of the king's monopoly.

The third factor causing the continued low price for cinnamon was the deliberate and persistent disregard of the regulations that governed the monopoly itself by many officials in Ceylon and India. Once more the lead was provided by superior officers. Jorge de Albuquerque, captain-general of Ceylon (1621-1623) and Lançarote de Seixas, vedor (1618-1622) are but two examples of men who used their position as the king's servants to defraud the king. It was little wonder that the camara of Colombo complained that the royal monopoly was a monopoly only for the poor. However a good deal of smuggling appears to have been carried on by lesser officials from Colombo too. Suspicion of this arose in Europe when it was reported that three Portuguese Antonio de Pinho da Costa, Cosmo Cardoso and

(30) TT.LM.12.f.599 In a letter to the king dated 19.11.1615 Antão Vaz Freire protested that Azevedo had already granted permission to individuals to export a total of 160 bahars. (AHU Caixa 4, 19.11.1615)

(31) Filmoteca LM.13A. 26-27/2-2; AHU 33.f.11; AHU Caixa 6, 11.12.1619

Dom Diogo Coutinho had petitioned for permission to collect quantities of cinnamon equal to what they had lost when a ship carrying the spice sank soon after leaving Colombo port. During the investigations it was found that the original receipts for the sale of this cinnamon were not to be found in the accounts of the factor Jorge Fernandes de Abreu. Although a thorough investigation by two officials from Goa subsequently cleared the three traders and the factor, it showed that unauthorised export of cinnamon from Colombo was not such a difficult proposition. (32) Finally, as always, the cinnamon of Ceylon had to compete in the market with the coarser and ~~the~~ less fragrant but cheaper cassia of the Malabar coast. (33)

There is insufficient evidence to detect any definite trends in the price movements during the first fifteen years of the royal monopoly. It is clear that the price paid to the

(32) Simancas SB.1522.f.20; Filmoteca LM.13A.27/4,26-27/2-2, Filmoteca LM.14.118/3-4; TT.LM.26.f.244; TT.LM.28.f.360; Filmoteca LM.15.67/4, 67-68/6-1; AHU 33.ff.16-16v;

Another instance that aroused suspicion of malpractices occurred in 1629. Domingos Ferreira, the vidana of the chaleas bought ^{one} hundred and seven bahars of cinnamon from the crown and paid the money for this amount to the factor, Francisco Tristao. However his name failed to appear in the list of people who had obtained permission to export cinnamon and to Ferreira's surprise the proceeds of these hundred and seven bahars were not credited to him. (Goa C P e AS X f.193) The regimento issued on 13 September 1636 to the outgoing vedor Antonio de Fonseca Ozouro makes it clear that smuggling had occurred from the ports of Galle, Kalutara, Jaffna and Mannar whence it was taken to Masulipatam and sold. (Goa regimento e instruccoes, III.ff.2-8)

(33) Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda, IV.f.197

peeler remained constant throughout this period and indeed
 (34)
 in the decade after it at two xerafins a Bahar. This was
 the price at which the government bought from peelers in
 cinnamon
 state held villages. The cost of ~~cinamon~~ to the government
 and to licence holders from privately held villages tended
 (35)
 to be higher ranging from four to five xerafins per bahar.

The cinnamon produced by peelers was bound into bales
 of about ^{one}/hundred and twenty pounds each and stored in warehouses
 in Mutwal. The bulk of this produce was loaded on to the cinnamon
 fleet which arrived from Goa annually in October. From 1621
 about two hundred bahars were also sent direct to Basra for
 sale in the Persian Gulf region. Occasionally dealers in Ceylon
 were sold small quantities of cinnamon for export to other
 areas. These dealers were not allowed to buy directly from the
 peelers or village holders. They had to buy from the vedor with

(34) Queyroz 1028; Evora CXVI/2-3.f.115; Filmoteca LM.19D.78/1-4; P.da Trindade III,20; TT.LM.45.f.352v

The assertion by T.Abeyasinghe 150-151 that the actual price paid to the peeler declined in the first forty years of Portuguese rule is difficult to prove. It is true that cinnamon cost the Portuguese three xerafins a bahar in the 1570's and two xerafins in 1639. But there is no proof that Portuguese dealings in the 1570's were directly with the peelers as they were in later times. There is evidence that the price paid to the dealer rose after the arrival of the Dutch. While in 1639 the state obtained a bahar of five fardos (actually $1\frac{1}{4}$ bahars of 3 quintals each) for two xerafins, Dom Filipe Mascarenhas reported in the 1640's that two xerafins or more had to be paid for a bahar of three quintals.

(35) Evora CXVI/2-3.f.115; Filmoteca LM.19D.78/4-1/4; AHU 210.f.250v

the approval of the junta. The quantities sold to each trader seems to have been in the region of fifty to a hundred bahars, but the total quantity so exported was often considerable. For example in 1622 five hundred and two bahars of cinnamon were sold to individual traders for a total sum of thirteen thousand six hundred ^{and} eighty four xerafins. No complete ~~prices~~ statistics of cinnamon prices at Colombo in the later 1620's are available but it is clear that in the early 1620's the price per bahar remained at or about twenty xerafins.⁽³⁶⁾

From the revenue point of view the most important factor in deciding the profit to the crown was the level of prices at Goa and Cochin for it was at these ports that the bulk of the Ceylon cinnamon was disposed of. The price level at Goa was normally at least ten xerafins a bahar above that at Colombo due to freight costs.⁽³⁷⁾ The prices at Cochin, a port much closer to Colombo, were expected to be somewhat lower⁽³⁸⁾ than at Goa. From the evidence available it appears that prices

(36) Filmoteca LM.19D 78/1-4; Filmoteca LM.13A.26-27/2-1; TT.LM.16.f.258; Assentos I.53; Goa provisoos dos visoréis, III, 2180220; Goa C.Pe AS VI.f.357

(37) According to estimates presented to the viceroy's council at Goa on 4 March 1637 the freight costs from Colombo to Goa of a bahar of cinnamon was estimated at twelve xerafins.

(Assentos II.162) Similar estimates were placed before the conselho da India in Lisbon on 16 March 1635. (Coimbra 645.f.68v)

(38) Cochin was less than four hundred miles by sea from Colombo. Goa was a further three hundred and fifty miles away.

Another document estimates freight cost at six xerafins a bahar. Both these estimates seem exaggerated for the cost of transporting a sack of rice from Goa to Colombo is known to have been one lavin (Goa C.Pe Ar. VIII f.152)

at Goa did rise to somewhat over thirty xerafins a bahar in 1620 from the low level of twenty two and a half xerafins that prevailed in 1615. This rise was no doubt the result of the interruption of supply due to the rebellions of 1616-1620. With the return of peace and continued violation of the royal monopoly, prices at Goa returned to the 1615 levels by the late 1620's. The cinnamon set at Basra yielded even less, for the selling price there ranged from fifteen to eighteen ⁽³⁹⁾ xerafins a bahar. In 1628 however with the outbreak of war with Kandy cinnamon prices showed a slight upward trend registering ⁽⁴⁰⁾ twenty five xerafins a bahar at Cochin.

The revenue derived from cinnamon during the period 1615-1628 obviously varied with the price and the quantity sold. In 1615 with the prevailing low prices the total cinnamon revenue could not have been much more than twenty thousand xerafins. By 1619 according to the figures of the factor, João da Costa Perestello, the yield had risen to 39,060 xerafins. During the period 1621-1627 the increase in the quantity exported by the state compensated for the gradual fall in prices keeping the annual revenue between 20,000 and 30,000 xerafins. The revenue

(39) Filmoteca LM.19D.78/1-4; TT.LM.16.f.258

(40) The price at Basra however remained at eighteen xerafins.

in 1628 was 45,000 xerafins. The amount of cinnamon exported by the state reached thousand five hundred and sixty bahars in 1626 and thousand eight hundred and fifty one bahars in ⁽⁴¹⁾ 1628.

The year 1629 marked a turning point in the cinnamon trade during the period under survey. In February that year Dom Miguel de Noronha, conde de Linhares assumed office as viceroy. He determined to enforce the monopoly in a way never done before. The authorities in Ceylon were forbidden to sell any cinnamon what so ever within the island. On 2 October 1629 it was decreed that with the exception of small quantities sent on the king's account to Mannar and ^{to} Persian Gulf, all cinnamon was to be taken direct to Goa and sold there on the orders of the viceroy. The export of cinnamon was strictly restricted to Colombo. The effect was immediate. The price at Goa shot up to eighty to ninety xerafins a bahar. Controlled selling at one centre enabled the Portuguese to obtain a sum of ⁽⁴²⁾ 71,157 xerafins from the produce of 1629. The cutting off of

(41) Filmoteca LM.19D. 78/1-4; TT.LM.16.f.258; Ajuda 51-V-44, f.23v

(42) A.Garcia - Arquivo da relação de Goa, 408; Ajuda 51-VIII-51. ff.256,405; Goa - Assentos do conselho da fazenda III. ff.84-85 104; AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635; Filmoteca LM.13B.13-14/4-5 Evora CXV/2-8.f.184

(43)
 the cinnamon supply in 1630-1632 caused a further rise in
 the price of cinnamon. In the 1630's the price at Goa remained
 at around a hundred xerafins a bahar. To ensure that prices
 remained at this level the export of inferior cinnamon from
 (44)
 the Malabar coast was forbidden. With exports in peace time
 averaging well over two thousand bahars a year, this meant
 (45)
 a total revenue of 200,000 xerafins.

(43) The total exported in 1630 was a hundred bahars. No cinnamon
 was exported in 1631. A storm at Colombo sank all eleven ships
 of the cinnamon fleet of 1632 after they were loaded. (TT.Ms . da Liv.
 816.f.257v,260; Filmoteca LM.14 114/3-4; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.
 f.313)

(44) Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda IV.f.199

(45) In this context Antonio Bocarro's estimate of a revenue
 of one hundred ~~and~~ thousand xerafins from cinnamon in the
 1630's appears to be an underestimate. A contemporary document
 at Evora supports the estimate given in the text. In the 1640's
 the price at Goa was around hundred and twenty xerafins a bahar
 but the quantity sold there declined with the loss of some
 of the cinnamon lands to the Dutch. The known export figures
 in the 1630's are as follows.

| | | | |
|------|---|--------|---------------|
| 1632 | - | 21,000 | <u>bahars</u> |
| 1633 | - | 2624 | <u>bahars</u> |
| 1636 | - | 2080 | <u>bahars</u> |
| 1637 | - | 2400 | <u>bahars</u> |

APO (new ed) IV-II-I,299; AHU 211.f.127; Queyroz 1193;
 Evora CXVI/2-3.f.115v; Goa Assentos do conselho da Fazenda,
 IV.f.123, V.ff.5-6

Every year about half the cinnamon produced in Ceylon
 (46)
 was shipped from Goa to Lisbon in the annual fleet. A small
 proportion of this was made up of the cinnamon privately
 imported by persons and institutions granted special permission
 by the king. A much larger quantity was taken by sailors in
 their 'liberty chests; the privilege of bringing back a
 certain quantity of spices being one of the inducements for
 (47)
 recruitment for the carreira da India. Both these categories

(46) No precise figures are available to us but in 1629 the viceroy proposed to sell 1500 bahars of cinnamon for transport to Lisbon to the newly formed companhia da India, a body formed in late 1620's in imitation of the English and Dutch joint stock companies, to take over the trade between Europe and the East. The companhia at the same time applied to the conselho da India at Lisbon for permission to import 2000 bahars. The companhia however never traded in cinnamon though it did trade in other spices for when permission to transport cinnamon to Europe was given the supply had been cut off due to wars in Ceylon. By this time supplies were resumed in 1633, the companhia had become defunct. (University of London, King's College Library -Portuguese department, manuscript entitled 'Companhia das Indias' D.S.4987 At.2; ENL.FG.7640. f.60; AHU Caixa 12.f.6.12.1635; TT.LM.27.f.365; AHU 476.f.45 Assentos I.527)

(47) The 'liberdade da canella' as defined in 1615, allowed each sailor one man's load of cinnamon (que hua pessoa os possa levantar.) This was originally understood to mean a bundle of ninety six pounds or at most hundred and thirty pounds. However in time the size of the bundle so defined grew in size so that its weight rose to 250-300 pounds. By 1625 it was contended that each sailor had the right to take two quintals (or nearly 200 pounds). Less than two decades later the sailors claimed that the right to take up to twelve large bundles. The privileges claimed by captains and other officers rose proportionately. Moreover another abuse crept into the system. The customs dues were sometimes evaded by landing the cinnamon direct and by-passing the casa da India. Merchants began to buy up sailors' rights and participate in the trade which was supposed to be a government monopoly. Ships overloaded with spice were often wrecked on the voyage to Lisbon. Finally the arrival

(Contd.,)

of imports were liable to a duty of 26% of the Goa value at the casa da India in Lisbon, but as the price in Europe was about five to ten times that in Goa, this duty by no means
(48)
discouraged trade in the spice. Cinnamon was also taken to Lisbon on behalf of the king to be sold at a profit. In the early years of the monopoly there was little opposition to the end of open trade. The critics of the system were chiefly
(49)
those who wished the monopoly tightened. The reason for this is not far to seek. Up to 1629 these officials could violate the monopoly with impunity and had nothing to lose by its nominal presence. After 1629 however with the tightening of controls opposition did emerge. It was led by Diogo de Mello de Castro, the energetic if impetuous captain-generals of Ceylon.

(48) (Contd.,)

in 1644 of a ship Nossa Senhora de Livramento with 4300 quintals (or 1433 bahars approximately) of cinnamon in 'liberty chests' alone provoked an inquiry which led to the limitation of this liberty to one quintal or 94-96 pounds per sailor. (AHU Caixa 17, 6.9.1644; TT.LM.19.f.54v; AHU Caixa 16, p.28.1.1644; AHU Caixa 16, 25.3.1644; AHU Caixa 10, 9.2.1626; AHU Caixa 18, 26.6.1625; AHU 210.f.143v-144v; Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda IV. f.123)

(48) AHU 31.f.151v-153v; AHU Caixa 8, 26.6.1625
N.W.Posthumas - Inquiry into the ~~kixan~~ history of prices in Holland, I. 147

(49) AHU 33.ff.11-12; Goa Assentos conselho da fazenda I, ff.126-127

De Mello's opposition to the monopoly seems to have been based on political as well as economic grounds. The operation of the monopoly as envisaged by the conde de Linhares removed the control of all cinnamon revenues from the captain-general to the viceroy and this loss seriously undermined the general's capacity to put his favourite policies into effect. However the captain-general had also an effective economic argument. He pointed out that the loss of cinnamon as an article of trade was hampering the role ~~of~~ Ceylon had to play as a part of the trading complex of South India. Unfortunately for de Mello his contentions were put forward during the years when the royal monopoly of cinnamon was for the first time yielding a substantial revenue. As the viceroy commented, for revenue reasons alone it was unthinkable at the moment to abolish the monopoly. The king and his councillors could not but ⁽⁵⁰⁾ agree.

ELEPHANTS

In the first half of the seventeenth century herds of wild elephants sometimes numbering up to two or three

(50) AHU Caixa ~~12~~ 12, 6.12.1635; TT.LM.37.f.1

hundred animals, wandered in the forests of the south-western and north-central plains of Ceylon. They were in demand in many parts of India for use in war and transport as well as for ceremonial purposes.

The Portuguese regime in Ceylon had three main sources of supply of elephants. Firstly as rulers of Kotte they received a fixed number of animals. In the time of the Sinhalese kings there had been an elaborate organization to ensure that the king received a certain number of elephants annually. According to the system the capture, the taming and the feeding of elephants were the responsibility of three groups of people - the panikkayas, the kuruwe people and the pannayas respectively. These groups held land in return for their services. This system was continued after the Portuguese became masters of Kotte. In 1615 the number of elephants due according to this system was thirty seven, of which thirty were from the Dolosdas Korale of the Matara disava and seven from the Magul Korale in the Seven Korales. The number of elephants actually received by the Portuguese however varied from year to year. In 1634 only

(51) Queyroz 73-74;1069; P.E.Pieris - The Ceylon littoral,2-3

(52) For a description of this system see T.Absyasinghe 160-162

(53)

sixteen elephants are recorded as having been sold from Kotte. However due to the lack of statistics it is difficult to determine whether the rebellions of 1616-1620 and the war of 1628-1633 had any permanent effect on the supply of elephants. The difficulty is greater because the Portuguese occasionally organized elephants hunts in areas other than those in which such hunts were due to take place according to the tombo (54) of Vaz Freire.

The second major source of supply was the Vanni. The Portuguese obtained a regular supply from this region long before they obtained control of Jaffna itself. As early as the 1580's the Portuguese in Mannar received two elephants a year from the king of Jaffna as a result of an accord (55) between the two parties. In 1591 Ethirimanne Sin^gham, made king of Jaffna by a Portuguese expeditionary force under Andre Furtado de Medonça, agreed to pay twelve elephants a year (56) as part of his tribute to the Portuguese. After the conquest of Jaffna in 1619, the Portuguese took over the dues in elephants the Vanniyars had hitherto paid to the king of Jaffna.

(53) Filmoteca LM.19D.33/2-5; TT.LM.45.f.173; On 20 December 1637 Diogo de Mello de Castrop reported a total of sixty animals obtained from all sources during the year.

(54) P.da Trindade III. 18-19

(55) Panduronga S.S.Pissurlencar - Regimento das fortalezas da India, 360

(56) Ibid., 485

These dues as recorded in the foral of Jaffna in 1645 amounted (57)
twenty seven tuskless elephants or half that number of tuskers.

This supply was even less dependable than that from Kotte
owing to the slender political control the Portuguese had over (58)
the Vanni chieftains.

The third source of supply was Kandy. During the eleven
years 1617-1627 the king of Kandy delivered two elephants
a year to the Portuguese as a mark of vassalage. According to
the treaty of 1634 which ended the war with Kandy, the Kandyans
agreed to pay all arrears of tribute and continue tribute at
the rate of one elephant a year for the next six years. Thus
during the twenty one years 1617-1638 the Portuguese received (59)
thirty eight elephants as tribute from Kandy. The Portuguese
also attempted to buy elephants from Kandy, though the
Kandyans naturally preferred to make greater profits by selling (60)
to South Indian traders or to their Indian customers direct.
With the seizure of Trincomalee in 1623, the inhabitants of
the neighbouring village of Tambalagama were required to (61)
deliver a fixed number of elephants to the captain of the fort.

(57) AHU 220.ff.16-16v; P.E.Pieris -The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 18

(58) TT.Ms da Liv. 731.f.359v

(59) See above chapters II, and IV.

(60) AHU 210.f.106, 124

(61) TT.LM.45.f.363

In Kotte the right to hunt and trade in elephants had traditionally been a royal monopoly. Although the kings of Jaffna had participated in the elephant trade in the sixteenth century it seems unlikely that the trade in elephants was a monopoly in that kingdom especially as the areas of the elephant hunt were not under the direct~~ex~~ political control of the Tamil kings. However once the Portuguese obtained control of the northern kingdom they attempted to extend their monopoly to Jaffna. As a provisional measure the vedor Lançarote de Seixas introduced a tax on elephant exports during his first term of office. On 8 April 1630, the conde de Linhares issued a viceregal decree declaring that elephant hunting in the Vanni was to be undertaken only for the state.

The instructions given to the vedor Diogo Mendes de Brito in 1639 as well as evidence in the foral of Jaffna (1645) indicate that the Portuguese maintained a monopoly over sale of elephants in Jaffna at least after 1630. The infringement of this monopoly was punishable by five years service in the
(62)
fleet of Malacca.

The Portuguese monopoly of the Ceylon elephant trade however had several gaps. In the first place, they had little real control over the supply from Kandy. The Kandyans by the

(62) AHU 220.f.44; P.E.Pieris - The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 30
AHU Caixa 2, doc.246

treaty of 1617 had the right to sell elephants abroad and they
(63)
often used the ports of Kotte and Jaffna for this purpose.

Secondly, in the 1620's the Portuguese monopoly was restricted
to trade within Ceylon. Once the elephants had been caught
and tamed they were taken to Colombo, Mannar or Jaffna and sold
(64)
by public auction. At these auctions they were bought by
private merchants who paid customs dues of seven and a half
(65)
percent. Thus the trade in elephants outside Ceylon was free.

Two captains-general of Ceylon are known to have exported
(66)
elephants on their account.

Elephants were taken by private traders to various
parts of India. In the early sixteenth century Ceylon's chief
(67)
market seems to have been Tanjore. In our period there is
evidence that elephants were sold to Vijayanagara, Bijapur,
(68)
Golconda, Tanjore, Madura and the Mughal empire. Ceylon elephants

(63) AHU 210.f.106,124; Coimbra 460.ff.228-230; TT.LM.43.f.175

(64) AHU 210.f.124; P.E.Pieris - The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 31

It seems likely that the elephants caught in Matara were
sold at Colombo while those caught in the Seven Korales were
escorted overland to Mannar and sometimes thence to Jaffna via
Elephant Pass. During the second and third decades of the
seventeenth century many elephants were taken overland across arid
country to Jaffna probably because of the higher prices that
could be obtained there. (TT.LM.12.f.344; TT.LM.16.f.294)

(65) AHU 220.f.45

Of these dues, seven percent went to the state. The half
percent was divided among customs officials as follows -
16/30 to the recebedor or receiver, 8/30 to the escrivã or
secretary, 6/30 to the kanakapulle or native official.

(66) TT.LM.16.ff.585,738

(67) T.Abeyasinghe, 162; Vriddagirison, 172

(68) Filmoteca LM.13B, 5-6/3-2; 11/3-5; P.da Trindade III, 6;
Goa regimentos e instruções, III.ff.2-8

were sometimes presented by the Portuguese state to Indian
 (69)
 rulers as tokens of friendship and esteem. In the 1630's Ceylon
 (70)
 elephants were also sent to work in the shipyards of Goa.

The king of Portugal himself sent a request for Ceylon
 (71)
 elephants to be sent to Europe. On the Coromandel and the
 Malabar coasts, the chief competition to the Ceylon elephants
 (72)
 came from elephants exported from the Arakan region.

In the 1630's the open trade in Ceylon elephants outside
 the island was disrupted by a measure of the conde de Linhares,
 viceroy of India (1629-1635). The conde who had already insisted
 on a monopoly in elephant hunting in 1630 ordered that auctions
 should cease and the Ceylon administration should take over
 the sale of elephants. The sale of elephants abroad by Portuguese
 officials had been tried in Azevedo's day and abandoned for
 financial reasons. The motive of the conde in returning to this
 policy was however not one of increasing the revenue obtained
 by the Ceylon government. In fact his plans envisaged the
 loss of all elephant revenue to Ceylon. It was dictated by a
 need to obtain a reliable supply of saltpetre and to deny it

(69) Ajuda 51-VIII-51.ff.198, 207

(70) Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda IV, f.65

(71) TT.LM.31.f.153 The request originally sent in October
 1631 was repeated in April 1632 and January 1634. It is unknown
 whether the request was eventually complied with.

(72) TT.LM.36.f.5

(73)
to the Dutch.

The Portuguese in the east needed quantities of saltpetre for the manufacture of gunpowder for their own use. As urgent however was the need to supply the mother country. In Europe, at the begining of our period, the demand for and the price of saltpetre rose steeply due largely to the outbreak of the (74) Thirty Years' War. The viceroy in India was therefore instructed to secure supplies of saltpetre and to deny it to all enemies of Portugal. The chief exporters of saltpetre in Asia at this time were Madura and Bengal. In 1633 the conde de Linhares sent Sebastião Pessanha to Madura to negotiate a trade agreement to exchange saltpetre for Ceylon elephants. The agreement eventually concluded laid down that the Nayak would sell saltpetre to the Portuguese at a price of twenty seven and a half xerafins a bahar in exchange for elephants delivered at Tuticorim at a price averaging six hundred and sixty six (75) six xerafins each.

The return to direct sale by the Portuguese officials to the customer in India aroused opposition in Ceylon. Portuguese officials led by captain-general, Diogo de Mello de Castro

(73) TT.LM.40.f.69; T.Abeyasinghe 162

(74) Rayachaudhuri 168; G.N.Clark - War and society in the seventeenth century, 62

(75) TT.LM.30.f.59; Coimbra 459.f.182; Coimbra 645.f.7
Evora CR Arm.V-VI, 14-5.f.165; TT.LM.31.f.227

argued against this practice on two counts. Firstly it was contended that the agreement caused a financial loss as the price fixed for saltpetre was too high and that for the elephants was too low. They held that better terms could be obtained from merchants from Bengal. Secondly, it was argued that the end of auctions at Jaffna and Mannar would also lead to the end of the supply of food stuffs brought by merchants from (76) Bengal. Eventually a compromise settlement was reached. The elephants continued to be auctioned in Ceylon and the funds (77) so obtained were used to buy saltpetre.

Estimates of the price of Ceylon elephants as found in seventeenth century books and documents vary a great deal. However two principles seem clear. The price of an elephant varied with its size, or more accurately, its height as measured in covados or cubits. Secondly, a tusker was double (78) the price of a tuskless elephant. Apart from these two factors the place of sale itself must have had an important relation to the price. Elephants were expensive to feed and difficult

(76) AHU 210.ff.106-106v; TT.LM.37.f.1; Diario do conde de Linhares vice-rei da India, 157

(77) TT.LM.43.f.175v; TT.LM.40.f.95; Assentos II.162; TT.LM.37.f.155; Filmoteca LM.20,19/2

(78) T.Abeyasinghe 163; P.E.Pieris -The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 18; 24,31.

A covado measured thirty inches.(Ribeiro, 138)

to transport. Unless well cared for they could sicken and die. This could probably explain why prices at Jaffna, a port nearer the customer, seem to have been higher than those at Colombo. The foral of Jaffna of 1645 gives a list of prices paid to the Vanniyars for the delivery of extra elephants.

For an elephant^s of 5 covados - 60 xerafins

$4\frac{1}{2}$ covados - 50 xerafins

4 covados - 40 xerafins

$3\frac{1}{2}$ covados - 32 xerafins

Female or tuskless elephants fetched much smaller prices. The foral gives the following details

For one of $5-4\frac{1}{2}$ covados - 16 xerafins

$4\frac{1}{2}-3$ covados - 12 xerafins (79)

Under 3 covados - 8 xerafins

These prices however by no means represented the value that could be obtained in the open market for they are the amounts fixed by a monopolistic buyer. More realistic perhaps ^were the penalties imposed in the case of non-delivery of fixed tribute. This amounted to one hundred pardãos per tusker and fifty
(80) pardãos for any elephant. The actual selling price of elephants in Ceylon was much higher due to costs of transport to the

(79) P.E.Pieris- The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 31

(80) Ibid.18

place of sale and of feeding. In Kotte it probably averaged⁽⁸¹⁾ between two hundred and three hundred xerafins per elephant.

In Jaffna the price was around five hundred xerafins each.

There is little information on the price of elephants in India but the Nayak of Madura agreed to buy elephants at the⁽⁸²⁾ rate of two hundred and twenty two xerafins a covado. Queyroz's estimate of about thousand pardãos per Kotte elephant may well have been based on the price level in India, though instances⁽⁸³⁾ of higher prices being paid are known.

The revenue obtained by the Ceylon administration from the sale of elephants is difficult to estimate, as the price and the number of elephants varied greatly. A list of the revenues of Kotte in 1620's estimates the income from elephants at five⁽⁸⁴⁾ thousand xerafins. The lowest recorded income for Kotte was that of 1634 - sixteen elephants were sold for three thousand ~~xx~~⁽⁸⁵⁾ nine hundred and ninety xerafins. The only complete figures

(81) Queyroz 729, 1194; T. Abeyasinghe, 163-164

(82) Coimbra 645.f.7

(83) Queyroz 1193. Ribeiro⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ who lived for many years in Ceylon gave eight thousand pardãos as the lowest price of a Ceylon elephant. Ribeiro's figures are however are not always reliable. In 1633 the Goa administration contracted with Francisco Telles, captain of Mannar to take delivery of three elephants at Cochin for a total payment of six thousand five hundred xerafins - over two thousand one hundred and sixty xerafins per animal. (Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda IV, f.65)

(84) Ajuda 51-V-44.f.23v

(85) APO (new ed) Tomo IV. Part I. 401-402

for elephants obtained from the whole of Portuguese Ceylon
 (86)
 occurs in 1637 when ~~sixty~~ six of them were captured. Sold
 at an average price of three hundred xerafins each in Ceylon
 they would have yielded 19,800 xerafins.

ARECANUT

The nut of the areca palm (areca catechu) had been
 an article of commercial value long before the arrival of the
 Portuguese in the east. The chewing of arecanut with betel
 leaves was a social custom among the people of Ceylon and south
 India. The palm itself could be cultivated in most parts of
 the south-western plains of Ceylon and in many parts of Kotte
 the nut had become the mainstay of local trade, for the Kotte
 peasants had become accustomed to pay for their requirements
 (87)
 of cloth and salt in areca.

When the Portuguese obtained possession of Kotte, the
 only arecanut the government was entitled to, was the produce
 paid as dues ⁱⁿ kind by those who lived in royal villages (gabadagam).
 With the increasing alienation of state-held villges this amount
 fell to three hundred and seventy six amunas of twenty four
 thousand to twenty five thousand nuts each in the last days

(86) TT.LM.43.f.175v

(87) Arasaratnam, 146

of Azevedo's captain-generalship. During the 1620's and 1630's this amount seems to have fallen further to three
(88)
hundred and five amunas.

Soon after taking over the administration of Kotte however, the Portuguese found another means of obtaining revenue from the arecanut trade, by the imposition of enhanced customs dues. When the vedor Jorge Frolim de Almeida arrived in Ceylon he found that there was a considerable difference of in the scale/prices between Colombo and Galle. While an amuna of arecanut could be sold for ten larins in Colombo, the sale price of the same quantity at Galle was only four larins. The duty at both ports was fixed at four fanams per amuna. The higher price at Colombo was no doubt due to the greater demand for the product for export from the metropolis. De Almeida determined to gain some benefit for the crown from this variation in prices. By his order the customs dues at Colombo were fixed at one larin an amuna while those at Galle were raised to the high level of ten larins an amuna. Modifications of dues at other ports probably followed suit. By the end of the sixteenth century an amuna of arecanut paid one and a half

(88) T.Abeyasinghe, 154; Filмотека LM.19D. 29/30-5/1, 33/2-5

larins in customs at Negombo and a little over a larin at (89)
 Weligama and Chilaw. The effects of these modifications on the revenue of the state and the pattern of the arecanut trade cannot be traced due to lack of evidence. However before long this innovation was superseded by another - that of compulsory purchase of all arecanut produced in Kotte.

The compulsory purchase of arecanut itself was no innovation at all. The Portuguese tombo made by Vaz Freire records that the inhabitants of Alutagama had to supply sixty amunas of arecanut a year in exchange for goods worth two hundred and forty larins to King Rajasinha of Sitawaka in the (90)
 sixteenth century. However this practice was by no means widespread in Kotte under the Sinhalese kings. The tombo of Jorge Frolim de Almeida makes it clear that, at least, at the end of the sixteenth century, there was open trade in arecanut. It was the widespread application of a practice hitherto confined to a small area that was new.

The regulations governing compulsory purchase were framed

(89) TT.Ms da Convento da Graça, tomo 6D. 341-342, 347-348
Fanam - a Sinhalese coin which fell in value in relation to the larin and the xerafin in the late sixteenth century. In the 1570's and 1580's a larin was equivalent to seven fanams. By 1599 a larin was worth fifteen to twenty fanams.
 (90) P.E.Pieris - The Ceylon littoral, 50

so as to obtain for the crown the total quantity of arecanut
produced in Kotte at a fixed price of four lagins and amuna.⁽⁹¹⁾

The total sum of four thousand and one hundred and eleven
amunas recorded in Vaz Freire's tombo thus represented an
estimate made of arecanut production of Kotte in the early
years of the seventeenth century. By the second decade of the
seventeenth century many officers of the administration, ranging
from the captain-general himself to captains of the army and
the vidanes of the baddas or departments, had acquired the
right to obtain quantities of arecanut at the price paid by
the government.⁽⁹²⁾ By the 1620's, the villager had to deliver
all the arecanut so purchased to Colombo with an additional
thousand nuts per amuna to cover possible losses in transport
and storage.⁽⁹³⁾

The reason given for originally enforcing the practice of
compulsory ^{purchase} was the need for money to finance the war against
Kandy.⁽⁹⁴⁾ However the practice proved so profitable that it was
retained even when the Portuguese financial resources improved
considerably in later times. This new obligation bore increasingly
on the peasants of Kotte with the passage of time ^{for} three reasons.

(91) TT.LM.18.f.240v

(92) AHU 222.ff.171-171v; T.Abeyasinghe, 155-157; Goa Assentos
do conselho da fazenda II, ff.211-212

(93) AHU 35.f.79; TT.Colleccao de S.Vicente XIX.doc.144

(94) TT.LM.18.f.240v; T.Abeyasinghe, 155

Firstly, the purchase price had been fixed at a time when arecanut prices were begining to rise - the fixing of the rate forced them to forgo a source of revenue they badly needed. Secondly, the obligation to produce a set quantity each year was rigidly enforced. Although warfare and natural disasters often caused the loss of arecanut trees in a locality, the amount originally fixed had to be delivered to Colombo. This sometimes forced villagers to buy arecanut at three or four times the fixed price to fulfill their obligations. Thirdly, at least in the 1630's the peasant often did not ~~even~~ receive even the four larins per amuna they were entitled to according to the tombo of Vaz Freire. The payment to the producer was usually made by lengths of cloth each worth four larins. The Portuguese made the peasant accept cloth worth only two or three larins in exchange for each amuna. Moreover the ~~amount~~ amount of nuts per amuna had been traditionally fixed at twenty four to twenty five thousand was gradually increased to thirty two thousand. This latter development effectively nullified the rise in price from four to five larins per amuna decreed by the viceroy Pero da Silva in his regimento to the new vedor Antonio da Fonseca (95) Ozouro on 13 September 1637.

Opposition to compulsory purchase of arecanut by the state came from two sources. In 1617 and again in 1621 the camara of Colombo petitioned to the king that this system be

(95) TT.LM.18.f.240v; Queyroz 1017,1027; Goa regimentos e instruccoes III, 2-8

ended. The abolition of compulsory purchase would have freed the village holding casados from the obligation of supplying a fixed quantity of arecanut to the state. The petition however made it clear that the casados had nothing against the principle of compulsory purchase itself. When the state requirement was abolished they planned to take over the whole system and apply it for their own benefit. The petition of the camara was considered in the conselho da India at Lisbon which recommended the abolition of compulsory purchase of areca on condition that the quit rents of the villages were raised proportionately. No further steps are known to have been taken in this respect. The second element to oppose this practise consisted of the Sinhalese themselves. When in 1636 they made representations to the captain-general in a lengthy petition, compulsory purchase of arecanut was one of the items singled out for bitter attack. The Sinhalese unlike the casados wanted the whole system abolished. Their hopes however had (98) far smaller chances of realization than those of the casados.

The evidence available however suggests that despite the rigid insistence on the quantities recorded in the tombo, the actual amount of arecanut received by the government in

(96) Queyroa 1017, 1027; AUH Caixa 5, 21.11.1617; TT.LM.18.f.240v AHU 33.f.12; TT.Colleccao de S.Vicente XIX.doc. 144
The only Portuguese known to have opposed the compulsory purchase in toto was Lançarote de Seixas but even he argued that it was justified in the case of Sinhalese landholders for unlike the Portuguese they did not pay quit rents to the state.
(AHU Caixa 6, 2.11.1618)

our period never reached the four thousand one hundred and eleven amunas obtained in 1615. A document in the 1620's estimates the total receipts from arecanut obtained by compulsory purchase at six thousand xerafins of three larins each.⁽⁹⁷⁾ If this estimate was even approximately true it would indicate that purchases had fallen to twenty five percent of the 1615 level for the selling price of arecanut/ in 1622 was twelve to sixteen larins per amuna. It was probably in an attempt to counter this fall in supply that the Governor Fernão de Albuquerque sought in 1622 to lower the price of cloth which was usually exchanged for arecanut. Even in 1634 the amount purchased by the government was apparently substantially less than the figure of 1615. In that year the arecanut purchased by the government totalled one thousand nine hundred and fifty two and a half amunas. It was made up as follows -

| | |
|---|---------------------------------|
| From Bulatgama | - 1195 <u>amunas</u> |
| the <u>vidane</u> of the <u>mahabadda</u> | - 200 <u>amunas</u> |
| the <u>vidane</u> of the gem mining villages of Denawaka | - 200 <u>amunas</u> |
| the Alutukuru <u>Korale</u> | - $6\frac{1}{2}$ <u>amunas</u> |
| the Pasdun <u>Korale</u> | - $86\frac{1}{2}$ <u>amunas</u> |
| the Sabaragamuwa <u>disava</u> | - $27\frac{1}{2}$ <u>amunas</u> |
| the Matara <u>disava</u> | - 140 <u>amunas</u> |

| | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|
| the Four Korales | - 152 <u>amunas</u> |
| the bullock-men of the Seven | |
| Korales | - 29 <u>amunas</u> |
| the <u>vidane</u> of the Pannayas | - 25 <u>amunas</u> |

1952½ amunas

These figures can be assumed as representative of the situation
(98)
in the 1630's.

Though much of the arecanut was exported to south India directly from Colombo, some also found its way to the Jaffna peninsula from which area it was transported to the Coromandel coast. In fact though arecanut was produced only in negligible quantities in Jaffna itself, trade between the peninsula and south India depended largely on its sale. For this reason Lançarote de Seixas when captain-major of Jaffna (1627-1630) proposed that the export of arecanut by local merchants be forbidden so that foreign merchants would come to Jaffna and thereby increase its customs revenues. This measure however proved to be ill-advised as the prohibition failed to achieve its objective for the customers in south India continued to be supplied from other parts of Ceylon and this policy was eventually

(98) AHU 35.f.79; TT.Colleccao de S.Vicente XIX.doc.144;
TT.LM.45.f.353 ; TT.LM.15.f.181; AHU Caixa 7, 11.2.1622;
P.da Trindade III,20; Queyroz 1034; Filmoteca LM.19D.33/2-5

abandoned before any lasting harm was done to the trade in
(99)
Jaffna.

The annual revenue derived from arecanut in our period is difficult to estimate. In 1634 the gross revenue was eleven thousand two hundred and sixty two and a half xerafins. When the price paid to the producer is deducted this leaves a net revenue of approximately eight thousand six hundred xerafins. The accounts of the factor João da Costa Perestello estimated the revenue from arecanut in 1618-1619 (100) to be between eight and nine thousand xerafins. This could well have been the average revenue from arecanut in the 1620's and 1630's.

LAND REVENUE

The first twenty years of Portuguese rule in Ceylon had seen two changes in respect of land tenure - the introduction of Portuguese settlers into the landholding class and the extensive supplanting of the principle of service tenure by (101) that of payment of quit rents for the lands held. Both these

(99) Filmoteca LM.15. 28/2-3; TT.LM.28.f.274; AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635

(100) Filmoteca LM.19D. 33/2-5; This view is further supported by an estimate of an annual revenue of nine thousand xerafins a year in the 1620's given in another contemporary document. (Ajuda 51-V-44.f.23v; TT.LM.16.f.258)

(101) These changes are analysed in detail in T.Abeyasinghe, 100-108. Discussions of many questions relating to land revenue, as for example the land tenure system of Kotte under Sinhalese rulers, though

relevant to an understanding of our period will be omitted or summarily dealt with where they are adequately treated in T.Abeyasinghe's work.

developments continued in the next twenty years and their combined effects determined the amount of land revenue obtained by the Portuguese government in the years 1617 to 1638.

Little evidence is available as to the extent of land held by the Portuguese within Kotte and to what extent it expanded, if indeed it did expand during this time. The tombo of Vaz Freire indicates that in 1614, the Portuguese land holdings were concentrated in the coastal belt from Colombo to Matara (102) and in a few fertile inland areas. Revenue figures in the same decade indicate that approximately 21% of all land in (103) Kotte was held by Portuguese settlers. Evidence from Portuguese sources however proves ^{that} a considerable change in land holding occurred in Jaffna in this period. In 1618 the principal landholders in Jaffna were all Tamils. In 1645, if evidence from the foral is to be accepted, Portuguese settlers had become the (104) principal landholders in Jaffna. Although perhaps in relation to the peasants the change from native to Portuguese landholders was vital, for the Portuguese both misunderstood and misused (105) the customary practices of the land, from the point of view

(102) T. Abeyasinghe, 114-115

(103) AHU Caixa 6, 13.11.1619 In the 1620's and 1630's the applicants for land grants included those who had served in various parts of the Portuguese empire. (TT.LM.31.f.203)

(104) I.O.L. Conselho ultramarino, I.

(105) T. Abeyasinghe, 120; Queyroz, 1008, 1015-1016, 1025-1026

of the Portuguese administration it was the second change - that of paying cash instead of performing services - that proved more important.

Portuguese land policy in Kotte as evolved in the first two decades of the seventeenth century envisaged one principal type of land holding. Land was to be granted with the obligation of paying 12% of their income to the state as foro or quit rents. The landholders were also expected to assume the task of maintaining a fixed number of militiamen, the obligation of each landholder in this respect varying with the income derived from the villges he held. Two exceptions to this rule were to be permitted. Firstly, the land formerly allocated to Buddhist or Hindu temples - the former viharagam and devalagam, when held by missionaries made no payment in cash or service. Secondly, the service tenure was retained in a few cases when it was thought to be profitable or convenient. Thus the cinnamon peelers and those who served in the elephant hunt held villages in return for these services. The service tenure villages thus preserved amounted to approximately 9% of the total number of villages in Kotte.

(106) Other lands when held by missionaries paid quit rents. (AHU Caixa 10, 7.12.1632)

(107) T.Abeyasinghe, 121-126; AHU Caixa 4, 20.11.1615

This system encountered several difficulties in the period under consideration. The principal landholders, mostly Portuguese, though willing to pay the foros for the lands they held proved reluctant to maintain the militiamen as they were required to by the terms of their land grants. Moreover, the Sinhalese lascarins whose pay had been discontinued in the early seventeenth century, refused to pay foro for their lands until these payments were resumed. Thus up to about 1626 while the Portuguese settlers paid their quit rents and evaded the military obligations the Sinhalese lascarins served in war but
(108)
refused to pay land rents.

Despite specific orders by the king, the Portuguese administration never succeeded in forcing the casados to
(109)
maintain militiamen. In the case of lascarins however, a compromise settlement was reached in the time of de Sa. Up to 1626, though the Portuguese held land by grants for three
(110)
lives, the Sinhalese had held villages at pleasure. In that year both the captain-general de Sa and the vedor Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara recommended to the viceroy that land grants

(108) TT.LM.16.f.294; AHU Caixa 4, 15.11.1615; AHU Caixa 6, 13.11.1619; TT.LM.21.f.167; T.Abeyasinghe, 125-126; AHU Caixa 4, 2.1.1616; AHU Caixa 4, 20.11.1615

(109) TT.LM.16.f.237

(110) In the early years of Portuguese rule grants were sometimes made for two lives but after the first decade of the seventeenth century grants were always made for three. (TT.LM.26.f.658; TT.LM.21.f.351; DR.I, 384-385; AHU Caixa 4, 28.9.1615)

to Sinhalese should be made on the ^{same} terms as to the Portuguese. This meant that the native holder would now be able to nominate his child, brother, nephew or indeed any relative to hold the land on the same terms as he had done. In return for this security of tenure the lascarins had to pay quit rents for the lands they held. The viceroy-in-council having accepted these recommendations, they were implemented in Ceylon. The reaction of the lascarins themselves is unknown. However, as the advantages they acquired were of rather dubious value (for the security of their holdings despite all guarantees from Goa depended on the inclinations of their disavas and the captain-general) they may well have resented the payment of dues they had so far refused to pay. Later evidence indicates that the Portuguese found it difficult to collect land rents from the lascarins even in the 1630's.

Another development which had little effect on land revenue receipts but was important as far as the rights of the landholders and the position of the peasants were concerned, is known to have occurred in this period. This was the acquisition by the

(111) The right to raise the foro at the end of each 'life' was reserved by the administration but it was seldom exercised.

(112) BNL.FG.1983.ff.88-89; AHU Caixa 9, 6.2.1626; TT.LM.24, f.385; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.216v

(113) TT.LM.45.f.304v; TT.LM.16.f.580

landholder of the right to buy and sell land. It is clear that this right did not exist in the second decade of the seventeenth century. Indeed land sales were prohibited by royal decree. However when on 3 December 1611 the king decreed that all those who held land in Ceylon should reside in the island, he allowed a period of four months within which those (114) who did not wish to reside in Ceylon could sell their lands.

Nine years later the bishop of Cochin complained that the king's prohibition on the sale of villages was being violated (115) both with and without the viceroy's consent. By 1629 this practice had become so commonplace that the authorities both at Goa and Lisbon had accepted it. The king in a letter to the viceroy dated 25 March 1629 merely laid down the condition (116) that sales must be made only to persons living in the island.

As long as the unit bought and sold was the village, (117) the peasant or the pangukaraya was not directly affected. In Kotte the village was made up of the muttettu (or the holder's share) and pangus or portions of land held by individual cultivators. Some of the holders of the pangus were obliged to cultivate the village holder's muttettu and give him the total

(114) A.Garcia - Arquivo/relação da Goa, 122

(115) TT.LM.16.f.239; AHU Caixa 3, 31.3.1615; AHU Caixa 4, 7.9.1615; AHU 33.f.19

(116) TT.LM.26.f.298

(117) However there is little doubt that during the period of Portuguese rule, landholders Portuguese and Sinhalese alike, began to extract more from the peasants in violation of customary practice. De Sa acknowledges this as the principal reason for rebellions and discontentment. (TT.Colleccao de S.Vicente XIX.doc.274)

(118)

produce of the land so cultivated.

Thus changes in land holding at the village level had relatively marginal effects on the peasants. In the late 1620's however buying and selling pangus themselves had already got under way. To understand the economies of these transactions it is necessary to return to the picture of the Sinhalese village in Kotte. The original simple muttettu-pangu structure had in course of time being modified, chiefly due to successive partition of shares among successive generations. There had grown up by the seventeenth century, certain arrangements by which the rightful holder of a plot who did not wish to cultivate it could lease it to another for a fixed share of the produce. Ande and otu were two forms of such leasing. They were disadvantageous to the peasants in that while as a pangukaraya he gained the whole of the produce of his plot, as an ande or otu cultivator he gained only a part. Thus, such cultivation would be undertaken by the peasant only if he did not hold a pangu or if the ande and otu lands were so situated in relation to his pangu that he could cultivate it with little extra effort. In times of labour scarcity, as the Kotte peasant was not tied to the soil ande or otu land would be of little value. Much depended however on the fertility of the plot and the

share due to the actual holder of the land. Even in the early seventeenth century when many lands in some parts were abandoned by pangukarayas, in other areas considerable tracts were
(119)
cultivated under otu contracts.

The right to buy and sell pangus had existed since the sixteenth century. However in the disturbed years of the early
(120)
seventeenth century such sales were few. With the return of peace the demand for land apparently increased, perhaps due to the influx of refugees from the Kandyan highlands. Portuguese casados now found it profitable to buy pangus from existing holders and convert them into ande or otu lands.

By the 1630's therefore the Portuguese administration was faced with the result of its own policy in converting a system of land tenure based on service to one in which a cash payment was the nexus between the landholder and the government. There had been created not merely a market for land but also a small but growing class of landless peasants. The administration also found that even those aspects of service tenure which they wished to preserve - the service of the cinnamon peelers, elephants

(119) P.E.Pieris - The Ceylon littoral, 3-5,12,14,19,35; Knox 68-69; Ribeiro 32

Ande involves equal division of crop after certain dues have been separated. (Queyroz 1017)

Otu involved the payment by the cultivator to the landholder of either (a) a basket full of grain or one man's burden or (b) one third of the produce or (c) the amount sown in the field or one and a half or twice the amount.

H.W.Codrington - Ancient land tenure and revenue in Ceylon, 9

H.C.P.Bell - Report on the Kegalle district, 116

(120) At least two instances are recorded in the tombo of Vaz Freire. (P.E.Pieris - The Ceylon littoral, 34,82)

hunters and feeders, wood cutters (cortadores) and the bullock-cart men were all affected as they had begun selling their lands. The reaction of the Ceylon authorities was decisive. Dom Jorge de Almeida in 1634 ordered that all lands purchased from the above categories of service landholders be immediately restored to them. The process of breaking up the economy of Kotte was (121) proving economically disadvantageous to the Portuguese.

There is much less evidence as to land tenure and land revenue in Jaffna than in respect of Kotte. However it seems clear that the changes in Kotte in the first twenty years of Portuguese rule were to some extent duplicated in Jaffna. Portuguese settlers entered the ranks of the land holding class and the old system of land tenure was supplanted in many areas by the (122) holding of land on payment of quit rents to the crown. The substitution of quit rents in lieu of grain tax on land occurred chiefly in areas where the Portuguese settled and at the end of the Portuguese period it was the old grain tax and not the new (123) system of quit rents that survived. In one respect however the Portuguese revenue authorities in Jaffna set out to reap the

(121) Queyroz 1034; Evora CXVI/2-3.f.115v; The cortadores or woodcutters performed the important task of cutting a way through the jungle and of carrying munitions for the army.

(122) S.Arasaratnam - Trade and agricultural economy of the Tamils in Jaffna during the latter half of the seventeenth century. (In Tamil culture IX, 371-373) ^{Don'tella Ullramayana 1,}

(123) Filмотека LM.15.38/2-3; TT.LM.31.f.430

benefits of their experience in Kotte. The foro or quit rents for the lands of Kotte was only 12% of the assessed revenue. This left 88% for the landholder. This foro had been considered too low by the authorities in Lisbon but little could be done without arousing discontent once the lands had been granted and the quit rents fixed. In 1630 Lancarote de Seixas, captain-major of Jaffna suggested that henceforth the foro for lands in Jaffna should be fixed at from two thirds to three quarters of the total revenue. The viceroy the conde de Linhares, always on the alert for fresh sources of revenue, recommended the change to the king. Wiser counsels however prevailed in Lisbon. It was perhaps felt that the burden of the higher ~~burden~~ foro might be passed on to the peasant. Also perhaps it was felt that discontent in Jaffna might well provoke a rising akin to that of 1627, and this was a real danger with the Portuguese at war with Kandy. On 15 March 1634 the king wrote back requesting that no innovations be made in matters of land policy.

The land revenues of Jaffna in this period seem to have risen very rapidly. On conquest these could not have been more than three thousand five hundred pardãos a year. With the new tombo of Antão Vaz Freire increased assessments made the land revenue rise to seven thousand five hundred pardãos. The labours of Amaro Roiz raised the figures still further. By 1646 the figure

(124) AHU Caixa 2, 246

(125) AHU Caixa 10, 5.12.1627

(126)
 had come up to 10,720 pardãos. In Kotte due to the refusal of the lascarins to pay foro the land revenue at the commencement of this period remained at about four thousand seven hundred pardãos. It was estimated that had the lascarins paid their dues the total revenue would have amounted to twenty two thousand (127) pardãos. This target however was probably never reached. In the 1620's the land revenue from foros remained at around six thousand xerafins and the estimates of land revenue given by Antonio Bocarro in 1634 indicates that this amount had not been substantially increased. Even in taking into account the yield of the twelve villages specially reserved to meet the expenses of the army of conquest, the total land revenue in Kotte in (128) the 1630's was only about eighteen thousand pardãos.

THE PEARL FISHERY

Pearl/oysters were to be found along both the Indian and the Ceylon coasts of the Gulf of Mannar. They were found in concentrations sufficient to make a large scale fishery profitable only during certain years. Even in these years the ~~fishery~~ fishing had to be engaged in during the months of February, March and April.

(126) AHU 220.f.24v

(127) AHU Caixa 6, 13.11.1619; TT.LM.16.f.257; Ajuda 51-V-44. f.23v

(128) Filmoteca 19D 33/2-5; APO (New ed) tomo IV. ~~Part 2~~ Vol.I. Part 2, 401-402; Queyroz 729

to obtain the best results. Although fishing for pearls was periodic and seasonal the divers were kept occupied by fishing for chanks, a task which could be done throughout the year. Chanks were large shells used for making ornaments and drinking vessels. While the income derived by the administration from chank fishing was very minute, that from the pearl fishery, if and (129) when one was held was considerable.

The Portuguese interests in the pearl fishery dated from the 1540's when the Jesuits converted large numbers of fishermen and divers on the Thirunavelli coast of India. With the establishment of a base at Mannar interest changed to control. The Portuguese with their command over the seas and their influence over the divers were well placed to take over the fishing rights from the Nayak of Madura who had hitherto held them. In the sixteenth century the Portuguese who needed the ~~saxaparkakam~~ co-operation of the Nayak apparently came to an arrangement with him by which the Nayak obtained all the pearls brought up by a fixed number (130) of divers. With the conquest of Jaffna, however, the Portuguese

(129) S.Arasaratnam 146; S.Arunachalam -The history of the pearl fishery of the Tamil coast, 99; Ribeiro 71; Ajuda 51-V-34. f.126; Coimbra 459.ff.188,201

The reasons for the seasonal nature of the pearl fishing were probably the prevalence of monsoon winds during other parts of the year. The viceroy on 8 February 1635 wrote to the king stating that fishing for pearls was possible only in February-March or November- both inter-monsoonal periods.

(130) S.Arnachalam, 99,113-114

became by far the most powerful force in the region. By the 1630's the Portuguese held that the Nayak had no right at all to fish for pearls. This contention however was much more difficult to enforce off the Indian coast than that off Mannar, especially as the Portuguese officials could not always trust the Jesuits not to conspire with the divers and the Nayak of Madura to hoodwink the captain of Mannar. In 1634 and again in 1637 the Portuguese used armed vessels to patrol the coasts and prevent the Nayak
(131)
from fishing for pearls.

During the thirty years 1604-1634 no pearl fishery was held. It is not known whether this interval was in part due to the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Fishery Coast in 1608 and their absence from the area for the next dozen years, but the absence of a ~~fishery~~ fishery even after their return in 1621 indicates that the main reason may have been the lack of a
(132)
sufficient concentration of oysters. From 1634 to at least 1639
(133)
pearl fishing on a greater or lesser scale was carried on annually.

When held, the pearl fishery was highly complicated

(131) Filmoteca LM.19B.27/2-4; Simancas SP.1469.f.194; Coimbra, 459.ff.184,188,201; Coimbra 645.f.7; TT.LM.40.f.69; AHU Caixa 6, 1.12.1619

(132) Reimers 55; DR I.342; DR II.145; TT.LM.18.f.41
There is however no doubt that the prospect of renewed income from the pearl fishery was a factor that facilitated the return of the Jesuits. For an account of the expulsion and the return of the Jesuits see D.Ferrolí -The Jesuits in the Malabar I, 312-334

(133) Coimbra 459.ff.188,201; TT.LM.37.f.425
1636 was a possible exception.

venture. The decision whether or not to hold a fishery was made on the basis of a pilot survey carried out in September of the previous year. On the shores off Ceylon, the pilot survey was arranged by the factor of Mannar who sent out boats with half a dozen divers in each to check on likely locations. The oysters collected by these divers were taken back to Mannar to be examined for pearls and the result notified to the viceroy with an appropriate recommendation. On the Indian coast similar surveys were made by the Portuguese captain at Tuticorin. The real decision about holding the fishery was made ⁽¹³⁴⁾ on the spot for the viceroy at Goa had not the expertise to analyse the reasons that lay behind the recommendations sent to him.

Once the decision to hold the fishery was confirmed at Goa however, the viceroy appointed an official to administer the fishery. In the sixteenth century the captain of Mannar was often chosen for this task but this arrangement did not always prove satisfactory as many of the captains proved more interested in ⁽¹³⁵⁾ their own incomes than the king's. In 1636 the viceroy nominated Antonio da Fonseca Ozouro, already named as vedor of Ceylon to be in charge of the fishery and the supervision of the fishery thenceforth became an ex-officio task of the vedor. By the

(134) TT.LM.40.f.311v; TT.LM.37.f.410; Assentos II. 97-98
P.E.Pieris - The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 39

(135) S.Botelho- O tombo da estado da India, 245; AHU 282.f.25

regimentos of 1636 and 1639 issued by Viceroy Pero da Silva it was decreed that the vedor should journey personally to Mannar every year to perform this task. In case he was unable to do this he was required to send a personal nominee to act as his
(136)
representative.

In the month before the fishery at a place on the sea-shore near the oyster-bed, a whole series of temporary buildings were built under the general supervision of the captain of Mannar. These buildings were designed to serve as residences, shops, and storehouses. The vedor arrived just before the fishery started registered and ~~enumerated~~ the number of vessels and divers which were to take part. The fishing itself lasted for about two months after which the whole makeshift settlement was dismantled. For the duration of the fishery a few Portuguese armed vessels stood by to prevent a raid by pirates or adventurers. Soldiers from the garrison of
(137)
Jaffna provided a guard on shore.

(136) Assentos II. 94; TT.LM.42.f.9; TT.LM.45.f.361; Goa regimentos e instruccoes III. ff.2-8

The decision to leave the vedor permanently in charge of the fishery was taken in 1638 and the instructions to the effect were drafted in early 1639.

(137) S.Arunachalam 99; P.E.Pieris - The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 5, 39-40; Ribeiro 7072;

Ribeiro's estimate of three to five hundred vessels engaged in the fishery is an exaggeration. The actual number must have been around two hundred with about one ~~hundred~~ thousand five hundred divers.

Throughout the Portuguese period the pearl fishery was essentially based on private enterprise, organized, directed and supervised by government officials. The fishing boats were privately owned and the divers were paid by the owners of the boats with a share of the catch. However the Portuguese administration derived a large revenue from each pearl fishery. The first and most important source of revenue was the tax on the divers. According to the foral of Jaffna each individual Christian diver paid two and a half patacas or four and one sixth xerafins ~~pardaos~~ for the right to participate in the fishery. (138) Non-Christians paid double this amount. The income from this source had been around five thousand pardãos in the 1570's. (139) By the 1580's it had risen to six thousand four hundred pardãos. (140) Towards the end of our period it amounted to over seven thousand two hundred pardãos. (141) Next in importance was the bolça or dues paid by merchants for the right to buy and sell at the site of the temporary settlement during the duration of the fishery. The income from this source is difficult to estimate. In the 1590's it was reported to have yielded ^{one} thousand three hundred and seventy five pardãos. Queyroz estimates that it yielded

(138) P.E.Pieris - The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 42

(139) Studia IV, 263-264; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.37; D.Velho- Orçamento do estado da India, 125

(140) Panduronga S.S.Pissurlenca - Regimentos das fortalezas da India, 485

(141) Queyroz 1194

(142)
 two hundred and seventy three pardãos in the 1640's. A less
 important source was the rents of the shops built by the
 Portuguese at the settlement and the stamp duty on all goods
 sold in the area. The right of searching the beaches after
 the fishery for pearls, lost or forgotten, was also sold for
 (143) a small sum. Besides these revenues, which were all farmed out, (144)
 at the start of the fishery, the vedor collected other customary
 dues. For example the people of Kilakarai had to supply two
 pearls of five carats each and two others of (145) two carats each.
 The total revenue derived from the fishery varied from year to
 year but the average income which had hardly reached ~~ten~~ (146)
 thousand xerafins in the sixteenth century had risen to about
 twelve thousand by the 1630's.

If revenue was high, so were the expenses. The captain of
 Mannar successfully claimed a sum of three hundred pardãos
 for his pains. The vedor was paid and extra two hundred pardãos.
 This lavish payment of bonuses continued down to the payment
 of a sum of four xerafins to every soldier of the Jaffna

(142) Panduronga S.S. Pissurlenca - Regimentos das fortalezas da India, 485; Queyroz 1194

(143) The revenues estimated from these sources in the 1590's were 300,200 and 300 pardãos respectively. According to Queyroz these amounts had fallen to 70,40 and 20 pardãos by 1645-46.

Queyroz 1194; P.S.S. Pissurlencar, 480-485

(144) S. Arunachalam, 104

(145) P.S.S. Pissurlencar 371; P.E. Pieris - The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 42

(146) Evora CV/2-7.f.57v; AHU 500.f.57; Studia IV.263-264; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.37

garrison who served in guarding the fishery. The expenses rose so high that in the 1640's it became hardly worthwhile
(148)
to hold a fishery at all.

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE

During the period, 1617-1638 the accounts of the revenue and expenditure of Kotte were kept separate from those of Jaffna. In 1640 the king approved of a suggestion made by the viceroy that the revenues of Portuguese Ceylon should be considered as
(148)
a whole, but apparently no steps were taken to implement this measure for Fr. Fernao de Queyroz writing four decades later about the revenues of Portuguese Ceylon in 1645 gave separate
(149)
estimates for Jaffna and Kotte.

Portuguese sources so far traced give us estimates of the revenue of Kotte only at three points in our period - 1619, 1620
(150)
and 1634. These represent the accounts of the factor of Ceylon, an estimate by an unknown author and the figures of Antonio Bocarro respectively. However, for purposes of obtaining a balanced view, estimates for the years 1615 and 1645, which fall outside the

(147) P.E.Pieris - The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 43

(148) Filmoteca LM.21 8/2

(149) Queyroz 1192-1194

(150) TT.LM.16.f.258; Ajuda 51-V-44.f.23v; APO (new ed)
Tomo IV.Vol.II.Part I.400-403

(151)

scope of this work have been used here. Unfortunately none of the annual reports of revenue and expenditure which the vedor

(152)

of Ceylon was required to send to the king has ever come to light.

These would have been extremely useful in showing the annual variations in revenue and expenditure which we can only guess

at now. Estimates of expenditure are available only for the year

(153)

1634. However with the assistance of isolated scraps of

information from various documents it is possible to build up a

coherent if not complete picture of the finances of the

Portuguese administration in Kotte.

The average annual revenue the Portuguese obtained from Kotte in years of peace during the period 1618-1628 were as follows -

| | |
|--|------------------------|
| From the sale 1000 <u>bahars</u> of cinnamon | 30,000 <u>xerafins</u> |
|--|------------------------|

| | |
|---|-----------------------|
| the sale of 2250 <u>amunas</u> of areca | 9,000 <u>xerafins</u> |
|---|-----------------------|

| | |
|--|--|
| the sale of 37 elephants at 250 xerafins | |
|--|--|

| | |
|------|-----------------------|
| each | 9,250 <u>xerafins</u> |
|------|-----------------------|

(154)

| | |
|---|-----------------------|
| the sale of gems mined in the Two Korales | 1,000 <u>xerafins</u> |
|---|-----------------------|

(151) TT.LM.16.f.257; Queyroz 1192-1193

(152) A.Botelho de Souza I.31; TT.LM.26.f.256; TT.LM.22.ff.88-88v; APO VI.1219-1220; TT.LM.13.f.193; TT.LM.17.f.85; TT.LM.20.f.67; TT.LM.38.f.396v; TT.LM.16.f.355

(153) APO (new ed) Tomo IV.Part I.379-399

(154) In 1615 Vaz Freire estimated ~~the~~ the revenue from gems at 2850 xerafins. (T.Abeyasinghe 166) The actual proceeds of that year amounted to 2300 xerafins. (AHU Caixa 4,15.11.1615) In 1616 basing their forecast on the actual revenues of 1614 and 1615 Vaz Freire and Balthazar Marinho estimated the yielded to be 2500 xerafins annually. (TT.LM.16.f.258) These hopes however were not fulfilled in subsequent years. In the 1620's the annual revenue was about 1000 xerafins. (Ajuda 51-V-44.f.23v) In 1625 the vedor reported to the king that the income from gems was 400-600 xerafins, (TT.LM.23.f.253) but here the vedor was arguing a case for the sale of gems within Ceylon and may have underestimated the revenue.

| | | |
|---|-------------------------------|-------|
| port dues | 12,000 <u>xerafins</u> | (155) |
| quit rents on land | 4,700 <u>xerafins</u> | (156) |
| the coconut tax, fines and customs dues | 3,000 <u>xerafins</u> | |
| | <u>68,950 <u>xerafins</u></u> | |
| less the price paid for 1900 <u>amunas</u> | | |
| of areca | 2,533 <u>xerafins</u> | |
| | <u>66,417</u> | |
| less the cost of freight of 1000 <u>bahars</u> | | |
| of cinnamon -2000 <u>xerafins</u> + the cost of | | |
| mats and cord used to bundle cinnamon etc., | | |
| | 400 <u>xerafins</u> | (157) |
| | <u>2,400 <u>xerafins</u></u> | |
| | <u>64,017 <u>xerafins</u></u> | |
| The revenue obtained in times of peace in the next decade was much greater. | | |
| From the sale of 2000 <u>bahars</u> of cinnamon | 200,000 <u>xerafins</u> | |
| the sale of 2250 <u>amunas</u> of arecanut | 9,000 <u>xerafins</u> | |
| the sale of 37 elephants at 250 <u>xerafins</u> | | |
| each | 9,250 <u>xerafins</u> | |
| the the sale of gems mined in the | | |
| Two Korales | 500 <u>xerafins</u> | (158) |

(155) This estimate is from the accounts of the factor João da Costa Perestello in 1618-1619.

(156) Queyroz 729

(157) APO (New ed) Tomo IV.Part I.391; TT.LM.16.f.258;

The freight costa have been estimated at the rate of two xerafins a bahar.

| | | |
|--|-------------------------|-------|
| port dues | 8,500 <u>xerafins</u> | (159) |
| quit rents on land and revenues of | | |
| garden land held by crown | 6,000 <u>xerafins</u> | (160) |
| the twelve villages seperated to supply | | |
| the army of conquest | 13,333 <u>xerafins</u> | (161) |
| the coconut tax, fines and customary dues | 3,000 <u>xerafins</u> | (162) |
| | <hr/> | |
| | 249,583 <u>xerafins</u> | |
| less the price paid for 1,900 <u>amunas</u> of | | |
| areca | 2,533 <u>xerafins</u> | |
| | <hr/> | |
| | 247,750 <u>xerafins</u> | |

(158) IN 1634 according to Antonio Bocarro the revenue from gems was 300 xerafins. This seems an unusually low figure and may have been due to the disorganized state of the mining villages after the risings of 1630-1633. In 1644 the viceroy reported to the king that the revenues from gems was 1000-1300 xerafins a year.

(159) Bocarro's estimate of the port dues of Colombo, Negombo, Chilaw, Puttlam was 8,250 xerafins.

(160) Bocarro's estimate of foros in 1630 (APO New ed. Tomo IV. Part I. Vol. II. 401-402) was 5,528 xerafins. To this must be added the

| | |
|--|---------------------|
| 1/10 charged from the gardens and properties of Colombo | 101 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the revenue of two gardens held by the government | 203 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the revenue of the <u>gabada</u> villages of the Two Korales | 150 <u>xerafins</u> |

(161) The actual practice was that these villages supplied the rice for the army directly. The above estimate is that given by Bocarro.

(162) The dekum or customary ~~tax~~ annual gift and the marala or death duty both yielded 2336 xerafins in 1634. For further information on these sources of revenue see T. Abeyasinghe, 171-180

less the cost of freight and packing 2000 bahars

of cinnamon

4,800 xerafins

242,250 xerafins

The contrast in revenue between the 1620's and the 1630's however must be kept in perspective. The figures above represent merely the average receipt during a year of peace. The actual revenue in 1617 probably did not exceed 45,000 xerafins; that in 1628 was about 75,000 xerafins and that in 1629 over 100,000 xerafins.

Moreover, while the 1620's were mainly years in which peaceful conditions prevailed in Kotte, the early 1630's saw most of Kotte wrested from Portuguese control. Thus while the actual revenue collected in the period 1617-1629 probably averaged 60,000 xerafins, that in the period 1630-1638 could not have been much ~~more~~ over 150,000 xerafins a year. Even this increase, however, did not immediately result in increased means for the captain-general of Ceylon, for, from the early 1630's the conde de Linhares appropriated the total revenue from cinnamon giving the Ceylon government 30,000 xerafins in exchange. The local administration benefited from the extra revenue only after 1636 when the king in response to the protests of Diogo de Mello de Castro, captain-general of Ceylon, decreed that revenue from Ceylon sources could be used for the needs of other parts of the estado only after the needs of

(163)

the island had been satisfied.

The fixed annual expenditure of Kotte in this period

(164)

was as follows -

| | |
|---|----------------------|
| To the salary of the captain-general | 4000 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the interpreter (<u>lingua</u>) and the treasurer | |
| (<u>banaca</u>) of the captain-general | 90 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the subsistence allowance of thirty <u>lascarins</u> | |
| forming the captain-general's bodyguard | 480 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the captain of the captain-general's bodyguard- | |
| 4 measures of rice a day and 2 <u>xerafins</u> a month | |
| month | 66 <u>xerafins</u> |
| 4 torch bearer's for the captain-general - | |
| 2 measurers of rice a day+ one <u>xerafin</u> a month 5 xerafins | |
| as pay + 5 <u>xerafins</u> a year for oil to each | 115 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the rice supplied to the captain-general's | |
| residence at Malwana- sixty <u>candils</u> | 420 <u>xerafins</u> |
| (165) | |
| the salary of <u>vedor da fazenda</u> | 4000 <u>xerafins</u> |

(163) TT.LM.36.f.15v

(164) Figures have been reduced to the nearest xerafin. The cost of the rice allowance has been calculated on the basis of seven Ceylon xerafins a candil. This estimate is closer to the price levels in the 1620's than in the 1630's. On 6 November 1634 the writer of the fazenda reported the cost of rice at at 10-12½ xerafins a candil. The items of expenditure unless otherwise indicated have been taken from Antonio Bocarro's account of the Estado da India, 1634. (APO. New ed. Tomo IV. Part II. Vol. I. 380-399)

(165) Bocarro gives the vedor's salary as 2666 xerafins of Goa
Contd.,

| | |
|---|----------------------|
| the writer of the fazenda or revenue department | 740 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the salaries of the attendants of the <u>vedor</u> including a torch bearer, washerman and a parasol bearer | 380 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the purchase of paper for records - 14 reams at 8 <u>xerafins</u> each | 112 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the <u>aratchi</u> and 20 <u>lascarins</u> who formed the <u>vedor's</u> bodyguard - at $4\frac{1}{2}$ <u>larins</u> a month per <u>lascarin</u> and 9 <u>larins</u> a month for the <u>aratchi</u> | 396 <u>xerafins</u> |
| (166) the captain of Colombo | 2222 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the subsistence allowance of 30 <u>lascarins</u> and an (167) <u>aratchi</u> in the captain's bodyguard | 512 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the factor | 400 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the writer to the factory office | 100 <u>xerafins</u> |
| Bailiff of the customs/at Colombo (<u>Meirinho da</u> <u>fazenda e alfandega</u>) | 100 <u>xerafins</u> |

(165) Contd., which is about 2960 xerafins of Ceylon. A xerafin of Goa in the 1630's was approximately 333 reis. A Ceylon xerafin was worth 300 reis. Queyroz is not certain on the issue for he states on one occasion that the vedor's pay was over 3000 xerafins and on another that it was over 4000 xerafins. (Queyroz 1040, 1073) However two contemporary estimates made by persons in Ceylon agree that his salary was 4000 xerafins. (Ajuda 51-VIII-40. f.216; TT.LM.16.f.571)
 (166) TT.LM.19.f.6; TT.LM.21.f.103; Simancas SP.1530.f.130
 (167) The ten Portuguese retainers mentioned in a list of expenses in 1607 seem to have been discontinued. (T.Abeyasinghe 186)

| | |
|--|---|
| the subsistence allowance (<u>mantimento</u>) and the curry allowance(<u>conduto</u>) of the bailiff and the writer to the factory | 70 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the purchase of paper for the customs house | 50 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the customs officer (<u>contador da alfandega</u>) | 60 <u>xerafins</u> |
| 7 assistants at the customs office | 150 <u>xerafins</u> |
| pilot | 70 <u>xerafins</u> |
| constable | 100 <u>xerafins</u> |
| (168) the captain of Galle | 2000 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the writer to the factory at Galle, the bailiff (169) and his men | ²⁸⁰ 2000 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the captain of Chilaw | 200 <u>xerafins</u> |
| 10 <u>lascarins</u> at Chilaw at the rate of one Goa <u>xerafin</u> a month | 132 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the bailiff (<u>Meirinho</u>) and writer (<u>escrivão</u>) of Chilaw | 98 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the <u>kanakapulle</u> at Chilaw | 20 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the captain of Negombo | 440 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the captain of Puttalam (169) | 200 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the judge (<u>ouvidor</u>) | 400 <u>xerafins</u> |

(168) Given in estimates of 1607 quoted by T. Abeyasinghe 187. Absent from Bocarro's list.

(169) Bocarro gives the ouvidor's salary as 333 xerafins, 1 tanga and 40 reis which is about 370 xerafins of Ceylon. However in 1607 his salary was already 400 xerafins and the ouvidor received additional functions in 1621. His salary therefore could hardly have fallen.

| | | |
|--|-------|----------------------|
| | (170) | |
| 4 men who assisted the <u>ouvidor</u> | | 71 <u>xerafins</u> |
| | (171) | |
| the jail guard | | 48 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the bailiff (<u>meirinho</u>) of the conquest | | 58 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the expenses of the hospital | | 4000 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the cost of mats and ropes used to bundle | 1350 | |
| <u>bahars</u> of cinnamon and for clothes of the Kaffirs | 700 | <u>xerafins</u> |
| | (172) | |
| the rent of eight storehouses | | 384 <u>xerafins</u> |
| | (173) | |
| the manufacture of gunpowder at Malwana | | 200 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the manufacture and repair of arms at the iron works | | |
| at Malwana | | 1620 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the receiver (<u>recebedor</u>) of Negombo | | 70 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the <u>kanakapulle</u> of Negombo and four assistants | | 60 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the subsistence allowance of the receivers | | |
| (<u>recebedores</u>) of Chilaw and Puttalam | | 70 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the two <u>kanakapulles</u> who assisted the receivers | | |
| of Chilaw and Puttalam | | 48 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the sailors who man the vessels which transports | | |
| supplies up to Malwana | | 380 <u>xerafins</u> |

(170) A document dated 1607 states that there were six such assistants and they cost 250 xerafins. (T. Abeyasinghe, 187) In 1634 the ouvidor's retinue were paid 4 larins a month each.

(171) T. Abeyasinghe, 187

(172) This item may have appeared in the accounts of 1634 only because of the destruction of storehouses built by the vedor Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara in the 1620's.

(173) The absence of any estimate of the expenses of the gunpowder factory established by de Sa at Colombo is striking.

| | | |
|--|-------|------------------------|
| | (174) | |
| the captain-major-of-the-field | | 1000 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the rice supplied to the captain-major-of-the- | | |
| field to feed his staff | | 365 <u>xerafins</u> |
| | (175) | |
| the 18 captains at 200 <u>xerafins</u> each | | 3600 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the two quarterages (<u>quarteis</u>) for 600 soldiers | | |
| | (176) | |
| at 10 xerafins each a quarterage | | 12,000 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the curry allowance (<u>conduto</u>) for 600 soldiers | | |
| at 1 Goa <u>xerafin</u> a month | | 7,920 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the rice supplied to the six hundred soldiers at | | |
| 2 measures a day | | 12,000 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the rice supplied to 20 captains at 5 measures | | |
| a day | | 427 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the curry allowance for 20 captains at 3 <u>xerafins</u> | | |
| of Goa a month | | 792 <u>xerafins</u> |
| | (177) | |
| the salary for 280 Kaffirs at a <u>fanam</u> a day | | 1708 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the rice allowance for 280 Kaffirs at 2 measures | | |
| | (177) | |
| a day | | 2,800 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the five gunners at Colombo, Menikkadawara, | | |
| Malwana and Sabaragamuwa | | 250 <u>xerafins</u> |

(174) Bocarro's estimate is confirmed by the letter of appointment of Francisco Brito de Almeida appointed captain-major-of-the-field on 27 September 1626 and three other sources. (JCERAS XI.471; Simancas SP.1530.f.30v; AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644; Queyroz 104)

(175) Also in Queyroz 1036

(176) Each Portuguese soldier was paid in two instalments of two xerafins each a year. (i.e. 18 xerafins of Goa or 20 xerafins of Kotte in all) Queyroz 104; JCERAS XI. 471

(177) The Kaffir contingent in the Portuguese army appeared after 1631.

| | |
|---|------------------------|
| the allowance paid to the factor for special journeys | |
| made to pay the troops | 272 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the 3 <u>kanakapulles</u> and 2 measurers at Malwana, | |
| Menikkadawara and Sabaragamuwa | 173 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the two surgeons at Menikkadawara and Sabaragamuwa | 190 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the allowances paid to the missionaries | 3,970 <u>xerafins</u> |
| | <hr/> |
| | 73,146 <u>xerafins</u> |
| | <hr/> |

The lack of integration that characterized the accounting system in Portuguese Ceylon as seen in the separation of the estimates of Kotte from those of Jaffna could also be noticed within Jaffna itself. During the period 1618-1638 the estimates of revenue and expenditure of the kingdom of Jaffna proper were kept separate from those of the Mannar-Mantota area. The reason for this was mainly historical. The Portuguese who had held the island of Mannar since 1560 had by 1618 already organized a machinery under the factor of Mannar for purposes of collection of revenue and the disbursement of expenses. When Jaffna was conquered in 1619 a new factor was appointed to that Kingdom but the old system at Mannar was allowed to continue. For our purposes however the figures for the whole of the kingdom of Jaffna will be considered together.

Information on the revenues of Jaffna can be obtained at three points of time - at the time of conquest, in 1627

and finally in 1634. Filipe de Oliveira estimated that the revenue of Jaffna excluding Mannar and Mantota in the days
(178)
of the kings of Jaffna had been as follows -

18,665 xerafins in cash

851 $\frac{1}{4}$ candils of grain of which 178 $\frac{1}{2}$ were rice

Oil, betel, butter and milk

Customary gift of bananas twice a year

Elephants

The revenue collected at Mannar in 1619 probably amounted
~~to~~ to a thousand or a thousand five hundred xerafins.

The revenue actually obtained in the years 1619-1624 fell somewhat short of de Oliveira's figures. In the first year of conquest the total revenue collected was hardly 7,360 xerafins. In 1620 however the vedor, Lançarote de Seixas visited Jaffna and made a list of revenues to be collected. This list provided for an annual income of 16,400 xerafins in cash together with ten elephants a year as well as small quantities of cloth and grain. The 7% duty fixed for certain

(178) The whole of the revenue listed in the text did not accrue to the king of Jaffna. Even as early as the 1580's the king of Jaffna appears to have paid the Portuguese two elephants a year. By the terms of the settlement of 1591 the Portuguese obtained twelve elephants as well as the revenues of the provinces of Weligamam and Wadamaratchi. The latter was worth over 3000 xerafins. Between 1591 and 1618 the rulers of Jaffna also granted villages and islands to Portuguese soldiers and missionaries who did not pay any dues.

exports and imports brought in an extra sum of three hundred
(179)
and thirty six xerafins a year. These figures exclude the
revenues of Mannar and Mantota.

The visit of the vedor Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara
in 1624 brought further changes in the revenue structure.
Firstly, he commuted many of the traditional services for
(180)
payments in cash. Secondly, he imposed new taxes like the
(181)
stamp duty on cloth. De Freitas also imposed on certain
groups of people such as the slaves of the Hindu temples
and some of the elephants' hunters an obligation to pay
a fixed sum to the state. Finally, the sum paid to the state
by two of the privileged sections of the kingdom, the Portuguese
settlers and the missionaries, ¹⁶²³ were greatly augmented by
(182)
a close examination of their claims. The cash revenues of
Jaffna was thus raised to a sum exceeding 25,000 xerafins a
(183) (184)
year. They remained around this level till 1634. In the

(179) These figures are based on the accounts of Antonio Teneles,
the first factor of Jaffna for the period 1 October 1619 to
25 April 1624. (AHU Caixa 10, 25.2.1627)

(180) The increase in cash revenue by this means was almost
2000 xerafins.

(181) This duty was expected to yielded only some 166 xerafins at
the out set. It may have been imposed as a substitute for the
payment of dues in cloth made in the times of Tamil kings.

(182) These groups probably still retained the right to hold
without payment of dues, the land obtained from the Tamil kings
on these terms. This may well account for the absence of the
Jesuits from the list of those who paid dues. The payment of
800 xerafins by the Franciscans and 605 xerafins by the casados
as foro indicates the extent of the dispossession of the Tamil

(Contd.,)

next few years the holding of the pearl fishery raised revenues by about 50%.

Estimates of expenditure of Jaffna and Mannar are available within this period only for the year 1634. According to Antonio Bocarro the expenses of Jaffna in that year was 14,572 xerafins made up as follows -

| | | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------|-------|
| To the salaries of missionaries | 3,600 <u>xerafins</u> | |
| the expenses of Trincomalee | 1,876 <u>xerafins</u> | |
| the cost of the garrison of Jaffna | 6,932 <u>xerafins</u> | |
| ies | | |
| the salary of the captain-major and | | |
| other officials | 2,164 <u>xerafins</u> | |
| | <hr/> | (185) |
| | 14,572 <u>xerafins</u> | |

The expenses of Mannar in this time amounted to a further 12,000 xerafins, the principal items of expenditure being
(186)
as follows -

| | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|
| To the captain of the fort | 1333 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the factor | 333 <u>xerafins</u> |

(182) Contd.

landholders in the first six years of Portuguese rule in Jaffna.

(183) The list made by de Freitas gave an estimated revenue of about 26,415 xerafins. The actual revenue collected between 25 April 1624 and 22 April 1625 was only 23,050 xerafins according to the factor of Jaffna Manoel de Bairros.

(184) APO (New ed) Tomo IV. Part II. Vol. I. 418, 420

(185) Ibid 420-424 When first appointed the captain-major of Jaffna had an annual salary of 200 mil reis (approximately 740 xerafins) and an allowance of 100 xerafins for ten attendants. By 1634 his salary had risen to 1111 xerafins. (P.E. Pieris-

The kingdom of Jaffnapatam- 1; APO (new ed) Tomo IV. Part II. Vol. I. 417; Assentos II. 50)

(186) APO (New ed) Tomo IV. Part II. Vol. I. 363-365

| | |
|---|------------------------|
| the writer | 133 <u>xerafins</u> |
| other officials | 400 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the hospital | 360 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the 30 <u>lascarins</u> of the captain's | |
| guard | 360 <u>xerafins</u> |
| Doctor and official in charge of | |
| hospital | 168 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the twenty soldiers of the garrison | |
| at 9 <u>pardaos</u> a <u>quartel</u> and 2 | |
| <u>pardaos</u> a month as <u>mantimento</u> | 800 <u>xerafins</u> |
| 180 sailors to man the six ships that | |
| guard the east coast at 9 <u>pardaos</u> | |
| a <u>quartel</u> and two <u>pardaos</u> a month | |
| as <u>mantimento</u> | 7,200 <u>xerafins</u> |
| the priests and the five churches | |
| at Mantota | 500 <u>xerafins</u> |
| | <hr/> |
| | 11,587 <u>xerafins</u> |
| | <hr/> |

Thus after about 1625 the revenues of Jaffna alone were sufficient to cover the expenses of both Mannar and Jaffna. In the 1630's, as in Kotte, the financial situation improved dramatically. With the pearl fishery yielding a regular revenue and the revenues of Jaffna further raised by the efforts of Amaro Roiz and the new foral of 1645, Dom Filipe Mascarenhas estimated a combined surplus of 77,698 xerafins from Jaffna

(187)
and Mannar.

IN the 1620's for the first time in over a half
a century Ceylon ceased to be a financial burden on the
(188)
Estado da India. During the years 1621-1628 the Portuguese
administration in Ceylon both in Kotte and Jaffna was able to
cover all expenses with the revenue received from local
(189)
sources. The war with Kandy did lead to a deficit in the
next six years but after the peace treaty of 1634 the Portuguese
financial position improved considerably owing to the high
cinnamon priced which prevailed. Ceylon's incomes began to
be used for Portuguese projects elsewhere in Asia. The
Portuguese had at length solved the problem of the budgetary
deficit that had hampered their war effort against Kandy
for so long. But even by the late 1630's it was already too
late for the king of Kandy, despairing of any lasting
settlement with the Portuguese, had by then called in the Dutch.

(187) P.E.Pieris - The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 46-55
(188) AHU 500.ff.53-54v; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.38; Ajuda 51-
VIII-58.f.291v; T.Abeyasinghe 182-183,191
(189) Filmoteca Reis Vizinhos I. 7-8/5-1; TT.LM.24.f.24;
TT.LM.26.f.272

CHAPTER VII

If in 1616 the prospects of the temporal conquest of Ceylon seemed promising, those for the spiritual conquest seemed even more/so. In Kotte the Franciscan missionary activity which had slowly got under way after 1543, had spread more widely and rapidly after the lowlands came under the Portuguese control in the 1590's and was by now firmly established. The Jesuits who had entered the missionary field later in 1602, were though less numerous, as active. Two other religious orders, the Augustinians and the Dominicans (1) had also established footholds at Colombo. In the northern kingdom of Jaffna, missionary activity, though less extensive than in Kotte, had achieved comparable success. Most of the inhabitants of the island of Mannar, which had been controlled by the Portuguese since 1560, had already been converted to Catholicism before 1616 by the Jesuit missionaries. Missionary outposts had also been established in the mainland around Mantota. A church had existed in the Jaffna settlement itself since the expedition of Andre Furtado de Medonça[^] in 1591. Though the rate of conversion in northern Ceylon may have been checked in the early seventeenth century by the

(1) T. Abeyasinghe 192-203; P. da Trindade III. 158-160; T.L.M. 12.f.454

dispute between Dom Frey Andr  s de Santa Maria, bishop of Cochin and the Jesuits which eventually resulted in the expulsion of the latter from the Fishery Coast in 1608, the efforts of a volatile Franciscan friar Pedro Betancor continued (2) ensured the/propagation of Christianity in Jaffna and Mannar. Even in Kandy, at that time at war with the Portuguese, the pro-Catholic inclinations of the children of Kusumasana Devi ensured that Catholic priests were provided with a courteous welcome within the palace though they won few converts among (3) the nobility or the people.

In both Kotte and Jaffna, the religious developments of the years 1617-1619 proved critical. They set the pattern of missionary enterprise, success and failure for the decade to come. In Kotte the year 1617 initially saw a set back for the missionary effort. The rebellion of Nikapitiya Bandara had distinct religious overtones. The rebels sent a special detachment for the purpose of killing the Catholic priests at Mathiagama to whom had been assigned as servants, two of the Buddhists monks apprehended by the captain-general for

(2) Queyroz 242-243, 663-686; P.da Tr  nidade III.193-194; CALR V.32-40

(3) P.da Tr  nidade III.146 claims that there was a church in Kandy called Bom Jesus. Unfortunately there is no available contemporary estimate of the number of Christians in Ceylon in 1616. In 1606 there were 30,000 converts in Kotte. T.Abeyasinghe 202

preaching in public against the Portuguese and Christianity. Rebel forces had likewise made a point of destroying all churches and missionary stations established in the Jaffna interior, Jesuit and Franciscan alike. But the Buddhist religion in Ceylon was not very strongly structured and in so far as it had frequently leant upon the support of the ruler it was at this period betrayed, first by the Hindu zeal of Rajasinha and then by the political weakness of Kandy. Far more important than the short-term losses inflicted by Nikapitiya was the accord in 1617 by the king of Kandy with the Portuguese. This ensured that once the rebellions were over, the missionaries in Portuguese territory would be free from the fear of Kandyan incursions against outlying stations.

The sixteen twenties marked perhaps the most successful decade for the Catholic missionary effort in Kotte. Since the inception of Portuguese rule there had been several factors favouring the growth of Catholicism within the kingdom. Embracing the new religion brought with it preferential judicial treatment, for the penalties imposed on Christians were less
(4)
heavy than those imposed on others. Moreover Christianity brought

(4) T. Abeyasinghe 208 The broader aspects of the Catholic missionary policy and the 'sincerity' of the converts have not been examined here as they are well dealt with in T. Abeyasinghe 206-214.

with its tangible economic advantages. Christians were exempt from marala or a levy on the movable effects of each person on his death. More important, conversion to Catholicism was increasingly being regarded as a precondition of appointment to office and a recommendation from the local priest⁽⁵⁾ an essential requisite for the award of positions of trust.

In the 1620's these factors were strengthened by three major considerations. The Buddhists and Hindus of the land had been denied the facilities of public worship and of access to their monks and religious leaders. By the third decade of the seventeenth century a new generation which knew little about their forefathers' religion had grown up. Moreover long periods of residence ~~in~~ in Kotte had given some of the missionaries a better understanding of the customs, beliefs and attitudes of the local people and perhaps a better command of the local language and idiom. These certainly were an aid in making more effective the explanation of the new doctrine. Finally in the 1620's the missionary bodies had the vigorous support of the captain-general Constantino de Sa de Noronha, who like most Portuguese of the time regarded conversion to

(5) T. Abeyasinghe 208 ; DR II.136; Filmoteca - Livro dos provisoes e alvares a favour da Christandade, ff.27-39v
Evora GR Arm V-VI.14-5ff.108-109

(6)

Christianity as an index of loyalty to the Portuguese regime.

During this decade the Franciscans maintained the lead they had always held, both in the number of missionaries working in Kotte and in the number of converts made. By 1621 they had established forty five parish churches, most of them in the disava of Matara. Seven years later this number had increased to fifty four. The total number of Franciscans working in Kotte varied between forty five and forty seven friars. Normally ten of these resided at their headquarters in the convent of Sant^o Antonio at Colombo while the rest served in the parishes. The Franciscans like the other missionaries in Ceylon solved the problem of the shortage of parish priests by placing several parishes in the same neighbourhood under the same priest^s. In 1628 the Franciscans (7) had over sixty thousand converts to their charge. The Jesuit mission too maintained a steady if gradual growth, once the Seven Korales, the centre of their activity, was pacified in 1619. In that year there were only fifteen Jesuits in Kotte. A year later the number had risen to seventeen.

(6) TT.LM.45.f.303 A Jesuit report of 1641 points out that earlier^s the native had avoided confession as they feared that *they would* ~~will~~ be punished by the priest and also that they would die after making a confession. CALR IV.151

(7) P.da Trinitade III.111,115; Boudens 34-38 basing his estimate of P.da Trinitade III.135-146 and Queyrooz 714-719 estimates over 70,000 converts by November 1628. But Fr. Simao de Nazareth, provincial of the Franciscans estimated the number to be around 50,000 on 13 December 1629. Filmoteca LM13A.21-22/4-2

In 1627 there were eighteen Jesuits in the field. About half the number usually remained in the Jesuit College of Colombo while the rest served in outlying parishes. In 1620 the Jesuits made two hundred and fifty adult converts and the years that followed were marked with increasing success. By the late 1620's the total number of Christians in their charge must have been around ten thousand.⁽⁸⁾ This period also marked a great expansion in the work of the other two orders which had entered Kandy in the early seventeenth century - the Augustinians and Dominicans. By the end of 1623 the former had established five parish churches at Bentota,^{Hovana} Rambukkana, Dungaha and Attanagalla. Under the energetic direction of two successive ^{priors} ~~fratres~~ of the convent of Our Lady of Grace (Convento da Nossa Senhora da Graça), Agostinho da Graça and Joseph Madre de Deus, the Augustinians greatly extended their missionary activity, chiefly in the Four Korales. In 1628 the Augustinians claimed eight parish churches outside the walls of the Colombo fort. By 1630 this number had increased to twelve. The number of Augustinians at work in Kotte in the early 1620's was only eight but in 1630 there were at least twelve Augustinians under the new prior of the new convent, Fr. Manoel de Assumpção. The number of converts made by these

(8) CALR II.225-229,233-234; CALR III 29030

Augustinians is difficult to estimate. They themselves claimed a total of six hundred and fifty converts in 1628 alone. Their total flock could not have amounted to more than (9) a few thousands. The Dominicans, the last of the four religious orders to officially gain entry into Kotte, were hampered by the lack of resources and personnel. In August 1625 the conde de Vidiguera granted them permission to take charge of three parishes in Sabaragamuwa and the Two Korales. Six months later the viceroy entrusted a further three parishes in the same area to them. These grants were followed by another from Frey Luis de Brito, bishop of Cochin which awarded the Dominicans permission to establish a further six parishes in Sabaragamuwa. The Dominicans however had only six or seven missionaries in Ceylon in this period and constructed only six of the twelve parish churches they were expected to (10) build. Nevertheless by 1630 there were eighty two churches and almost 80,000 Christians in Kotte.

In Jaffna, the subjugation of the kingdom in 1619-1620 led to a rapid extension in the field of missionary activity. Hitherto, though missionaries preached within their the lands of the Tamil Hindu kings, ~~these~~ activities were

(9) Queyroz 720,1056; TT.MM.da Liv.731ff.404v,373-400,496
TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.245,381-381v; ENL FG 59.f.34

AHU Caixa 8, 15.1.1624; AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644

(10) Boudens 55-56; AHU 210.f.27v; AHU Caixa 10,10.9.1633
BNL FG. 177.ff.356-357; Filmoteca LM.16B.17/2;
Evora CV/2-6.ff.518-519

largely confined to the islands off Jaffna and the port and settlement of Jaffna itself. Moreover, though they had obtained considerable grants of land before 1619, these were sufficient to sustain only a handful of priests. In addition, Christianity had up to 1619 to compete on more or less equal terms with Hinduism which was the religion of the Tamil king and the majority of his subjects. With the conquest of Jaffna came the destruction of Hindu temples and the confiscation of temple lands. While Hinduism lost its secular support a large state missionary effort was organized with the active support and encouragement of the first captain-major of Jaffna. The first to take advantage of this situation were the Franciscans, who since the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Fishery Coast had been in charge of the Christians in Jaffna. The Franciscans available for the task of conversion were however deemed insufficient by Filipe de Oliveira, the captain-major who appealed through the provincial of the Jesuits on the Malabar coast for missionaries. The response was immediate. In 1622 Fr. Pero Rebello, a professor of theology at the College of Cochin was sent over and three other missionaries followed soon after. The reaction of the Franciscans to the decision to call in the Jesuits is unknown,

(11) See above chapter I. pages 46-47

(12) See CALR III. 118-120

but it is evident that once the Jesuits moved into Jaffna
 disputes did arise between them and the Franciscan frairs. (13)

In 1627 there were twenty four Franciscans and sixteen Jesuits
 working within the Jaffna peninsula. In 1629 the number of

Franciscans had risen to thirty. Apart from this there were

seven ^{Franciscans} Christians in charge of over ten thousand Christians
 (14)

in Mannar and Mantota. The total number of converts made
 in the 1620's in the Jaffna peninsula is ~~xxx~~ not easy to

determine. A contemporary Jesuit letter claims that in 1627

there were some forty one thousand Christians under Jesuit
 (15)

pastoral care in Jaffna. The Franciscans claimed to have made

fifty two thousand converts between 1624- and 1626 alone. (16)

The latter claim~~at~~ at least is probably an exaggeration for

in a letter to the king on 13 December 1629, Fr. Simão de Nazareth

provincial of the Franciscans, estimated the number of converts
 (17)

made by his order in Jaffna at a total of thirty thousand.

The missionary field in Jaffna in this period continued to

be monopolised by these two orders with the exception of a

lone Dominican who established a convent in Jaffna in the

(18)
 early 1620's.

(13) TT.LM.22.f.19

(14) TT.LM.23.f.93; Filmoteca LM.13A. 21-22/4-2; AHU Caixa 12,
 4.2.1637

(15) Queyroz 659; Boudens 49; P.da Trindade III.193
 CALR III. 129-130; CALR IV.95-96

(16) Boudens 43; Coimbra 459.f.116

(17) Filmoteca LM 13A.21-22/4-2

(18) By the 1640's the number of Dominicans had risen to two.

Fr. Luis Caceges - Historia de S.Domingos IV. 270; P.E.Pieris-
The kingdom of Jaffnapatam -28-29

Missionary success however was largely bound up with political power and Portuguese fortunes in the war against Kandy 1628-1634 had a close and direct relationship with the spread of Catholicism in both Kotte and Jaffna. In both areas, for short periods the success of Sinhalese arms served to end the run of Catholic triumphs. The first blow to the missionary effort came in Jaffna. In 1628 a Sinhalese army aided by many of the inhabitants of Jaffna forced the Portuguese to retire into Jaffna fort where they were hemmed in for two weeks. During this short period thirteen churches (19) were burnt to the ground and much church property was destroyed. The Sinhalese invasion of Jaffna in 1629 resulted in further uncertainty and insecurity. Though Jaffna remained quiet for the next three years and priests made tours of their parishes from their central base at Jaffna fort, missionary activity on the scale of the early 1620's does not seem to (20) have been resumed till 1632.

If disaster struck the missionary effort in Kotte later than it did in Jaffna, it struck with greater effect. In 1630-1631 for sixteen months Portuguese power was virtually confined to their forts on the coast. All external vestiges of Christianity, churches, crosses and the like were destroyed

(19) Simancas SP.1523.f.5

(20) See above chapter IV. Page 275.

by the triumphant Sinhalese forces. Many of the recent converts
 (21)
 returned to the faith of their forefathers. The gains of
 the past century seemed wiped out in a few days. With the
 return of peace with Kandy and of order in Portuguese territory,
 however the missionaries returned to the fray with undiminished
 vigour. In Kotte, sixty Franciscans were mobilised for work
 in the parished and by 1638 fifty six new churches had been
 (22)
 built. The Jesuits did not lag behind. In 1632 there were
 twenty three Jesuits in Kotte, nineteen of them engaged in
 (23)
 work in the parishes. The Dominicans not only reconstructed
 the six churches of their order that had been destroyed but
 built a further six in the period 1634-1638. The figure of
 (24)
 twelve missionaries the Dominicans had on the field was easily
 (25)
 surpassed by the Augustinians who had up to eighteen churches.
 By 1638 the number of Christians in Kotte would have neared
 the one hundred thousand mark. In Jaffna too, missionary
 activity returned to full strength after 1632. In 1634 twenty
 five Franciscans and fifteen Jesuits were working in the
 parished in the Jaffna peninsula while a further ten Franciscans
 attended to the spiritual needs of the Christians of Mannar

(21) P.da Trindade III.111 ; CALR II.230

(22) APO (New ed) Tomo IV.Vol.IPart II. 57; TT.LM.45.f.304

(23) CALR III.34-35

(24) Queyroz 720; Boudens 56; TT.LM.45.f.304; Coimbra 460
 ff.86-87v; TT.Md da Liv 674.f.288v; AHU Caixa 10, 10.9.1633

(25) APO (New ed) Tomo IV.Vol.IIPart I.59; Boudens 4 ;
 TT.LM.35.f.178; Don Peter -Studies in Ceylon church history, 117-126

and Mantota.⁽²⁶⁾ In 1634 the Franciscans alone claimed to have seventy one thousand native Christians in their charge in the Jaffna peninsula and the adjoining islands.⁽²⁷⁾ The Jesuits had well over thirty thousand converts in their hands in the 1630's while the inhabitants of Mannar under Franciscan guidance⁽²⁸⁾ formed another sizable group of Christians.

In terms of their original objectives, the conversion of the whole island, the Portuguese missionaries failed. Almost all the inhabitants of the Jaffna peninsula and the island of Mannar had been baptised by 1638. About half the inhabitants of Kotte were likewise converted but Buddhism and Hinduism remained strongly entrenched in the Vanni, the kingdom of Kandy and in some of the frontier districts⁽²⁹⁾ of Kotte itself. Nevertheless, even taking into account the amount of state support they obtained, in view of the difficulties they encountered as aliens dependant on an alien power, the achievement of the Catholic missionaries was a striking reflection of the zeal and enthusiasm they brought with them to their task.

(26) CALR III.34-35;

(27) Boudens 43

(28) APO (New ed) Tomo IV.Vol.II Part II.57 estimates that there were ten Franciscans in the Mannar-Mantota area.

CALR IV.155-156; TT.LM.38.f.97

(29) Even of those converted a majority were Christians only in name. (TT.LM.30.f.253) By the end of Portuguese rule there were 200,000-250,000 Catholics in Ceylon. (Queyroz 1059; Arasaratnam, 217)

Throughout the 1620's and 1630's all missionaries were under the overall supervision of the bishop of Cochin. With the growth of the number of missionaries and of Christians in Ceylon there gradually arose a realisation that the bishop of Cochin could not effectively exercise his duties in respect of the island without making regular visits to Ceylon. This, the bishop of Cochin found it difficult to do, owing to his duties in Cochin itself and the dangers of crossing the Gulf of Mannar at certain times of the year. The solution proposed was the establishment of a new bishopric/ in Ceylon. A bishop in Ceylon, besides ensuring greater ecclesiastical discipline might also provide a salutary check to the great powers of the captain-general, and ~~also~~ a useful source of reliable information on events in Ceylon. The proposal for a new bishopric in Ceylon was originally made as early as 1622 but was given little serious consideration till 1630 when the conde de Linhares, viceroy of India renewed the suggestion. He proposed that the bishop of Ceylon should also be in charge of the former see of Mailapor which the viceroy contended was within easy reach of Jaffna. This suggestion, having ~~being~~ been considered in the council at Lisbon, was referred to the conde de Vidiguera, the former viceroy for his opinion. The conde de Vidiguera not merely approved of the suggestion but amplified

the proposal suggesting that the new bishop should take with him sufficient secular clergy to take over all churches within twenty miles of Colombo thus releasing the monastic orders for the more difficult task of converting the frontier areas. Eventually however it was decided in Lisbon that the Christians of S.Thome had their individual problems which might not be adequately served by a bishop in Ceylon and the king therefore petitioned the pope for an entirely new bishopric. As this step would reduce the area of jurisdiction of the Cochin bishopric under which Ceylon had hitherto been placed it was decided to include the archbishopric of Cranganore in the new bishopric of Cochin. These suggestions however were not approved in time by the pope to have any effect (30) while the Portuguese held Ceylon.

One of the questions the new bishop was expected to resolve when appointed was that of the demarcation of parish boundaries and the delimiting of districts allocated to the four monastic orders. When the Jesuits entered Kotte, the

(30) Boudens 58; Evora GR Arm. Y-VI.14-5.pp.66; Filmoteca LM 17 22/4-5; Filmoteca LM 20 36/2; TT.LM.16.f.114; Filmoteca LM 19B 20/1; Filmoteca LM 14 18-19/4-3; TT.Ms da Convento da Graça, tomo 2E ff.387-391; Coimbra 460.f.34

the bishop of Cochin had decreed that they were to concentrate
(31)

on the Seven Korales. Similarly in the 1620's the Augustinians
were allocated the Four Korales and the Dominicans,

Sabaragamuwa while the Franciscans retained the largest

(32)
and most populous disava , that of Matara. These divisions

however were not rigidly enforced and each order sought to

gain especial privileges to encroach upon areas allocated

to others. The issue was further complicated by the allocation

of temple lands, regardless of their location, for the sustenance

of various religious orders. Thus, Jesuits and Augustinians

as well as Franciscans held land in Matara. The acquisition

of new territory by the Portuguese in Jaffna, Trincomalee and

(33)
Batticaloa led to even greater disputes among the clergy. At

length in 1628 the king ordered the viceroy to appoint responsible

persons authorized to make a summary settlement of all such

(34)
disputes.

The missionaries throughout the period 1618-1638 were
materially supported by the state. They were awarded, for each

(31) AHU Caixa 10, 7.12.1632; AHU Caixa 16, 12.1.1644;
Boudens 46; Queyroz 1055; T. Abeyasinghe 199; Ferrolli -
The Jesuits in Malabar Vol. I. 312

(32) Queyroz 1083; TT. Ms da Liv. 731. ff. 204, 206v

(33) Boudens 54; Reimers 52;

(34) Filmoteca LM 13A.4/1 ; ; P. da Trindade III.230

(34) TT. LM. 26. f. 406; TT. LM. 27. f. 82

member working in a parish either an annual grant termed ordinaria amounting to a hundred xerafins a year or lands yielding approximately the same revenue. The Franciscans in Kotte for instance received in 1629 an allowance in money amounting to five hundred xerafins a year. They also held lands which were worth 2050 xerafins a year according to the tombo of Vaz Freire. In addition they , like the other three orders received four candila of rice per year for their convent. This last grant was estimated as worth forty eight
(35)
xerafins a year. The missionaries as a rule preferred to hold land rather than ~~xxxxxxx~~ receive a payment in money. The value of land tended to rise gradually with rising/ prices, while grants in money remained fixed. For instance/ the Franciscans received an actual revenue of 2677 xerafins from their villages in 1621. Moreover possession of villages ensured a ready supply of unpaid labour for the construction of churches and similar functions. These advantages however were gained partly at the expense of the state which lost prospects of increased revenue and labour services. Perhaps this was why the king in 1615 ordered that/ all the land granted to religious bodies in Ceylon should be resumed and the missionaries
(36)
paid a fixed salary. Attempts to enforce this order by the
6

(35) AHU Caixa 7, 3.2.1621

(36) Simancas SP 1474.f.238v

the bishop of Cochin in 1619, the conde de Linhares in 1630 and viceroy Pero da Silva in 1638 were all checked by the effective lobbies these religious orders, particularly the (37) Jesuits, maintained both at Goa and Lisbon. In Jaffna however the policy of annual payments in money which had prevailed since its conquest continued till 1638.

The amounts disbursed by the state in the maintenance of missionaries may be roughly calculated as follows -

| | In cash | In land grants |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| Jaffna - 25 Franciscans | 25,00 <u>xerafins</u> | - |
| 16 Jesuits | 1600 <u>xerafins</u> | - |
| 1 Dominican | 100 <u>xerafins</u> | - |
| Mannar - 7 Franciscans | 700 <u>xerafins</u> | - |
| Trincomalee - | 100 <u>xerafins</u> | - |
| Batticaloa - | 100 <u>xerafins</u> | - |
| Kotte - Franciscans | 500 <u>xerafins</u> | 2050 <u>xerafins</u> (38) |

(37) TT.LM.12.f.404; TT.LM.16.f.734; AHU 35.f.40v; AHU Caixa 10, 7.12.1632; AHU Caixa 8, 24.2.1625; Queyroz 1054; BM Add.Mss 9853.f.157v; Simancas SP.1522.f.12v

(38) This was the value of the villages according to Vaz Freire's tombo. In 1621 they were actually worth 2677 xerafins, (AHU Caixa 7, 3.2.1621) or if we accept Queyroz, (1054) 3364 xerafins. A decade later according to Queroz their value had risen to 4200 xerafins and by 1638 to 5010 xerafins.

| | | |
|---|---------------------|---------------------------|
| Jesuits | 300 <u>xerafins</u> | 1445 <u>xerafins</u> (39) |
| Dominicans | 600 <u>xerafins</u> | 150 <u>xerafins</u> (40) |
| Augustinians | 500 <u>xerafins</u> | 140 <u>xerafins</u> |
| Sixteen <u>candils</u> of rice supplied to the four convents (41) at 12 <u>xerafins</u> a <u>candil</u> 192 <u>xerafins</u> | | |
| <hr/> | | <hr/> |
| 7192 <u>xerafins</u> | | 3795 <u>xerafins</u> |

The spiritual conquest of Ceylon had thus been allocated about eleven thousand xerafins a year, a little over ten percent of the total Portuguese expenditure in Ceylon.

(39) This represented the income of the villages held by the Jesuits in 1632 as given in the tombo. As the largest village held by them, Munneswaram (revenue = 770 xerafins) did not pay foro as it was a temple village the Jesuits paid only eighty xerafins as land rents. The actual revenue of the lands held by Jesuits was much greater than the estimate given above. On 30 October 1632 the junta resumed Munneswaram to be used as a source of rice to supply the army and gave the Jesuits twelve villages worth 878 xerafins a year in exchange. After payment of foro of one hundred five xerafins for the new villages this left the Jesuits theoretically in the same financial position. Throughout the 1620's and 1630's the Jesuits were clamouring for increased grants to support a greater number of missionaries in the Seven Korales. Sometime before 1638 the fixed cash payment was raised to four hundred xerafins.

TT.LM.38.f.101; TT.LM.45.f.304v; TT.LM.15.ff.361-361v, 368-369; AHU Caixa 10, 7.12.1632; AHU Caixa 7, 3.2.1621; TT Ms da Liv. 674.f.293v; TT.LM.61.f.76

(40) The Dominicans held Athuraliya, the Augustinians the three villages of Horana, Dunagaha and Rambukkana.

(41) If price is any indication, the rice supplied seems to have been of the best quality.

The Portuguese of the seventeenth century never discussed the expenditure on the propagation of religion solely in terms of political advantages. To them the temporal and spiritual conquest of the island was but two ~~aspects~~
(42)
essential aspects of the same enterprise. In the twentieth century however the question as to whether this expenditure could be justified even from a purely politico-military point of view appear relevant.

It is evident that Sinhalese and Tamil opposition to Portuguese rule stemmed in part from the policy of conversion. Apart from the desire to protect their traditional religious beliefs the Sinhalese had specific complaints against Catholic priests. A Christian burial cost three to four xerafins, a payment which many could ill-afford. The missionaries paid only half-price for all the provisions they bought from the peasants. The children who were forced to attend to church school were sometimes compelled to cultivate the church garden. The peasants were compelled to labour to build new churches and residences for priests with little or no payment. It is no surprise that the first

(42) This however did not prevent secular officials from delaying or even withholding the payments due to the missionaries in times when money was scarce.

Filmoteca LM 20. 36/-2-3; TT.LM.36.f.15v; TT.LM.21.f.223

targets for attack in case of a rebellion were the missionaries
 (43)
 and the churches.

In our period this disadvantage was partly counteracted by the partial success of the proselitising campaign itself. By 1618 substantial numbers of converts had been made in both Kotte and Jaffna. Though missionary activity continued to evoke opposition the Sinhalese and Tamils were now irrevocably divided into those who embraced the new faith and those who did not. Though many of the converts accepted Catholicism under political or economic pressure, the missionaries could henceforth rely on an increasing number of loyal Catholics, especially those of the second and third generations, particularly ^{at} these looked to priests for protection against
 (44)
 the more rapacious village holders. It was this element which greatly facilitated the conquest of Jaffna and played a vital part in alerting the Portuguese at Colombo after the battle of Randeniwela as well as in the defence of the city. We could also perhaps surmise that the few hundred Sinhalese lascarins who remained fighting for de Sa after his defeat were pretty certainly those who preferred their new religion

(43) JCERAS XIX 129; Evora GR Arm.V-VI 14-5ff.1290130; APO (new ed) Tomo IV Vol.II Part I. 377; Queyroz 1050-1052 Coimbra 460 ff.94-94v; TT.LM.31.f.627; TT.LM.36.f.423; Filmoteca LM 13A 60/1
 (44) TT.LM.27.f.114; TT.LM.28.f.274; P.da Trindade III. 163-165; Filmoteca LM13A.19/4-5

to the old. Furthermore the missionaries also served as army chaplains and apart from keeping up the morale of the soldiers often proved to be effective fighting men themselves.

From a secular point of view the missionaries proved their worth in other spheres. They were generally concerned with works of charity and played an important role in this respect through the Santa Casa da Misericórdia or the Holy House of Mercy, branches of which were established in Colombo (45) and Jaffna. They cared for the sick and ran the hospitals of (46) Colombo and Mannar. Finally, they established schools to teach the local people both at the parish level and at Colombo. At parish schools the students were taught only reading, writing and religion but Latin and theology were taught at the Jesuit (47) College of Colombo.

But if the missionaries were an asset to Portuguese political power, they derived even greater benefits from it. In Ceylon Catholicism established itself and survived in the first half of the seventeenth century only where Portuguese power could give it assistance and protection.

(45) TT.LM.46.f.33

(46) Queyroz 1041-1042; T.Abeyasinghe 217; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.37

(47) Detailed information on the Jesuit educational system is provided by Rev. W.L.A. Don Peter's thesis on 'The educational work of the Jesuits in Ceylon', London University, 1955.

Useful information on the educational activities of all four orders is given by Fr. S.G. Perera in Historical Sketches 76-82. The Franciscans prodded to action by Jesuit success planned three Colleges of higher education in Ceylon in 1615 but little eventually came of it. (AHU Caixa 4, 26.11.1616)

CONCLUSION

Luso-Kandyan relations remained the key factor in the political history of Ceylon throughout the period 1617-1638. The Portuguese had now fully established themselves as rulers of Kotte and in 1619 they brought the protectorate of Jaffna under direct rule. Kandy alone remained outside Portuguese control. The advantages to the Portuguese, of the conquest of Kandy were undeniable for it would have given them complete control over the whole island, ^{if} simplifying internal administration and defence against outside enemies. Nevertheless the numerous difficulties involved in a policy of conquest convinced many responsible officials that an accord with Kandy was the best way to surmount this problem.

A peaceful solution to the Kandyan problem depended on the grant to Kandy, of certain concessions. Kandyans had to be allowed to export their products freely, a step which ran counter to Portuguese efforts to obtain a monopoly control over the lucrative trade in cinnamon and elephants. Further a policy of conciliation would have involved a toning down of the harsh anti-Buddhist, anti-Hindu and anti-Muslim attitude of the Portuguese missionaries. The success of such a policy also rested upon certain political concessions. In the 1620's these included the abandonment of the project of fortifying Batticaloa and Trincomalee. In the 1630's it involved at least

a policy of rigid non-intervention in Kandyan internal affairs. As the Portuguese during this period never really abandoned hope of conquering Kandy, they were unwilling to fulfill these conditions, so that despite the treaties made to meet political and military exigencies, they did not come to any lasting settlement.

A military solution was likewise incapable of achievement. The Portuguese at Goa, who found it difficult to meet existing commitments could find little money, men or arms to aid the captain-general to prosecute a policy of conquest. Though from the 1620's Portuguese Ceylon yielded sufficient revenues to pay its way in years of peace, until after 1633 there was little surplus to spend on warlike preparations. Moreover, the captain-general in Ceylon had the difficult task of reconciling the various elements within Ceylon on whom he depended for military service and this he failed to do so. The policy of re-settlement of the lascarins which was designed to give them security and ensure their loyalty was foiled by casado opposition. Conflicts of interests also arose (1) among the Portuguese themselves - between soldados and casados. Finally, the Portuguese had their attention and energies increasingly diverted by the Dutch threat, both with regard to

(1) TT.LM.13.f.27; TT.LM.15.f.7; TT.LM.31.f.41

sea borne communications with Goa and the defence of the Portuguese possessions in the island itself. Within Ceylon, for example, the replacement of Azevedo's ring of mud forts on the Kandyan frontier by an outer ring of forts of stone and mortar on the coast, represents a notable diversion of effort from the Kandyan enterprise caused by the prospects of Dutch intervention.

However, if the Portuguese were distracted both by external problems and by divisions within their ranks so were their opponents, both Sinhalese and Tamils. The Portuguese recovered so quickly from a perilous situation in 1617 only because of Senerat's willingness to make common cause with them against Nikapitiya Bandara, who was seen as a rival for Sinhalese loyalty. In the 1630's one of Senerat's own sons, Vijayapala, Prince of Matale was engaged in secret correspondence with the Portuguese for an alliance against his own brother (2) Rajasinha. Moreover, the cultural and linguistic divide that separated the Sinhalese and the Tamils enabled the Portuguese to use the Sinhalese lascarins in Jaffna and to make use of Tamil troops in the garrisons of Trincomalee and Batticaloa.

The official Kandyan reaction to the permutations of

(2) P.E.Pieris - Prince Vijayapala of Matale, 3-6

Portuguese policy was largely determined by the character of the monarch. The gentle, scholarly Senerat sought peace whenever ~~possible~~ possible. The youthful, energetic Rajasinha was more warlike. He too, tried to secure a peaceful solution at first but when after 1634 it became clear that the Portuguese would let slip no opportunity of conquering Kandy, he determined to invite the Dutch to aid him in an all-out effort against the Portuguese. With the arrival of the Dutch the Portuguese conflict against the two allies became the dominant theme
(3)
of the day.

Portuguese reactions to Kandyan moves were likewise strongly influenced by the personal attitudes of leading figures. In the first instance, this meant the attitudes of the captain-general and perhaps of the vedor. But it is also clear from evidence that a considerable measure of detailed supervisory control over policies in Ceylon was exercised by the viceroy and council in Goa, whether in political, economic or religious matters. This is scarcely surprising when it is recalled that the ~~viceroy~~ governor Fernao de Albuquerque had himself served as captain of Colombo and that his son Jorge acted as captain-general, that the bishop of Cochin had spent two years in Ceylon reorganizing the ecclesiastical

(3) K.W.Goonewardane, XVIII

system in Ceylon a decade before he became viceroy or that in the days of the conde de Linhares his council contained the forceful and experienced ex-vedor Ambrásio de Freitas da Camara. There was some control from Portugal and Spain, but the officials there, handicapped in the main by lack of personal experience of the island problems, could exercise only a rather general supervision.

Within Ceylon the efficient working of the administrative system was marred by conflicts of jurisdiction between various officials, particularly between the vedor and the captain-general. Moreover, the personality of the men who occupied these posts was often as important as the powers attached to the posts themselves. Of the captains-general of the time Constantino de Sa stands out as the most interesting. As an able and energetic administrator, and a good commander in the field he was respected by all. His understanding of some of the problems faced by the Sinhalese won him a regard that no Portuguese general had ever gained. However, it is clear that he was by no means as upright as his son and biographer João Rodriguez de Sa^A de Menezes tries to make him out to be. He was perfectly capable of deception and

(4)

and subterfuge and of placing private profit before the interests

(5)

of the state. Of the other captains-general Diogo de Mello was the most effective, both in the military and the administrative spheres. De Mello had many of the qualities of de Sa but was much less willing to listen to advice and was certainly more impetuous. Of the rest, the mediocre and weak Don Nuno Alvares Perera, the self-centred Jorge de Albuquerque and the aged, tactless Jorge de Almeida should never have been appointed to the post. On the other hand, in Filipe de Oliveira the able but ruthless and bigoted captain-major of Jaffna the Portuguese found the ideal instrument for the execution of their policy in Jaffna.

The post of vedor too attracted men of ability, notably Lançarote de Seixas, Miguel Pinheiro Ravasco, Ambrásio de Freitas da Camara and Amaro Roiz. These and others continued the work of recording and collecting the revenues in the tradition of the first two vedores of Ceylon, Jorge Frolim de Almeida and Antão Vaz Freite. However, it was particularly in the revenue sphere that the Portuguese in the 1620's failed to make the best of their resources. The key to this was the

(4) One clear instance was his attempt to deceive Senerat as to the real purpose of the construction of the fort/ at Trincomalee.
 (5) See foot-note 68 of chapter II.

violation of the cinnamon monopoly. This practice, condoned by officials in both Goa and Ceylon, caused a loss which can be best gauged by comparing the revenues of the 1620's with those of the 1630's.

The two decades under consideration saw little innovation in administrative methods or missionary policy. Yet they are significant in that they represented the age when Portuguese customs and manners, the Portuguese language and the Catholic religion made their deepest imprint on the
(6)
island.

(6) Portuguese influence on female dress in the low-country was preserved till the nineteenth century and a Portuguese dialect was spoken in Ceylon till about the same time. Many Portuguese words have been absorbed into both Sinhalese and Tamil. Roman Catholics (mostly descendents of converts in Portuguese times) remained the largest Christian element in Ceylon.

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